stitution, if faithfully maintained and carried out, would prove of sufficient strength and breadth to comprehend within their sphere and influence the civilized nations of the world."

It may

This extraordinary proposition needs no comment. have been suggested by Seward, but it was out of all relation with public sentiment, and fell little heeded.

RESULTS OF SEWARD'S DIPLOMACY (1861-1869)

A brief review of the eight years of Seward's service as Secretary of State may bring out the general success of his American policy. Backed up by circumstances and the United States army, he was able to squeeze the French out of Mexico without hostilities either with Mexico or France. The Spaniards withdrew from Santo Domingo without even a show of protest. He annexed Alaska, and was prevented only by what seemed an accident from the statesmanlike project of purchasing the Danish Islands. He failed in his great designs on Canada and his open attempts on Santo Domingo. His Canal diplomacy struck out a new path and he attempted to ignore the relation of Great Britain to the whole Canal scheme.

What stands out in the whole history of this period is that the Monroe Doctrine of Secretary Cass and the Monroeless Doctrine of Secretary Seward led to exactly the same point; viz., that the Latin-American countries were made up of people who did not know how to govern themselves and who kept the neighborhood of the United States stirred up with misrule and anarchy. Therefore so ran relentlessly the logic of both Secretaries - the remedy was for the United States to annex these lawless and ungovernable regions. That comes out clearly in the utterances of all the Presidents (except Lincoln) from Polk to Johnson. Not one of them was really concerned with the duty of protecting Europeans or of avoiding difficulties with Europe. They all rested their case on the needs of the United States-sometimes the need of markets, sometimes of slave-holding territory, sometimes of peace and quiet. The more populous the neighboring nations grew, the more complicated their relations with each other and the world became, so much the more necessary it seemed to those statesmen to "take arms against a sea of troubles, and by opposing end them."

PART III

THE AMERICAN DOCTRINE

1869-1915

CHAPTER XI

DOCTRINE OF PARAMOUNT INTEREST

1869-1884

CHANGE OF EMPHASIS

FROM 1845 to 1869 the usual theory of the government and people of the United States was that a principle had been laid down by President Monroe, which was broad enough and prophetic enough to cover any and all phases of our relations with Latin America. Every President, except Lincoln, and every Secretary of State, except Seward, referred back in terms or indirectly to Monroe. Several of them quoted him and professed to expand and improve him. Even Lincoln and Seward followed the traditional lines of Monrovian policy. The interests which they had in mind were chiefly political influences, international friendships, and then territorial. The fundamental idea of them all was that Monroe had expressed a classic and hallowed form of international philosophy, which justified some kind of action on the part of the United States government in favor of Latin-American powers that were in trouble with European powers.

Since 1869, the prevailing thought among statesmen has been more individual. They have referred to the tradition, but have relied on a strong and definite line of policy, which was to be stated from time to time not for the benefit of others, but because it was needed in the interests and for the welfare of the United States. They were willing to add as a plausible argument that such a policy was also in accord with previous statements and acts put forth by Monroe and his successors.

The incidents and controversies which involved special interests of the United States were still mostly political; but strong commercial influence began to be felt, especially in the Caribbean area.

A new sense of commercial potency animated our statesmen. The Cuban question was largely one of trade. The Isthmus controversy was chiefly over the desire to get into line for control of a world-waterway. The brief phrase which best expresses this altered point of view is Secretary Evarts' "Paramount Interest." Journalists, writers, and public men have generally found it more convenient to keep on using the old term "Monroe Doctrine", both because it was hazy and because it seemed to make earlier generations responsible for the purposes and motives of the present time. To the changed and broadened principle will be usually applied in the remainder of this volume the term "American Doctrine."

THREE SECRETARIES OF STATE (1869-1882)

The difficult problems of American policy were taken up after 1869 by three successive Presidents, of whom two - Grant and Hayes took a direct and personal interest in PanAmerican affairs. The handling of most of the specific questions and the phrasing of most of the important documents was left to three remarkable Secretaries of State: Hamilton Fish, William M. Evarts, and James G. Blaine. Though only one of them had previous diplomatic experience, Fish became one of the most efficient heads of the American foreign office; Evarts was a profound lawyer, who carried his principles into public law; Blaine, though a politician and an advocate, showed a more definite theory, larger views, and a more attractive program than either of his predecessors.

All three Secretaries had to contend from first to last against an apathy in public opinion. Apparently most members of Congress and their constituents preferred to keep out of any kind of pledges or agreements with American powers, looking to political action. It was the fashion at that time to believe that the annexations of Texas and the Mexican War were wholly due to the greed of the slave power; and that the immediate task of the United States was to undo the evils which had come on the country. Public interest, therefore, was

directed first to the task of reëstablishing the South, the settlement of the West, and the reconstitution of the nation. The completion of the first Pacific railroad in 1869 at once took away much of the importance of the Isthmus routes, which for many years thereafter were little used, either for freight or passengers. Mexico was unexpectedly brought out of the anarchy of half a century, first by Juarez and then by the remarkably able and unscrupulous dictator, Diaz. American capital, mines, and railroads were encouraged and safeguarded in that country, and for a long time the cry for annexation of Mexico ceased. The two West Indian republics of Haiti and Santo Domingo, though at last recognized by the United States, were not in a condition which made them desirable wards.

THE GRANT DOCTRINE AND CUBA (1866–1870)

In this hurly-burly of plans and complications, the one serious and dangerous Latin-American question was that of Cuba. The Spanish government was probably no more harsh than in earlier periods. Many of the richest and most influential men were born Spaniards; and most of the native planters and large business men were favored by the Spanish government and had no desire for independence. Nevertheless, in 1866 an insurrection broke out, which was the first approach to a spontaneous movement for Cuban independence. During the next seven years Spain in Europe passed through four revolutions, and could give little attention to distant colonies. The cause of revolution was aided by a Junta of native Cubans, living in the United States, who organized a score of filibustering expeditions during the progress of the revolution.

Great sympathy was felt with the Cubans by the United States; and in 1869 Grant was on the point of recognizing their belligerency; but he took the advice of Secretary Fish and held back. He began at once to appeal to his countrymen in behalf of the Latin-Americans. In his first annual message (1869), he said:

"These dependencies are no longer regarded as subject to transfer from one European power to another. When the present relation of colonies ceases, they are to become independent powers, exercising the right of choice and of self-control in the determination of their future condition and relations with other powers."