think it safer to speak of contentment with the present state of the law as simply "apparent," under the rule that every man is to be presumed innocent until he is proved guilty. With this understanding I wish to make a few statements, which I believe to be easily within bounds. I. That in no civilized State in the world are the laws in such frightful disorder as in the State of New York. II. That nearly every action, brought under any statute which has been in existence twenty years or more, can be successfully defended by reason of some amendment or repeal hidden away in a corner of some subsequent statute and generally overlooked. III. That the opponents of the Civil Code - and for that matter, the advocates of the Civil Codemay be asked a dozen different questions on a dozen different parts of statutory law; and with an allowance of a week in which to answer each question, they will be unable, after twelve weeks have elapsed, to-construe the laws? Not at all, but simply to state what laws are in force. Attorneys often rely upon some unauthorized revision of the statutes, leaning upon a reed which, if not broken, is at least weak in places. It is less to be wondered at that legislatures occasionally do the same thing, and flattering themselves that they are amending or repealing portions of the Revised Statutes, merely fire a shot in the air, which hits nothing. I do not mean to condemn, in toto, unauthorized revisions. The work is generally well done. But the "reviser" who, in the time usually allowed for such a feat, attempts to pick his way through the wilderness of laws spread out on the statute books of this State, keeping to the right paths and making no missteps, has a task beside which the cleansing of the Augean stables was child's play. The chief thing to be desired is repeal, repeal, repeal. Why should one be forced to hold continual post-mortems on ancient statutes to determine whether they are really dead? If any Legislature, at the end of its session, in answer to the question "what have you to show as the result of your labors?" could answer 66 not one new law nor any amendment of an old law. Not one smallest scrap of that kind. But we have repealed some thousands of laws which cumbered the statute books "the members of that Legislature would, I think, deserve to be hailed benefactors of the people and to have statues erected in their honor. It may be thought that I have wandered some distance from the subject which I ought to have considered, viz., the advisability of adopting the proposed Civil Code. But all that I have said is, I think, pertinent, and for this reason: In the remarks of the opponents of the Code I have failed to find any clear recognition of the fact that our laws are in a state of chaos; but on the contrary, these gentlemen appear to be contented with the existing condition of affairs. For myself, I should be satisfied with a thorough revision of the statutes. This At would not, indeed reach those portions of the com- Of the coming of revision, however, I see no sign. There remains, then, simply the choice between the code and chaos; and I prefer the code. ROCHESTER, March 31, 1885. WE J. H. HOPKINS. REED ON THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS.* E noticed Mr. Reed's first volume on its appearance as a forerunner of the work, but postponed an extended discussion of it until the second and third should have been published. The three make an important contribution to our literature, and no one is likely to go over the field for years to come, if at all. If our estimate of the effect of the undertaking is correct, it is highly improbable that any other one man will examine the cases antedating Mr. Reed's treatise. Much more improbable is it that there will be a new writer, for whatever might be the ardor of a student with a fresh enthusiasm and a favorable aptitude, unrestrained by the need of his time for other employment, he would be deterred, as till the present no one has been, by the fact that he would thus enter into competition with a standard work. We think the book takes this rank. The first volume impressed us to a degree that forced a high encomium, and a second perusal has increased our respect and approval of it. The others we have gone over once. The three will live as a correct criticism and classification of all the learning on the subject. To the learned a sincere judgment of this kind means the praise that is most valuable; yet there is more to be said; by which we intend that the work has a literary excellence also, and that besides its shows a philosophic spirit of adjustment, of judicial comprehensiveness, accuracy and literary excellence it induction that rarely appears in modern text books. Fearne lost it in discussing Murray's opinion, brought to light by Perrin v. Blake, and smaller men than he have lost it oftener. Some of our writers, unhappily, have bad but little of it to lose. Mr. Reed turns from his enormous labor to manifest his sense of the vacillation and folly to which he is nowhere unjust, and of which a hasty reader might believe him unconscious, in a suggestion of statutory remedy, or in an allusion, as he progresses in the disentanglement of unreconcilable judgments, to a witticism like that of Judge Biddle when the court was stating the efficacy of instruments of writing. § 444. On the 21st of last June we quoted from his preface to illustrate the doctrine that codification cannot be fairly opposed by the argument that statutes give rise to discussion otherwise avoidable. We are not now on that subject, but we glance at it in finding evidence of ability here to do more than state what has been wrangled over, and to *A Treatise