could not be effective if the Indians retained the power to take an unlimited number of steelhead within the reservation. Pp. 173–177.

3. It appears that the state court complied with the mandate of Puyallup II, supra, at 48-49, and used a proper standard of conservation necessity in limiting the steelhead catch, where such limitation was based primarily on expert testimony for both parties. P. 177.

4. Although the Tribe properly resists the state courts' authority to order it to provide information with respect to the status of tribal members and the size of their catch, it may find that its members' interests are best served by voluntarily providing such information, bui the state courts on remand must continue to respect the Tribe's right to participate in the proceedings without treating such participation as qualifying the Tribe's right to claim sovereign immunity. P. 178. 86 Wash. 2d 664, 548 P. 2d 1058, vacated and remanded.

STEVENS, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which BURGER, C. J., and STEWART, WHITE, BLACKMUN, POWELL, and REHNQUIST, JJ., joined. BLACKMUN, J., filed a concurring opinion, post, p. 178. BRENNAN, J., filed an opinion dissenting in part, in which MARSHALL, J., joined, post, p. 179.

William H. Rodgers, Jr., argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the briefs was John Sennhauser.

Slade Gorton, Attorney General of Washington, argued the cause for respondent Department of Game of Washington. With him on the brief was Edward B. Mackie, Deputy Attorney General. Don S. Willner argued the cause and filed briefs for respondents Northwest Steelheaders Council of Trout Unlimited et al.

H. Bartow Farr III argued the cause for the United States as amicus curiae urging reversal. With him on the brief were Acting Solicitor General Friedman, Assistant Attorney General Taft, Edmund B. Clark, and George R. Hyde.*

*Joseph S. Fontana filed a brief for the National Tribal Chairmen's Assn. as amicus curiae urging reversal.

Briefs of amici curiae were filed by Mason D. Morisset, Alan C. Stay, and Michael Taylor for the Colville Indian Tribe et al.; and by Joseph T. Mijich for the Purse Seine Vessel Owners Assn. et al.

MR. JUSTICE STEVENS delivered the opinion of the Court. On April 8, 1975, after more than 12 years of litigation, including two decisions by this Court,' the Superior Court of the State of Washington for Pierce County entered a judgment against the Puyallup Tribe of Indians. That judgment recited that the court had jurisdiction to regulate the fishing activities of the Tribe both on and off its reservation, and limited the number of steelhead trout that members of the Tribe may catch with nets in the Puyallup River each year. The Tribe was directed to file a list of members authorized to exercise treaty fishing rights, and to report to the Washington State Department of Game, and to the court, the number of steelhead caught by its treaty fishermen each week. The judgment, with a slight modification, was affirmed by the Supreme Court of Washington, 86 Wash. 2d 664, 548 P. 2d 1058 (1976).

The Tribe, supported by the United States as amicus curiae, contends in this Court that the doctrine of sovereign immunity requires that the judgment be vacated, and that the state courts of Washington are without jurisdiction to regulate fishing activities on its reservation. The Tribe also argues that the limitation of the steelhead catch imposed by those courts is not, in any event, a necessary conservation measure. We hold that insofar as the claim of sovereign immunity is

1 In Puyallup Tribe v. Washington Game Dept., 391 U. S. 392 (Puyallup I), the Court held that Art. III of the Treaty of Medicine Creek, 10 Stat. 1133, did not foreclose reasonable state regulation, in the interest of conservation, of fishing by the Indians "in common with" fishing by others; the Court remanded the case to the state court to determine whether a total ban on net fishing was justified by the interest in conservation.

In Washington Game Dept. v. Puyallup Tribe, 414 U. S. 44 (Puyallup II), the Court held that a complete ban on net fishing for steelhead trout by the Indians was precluded by the treaty, and remanded for a determination of the number of catchable fish that should be apportioned to an Indian net fishery.

advanced on behalf of the Tribe, rather than the individual defendants, it is well founded, but we reject petitioner Tribe's other contentions.

I

The complaint as originally filed by respondent Department of Game of the State of Washington (hereafter respondent),2 named 41 individuals, including "John Doe and Jane Doe, members [of the Tribe],"3 as defendants. It alleged that the defendants, claiming to be immune from the State's conservation laws, were fishing extensively in the Puyallup River with set nets and drift nets in a manner which would virtually exterminate the anadromous fishery if not enjoined. Anadromous fish are those which spend most of their life in the open sea, but which return as adults to freshwater streams, such as the Puyallup River, to spawn. The steelhead is an anadromous fish. The prayer of the complaint sought a declaration that the defendants were bound to obey the State's conservation laws and an injunction against netting the runs of anadromous fish.

The trial court entered a temporary restraining order enjoining each of the defendants from netting fish in the Puyallup River, and directing that service be made on each defendant.

