or independence of, or of altering the institutions of any one of the republics of America, would be considered by the nation making the declaration, as an attack on itself."

LATIN-AMERICAN DISLIKE OF THE MONROE DOCTRINE

If the Monroe Doctrine justified the support of the Republic of Panama by the United States, every power in that part of the world was certain to oppose the Doctrine. It is common sense for the Latin-Americans to be willing to accept the powerful protection of the United States against European powers; and equally common sense to oppose anything that looks like a leadership over them. An American writer on Colombia has recently said that

"Even in this enlightened age every nation seems to have a bugaboo of an impending foreign enemy - England, Germany; the United States, Japan, and so forth. So Colombians dread a Yankee attempt, sooner or later, to overpower South America and believe their land to be the outpost which will be first attacked. They have already felt the talon of the Eagle."

Evidence that the Monroe Doctrine is usually looked upon with suspicion is too strong to be denied. Recent travellers and visitors find an atmosphere of distrust. Professor Hiram Bingham, who knows the language, has explored the interior, and is not looking for trouble, quotes diplomats, business men, and literary men to that effect, including James Bryce. One Chilean sums up his opinion in the phrase:

"We don't want any Papa."

An editor says:

66

The Monroe Doctrine implies a moral subordination to the United States which is repulsive to the national feelings of the young republics."

Perez Triana, formerly President of Colombia, sharply criticizes the United States as follows:

"The American Continent, with the exception of the colonies belonging to the belligerent nations, is outside the political radius of the reign of barbarism under which any colonies which Europe might acquire in America would come.

"The principle laid down by the United States is by no means based on disinterested, altruistic, or humanitarian motives, but solely on the advantage of that nation, on a desire for isolation from the powers of the western hemisphere and their troubles. . . . "The United States, while preventing the conquest of American territory by European nations, has not been logical nor honest; it has not respected the essential equity of the principle, for it has conquered territory by violating the sovereignty of other American nations.'

The dislike of the Monroe Doctrine in many cases goes over to those who apply the Monroe Doctrine. The general testimony of those who have recently been in Latin America is that the Yankee is unpopular. He looks down upon the Latin people whom he visits, rarely learns their language, and has a low opinion of their abilities. A great part of the trade is in the hands of English, German, and other banks and importers from Europe. The United States has not a large commerce, and the Latin-Americans complain bitterly that American merchants will not adapt themselves to the trade conditions of the country. The Americans retort that the business conditions of Latin America are a hollow shell and that the people who have been doing the business must shoulder the losses. It is hard for the two races and the two political systems to understand each other or to work together.

THE LATIN-AMERICAN REMEDY

In the long run neither the Monroe Doctrine nor any other great line of international action will ever be supported by the Latin-Americans unless they can have a hand in framing it. In the present conditions of the world, invasions of Latin America seem more probable than for many years past; and there is a great need of bringing the American powers together beforehand. That is what the Latin-Americans want, but what the United States does not want. In a congress of sovereign powers, each equally independent, every one claims to vote as a unit on general questions; but the United States will never consent to be outvoted even by a majority of twenty republics to one, on any question of defense and assurance of her future in the world. So far, even the A B C have not been admitted into the confidence of the United States, beyond giving

advice. For the United States is no readier to yield to a vote of three to one than twenty to one. Hence the two forces of Pan-Latinism and Pan-Americanism work against each other.

Some little effort has been made to form a sentiment in favor of Pan-Iberianism, that is of a union of friendship, commerce, and perhaps some kind of government in which Spain, Portugal, and all the Spanish and Portuguese-speaking peoples shall take part. The taking over of the Philippines, Cuba, Porto Rico, and Panama by the United States subtracts four areas from this project; and the renewal of special relations with Spain would be an alliance with a weak and distant power, against a strong nation which is at the gates of Latin America.