on the Statute of Frauds and other like enactments in force in the United States of America and in the British Empire. By Henry Reed, of the Philadelphia Bar. In three volumes. Kay & Brother, Philadelphia. extract the point of a mass of decisions. The book is the great aid to us because it not only embodies the cases, but also exposes the few dominant principles to which all the cases might be reduced, which,principles, as Mr. Reed thinks, might be now safely embodied in statutes, to guide us as substitutes for the gigantic bulk of the reports. General and broad rules may not be drawn from legislation or case law on subjects of business or governmental management, but the Statute of Frauds was an enactment in the sphere of morals, designed as a canon of jurisprudence as distinguished from government. It embodies an enduring principle. Mr. Reed's first chapter shows that before it the judicial mind was tending to the creation of limitations not much less effective than those of the statute, and certainly as effective as those which equity found in the statute when the chancellor chose to be lenient. This of course only means that the need for the statute was felt by the profession before it was provided. Sugden and Spence, as Mr. Reed shows in one of his later notes, thought this. The enactment accomplished at once the result that the judges would have assured after a slow progress in, presumably, a good many years. It was in one sense then, and we do not imply more than we say, a codification. The need for it was not a political need. It represents no conflict of material interests, marks no triumph of faction; it is without the channel of the selfish legislation of force. The statutes of laborers, of liveries, were partisan edicts. So charitable a system as the law of Amendment bore the traces of a struggle, and to-day suggests the commons' decorous rebuke of the man who built Westminster clock, and their sympathy for the man whose money, the vulgar believe, was taken to pay for it. The statutes for the Selling of Salmons and Eels, their Vessels, Packing, etc., touching Worsted Weavers of Yarmouth and Linn; concerning Peter-pence and Dispensation, were no more parcel of the jurisprudence of England than the statutes De Donis, Quia Emptores, Extenta Manerii, or 12 Car. 2, cap. 24. No one could ever think of making a philosophical system from them. The Statute of Frauds, on the other hand, is an expression of the ethical system that is mainly made up of principles that could not easily be formulated, and that appears on the statute book in so few laws that one can readily enumerate them. And Mr. Reed has made it clear, that as it was the fruit of an extended experience created by men who sat as judges, as in brief it was the expression of a doctrine gradually evolved, so after this lapse of time, the important judicial exceptions to it which have flourished in the sanction of many years are now ripe for similar concise legislative enactment. The work has been written successfully to show that courts have, when unfettered by authority, and the Legislature can, "formulate such rules that the only real occupation for a judicial tribunal will be the ascertainment of facts in the particular controversy." To find this in the work is to find all that one wants, so long as the legislation is not furnished. To produce this has demanded an effort of intellectual labor of the severest kind. The logic is inexorable, but the book is not severe, as too closely set together. The arrangement commences with the birth of the statute; involves its history and reputation, the extent of its sway, whether to Barbadoes, St. Kitts, Newfoundland, Maryland, etc.; how far the adoption of it, or its extension in any direction involved the acceptance of English decisions upon it; how it is to be applied, whether by the law of the forum or of the locus contractus, etc. The refinements drawn from cases of contracts made in one place and to be executed in another; made abroad to be performed in the forum; made in the forum to be performed abroad, are pa tiently marshalled and disposed of. Upon this there is erected the enormous superstructure of law, more or less applicable wherever a Statute of Frauds is known. The opening chapters, the third, fourth aud fifth, relating to guaranties, are in analysis and precision, and in the life and vigor due to the author's use of his own language in stating the cases, admirable in every way. The propositions which they involve are clearly stated and profusely illustrated; while the chapter on promises of administrators or executors closes with a table of conclusions. There are eight chapters upon the subject of the memorandum, and five upon trusts, equally remarkable for their literary proportion and their rational solution of the difficulties of conflicting authorities. As to method, the names of cases are mainly given in the notes, and instances of thorough citation of authority will be found in vol. 1, pp. 156, 190, 490; while for apt condensation we refer to note m to section 355; to note p to section 382; to note s to section 393. Sections 359, relating to the signing of the memorandum; 388, as to whether a delivery of deeds in escrow constitutes a memorandum; 407, discussing how far in the memorandum a designation or description of the parties as 66 vendor," trustee," 'representative," "proprietor," etc., will answer as substitute for a name; and 434, on the decisions of our State as to whether contemporaneous written contracts show a consideration are excellent. They do not stand alone. The appendix contains the statutes of England and the United States; and there is a table of cases filling 140 pages. In publisher's work the book is luxurious. MUNICIPAL CORPORATION-NEGLIGENCE-ICY SIDEWALK. SUPREME COURT OF ERROR OF CONNECTICUT. CLOUGHESSY V. CITY OF WATERBURY.