In response, a "Return on Temporary Restraining Order and Answer to Complaint" was filed by "the PUYALLUP TRIBE of INDIANS, by and through the Chairman of the Tribal Council, MR. JEROME MATHESON." App. in

2 Respondent regulates steelhead fishing in the State of Washington. The Washington Department of Fisheries was a coplaintiff with respondent in the original complaint by virtue of its responsibility for salmon fishing. After this Court's decision in Puyallup I, the Department of Fisheries amended its regulation to allow members of the Tribe to use a net fishery for salmon. No issue relating to salmon fishing remains in the case.

3 Three of the named individuals were further identified as tribal officers.

Puyallup I, O. T. 1967, No. 247, p. 8 (hereafter App. in Puyallup I). The return and answer used the term "tribe" in two senses, first as a collective synonym for the individual defendant-members, and also as referring to a sovereign Indian nation. It asserted an exclusive right to the fish in the Puyallup River, describing that right somewhat ambiguously as a "property right which belongs to the Tribe and is exercised by the Tribe members under the Treaty of Medicine Creek." Ibid. Therefore, while filed in the name of the Tribe, the return and answer was also tendered on behalf of the individual defendants.

Throughout this long litigation the Tribe has continued to participate in the dual capacity of a sovereign entity and as

I. e., "Answering Paragraph No. 1 these defendants being a tribe of Indians ..." App. in Puyallup I, p. 8; "the defendants have suffered numerous arrests, jailing and other indignities at the hands of the plaintiffs who knowingly and wilfully badger, abuse and degrade the defendants ...," id., at 9; "[t]hat the plaintiffs are recklessly using the power of the State of Washington to deprive the defendant [sic] and each of them of their means of making a livelihood . . .," id., at 10.

5 I. e., "this Tribe of Indians signed a treaty with the United States of America as a sovereign nation of Indians . . ."; "the Puyallup Tribe of Indians own the fish in the river...." Ibid.

6 The trial court so found: "Defendants answered and alleged that they were members of the Puyallup Tribe of Indians Id., at 31, Finding of Fact I.

7 The Tribe has been described several ways in the captions which have been filed over the years. In this Court this Term the Tribe has described itself as "Puyallup Tribe, Inc." The Washington Supreme Court has thrice noted that there is no such entity, see 86 Wash. 2d 664, 665 n. 1, 548 P. 2d 1058, 1062 n. 1 (1975). In Puyallup I the trial court held that the Tribe had ceased to exist; this holding was reversed by the Washington Supreme Court, 70 Wash. 2d 245, 252-253, 422 P. 2d 754, 758759 (1967). It has therefore been settled in this case that, whatever its correct name may be, the Tribe is still in existence and is clearly recognized as such by the United States.

In this Court Ramona Bennett is a copetitioner with the Tribe. She

a representative of its members who were individual defendants. The Tribe has repeatedly asserted its sovereign immunity from suit, arguing that neither it nor Congress has waived that immunity."

In Puyallup I, we addressed the problems of tribal immunity and state-court jurisdiction in a footnote:

"Petitioners in No. 247 argue that the Washington courts lacked jurisdiction to entertain an action against

appears in her capacity as chairwoman of the Puyallup Tribal Council. Accordingly, we treat this case as though the Tribe itself is the only petitioner in this Court and hereafter use the term "petitioner" to refer to the Tribe.

8 On a few occasions individual tribal members have been represented by attorneys who filed appearances in the Superior Court for Pierce County. On at least two occasions attorneys have filed appearances in the Washington Supreme Court in this capacity. No such appearance has been filed since the decision in Puyallup II in 1973. No appearance on behalf of an individual defendant was ever filed in this Court. Nor does the record reveal any instance of an objection to the Tribe's representation of the individual defendants. It is clear from the record that the major responsibility for the defense of the litigation has been assumed by the Tribe.

It has relied on Worcester v. Georgia, 6 Pet. 515, and United States v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 3C9 U. S. 506. Only twice in this litigation has petitioner failed to clearly raise the issue of its tribal sovereign immunity. The first time was in its first return and answer, supra, at 168169. The immunity issue was later presented to the trial court, however, and the court, in the course of concluding that the Puyallup Tribe had ceased to exist, held in its memorandum decision that "this argument about the tribe being a sovereign nation is without merit." App. in Puyallup I, p. 18. As already noted, n. 7, supra, the trial court's holding that the Tribe had ceased to exist was reversed by the Washington Supreme Court. Second, during the representation of the Tribe by the Solicitor General before this Court in Puyallup II, no mention was made of tribal sovereign immunity. Congress has not given the Solicitor General authority to waive the immunity of an Indian tribe. United States v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., supra, at 513; cf. Ford Motor Co. v. Dept. of Treasury of Indiana, 323 U. S. 459, 466–470.