The proposed military security program for Formosa is based on determinations by a military survey team from the Headquarters Commander in Chief of the Far East of material which would be required to give the Chinese Nationalist Army forces a capability of defending Formosa against any Communist attack, in conjunction with the United States Seventh Fleet, and properly maintaining the equipment furnished those forces in order that they may successfully perform their mission.

The detailed program consists of radio and radar, wire communications and miscellaneous equipment, tanks and combat vehicles, motor transport vehicles, small arms, machine guns, artillery, and fire control, small-arms ammunition, artillery ammunition, bombs, rockets, and miscellaneous items, some items of quartermaster supplies, miscellaneous supplies in the field of hospital and medical equipment, and steel bridges and compressors in the way of engineering equipment. Mr. GARY. What are the truck figures?

Colonel BURGESS. The truck figures: On hand, 1,000. No country production. We propose 3,239 in the fiscal year 1952 program. Total requirements are 8,000. Total assets, including the 1952 program, 5,900, leaving a net deficit of 2,100.

Now, this is off the record.

(Off the record discussion.)

Mr. WIGGLESWORTH. These items will all be made available in the course of the fiscal year 1952?

Colonel BURGESS. Calendar year 1952.

NAVY PROGRAM

Captain ASCHERFELD. Mr. Chairman, I hand the members of the committee a copy of the Navy fiscal year 1952 tentative program for the Republic of China, consisting of three pages.

The purpose of the program is to provide support for certain forces of the Chinese Nationalists.

(Off the record discussion.)

AIR FORCE PROGRAM

Colonel KLEIN. Mr. Chairman, in Formosa the Air Force program for the fiscal year 1952 is designed to provide the Chinese Nationalists an air force which can be really effective in furnishing protection for the island against a Communist invasion.

The personnel and the airfield sites are there and the spirit on the part of the personnel, but the status of the Chinese Air Force on Formosa presently is in a very poor state, and it is necessary that they have help in building up an effective fighting force. The organization and the status of training, both, are of very low order at the present time.

With the assistance and advice of the military advisory group, and upon arrival of military aid that we propose, there is every reason to believe that the Chinese Air Force can be rejuvenated into a real effective fighting force. It will be a very difficult uphill struggle.

But the strategic importance of Formosa is of such a nature that we must put forth every effort to guarantee that its security is not imperiled.

We believe that the MDAP, implemented by training assistance, will make it possible for the Nationalist air force to become a truly effective fighting force, and will enable it to function very effectively with the Army and Navy in guaranteeing the protection of the island. I would like to pass out copies of the proposed program for Formosa to the members of the committee. I will be glad to answer any questions you may have.

At this point I will go off the record. (Off the record discussion.)

INDOCHINA

Mr. GARY. The next is Indochina.

General OLMSTED. Yes. Communist inspired civil strife has torn the associated states since the close of World War II. The Viet Minh, with Chinese Communist arms and technical assistance, have made deep inroads into the territory and economy of the free and associated states of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. The French have spent much of their national defense budget and thousands of their best troops each year to stamp out communism in this area in order to lead the return of these states to an era of peace and prosperity.

The loss of Indochina to Communist control would gravely threaten the other mainland states of southeast Asia and Indonesia. In order to assist the French and free native states in a struggle, in which their proposition was rapidly deteriorating due to increasing Chinese Communist assistance, the United States commenced rendering military assistance in the spring of 1950. The assistance rendered was highly important in preventing the loss of the whole of the area in the late fall of 1950. As it was, the free forces were driven back to a tightly held perimeter around Tonkin. Now, French troops and the rapidly growing forces of the free native states are facing a new life and death struggle with the close of the rainy season. Extraordinary steps have been taken in the United States to again help our friends by speeding up deliveries of equipment of past approved programs, but additional equipment of the fiscal year 1952 program is also urgently required. United States aid at present is centered on arming the battalions being raised by the free states of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia. At this time battalions have been brought into being but additional units are planned for immediate use. It is a hopeful sign that the native states are fighting in an increasing degree for their own freedom. The United States is inherently allied with such expressions of freedom. However, France, which has been affording 70 percent of the expenses in connection with the military support of the native states as opposed to their 30 percent share and has maintained the flower of her troops in Indochina, cannot increase her contribution except at dire further sacrifice of the defense of the North Atlantic Treaty area. In fact, it is in the national interest of the United States to eventually facilitate, by increase in native forces strength, the return of French forces for the defense of free Europe.

The fiscal year 1952 program, although now found possibly inadequate to the requirements, will furnish vitally needed equipment for improving the defensive capability of both the French and native states' ground forces, will provide a numbr of small craft for river

operations in support of land operations and will afford a number of aircraft for bombing and troop airdrop operations.

I will now tell you, off the record, some of the strength they have and the estimate about their combat effectiveness.

(Off the record discussion.)

There is very little room for doubt but that the French forces engaged in combat are of top quality. It is a grievous thing that France is losing such a high number of her younger officers and her essential noncommissioned officers, and to that extent it creates a delaying effect upon the activation of any new units in metropolitan France.

Mr. COUDERT. The French conscripts are not allowed to be sent out of the continental area of France, are they?

General OLMSTED. The conscripts-that might be possible about Frenchmen. I do not think it applies, however, to the legionnaires and to the African contingent.

Mr. GARY. The legion is not a conscript army.

General OLMSTED. No; I think not.

The mission for Indochina is located at Saigon, which performs training as well as supply functions.

I think it important that we realize something of the strategic situation, the strategic value involved in this particular problem. If I may point out here on the map some of the points of importance. This is Indochina. This area is exposed to this side [indicating].

