personnel. The design shall include means to:

(1) Prevent the accumulation of radioactive material in those systems requiring access;

(2) Decontaminate those systems to which access is required;

(3) Control access to areas of potential contamination or high radiation within the ISFSI;

(4) Measure and control contamination of areas requiring access;

(5) Minimize the time required to perform work in the vicinity of radioactive components; for example, by providing sufficient space for ease of operation and designing equipment for ease of repair and replacement; and

(6) Shield personnel from radiation exposure.

(b) Radiological alarm systems. Radiological alarm systems shall be provided in accessible work areas to warn operating personnel of radiation and airborne radioactivity levels above a given setpoint and of concentrations of radioactive material in effluents above control limits. Such systems shall be designed with provisions for calibration and testing their operability.

(c) Effluent and direct radiation monitoring. (1) Effluent systems shall be provided with means for measuring the amount of radionuclides in effluents during normal operations and under accident conditions. A means of measuring the flow of the diluting medium, either air or water, shall also be provided.

(2) Areas containing radioactive materials shall be provided with systems for measuring the direct radiation levels in and around these areas.

under accident

(d) Effluent control. The ISFSI shall be designed to provide means to limit to levels as low as is reasonably achievable the release of radioactive materials in effluents during normal operations; and control the release of radioactive materials conditions. Analyses shall be made to show that releases to the general environment during normal operations and anticipated occurrences will be within the exposure limits given in $ 72.67 of this part. Analyses of design basis accidents shall be made, to show that releases to the general environ

ment will be within the exposure limits given in § 72.68 of this part. Systems designed to monitor the release of radioactive materials shall have means for calibration and testing their operability.

$ 72.75 Criteria for spent fuel and radioactive waste storage and handling.

(a) Spent fuel and radioactive waste storage and handling systems. Spent fuel storage, radioactive waste storage. and other systems that might contain or handle radioactive materials associated with spent fuel, shall be designed to ensure adequate safety under normal and accident conditions. These systems shall be designed with: (1) A capability to test and monitor components important to safety, (2) suitable shielding for radiation protection under normal and accident conditions. (3) confinement structures and systems, (4) a heat-removal capability having testability and reliability consistent with its importance to safety. and (5) means to minimize the quantity of radioactive wastes generated.

(b) Waste treatment. Radioactive waste treatment facilities shall be provided. Provisions shall be made for the packaging of site-generated low level wastes in a form suitable for transfer to disposal sites.

ance program should be commensurate with the importance to safety of identified activities and individual structures, systems, and components.

(b) The quality assurance program shall cover all activities identified as being important to safety throughout the life of the licensed activity-from site selection through decommissioning-prior to termination of the li

cense.

(c) Appropriate records of the design, fabrication, erection, testing, maintenance and occupation of structures, systems, and components important to safety shall be maintained by or under the control of the licensee throughout the life of the ISFSI.

Subpart H-Physical Protection

§ 72.81 Physical security plan.

A plan for detailed security measures for physical protection shall be established. This plan shall consist of two parts. Part I shall demonstrate how the applicant plans to comply with the applicable requirements of Part 73 of this chapter and during transportation to and from the proposed ISFSI and shall include the design for physical protection and the licensee's safeguards contingency plan and guard training plan. Part II shall list tests, inspections, audits, and other means to be used to demonstrate compliance with such requirements.

§ 72.82 Design for physical protection.

The design for physical protection shall show the site layout and ISFSI design features provided to protect the ISFSI from sabotage. It shall include:

(a) The design criteria for the physical protection of the proposed ISFSI;

(b) The design bases and the relation of the design bases to the design criteria submitted pursuant to paragraph (a) of this section; and

(c) Information relative to materials of construction, equipment, general arrangement, and proposed quality assurance program sufficient to provide reasonable assurance that the final security system will conform to the design bases for the principal design criteria submitted pursuant to paragraph (a) of this section.

§ 72.83 Safeguards contingency plan.