* Where there is ice on a city sidewalk over which there is much travel in such condition as to be dangerous to travellers, and the city has ample notice of the fact, and can with reasonable expenditure make the walk safe, it is responsible for the consequences if the duty is neglected. ACTION for an injury from falling upon ice on a sidewalk in Waterbury, soon after 6 o'clock in the evening of December 30, 1880. The injury consisted of a bad fracture of the leg just above the ankle joint. Bank street is one of the principal business streets in Waterbury, and the sidewalks on both sides of the street were generally in good condition at the time of the accident, with the exception of the place where the accident occurred. The sidewalk at that place was in a dangerous condition at the time by reason of smooth ice upon it for nearly the entire width of the walk, which rendered it very slippery and dangerous. There was no structural defect in the walk, which was made of concrete, and is a hard and nearly level walk, from eight to ten feet in width,constructed with a little slope toward the street, but no more than is necessary to permit the water to flow off readily. Bank street at that point is very nearly level. There were no ridges of snow or ice on the walk where the accident occurred, and its dangerous condition was owing entirely to its being covered with glare and smooth ice, which had accumulated to the thickness of about one inch. The sidewalk in this locality had been in this smooth, slippery and dangerous condition for a number of weeks prior to the accident, and at the time of the accident there was no sand or other substance upon the walk to make it more safe for travel, but it had been per *To appear in 51 Conn. Reports. mitted by the defendant to remain in this slippery and dangerous condition. Some sand was sprinkled upon the walk the day after the accident. The weather was intensely cold at the time, the thermometer at its highest point on the day of the accident being only five degrees above zero, and ranging from five to twelve degrees below zero at the coldest part of the day. The city at the time of the accident, with a little care and attention to the walk in question could have made it safe for travel. The ice had been cleared off above and below the place of the accident by the adjoining proprietors, but at this point had negligently been suffered to remain. The plaintiff did not know of the slippery condition of the walk. He came out of a dark alley-way near by, and while in the exercise of reasonable care, fell after he had taken a step or two on the walk. The street and sidewalk were lighted at the time by lights shining from the store windows upon that side of Bank street. No notice or complaint of the slippery and dangerous condition of the sidewalk had been made to any officer of the city, or to the owner or occupants of the adjoining premises, before the accident. The plaintiff recovered a verdict of $1,300, and defendant appealed. S. W. Kellogg and G. E. Terry, for appellant. J. O'Neil (with him M. Myers), for appellee. LOOMIS, J. In Stanton v. Springfield, 12 Allen, 566, it was held that the mere fact that a highway is slippery from ice upon it, so that a person may be liable to slip and fall upon it while using ordinary care, if the way is properly constructed, and there is no such accumulation of ice and snow as to constitute an obstruction, and nothing in the construction or shape of the way which occasions any special liability to the formation or accumulation of ice upon it, it is not a defect or want of repair which will authorize a jury to find that it is not safe or convenient for travellers within the meaning of the statute. Hoar, J., in giving the reasons, said: "If a city was made liable for this cause it would have to be extended also to country roads, and the same rule would apply to pavements or roads made slippery for horses by snow or ice, or even by rain. *** It could never have been intended by the Legislature to impose upon towns and cities of the Commonwealth a responsibility so extensive, or that the phrase 'safe and convenient for travellers' should receive such an interpretation. It would require of all towns an examination of all their roads so incessant and minute, and the application of an efficient remedy would be so laborious and expensive that it would be manifestly unreasonable to require or expect it. The freezing mist of a single night may glare over the whole territory of a town. The formation of thin but slippery ice in our climate is an effect which may be so sudden and extensive, and which may continue or be renewed for such a length of time that it would be extremely difficult, if not impossible, for towns to make adequate provisions against it." Notwithstanding this powerful presentation of objections, we think the principles heretofore accepted by this court will render the reasoning inapplicable in this State so far as the case at bar is concerned. In Congdon v. City of Norwich, 37 Coun. 419, Seymour, J., in giving the opinion of the court, says: "When an ice storm covers the entire surface of the earth with ice, the public authorities cannot be expected to scatter sand and ashes upon all places of public travel within their limits, * * * but it has become familiar law in Connecticut that some duty in regard to snow and ice devolves upon cities and towns. Accumulation of snow and ice may produce such a condition of the road as to cause it to be dangerous and defective, and in each particular case of