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tingency plan by individuals independ- tion attempts by persons or materials ent of both security program manage- at the time of the attempt so that the ment and personnel who have direct response can prevent the unauthorresponsibility for implementation of ized access or penetration. the security program. The review shall (2) Detect attempts to gain unauinclude a review and audit of safe. thorized access or introduce unauthorguards contingency procedures and ized materials into material access practices, an audit of the security areas or vital areas by deceit using the system testing and maintenance pro- following subsystems and subfuncgram, and a test of the safeguards tions: system along with commitments estab (i) Access authorization controls and lished for response by local law en procedures to provide current authoriforcement authorities. The results of zation schedules and entry criteria for the review and audit, along with rec both persons and materials; and ommendations for improvements, (ii) Entry controls and procedures to shall be documented, reported to the verify the identity of persons and malicensee's corporate and plant manage terials and assess such identity against ment, and kept available at the plant current authorization schedules and for inspection for a period of two entry criteria before permitting entry years.
and to initiate response measures to
deny unauthorized entries. (Sec. 161i, Pub. L. 83-703, 68 Stat. 948; secs. 201, 204(b)(1), Pub. L. 93-438, 88 Stat. 1243,
(c) Permit only authorized activities 1245 (42 U.S.C. 2201, 5841, 5844))
and conditions within protected areas,
material access areas, and vital areas. (43 FR 11965. Mar. 23. 1978: 43 FR 14007,
To achieve this capability the physical Apr. 4, 1978, as amended at 44 FR 68188, Nov. 28, 1979)
protection system shall:
(1) Detect unauthorized activities or
conditions within protected areas, ma$ 73.15 Performance capabilities for fixed
terial access areas and vital areas site physical protection systems.
using the following subsystems and (a) To meet the general performance subfunctions: requirements of $ 73.20 a fixed site (i) Controls and procedures that esphysical protection system shall in- tablish current schedules of authorclude the performance capabilities de- ized activities and conditions in described in paragraphs (b) through (g) fined areas; of this section unless otherwise au (ii) Boundaries to define areas thorized by the Commission.
within which the authorized activities (b) Prevent unauthorized access of and conditions are permitted; and persons, vehicles and materials into (iii) Detection and surveillance submaterial access areas and vital areas. systems and procedures to discover To achieve this capability the physical and assess unauthorized activities and protection system shall:
conditions and communicate them so (1) Detect attempts to gain unau that response can be such as to stop thorized access or introduce unauthor- the activity or correct the conditions ized material across material access or to satisfy the general performance obvital area boundaries by stealth or jective and requirements of $ 73.20(a). force using the following subsystems (d) Permit only authorized placeand subfunctions:
ment and movement of strategic spe(i) Barriers to channel persons and cial nuclear material within material material to material access and vital access areas. To achieve this capability area entry control points and to delay the physical protection system shall: any unauthorized penetration at- (1) Detect unauthorized placement tempts by persons or materials suffin and movement of strategic special nucient to assist detection and permit a clear material within the material response that will prevent the pene access area using the following subsystration; and
tems and subfunctions: (ii) Access detection subsystems and (i) Controls and procedures to delinprocedures to detect, assess and com- eate authorized placement and control municate any unauthorized penetra- for strategic special nuclear material;
(ii) Controls and procedures to es. authorized removal of strategic speciai tablish current authorized placement nuclear material which specify the auand movement of all strategic special thorized properties and quantities of nuclear material within material material to be removed, the persons access areas;
authorized to remove the material. (iii) Controls and procedures to and the authorized time schedule: maintain knowledge of the identity, (ii) Removal controls and procedures quantity, placement, and movement of to identify and confirm the properties all strategic special nuclear material and quantities of material being rewithin material access areas; and
moved and verify the identity of the (iv) Detection and monitoring sub persons making the removal and time systems and procedures to discover
of removal and assess these against and assess unauthorized placement the current authorized removal schedand movement of strategic special nu
ule before permitting removal; and clear material and communicate them
(iii) Communications subsystems so that response can be such as to
and procedures to provide for notificareturn the strategic special nuclear
tion of an attempted unauthorized or material to authorized placement or
unconfirmed removal so that response control.
