Human nature is very corrupt, that all obligations lose their force, unless they are frequently renewed. Long parliaments become, therefore, independent of the people; and when they do so, there always happens a most dangerous dependence elsewhere. It has of late been denied that the people have a right of remonstrating to us. It has been called an unjustifiable control upon the freedom of our proceedings. But then let them have more frequent opportunities of varying the choice of their representatives, that they may dismiss such as have unfaithfully withdrawn their attention from them. The influence of the crown is daily increasing and it is highly requisite that parliaments should be frequently responsible to their constituents; that they should be kept under the constant awe of acting contrary to their interests. Modern history, I believe, will inform us, that some very dangerous attempts upon our liberties have been disappointed, not so much from the virtue of many in this house, as from the apprehensions they may have had of an approaching election. It is true, there is a provision against such whose places vacate their seats here; but this is no guard against secret pensioners and placeholders. Give me leave to say, that the laws with respect to them are very insufficient; and as we were not allowed to make them effectual, the people have no other remedy but a new election. I think that long parliaments are a great hardship upon those, who may be excluded out of this house, and ought reasonably to take their turn; but seven years is the purchase of a man's life. it is equally hard upon such, whose private fortunes will not admit them to engage in so long and painful a service: it must be so to those, who mean no private view nor advantage. by it. I think, too, rothing can be of greater use to his majesty than frequent new parliaments; that he may often take the fresh sense of the nation, and not be partially advised; for his measures will always have a greater weight, both at home and abroad, the more generally he refers himself to the opinion of his people. A farther mischief of long parliaments is, that a minister has time and opportunities of getting acquaintance with members, of practising his several arts to win them into his schemes; but this must be the work of time; corruption is of so base a nature, that at first sight it is extremely shocking. Hardly any one has submitted to it all at once; his disposition must be previously understood, the particular bait must be found out with which he is to be allured, and after all, it is not without many struggles that he surrenders his virtue. Indeed there are some who will at once plunge themselves over head and ears into any base action; but the generality of mankind are of a more cautious nature, and will proceed only by leisurely degrees. One or two perhaps have deserted their colours the first campaign; some have done it a second: but a great many, who have not that eager disposition to vice, will not wait till a third. For this reason, short parliaments have been less corrupt than long ones; they are observed, like streams of water, always to grow more impure, the greater dis.ance they run from the fountain had. I am aware it may be said that frequent new parlia. ments will produce frequent new expences; but I think quite the contrary. I am really of opinion, that it will be a proper remedy against the evil of bribery at elections; especially as you have provided so wholesome a law to co-operate upon those occasions. As to bribery at elections, whence did it arise? Not from country gentlemen, for they are sure of being cho sen without it. It was the invention of wicked and corrupt ministers, who have from time to time led weak princes into such destructrive measures, that they did not dare to rely upon the natural representation of the people. Long parliaments first introduced bribery, because they were worth purchasing at any rate, Country gentlemen, who have only their private fortunes to rely upon, and have no mercenary ends to serve, are unable to oppose it, especially if at any time the public treasure shall be unfaithfully squandered away to corrupt their boroughs. Country gentlemen indeed may make some weak efforts, but as they generally prove unsuccessful, and the time of a fresh struggle is at so great a distance, they at last grow faint in the dispute, give up their country for lost, and retire in despair. Despair naturally produces indolence, and that is the proper disposition for slavery. Ministers of state understand this very well, and are therefore unwilling to awaken the nation out of its lethargy by frequent elections. They know that the spirit of liberty, like every other virtue of the mind, is to be kept alive only by constant action; that it is impossible to enslave this nation whilst it is perpetually upon its guard. Let country gentlemen, then, by having frequent opportunities of exerting themselves, be kept warm and active in their contention for the public good. This will raise that zeal and indignation which will at last get the better of that undue influence by which the officers of the crown, though unknown to the several boroughs, have been able to supplant country gentlemen of great characters and fortune, who live in their neighbourhood. I don't say this upon idle speculation only; I live in a country where it is too well known; and I will appeal to many gentlemen in the house, to more out of it (and who are so for this very reason,) for the truth of my assertion. It is a sore which has been long eating into the most vital part of our constitution, and I hope the time will come when you will probe it to the bottom. For if a minister should ever gain a corrupt familiarity with our boroughs; if he should keep a register of them in his closet, and by sending down his treasury mandates should procure a spurious representation of the people, the offspring of his corruption, who will be at all times ready to reconcile and justify the most contradictory measures of his administration, and even to vote every crude indigested VOL. I. 47 dream of their patron into a law; if the maintenance of his power should become the sole object of their attention, and they should be guilty of the most violent breach of parliamentary trust, by giving the king a discretionary liberty of taxing the people without limita tion or control, the last fatal compliment they can pay to the crown; if this should ever be the unhappy circumstance of this nation, the people indeed may complain, but the doors of that place where their complaints should be heard, will for ever be shut against them. The power of the crown is very justly apprehended to be growing to a monstrous, I should have said, too great a size, and several methods have been unsuccessfully proposed for restraining it within its proper bounds. But our disease, I fear, is of a complicated nature, and I think that this motion is wisely intended to remove the first and principal disorder. Give the people their ancient right of frequent new elections, that will restore the decayed authority of parliaments, and will put our constitution into a natural condition of working out her own cure. Upon the whole, I am of opinion, that I cannot express a greater zeal for his majesty, for the liberties of the people, or the honour and dignity of this house, than by seconding the motion which the honourable gentleman has made you. SIR WATKIN WILLIAM WYNNE, Was member for Denbighshire. It cannot be denied that the following speech is a real and close examination of the question. Sir Watkin William Wynne's Speech on the same. I am surprised to hear it insinuated by the honourable |