alleged defect from such cause the question will depend upon an inquiry of fact whether under all the circumstances of the case the road was in a reasonably safe condition, and whether those who were bound to keep the road in repair are justly chargeable with negligence and want of reasonable care in relation to it." If the Massachusetts court could have accepted the distinction above mentioned it is obvious the reasoning referred to would lose all its force. The argument of the learned counsel may be summarized thus: If a city is liable in respect to any smooth ice it is liable for all, and if liable for all it is a burden too heavy to be borne; there is practically no power to perform it, and where there is no power to do, there is no duty to be done. We hold, on the contrary, that if ice is found on the sidewalks to a limited extent, in a dangerous condition, whether smooth or otherwise, and the city has ample notice of the fact, and can with reasonable expenditure make the passage safe for travel, it ought to do it, and is responsible for the consequences if the duty is neglected. But if a sudden ice storm covers all the territory of a town it would be impracticable to apply the remedy, and it would be considered aud treated as would an extraordinary inundation of its streets by a flood. But it may be suggested that we overlook the logic of the Massachusetts court, which is, that to make a city liable the street must be found defective, and if a small amount of ice existing for a long time is a defect, so is a large amount, coming however suddenly. But it should be borne in mind that the existence of a defect in the street is but one fact among several, all of which are indispensable to impose a liability for au injury caused by such defect upon the city. The latter must be found guilty of some negligence or want of reasonable care in regard to the matter. A defect may exist, and yet the city or town may not be liable for the injury occasioned by it. To determine this question all the circumstances must be considered. The decision of the case at bar must be understood to refer only to the particular circumstances found by the court, namely, that the place of injury was on one of the principal business streets of the city; that the sidewalks on both sides of that street were in good condition, except at the precise place of the accident, which was very dangerous by reason of glare, smooth ice; that it had been in this same condition for a number of weeks prior to the accident, and that no sand or other substance had been put upon the ice to make it more safe, as might easily have been done, but it had been permitted by the defendant during all this time to remain in the same slippery and dangerous condition; and that the plaintiff, while in the exercise of ordinary care, slipped and fell upon the ice, and was thereby injured. Our decision is that under such circumstances we cannot say that the court below erred in finding the defendant liable, and this decision we regard as in harmony with all previous decisions by this court, and as logically required by the principles heretofore accepted by the court. [See 47 Am. Rep. 744.] No error. DECEIT FALSE REPRESENTATIONS AS TO AP MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT. BOURN V. DAVIS.* False and fraudulent representations by the vendor to the vendee concerning the appraisal of the property by ap *S. C., 76 Me. 223. praisers appointed by the Probate Court as to the value placed upon it by the appraisers, are not sufficient to sustain an action of the case for deceit in the sale or exchange of property. ON exceptions from Superior Court. The case and material facts are sufficiently stated in the opinion. John H. Potter and George J. Moody, for plaintiff. Bean & Bean, for defendant. SYMONDS, J. Case for deceit alleged to have been practiced by the defendants in effecting an exchange of real estate with the plaintiff. One of the allegations of fraud relied upon at the trial was that the defendants said the place in Belfast which they exchanged with the plaintiff for her farm in Fayette, was valued by the appraisers upon the estate of Lydia A. Hollis, mother of the defendant, Grace U.Davis, at $1,000, when in fact the appraisal was only $225. In this respect the jury were directed by the presiding judge that if the defendants stated 'as a matter of fact that the appraisal had been made by the official appraisers, under their oaths, in performing their official duty under the laws of this State, and that statement was false (and there is no dispute, I believe, about the fact that the appraisal was $225 instead of $1,000), and was known by them to be false at the time, and was made for the purpose of deceiving the plaintiff, and as an inducement to her to make the exchange, and she did rely upon it, and was thereby induced to make the exchange," it was a fraudulent misrepresentation, which would give the plaintiff a right of action to recover the damages which she sustained thereby. The ruling appears to have been a pro forma one, and the verdict being for the plaintiff, the question of its correctness is reserved upon exceptions by the defendants. 