More than 35 percent of VOA's transmitters are over 30 years old. Virtually all of our transmitters are older than 15 years. We broadcast to Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union from Munich using transmitters literally captured from the Nazis at the end of World War II. When the Korean Air Lines jet was downed, VOA was able temporarily to increase its broadcast hours to the Soviet Union. Unlike other international broadcasts, however, we had no state of the art 500-kilowatt supertransmitters only the six gerry-built 500-kilowatt transmitters comprised of two times 250 kilowatts that we had put together. We did not, therefore, have state-of-the-art transmitters that could be used and operated at a capacity that would extend the short period of time our present facilities provide for the increased. transmissions. As President Reagan expressed in a recent weekly radio broadcast, "We are as far behind the Soviets and their allies in international broadcasting today as we were in space when they launched Sputnik in 1957." If VOA is to broadcast clearly and effectively to the peoples of the world, we need your help in supporting our request for resources commensurate to the task. The Senate when it passed the Radio Marti bill last week approved an amendment restoring $54.8 million to USIA in fiscal years 1984 and 1985 for VOA modernization. This is a start, and we appreciate this approval of our request for fiscal year 1984. However, the committee should be aware that the Agency's request for fiscal year 1985 required another $145 million to continue this long overdue process. I hope the committee will give further consideration to this request keeping in mind that the Agency's resources have declined 27 percent in constant dollar terms since 1967 and its personnel level has declined 34 percent. Compared with USIA's budget of $496 million in fiscal year 1982, the Soviet Union in 1982 had a budget allegedly of $2.125 billion for information and exchange-type activities. Many of the Agency's budget and personnel cuts have come at the expense of our field posts which are our front lines in direct contact with key foreign audiences. The Agency is just beginning now to rebuild this most vital resource. Other Agency programs, television, exhibits, research, magazines, the wireless file and many others represent vital links in reaching key foreign audiences and providing analyses and guidance such as the Agency's annual compilation of Soviet informational and cultural activities to U.S. decisionmakers. We are beginning to rebuild all of these programs as well and believe they merit continued congressional support. Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you for the opportunity to meet with you today and again want to thank the other members of the committee for their always constructive support. [The following material was referred to on page 3.] Soviet Destruction of KAL 007 Flight THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 1 (KAL Flight 007 was shot down over the Sea of Japan at 1826 GMT on August 31. Word of its loss, and the circumstances surrounding that loss, began to reach Washington in the late evening of the same day. With Secretary Shultz's announcement on the morning of September 1 of the destruction of the airliner by the USSR, the Agency took immediate action.) At Director Wick's instruction, an Agency Task Force was launched, bringing together the directors of all relevant Agency elements (Voice of America, Television Service, Bureau of Programs and the five geographic area offices) under the Counselor's chairmanship. The Task Force defined Agency objectives on the shoot-down as follows: * Reinforce the impact of ongoing world reaction against the Soviet shoot-down, emphasizing its human and multinational dimensions. * Inform peoples without ready access to commercial media for political reasons (such as the USSR) or technological reasons (such as the Third World) via VOA and through utilization by overseas posts of Agency print and TV output with local media and key official contacts. * Stimulate continuing international attention on the fact that the issues raised by the tragedy are of concern to all nations. Priority tasking of elements included: * VOA Maximize transmissions to the USSR to carry the message through Soviet jamming. * All Agency media - Be prepared to utilize quickly statements and comments made by senior U.S. officials, Members of Congress, foreign commentators, etc. -- Monitor Thursday night commercial American -2 -- Be postured to intensively cover known Friday events - * Press Service -- Assure that all overseas posts receive full information on the fast-developing story via the overnight Wireless File in English, Arabic, Spanish and French and telegraphically for items occurring too late for the Files. * Policy guidance unit - Prepare public affairs guidance for all overseas posts and Agency media, drawing on State Department