To satisfy the A B C powers does not mean to satisfy Latin America. It leaves the world face to face with a group of small, undisciplined, and changeful countries, which will certainly do what they think best for their own destinies, unless restrained by the force of their neighbors. Any partnership or union or arrangement that can be thought of, still leaves in existence a group of dissatisfied and tough little countries which will not accept anybody's fiat. Some kind of Doctrine may be worked out which contents both the United States and the A B C powers; but a doctrine which does not also please the small States is only the old Monroe Doctrine over again. It is a rule of action laid down upon them by outsiders, for the advantage of those outsiders.

Manifestly there can be no American combination or alliance in which the United States will not be the most powerful factor. The A B C powers would be quite satisfied with an arrangement which recognized them as selected partners with the United States; and under any stress of danger they would admit the superior power and therefore the superior judgment of the United States. Still, the conditions would be much like those of the New England Confederation of 1643, in which Massachusetts had more population than the other three constituent States put together; and Massachusetts once flatly refused to accept a vote of the other three as binding on her. It is impossible to get rid of that fateful arithmetic. Either the greater must yield to the less, or the union dissolves.

CHAPTER XVI

DRAGO DOCTRINE AND CALVO DOCTRINE

1902-1915

THE INDIVIDUAL IN AMERICAN AFFAIRS

WE think of the American Doctrine as something which affects only nations: we conceive that the United States stands as a defender between Mexico and Germany, or England and Santo Domingo. In actual operation the American Doctrine has of late years usually been set in motion by the troubles of individuals. A Pennsylvanian goes down to Guatemala to raise bananas, and straightway becomes a storm center in international relations. His right to buy land, to carry on business, to be protected from brigands and rapacious officials, at once affects the relations of the government of the United States with the government of Guatemala. So when Castro, exPresident of Venezuela or Huerta, ex-President of Mexico, comes to the "States," he finds that he is not a simple visitor; he disturbs the friendly relations between his former country and the United States.

The same thing may happen in the case of citizens of the United States who visit European countries; but almost anywhere in Latin America the foreigner finds two special difficulties revolutions and weak governments. Revolutions mean disorder, pillage, violence, and often murder both of natives and of resident foreigners. Weak governments take as much as they can of the foreigner's property and often refuse to stand by the concessions and privileges granted by a previous ruler or government. In addition, the weak government borrows money abroad and then neglects to pay the interest. That makes the foreign investor or stockholder in a company carrying on business in a Latin-American State a party to the ravages and the injustices of both revolutionary and recognized governments.

This capacity of the alien to make trouble between his original country and his country of residence extends farther. The American railroad builder whose contract is broken appeals to his government to put a pressure upon the government which has ill used him, and files a claim for damages which may be twenty-five years in dispute. The German bondholder asks his government to back up the demand for interest and unpaid principal by a show of force.

Such demands, starting with individual rights and the failure of weak governments to protect the alien, have frequently led to threats of intervention which have called up the question whether the American Doctrine stands in the way of enforcing such claims. To meet this point several ingenious statements of policy have been evolved of which the most striking are the so-called Calvo Doctrine, against any intervention; and the so-called Drago Doctrine, against intervention for the collection of debts. The purpose of both these doctrines is the same as that of the American Doctrine to prevent wars and territorial seizures which would change the conditions of America and bring Europe into closer contact with American affairs.

RIGHTS OF ALIENS IN LATIN AMERICA

Little trouble arises in Latin America from the ordinary tourist, travelling business man, or scientific explorer. They come and go easily, often steering a safe course between revolutions. It is different with those citizens of the United States and European powers who settle down to make their homes in Latin America: for few of them accept naturalization in those countries; instead, they remain citizens of a home country which has some power to protect them. The archives of the consulates and the legations are full of demands for such protection, and the belief that these demands will be listened to, is a daily restraint on the Latin governments. The result is that the foreigner is far less likely to be overtaxed, or plundered, or to see his property destroyed by revolutionaries. The foreigner expects to keep his property and to save his life in times of disturbance, and if he is ill treated, counts up his injuries and makes out a bill which he expects his own government to

press.

To meet this difficulty many of the Latin-American states