FOREWORD This study is the fourth in a continuing series intended to provide industry and government with information and guidance for effective manpower planning. In each of the studies, particular effort was made to refine and improve the analysis techniques and the accuracy of the data on which each study was based. The third of the series introduced a test of the sensitivity of the projection to changes in a number of key assumptions. This provided a basis for judging the accuracy of the projection, and was a particularly important element in framing the recommendations of that study. The principal authors of this fourth study in the series, produced in the Office of Maritime Manpower, Maritime Administration, were Thomas F. Riley and Daniel G. Secrest with technical direction by Esther M. Love. In a significant improvement over the earlier studies, the authors have attempted to quantify demand for the officer-level personnel in the maritime sectors of offshore oil exploration, coastal and ocean towing, inland waterways, and government employment. Perhaps more important, the authors have developed a dynamic analysis which recognizes that key factors, such as attrition rates and employment priorities, are themselves subject to change as the overall supply-demand relationship changes. In this respect, the authors have attempted to recognize that the condition of the job market itself influences what newly licensed officers will do in terms of their availability for em ployment. Mr. R.F. Schamann, Research Director, National Marine Engineers Beneficial Association, AFL-CIO, was very helpful with major comments on portions of the study. While we were unable to reconcile differences regarding the fleet forecast, other of his comments directly led to improvements in the study. It is difficult to gaze into a crystal ball and project with any certainty the world-wide economic climate of the shipping industry or national and international political affairs more than a very short span ahead. This study does attempt to present a range of economic assumptions and conditions which might reasonably exist over the next ten years. It does not consider extremes in shipping conditions such as would accompany a 1930's style depression or a wartime expansion. We recognize that the aggregate findings and conclusions of this study are more sugestive and informative than exact and authoritative. The recommendations contained in the study are based to a large degree on this understanding. Arthur W. Friedberg Director, Office of Maritime September 30, 1976 INTRODUCTION The United States was born as a maritime nation in which a healthy and competitive merchant marine was an essential, vital element to its well-being. Today, two hundred years after its birth, the United States remains essentially dependent on waterborne commerce for its vital necessities as well as for its own contribution of agricultural commodities and manufacturers to the rest of the world. The U.S. flag merchant marine remains the one assurance that this nation can exert sufficient control over its international life lines without which the nation would be seriously threatened. Essential in war as well as in peace, the U.S. merchant marine has always responded to the defense needs of the nation. The history of the U.S. merchant marine has been one of major expansion during periods of international conflict. and subsequent contraction in peacetime. Much as with any of the Armed Forces, the U.S. merchant marine, the fourth arm of defense, has undergone the same cyclical expansion and contraction, and the men of the U.S. merchant marine have suffered repeated phases of job insecurity and underemployment between short periods of high activity associated with the defense logistics support of the nation. Almost half of today's deck and engine officers, career men and largely major expansions of shipping activity for the Korea, Suez and Vietnam crises, and the long decline following. In 1969 there were over 900 ships of 1,000 CT or over in the privatelyoperated U.S. flag oceangoing fleet. On July 1, 1976, the active ocean fleet stood at 536 ships. the purpose A substantial job decline was forseen by the Maritime Administration as the Vietnam conflict drew to a close. Since the Agency was directly supporting, with Federal funds, the Federal and State maritime academies (for of producing new deck and engine officers), it was imperative that a serious review take place of these programs. Further, the industry, through union/management schools, had initiated officer training programs at the outset of the fleet expansion in response to Southest Asia defense logistics support needs. The expected job decline, and the clear oversupply which would ensue, particularly if all then existing officer training programs were continued, argued strongly for some rational approach to avoid a waste of resources and hardships for the workforce. In early 1969, the Maritime Administration initiated the first of a continuing series of studies to project ten years ahead the deck and engine officer supply and demand situation. The first in the series, MERCHANT MARINE OFFICER TRAINING, February 1970, and Training of the House Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries./ 1/ Hearings on Maritime Academy Act Amendments before the Special Subcommittee on Maritime Education and Training of the Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries House of Representatives, 91st Congression, 1st sess., Serial No. 91-36, UCPO 1971. pp. 127-138. 26-583 O - 78 - 3 |