(a) The requirements of the licensee's safeguards contingency plan for dealing with threats and industrial sabotage shall be as defined in $ 73.40(b) of this chapter. This plan shall include Background, Generic Planning Base, Licensee Planning Base, and Responsibility Matrix, the first four categories of information relating to nuclear facilities licensed under Part 50 of this chapter. (The fifth category of information, Procedures, does not have to be submitted for approval.)

(b) The licensee shall prepare and maintain safeguards contingency plan procedures in accordance with Appendix C to 10 CFR Part 73 for effecting the actions and decisions contained in the Responsibility Matrix of the licensee's safeguards contingency plan.

§ 72.84 Change to physical security and safeguards contingency plans.

(a) The licensee shall make no change that would decrease the safeguards effectiveness of the physical security plan or the first four categories of information (Background, Generic Planning Base, Licensee Planning Base, and Responsibility Matrix) contained in the licensee safeguards contingency plan without the prior approval of the Commission. A licensee desiring to make such a change shall submit an application for an amendment to his license pursuant to § 72.39 of this part.

(b) The licensee may, without prior Commission approval, make changes to the physical security plan or the safeguards contingency plan, if the changes do not decrease the safeguards effectiveness of these plans. The licensee shall maintain records of changes to any such plan made without prior approval for a period of 2 years from the date of the change and shall furnish to the Director of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C. 20555, with a copy to the appropriate NRC Regional Office specified in Appendix A to Part 73 of this chapter, a report containing a description of each change within 2 months after the change is made.

Subpart I-Training and Certification of ISFSI Personnel

§ 72.91 Operator requirements.

Operation of equipment and controls that have been identified as important to safety in the Safety Analysis Report and in the license shall be limited to trained and certified personnel or be under the direct visual supervision of an individual with training and certification in such operation. Supervisory personnel who personally direct the operation of equipment and controls that are important to safety must also be certified in such operations.

§ 72.92 Operator training and certification

program.

The applicant for a license under this part shall establish a program for training, proficiency testing, and certification of ISFSI personnel. This program shall be submitted to the Commission for approval with the license application.

$72.93 Physical requirements.

The physical condition and the general health of personnel certified for the operation of equipment and controls that are important to safety shall not be such as might cause operational errors that could endanger other inplant personnel or the public health and safety. Any condition which might cause impaired judgment or motor coordination must be considered in the selection of personnel for activities that are important to safety. Such conditions need not categorically disqualify a person, so long as appropriate provisions are made to accommodate such defect.

Sec.

73.6 Exemptions for certain quantities and kinds of special nuclear material.

73.20 General performance objective and requirements.

73.21 Requirements for the protection of safeguards information.

73.24 Prohibitions.

PHYSICAL PROTECTION OF SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIAL IN TRANSIT

73.25 Performance capabilities for physical protection of strategic special nuclear material in transit.

73.26 Transportation physical protection systems, subsystems. components. and procedures.

73.27 Notification requirements. 73.37 Requirements for physical protection of irradiated reactor fuel in transit. PHYSICAL PROTECTION REQUIREMENTS AT FIXED SITES

73.40 Physical protection: General requirements at fixed sites.

73.45 Performance capabilities for fixed site physical protection systems. 73.46 Fixed site physical protection systems, subsystems, components and procedures.

73.50 Requirements for physical protection of licensed activities.

73.55 Requirements for physical protection of licensed activities in nuclear power reactors against radiological sabotage. 73.60 Additional requirements for physical protection of special nuclear material at non-power reactors.

the

PHYSICAL PROTECTION OF SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIAL OF MODERATE AND LOW STRATEGIC SIGNIFICANCE

73.67 Licensee fixed site and in-transit requirements for the physical protection of special nuclear material of moderate and low strategic significance.

RECORDS AND REPORTS

73.70 Records. 73.71 Reports of unaccounted-for shipments, suspected thefts, unlawful diver sion. radiological sabotage, or events which significantly threaten or lessen the effectiveness of safeguards. 73.72 Requirement for advance notice of shipment of special nuclear material.