direction; develop rebuttals to Soviet propaganda, analyses and early warnings to USIA posts of Soviet disinformation; prepare recommendations for U.S. public diplomacy abroad for USG consideration. * USIA Foreign Press Centers -- Washington Center to arrange special briefing for resident correspondents on Friday morning by a high-level USG official; New York Center to be prepared to facilitate coverage of Friday's UNSC special meeting by foreign media correspondents. * Foreign Media Reaction Unit -- Task all overseas posts to begin reporting in extenso relevant news play and commentary appearing in the media of their respective countries -- for use by USG foreign affairs agencies in assuring foreign opinion and for crossplay by Agency media. - * All relevant overseas posts and Washington elements alerted to prepare for exceptional requirements over the long Labor Day weekend ahead. Be Following the initial Task Force meeting, the Counselor established liaison with the just-formed Korean Working Group at State, which was having difficulty establishing the identity of passengers on the downed KAL 007 flight. All USIA overseas posts were cabled to report identification of victims appearing in local foreign media. A Task Force status report was sent to Director Wick at 9 p.m. (Since September 1, all USIA activities have been fully coordinated by the Agency's Task Force.) -3 FRIDAY, SEPTEMBER 2 Voice of America * By 6:30 p.m., VOA transmitters had been redirected to beam an additional 56 hours of transmission time per day to the USSR. * In addition to extensive coverage of the day's pertinent events, VOA taped an interview with the U.S. Ambassador to the USSR, Arthur Hartman, for worldwide use on its weekend "Press Conference USA" program. * VOA's daily editorial presented the USG view on the shoot-down. Television Service At USIA leased studio facilities at the UN, the TV Service arranged interviews with USUN Ambassador Lichenstein, with NYU's Dean of International Law on legal implications of the shoot-down and with the Ambassador to the UN from Trinidad and Tobago on Third World reaction. The TV Service also facilitated taping and transmission of satellite reports done by their own correspondents at the UN to foreign networks. * Videocassette program packages were airshipped to 51 USIA overseas posts, containing the following materials (for local TV placement in the case of USIA-produced programs and for information of Mission personnel and contacts in the case of commercial programs): STATEMENT BY PRESIDENT REAGAN, 9/2: Coverage of the 2:40 EXCERPTS FROM UN DEBATE, 9/2: Edited coverage of the special UN Security Council session called on September 2 to discuss the Soviet's downing of the Korean airliner; MACNEIL/LEHRER REPORT, 9/1: Assistant Secretary of State ABC NIGHTLINE, 9/1: Senator Jesse Helms, Under Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger, Admiral Stansfield Turner, Admiral Bobby Inman, Ambassador Malcolm Toon, ABC Science Editor Jules Bergman, ABC Moscow Bureau Chief Bob Zelnik and others comment on the Soviet's downing of the Korean airliner; -4 INTERVIEW WITH UN DELEGATE, 9/2: Excerpts from interview with the Reverend D. Carl Buxo of Trinidad and Tobago at the United Nations; INTERVIEW WITH INTERNATIONAL LAW EXPERT, 9/2: Excerpts * TV launched production of a television documentary on reaction to the shoot-down; USIA posts worldwide were requested to acquire suitable tapes from local TV networks ASAP. Press Service * Via Wireless File and telegram (USINFO) the following texts were sent to USIA's 126 country posts in English, Arabic, French and Spanish: The Shultz statement (USINFO); article based on Shultz statement (WF); Speakes statement (WF); text of Shultz news Conference (WF); U.S. Congressional reaction roundup (WF); text of Presidential statement from Santa Barbara (WF); Hughes briefing (USINFO, September 2); Q&A from Shultz news conference (USINFO); transcript of State briefing of September 2 (USINFO); summary of VOA interview with Ambassador Hartman (WF). Also transmitted was an update of domestic editorial and foreign press reaction and an update of statements by foreign leaders. Policy Guidance * Policy officers drew their on-the-record guidance for USIA media and overseas posts from White House and State Department spokesmen and background guidance from the new Korean Plane Interagency Working Group chaired by Assistant Secretary Richard Burt at State with which the Task Force continued close coordination in the weeks to come. USIA Foreign Press Centers * At noon, the Washington FPC arranged a heavily-attended interview for resident foreign media correspondents with Linn Pascoe, State Department Soviet Country Director. They were also provided with texts and transcripts of USG statements as they became available during the day. * The New York FPC provided facilitative assistance and official U.S. texts and transcripts to foreign correspondents covering the UNSC debate. |