can be such as to prevent the removal (e) Permit removal of only author
and satisfy the general performance ‘ized and confirmed forms and amounts
objective and requirements of of strategic special nuclear material
$ 73.20(a). from material access areas. To achieve
(f) Provide for authorized access and this capability the physical protection
assure detection of and response to unsystem shall:
authorized penetrations of the pro(1) Detect attempts at unauthorized
tected area to satisfy the general perremoval of strategic special nuclear
formance objective and requirements material from material access areas by
of $ 73.20(a). To achieve this capability stealth or force using the following
the physical protection system shall: subsystems and subfunctions: (i) Barriers to channel persons and
(1) Detect attempts to gain unaumaterials exiting a material access
thorized access or introduce unauthorarea to exit control points and to delay
ized persons, vehicles, or materials any unauthorized strategic special nu
into the protected area by stealth or clear material removal attempts suffi
force using the following subsystems cient to assist detection and assess
and subfunctions: ment and permit a response that will
(i) Barriers to channel persons, vehiprevent the removal; and satisfy the
cles, and materials to protected area general performance objective and re
entry control points; and to delay any quirements of $ 73.20(a); and
unauthorized penetration attempts or (ii) Detection subsystems and proce the introduction of unauthorized vehidures to detect, assess and communi cles or materials sufficient to assist decate any attempts at unauthorized re tection and assessment and permit a moval of strategic special nuclear ma response that will prevent the peneterial so that response to the attempt tration or prevent such penetration can be such as to prevent the removal and satisfy the general performance and satisfy the general performance objective and requirements of objective and requirements of $ 73.20(a); and $ 73.20(a).
(ii) Access detection subsystems and (2) Confirm the identity and quanti procedures to detect, assess and comty of strategic special nuclear material municate any unauthorized access or presented for removal from a material penetrations or such attempts by peraccess area and detect attempts at un sons, vehicles, or materials at the time authorized removal of strategic special of the act or the attempt so that the nuclear material from material access response can be such as to prevent the areas by deceit using the following unauthorized access or penetration, subsystems and subfunctions:
and satisfy the general performance (i) Authorization controls and proce- objective and requirements of dures to provide current schedules for $73.20(a).
(2) Detect attempts to gain unau. (ii) Transmit rapid and accurate dethorized access or introduce unauthor- tection and assessment information to ized persons, vehicles, or materials offsite assistance forces. into the protected area by deceit using (5) Assure that a single adversary the following subsystems and subfunc action cannot destroy the capability of tions:
the security organization to notify off(i) Access authorization controls and site response forces of the need for asprocedures to provide current authori sistance. zation schedules and entry criteria for
(44 FR 68193. Nor. 28. 1979) persons, vehicles, and materials; and
(ii) Entry controls and procedures to verify the identity of persons, materi
$ 7:3.16 Fixed site physical protection suisals and vehicles and assess such identi
tems. subsystems, components. and ty against current authorization
procedures. schedules before permitting entry and . (a) A licensee physical protection to initiate response measures to deny system established pursuant to the unauthorized access.
general performance objective and re(g) Response. Each physical protec quirements of $ 73.20(a) and the pertion program shall provide a response formance capability requirements of capability to assure that the five capa. $ 73.45 shall include, but are not necesbilities described in paragraphs (b) sarily limited to, the measures specithrough (f) of this section are fied in paragraphs (b) through (h) of achieved and that adversary forces this section. The Commission may rewill be engaged and impeded until off quire, depending on individual facility site assistance forces arrive. To and site conditions, alternate or addiachieve this capability a licensee shall: tional measures deemed necessary to
(1) Establish a security organization meet the general performance objecto:
tive and requirements of $ 73.20. The (i) Provide trained and qualified per- Commission also may authorize prosonnel to carry out assigned duties and tection measures other than those reresponsibilities; and
quired by this section if, in its opinion, (ii) Provide for routine security oper the overall level of performance meets ations and planned and predetermined the general performance objective and response to emergencies and safe requirements of $ 73.20 and the perguards contingencies.