Throughout this area here [indicating] there is no organized Communist activity, except perhaps in this area [indicating]. That is one of the reasons for deciding to improve this area, because the main Communist supply line comes across here, and the assistance which we have given Irdochina, and which they are asking for, is to complete this program here [indicating].

This can also block the supply line across the China Sea [indicating]. The southern portion of this area produces rubber and rice, both of which are needed very badly. The loss of this area would of course expose the line to Thailand.

In addition to the possible rice and rubber production they have some important nonferrous metal products.

General DeLattre estimated the situation that as long as he can hold this area [indicating] it would protect this southeastern section [indicating]. He did impress upon us just what the war is in here [indicating], and the importance of maintaining this supply line in here [indicating].

One of the problems is developing an effective organization. With this area organized, his belief is that he can meet the situation. From this standpoint the national defense of this area is necessary to all of southeastern Asia.

The program of 1951 has been given priority above everything else except the forces fighting in Korea. It is anticipated that we will substantially complete deliveries in the 1951 program with this year, which is about 6 months ahead of our target date.

We expect also to expedite delivery in the 1952 program.

(Off the record discussion.)

General OLMSTED. You probably noticed in the papers within the past week the arrival of shipments of small arms, which the papers

said was sufficient for the initial equipping of some four native divisions. That is the beginning of the augmentation of this program.

The monsoon season ends there about this time of the year, and it is the best fighting weather for the next 6 months.

Mr. COUDERT. I was interested in your observation about the emergency air support suggested by General DeLattre. How far did the conversation get?

General OLMSTED. Simply an expression of his urgent desire and the reasons why, and an expression from our side that we would be glad to study the problem and communicate with him about it.

Mr. COUDERT. Was that the only suggestion from him, or from the French for American military participation?

General OLMSTED. Yes. There has been no desire expressed for any American ground troops or for combat participation or the American Navy.

I might say that he did start out by asking for that. What he asked us to supply were C-47's and C-119's; and when told that they could not be made available within the next 18 months, then this was his alternative thought.

I think he would much prefer to do it himself.

Mr. WIGGLESWORTH. Generally the program is for equipment of native forces?

General OLMSTED. The current program is almost all for native forces. The French are in pretty good shape and largely selfsustaining.

There undoubtedly will arise the question of combat expenditures, for ammunition, and we may be the only source of supply for these

weapons.

Mr. WIGGLESWORTH. You spoke of having headquarters at Saigon. What do you have there?

General OLMSTED. We have a relatively small mission-I think I can give you the exact number.

Mr. O'HARA. The total of the mission is 73 people. It is planned to increase that to 87 during this year.

Mr. WIGGLESWORTH. What is their function?

General OLMSTED. Their function is to aid in the training of the native forces and to supervise the receipt and distribution and the appropriate end-use of the United States military aid.

Mr. WIGGLESWORTH. The French do not take care of the native troops?

General OLMSTED. Of the French forces they do. We are helping them out with the native troops. That is particularly true about the type of equipment with which the French may not be as familiar as we are with our American equipment.

ARMY PROGRAM

Colonel BURGESS. I have presented the committee copies of the classified Indochina program proposed for the Army for fiscal year 1952 MDAP. It consists of 19 pages.

French arms and equipment are of mixed French, United States, British, and German origin.

Receipt of United States aid and of new equipment from France is remedying shortages in automotive and signal equipment and is

89249-51-pt. 8-10

increasing French firepower and superiority in heavy equipment. The shortages, however, have not yet been fully made up, nor has all the necessary equipment been provided for current plans for the expansion of the forces of the Associated States.

No munitions industry as such exists in Indochina, apart from reconditioning of equipment in French base ordnance depots, all equipment must come from French, United States, or other outside

sources.

The proposed program for Indochina will consist of matériel which cannot be provided by the French that would be required to increase the capability of the forces in being and the forces scheduled for activation in the French units and those of the Associated States, and to properly maintain the equipment furnished in order that they may properly perform their mission.

The proposed program consists of signal equipment, radios, telephones and communications equipment; ordnance, primarily combat and transport vehicles, weapons and ammunition; engineering equipment, such as compressors, cranes, tractors, and miscellaneous items. Quartermaster items consisting of tentage and miscellaneous; and medical supplies.

I believe that completes the presentation.

Mr. GARY. What about the truck figures?

Colonel BURGESS. The trucks for Indochina: on hand prior to MDAP, 5,000 (estimated).

Total production, none.

We are furnishing in the proposed program, 2,220. Total requirement, 17,500. Total assets, including the fiscal year 1952, MCAP about 14,060, leaving a net deficit of 3,440.

Mr. WIGGLESWORTH. Are any other nations contributing to the Indochina program?

Colonel BURGESS. Other than the French, I do not know of any. (Off the record discussion.)

NAVY PROGRAM

Mr. GARY. All right, Captain;

Captain ASCHERFELD. I hand the members of the committee a 6page Navy tentative fiscal year 1952 program. There will be noted on the first page a type of craft on lines 3, 4, and 5, with the total on line 8. There is another type described on lines 9, 10, and 11, with the total on line 14. There is another type beginning on line 15 with the total on line 20, and another type beginning on line 21 with the total cost on line 26.

On page 2 there are six different floating items with the cost of each. shown opposite.

On page 3 there is one item, aircraft, shown on line 11.

Mr. GARY. Page 3?

Captain ASCHERFELD. Line 11, page 3, with the total on line 19. Now, this is off the record from now on.

(Discussion off the record.)