ENFORCEMENT

73.80 Violations.

APPENDIX A UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGU LATORY COMMISSION INSPECTION AND ENFORCEMENT REGIONAL OFFICES

APPENDIX B GENERAL CRITERIA FOR SECU RITY PERSONNEL

APPENDIX C-LICENSEE SAFEGUARDS CONTINGENCY PLANS APPENDIX D-PHYSICAL PROTECTION OF IRRADIATED REACTOR FUEL IN TRANSIT. TRAINING PROGRAM SUBJECT SCHEDULE AUTHORITY: Secs. 53, 147, 161b, 161, 1610. Pub. L. 85-703, 68 Stat. 930, 948-950, as amended. Pub. L. 85-507, 72 Stat. 327. Pub. L. 88-489. Stat. 602. Pub. L. 93-377, 88 Stat. 475. Pub. L. 96-295, 94 Stat. 780, (42 U.S.C. 2073, 2201, 2167); sec. 201, Pub. L. 93-438, 88 Stat. 1242, 1243, as amended, Pub. L. 94-79. 89 Stat. 413 (42 U.S.C. 5841). For the purposes of sec. 223, 68 Stat. 958, as amended, 42 U.S.C. 2273. § 73.55 is issued under sec. 161b, 68 Stat. 948, as amended, 42 U.S.C. 2201(b); $$ 73.20. 73.24. 73.25. 73.26. 73.27. 73.37. 73.40, 73.45. 73.46. 73.50. 73.55, and 73.67 are issued under sec. 161i, 68 Stat. 949. as amended, 42 U.S.C. 2201(i); and $$ 73.20(c)(i), 73.24(b)(i), 73.26(b)(3), (h)(6), (i)(6), and (k)(4), 73.27 (a) and (b), 73.40(b) and (d). 73.46(g)(6), and (h)(2), 73.50(g)(2), (3)(iii)(B) and (h). 73.55(h)(2). and (4)(iii)(B), 73.70. 73.71, and 73.72 are issued under sec. 1610, 68 Stat. 950, as amended, 42 U.S.C. 2201(0).

SOURCE: 38 FR 35430. Dec. 28, 1973, unless otherwise noted.

NOMENCLATURE CHANGES: 40 FR 8792-8793. Mar. 3, 1975 and 44 FR 68199, Nov. 28, 1979; 45 FR 14201, Mar. 5, 1980.

GENERAL PROVISIONS

$73.1 Purpose and scope.

(a) Purpose. This part prescribes requirements for the establishment and maintenance of a physical protection system which will have capabilities for the protection of special nuclear material at fixed sites and in transit and of plants in which special nuclear material is used. The following design basis threats, where referenced in ensuing sections of this part, shall be used to design safeguards systems to protect against acts of radiological sabotage and to prevent the theft of special nuclear material:

(1) Radiological sabotage. (i) A determined violent external assault, attack by stealth, or deceptive actions, of several persons with the following attributes, assistance and equipment: (A) Well-trained (including military training and skills) and dedicated individuals, (B) inside assistance which may include a knowledgeable individual who attempts to participate in a passive role (e.g., provide information),

an active role (e.g., facilitate entrance and exit, disable alarms and communications, participate in violent attack), or both, (C) suitable weapons, up to and including hand-held automatic weapons, equipped with silencers and having effective long range accuracy, (D) hand-carried equipment, including incapacitating agents and explosives for use as tools of entry or for otherwise destroying reactor, facility, transporter, or container integrity or features of the safeguards system, and

(ii) An internal threat of an insider, including an employee (in any position).

(2) Theft or diversion of formula quantities of strategic special nuclear material. (i) A determined, violent, external assault, attack by stealth, or deceptive actions, by a small group with the following attributes, assistance and equipment: (A) Well-trained (including military training and skills) and dedicated individuals, (B) inside assistance which may include a knowledgeable individual who attempts to participate in a passive role (e.g., provide information), an active role (e.g., facilitate entrance and exit, disable alarms and communications, participate in violent attack), or both, (C) suitable weapons, up to and including hand-held automatic weapons, equipped with silencers and having effective long range accuracy, (D) handcarried equipment, including incapacitating agents and explosives for use as tools of entry or for otherwise destroying reactor, facility, transporter or container integrity or features of the safeguards system, and (E) the ability to operate as two or more teams,

(ii) An individual, including an employee (in any position), and

(iii) A conspiracy between individuals in any position who may have: (A) Access to and detailed knowledge of nuclear power plants or the facilities referred to in § 73.20(a), or (B) items that could facilitate theft of special nuclear material (e.g., small tools, substitute material, false documents, etc.), or both.