formance capability requirements of (2) Establish a predetermined plan $ 73.45. to respond to safeguards contingency (b) Security organization. (1) The lievents.
censee shall establish a security orga(3) Provide equipment for the secu nization, including guards. If a conrity organization and facility design tract guard force is utilized for site sefeatures to:
curity, the licensee's written agree(i) Provide for rapid assessment of ment with the contractor will clearly safeguards contingencies:
show that (i) the licensee is responsi(ii) Provide for response by assigned ble to the Commission for maintaining security organization personnel which safeguards in accordance with Comis sufficiently rapid and effective to mission regulations and the licensee's achieve the predetermined objective of security plan, (ii) the NRC may inthe response; and
spect, copy, and take away copies of all (iii) Provide protection for the as reports and documents required to be sessment and response personnel so kept by Commission regulations, that they can complete their assigned orders, or applicable license conditions duties.
whether such reports and documents (4) Provide communications net. are kept by the licensee or the conworks to:
tractor, (iii) the requirement, in (i) Transmit rapid and accurate secu- $ 73.46(b)(4) of this section that the lirity information among onsite forces censee demonstrate the ability of for routine security operation, assess physical security personnel to perform ment of a contingency, and response their assigned duties and responsibilto a contingency; and
ities, include demonstration of the
ability of the contractor's physical se one of the redundant elements of a curity personnel to perform their as- physical protection subsystem if such signed duties and responsibilities in assignment or control could result in carrying out the provisions of the Se the loss of effectiveness of the subsyscurity Plan and these regulations, and (iv) the contractor will not assign any (6) Guard and armed response force personnel to the site who have not armament maintained on site shall infirst been made aware of these respon clude handguns, shotguns, and sesibilities.
miautomatic rifles, as described in Ap(2) The licensee shall have onsite at pendix B to this part. all times at least one full time member (c) Physical barrier subsystems. (1) of the security organization with au- Vital equipment shall be located only thority to direct the physical protec within a vital area and strategic spetion activities of the security organiza cial nuclear material shall be stored or tion.
processed only in a material access (3) The licensee shall have a man area. Both vital areas and material agement system to provide for the de access areas shall be located within a velopment, revision, implementation, protected area so that access to vital and enforcement of security proce- equipment and to strategic special nudures. The system shall include:
clear material requires passage (i) Written security procedures through at least two physical barriers. which document the structure of the More than one vital area or material security organization and which detail access area may be located within a the duties of guards, watchmen and single protected area. other individuals responsible for secu (2) The physical barriers at the perity; and
rimeter of the protected area shall be (ii) Provision for written approval of separated from any other barrier dessuch procedures and any revisions ignated as a physical barrier for a vital thereto by the individual with overall area or material access area within the responsibility for the security func- protected area. tion.
(3) Isolation zones shall be main(4) The licensee shall not permit an tained in outdoor areas adjacent to individual to act as a guard, watch the physical barrier at the perimeter man, armed response person, or other of the protected area and shall be member of the security organization large enough to permit observation of unless such individual has been the activities of people on either side trained, equipped, and qualified to of that barrier in the event of its peneperform each assigned security job tration. If parking facilities are pro. duty in accordance with Appendix B vided for employees or visitors, they of this part “General Criteria for Se- shall be located outside the isolation curity Personnel." Upon the request of zone and exterior to the protected an authorized representative of the area. Commission the licensee shall demon (4) Isolation zones and all exterior strate the ability of the physical secu- areas within the protected area shall rity personnel, whether licensee or be provided with illumination suffi. contractor employees, to carry out cient for the monitoring and observatheir assigned duties and responsibil- tion requirements of paragraphs ities. Each guard, watchman, armed (c)(3), (e)(8), (h)(4) and (h)(6) of this response person, or other member of section, but not less than 0.2 footcanthe security organization, whether a li- dle measured horizontally at ground censee or contractor employee, shall level. requalify in accordance with Appendix (5) Strategic special nuclear materiB of this part at least every 12 al, other than alloys, fuel elements or months. Such requalification shall be fuel assemblies, shall: documented.