80 It is the general rule, at least in Massachusetts and Maine, that an action of tort for deceit in the sale of property does not lie for false and fraudulent representations by the vendor to the vendee concerning its cost or value, or the prices which have been offered or paid for it. Long v. Woodman, 58 Me. 52; Holbrook v. Connor, 60 id. 578; Martin v. Jordan, id. 531; Bishop v. Small, 63 id. 12. "When a vendor of real estate affirms to the vendee that his estate is worth much; that he gave so much for it; that he has been offered so much for it, or has refused such a sum for it, such assertions, though known by him to be false, and though uttered with a view to deceive, are not actionable." Medbury v. Watson, 6 Metc. 259; Gordon v. Parmelee, 2 Allen, 212; Hemmer v. Cooper, 8 id. 334; Mooney v. Miller, 102 Mass. 220; Cooper v. Lovering, 106 id. 78; Parker v. Moulton, 114 id. 99; Poland v. Brownell, 131 id. 138; Puge v. Parker, 43 N. H. 368. With this rule established, it is difficult to see how a distinction can be drawn so as to hold a false statement about an appraisal of property actionable, when proof of similar misrepresentations in regard to prices offered or actually paid for it would fail to support the action. It will be observed that in this case the false affirmations alleged are by the vendor to the vendee, personally or by agent, not as in Medbury v. Watson, supra, by a third person, who stands "in the light of a friend who has no motive nor intention to depart from the truth, and who thus throws the vendee off his guard and exposes him to be misled by the deceitful representations." This is the distinction drawn in that case between misstatements of this class by the vendor and the same by a person who assumes to be disinterested, not between misrepresentations by the vendor on the one hand as to what he himself had paid, and on the other as to what had been paid by third persons, as the dicta in Manning v. Albee, 11 Allen, 522, and Belcher v. Costello, 122 Mass. 190, would seem to imply. We can see no difference in legal effect between a misrepresentation by the vendor in regard to the price which he paid and one by him in regard to the price paid by other persons. The case of Medbury v. Watson draws no such distinction, and the other cases cited only purport to follow that. In this respect then the misrepresentations as to the appraisal stand upon the same footing as that class of affirmations of cost and value which the authorities hold are not material. They were made by vendor to vendee. The ruling so regards them. In another respect they are even less dangerous to a vendee in the exercise of common diligence; the proceedings of appraisers upon estate being matters of public record, and therefore open to the inspection of all persons interested. Notwithstanding the official character of the action of the appraisers, it still expresses only the judgment of individuals as to the values of property. and from the time of Harvey v. Young, Yelv. 21 a, it has been held as a general rule that mere affirmations of value between vendor and vendee are not actionable, though false; "for it was but the defendant's bare assertion that the team was worth so much, and it was the plaintiff's folly to give credit to such assertion." The extension of this rule to false statements about prices paid or offered seems to include its application to fraudulent representations, such as appear in this case, about an appraisal of property. In Buxton v. Lister, 3 Atk. 385, a decree for the specific performance of an agreement to buy timber trees was resisted on the ground that the plaintiff had procured the contract by representing that two timber merchants had valued the trees at £3,500, when in fact their valuation was only £2,500. Lord Hardwicke held that this, if proved, was good ground for refusing to decree specific performance, for such a decree is in the discretion of the court, and should be entered only when the agreement is certain, fair and just in all its parts. This case is cited in 2 Kent Comm. 487, as illustrating the greater strictness of the rule in this respect in equity than at law, and also as showing that in equity there is a distinction between enforcing specifically and rescinding a contract. It does not follow that a contract of sale is void in law merely because equity will not decree a specific performance." Under the principle which the decisions in this State have established, we think that proof of the fraudu lent representations alleged in regard to the appraisal of property was not sufficient to sustain the action. Exceptions sustained. Peters, C. J., Barrows, Danforth, Virgin and Libbey, JJ., concurred. cream of the same, or shall sell, or offer for sale, the same as an article of food." Held, that said section prohibited, absolutely, the manufacture and sale, as therein specified. of any article designed to take the place of butter or cheese, without regard to whether or not it was manufactured or sold with, an intent to deceive. That the Legislature had power to pass the act by virtue of A 202 of the Laws of 1884. James Troy, for defendant. ment by the adoption of the Constitution of the United States, in which they delegated to the national government certain enumerated powers. Then the people of each State established State governments and invested the same with all the power which they did not expressly withhold; so that the powers of the general government are definite and restricted, while the powers of the State governments are general and residuary, and all power not conferred on the general government belongs to the State governments or to the people. The State governments exercise all the powers of sovereignty not conferred on the national government, so far as the people permit them to be exercised at all. Without constitutional limitations the power of the Legislature to make laws would be absolute, because the law-making power is intrusted by the people to the legislative branch of the State government. Whether a statute is constitutional or not is a question of power, and if that question be au James W. Ridgway, district attorney, for people. DYKMAN, J. The Legislature of this State has enacted a