(b) Scope. (1) This part prescribes requirements for: (i) The physical protection of production and utilization facilities licensed pursuant to Part 50 of this chapter, (ii) the physical pro

tection of plants in which activities licensed pursuant to Part 70 of this chapter are conducted, and (iii) the physical protection of special nuclear material by any person who, pursuant to the regulations in Part 70 of this chapter, possesses or uses at any site or contiguous sites subject to the control by the licensee, formula quantities of strategic special nuclear material or special nuclear material of moderate strategic significance or special nuclear material of low strategic signifi

cance.

(2) This part prescribes requirements for the physical protection of special nuclear material in transportation by any person who is licensed pursuant to the regulations in Part 70 and Part 110 of this chapter who imports, exports, transports, delivers to a carrier for transport in a single shipment, or takes delivery of a single shipment free on board (F.O.B.) where it is delivered to a carrier, formula quantities of strategic special nuclear material, special nuclear material of moderate strategic significance or special nuclear material of low strategic significance.

(3) This part also applies to shipments by air of special nuclear material in quantities exceeding: (i) 20 grams or 20 curies, whichever is less, of plutonium or uranium-233, or (ii) 350 grams of uranium-235 (contained in uranium enriched to 20 percent or more in the U-235 isotope).

(4) Special nuclear material subject to this part may also be protected pursuant to security procedures prescribed by the Commission or another Government agency for the protection of classified materials. The provisions and requirements of this part are in addition to, and not in substitution for, any such security procedures. Compliance with the requirements of this part does not relieve any licensee from any requirement or obligation to protect special nuclear material pursuant to security procedures prescribed by the Commission or other Government agency for the protection of classified materials.

(5) This part also applies to the shipment of irradiated reactor fuel in quantities that in a single shipment both exceed 100 grams in net weight

of irradiated fuel, exclusive of cladding or other structural or packaging material, and have a total radiation dose in excess of 100 rems per hour at a distance of 3 feet from any accessible surface without intervening shielding.

(6) Scope. This part prescribes requirements for the physical protection of spent fuel stored in an independent spent fuel storage installation (ISFSI licensed under Part 72 of this chapter. (7) This part prescribes require ments for the protection of Safeguards Information in the hands of any person, whether or not a licensee of the Commission, who produces, receives, or acquires Safeguards Information.

[44 FR 43282. July 24, 1979: 44 FR 68186. Nov. 28, 1979, as amended at 45 FR 10328. Feb. 15, 1980: 45 FR 67645, Oct. 14. 1980: 45 FR 74712, Nov. 12, 1980: 45 FR 80271. Dec. 4. 1980: 46 FR 51724. Oct. 22. 1981]

EFFECTIVE DATE NOTE: At 46 FR 51724. Oct. 22, 1981, § 73.1(b)(7) was added, effective Jan. 20, 1982.

$73.2

Definitions.

As used in this part:

(a) Terms defined in Parts 50 and 70 of this chapter have the same meaning when used in this part.

(b) "Authorized individual" means any individual, including an employee. a student, a consultant, or an agent of a licensee who has been designated in writing by a licensee to have responsibility for surveillance of or control over special nuclear material or to have unescorted access to areas where special nuclear material is used or stored.

(c) Guard" means a uniformed individual armed with a firearm whose primary duty is the protection of special nuclear material against theft, the protection of a plant against radiological sabotage, or both.

(d) "Watchman" means an individual, not necessarily uniformed or armed with a firearm, who provides protection for a plant and the special nuclear material therein in the course of performing other duties.

(e) "Continuous visual surveillance” means unobstructed view at all times of a shipment of special nuclear material, and of all access to a temporary