(i) Be stored in a vault when not un(5) Within any given period of time, dergoing processing if the material can a member of the security organization be used directly in the manufacture of may not be assigned to, or have direct a nuclear explosive device. Vaults used operational control over, more than to protect such material shall be capa
ble of preventing entry to stored displayed by all individuals while SSNM by a single action in a forced inside the protected areas. entry attempt, except as such single (2) Unescorted access to vital areas, action would both destroy the barrier material access areas and controlled and render contained SSNM incapable access areas shall be limited to individof being removed, and shall provide uals who are authorized access to the sufficient delay to prevent removal of material and equipment in such areas, stored SSNM prior to arrival of re
and who require such access to persponse personnel capable of neutraliz form their duties. Access to material ing the design basis threat stated in access areas shall include at least two § 73.1.
individuals. Authorization for such in(ii) Be stored in tamper-indicating dividuals shall be indicated by the iscontainers;
suance of specially coded numbered (iii) Be processed only in material badges indicating vital areas, material access areas constructed with barriers access areas, and controlled access that provide significant delay to pene areas to which access is authorized. No tration; and
activities other than those which re(iv) Be kept in locked compartments quire access to strategic special nucleor locked process equipment while un ar material or to equipment used in dergoing processing except when per the processing, use, or storage of strasonally attended.
tegic special nuclear material, or nec(6) Enriched uranium scrap (en- essary maintenance, shall be permitriched to 20% or greater) in the form ted within a material access area. of small pieces, cuttings, chips, solu
(3) The licensee shall establish and tions or in other forms which result follow procedures that will permit from a manufacturing process, con access control personnel to identify tained in 30 gallon or larger containers those vehicles that are authorized and with a uranium-235 content of less those materials that are not authorthan 0.25 grams per liter, may be ized entry to protected, material stored within a locked and separately access, and vital areas. fenced area within a larger protected (4) The licensee shall control all area provided that the storage area points of personnel and vehicle access fence is no closer than 25 feet to the into a protected area. Identification perimeter of the protected area. The and search of all individuals for firestorage area when unoccupied shall be arms, explosives, and incendiary deprotected by a guard or watchman vices, shall be made and authorization who shall patrol at intervals not ex- shall be checked at such points. ceeding 4 hours, or by intrusion United States Department of Energy alarms.
couriers engaged in the transport of (d) Access control subsystems and special nuclear material need not be procedures. (1) A numbered picture searched. Licensee employees having badge identification subsystem shall an NRC or United States Department be used for all individuals who are au of Energy access authorization shall thorized access to protected areas be searched at least on a random basis. without escort. An individual not em The individual responsible for the last ployed by the licensee but who re- access control function (controlling quires frequent and extended access to admission to the protected area) shall protected, material access, or vital be isolated within a structure, with areas may be authorized access to such bullet-resisting walls, doors, ceiling, areas without escort provided that he floor, and windows. receives a picture badge upon entrance (5) At the point of personnel and veinto the protected area and returns hicle access into a protected area, all the badge upon exit from the protect- hand-carried packages shall be ed area, and that the badge indicates, searched for firearms, explosives, and (i) Non-employee-no escort required; incendiary devices except those pack(ii) areas to which access is authorized ages carried by persons having an and (iii) the period for which access NRC or DOE access authorization has been authorized. Badges shall be which shall be searched on a random