law with a title at its head indicative of a pur-swered in the affirmative the courts can institute no pose to prevent deception in sales of dairy products in this State. Ch. 202, Laws of 1884. Section 6 of this law has in it these words: "No person shall manufacture out of any oleaginous substance or substances, or any compound of the same, other than that pro-quisite evidence to justify the same. But the people duced from unadulterated milk or of cream from the same, any article designed to take the place of butter or cheese produced from pure unadulterated milk, or cream of the same, or shall sell, or offer for sale, the same as an article of food." Then the same section specifies the punishment for its violation. This defendant has been convicted of a misdemeanor for violation of this section of the law, on proof that he manufactures what is called oleomargarine from an oleaginous substance other than that produced from milk or cream, namely, animal oil extracted from the tallow of beef; that this article is manufactured for sale as a substitute for butter; that it resembles butter so much in appearance and taste that it might be taken for butter by any ordinary person, and that it was designed by the defendant to take the place of butter as an article of food and a substitute therefor. He however manufactures it as and calls it oleomargarine, and does not pretend or represent that it is butter, but states expressly that it is oleomargarine and not butter, and that it is designed and intended as a substitute therefor; that he has sold about eight pounds of this article as oleomargarine with the design that it should be used for food as a substitute for butter, and that the purchaser knew how it was made and of what it was composed and bought it for use as an article of food in the place of butter. From such conviction the defendant has appealed to this court, on the theory that the section under which his condemnation was secured was intended only to apply to a case of deception in the manufacture and sale of the article specified. The language employed however will not admit of that mild interpretation. It prohibits both the manufacture out of any oleaginous substance, except that produced from milk or cream, of any article designed to take the place of butter or cheese produced from milk or cream, and also the sale, or offer for sale, of the same as an article of food. The prohibition, so far as it extends, is absolute, and if the Legislature possessed the power to make the law it must be respected and enforced. Under the American system of government the uncontrolled power of legislation resides in the people themselves as an aggregate body politic. On the separation of the colonies from the mother country all sovereignty and supremacy devolved upon the people in undiminished plenitude. But they do not exercise Sovereign power directly. In the first place all the people of all the States established the general govern inquiry into the proper exercise of the power. They must assume that the power and discretion have been judiciously and wisely exercised, and that the Legislature had before it, at the time of its action, all re have set certain limitations to the law-making powers, some of which are expressed and some are implied. One of the express limitations is that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. If therefore the law in question falls under the condemnation of the Constitution it is because it offends against this limitation of legislative power. This constitutional restriction has received exhaustive examination in our Court of Appeals in the cases of Wynehamer v. People, 13 N. Y. 378, and Bertholf v. O'Reily, 74 id. 509; and in both of these cases the conclusion was reached that notwithstanding such restriction the legislative power extends to entire prohibition of the traffic in spirituous liquors. This doctrine proceeds on the theory that the Legislature may prohibit and suppress any traffic injurious or demoralizing either to the public health or public morals, or in its tendencies or consequences, and that the conclusion and decision of the Legislature on the question of fact involved is final and conclusive. The same doctrine was enunciated by the Supreme Court of the United States in the Slaughter-House cases, 16 Wall. 36, where a law of the State of Louisiana, which operated very disastrously on large business interests and materially impaired the value of private property, was held constitutional and valid. These cases are sufficient to sustain the constitutionality of the law under consideration. It may well be that such legislation requires the highest reason for its justification, but it is not the province of the courts to inquire into their existence. Complaints against such enactments must be carried to the Legislature and not to the courts. It must be assumed in the consideration of this statute that the Legislature ascertained that the use of this prohibited article was injurious and detrimental to the public, and so found it necessary to advance in respect to the same, beyond the point of regulation, to actual prohibition. The presumption is that such legislative action was deemed necessary for the welfare of the public, and it cannot be abrogated by the courts. With these necessary assumptions this law falls easily within the police power of the State, which is a power vested in the Legislature to ordain such laws and ordinances as shall be deemed essential and necessary for the welfare, health and property of the public. The underlying foundation of the power is the principle that all property must be so used that it shall not become injurious to others. All reasonable |