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2. With the elimination of paid drills for officer students, there would come an end to the necessity of using age limitations as a means of budgetary control. This would retain more qualified officers in the active Reserve and end their being forced out involuntarily.

(a) There is no doubt that young men-say, up to 40 years of age, if they're kept in good physical condition-should be the men directly concerned with combat troops. This age requirement would naturally be higher for higher ranks and at higher command echelons as presently constituted.

(b) But behind every man in the front line there are 10 more keeping him supplied with a material or service. These men, too, must have leadership, but their leader does not have to be an athlete. A man must be physically fit for any type of service, but there are degrees of fitness for each service or echelon of command.

(c) A man of, say, 55 is usually a better leader of men-especially in the services as opposed to the arms-than an athletic young man of 32.

(d) The officer students in the USAR schools today are men destined to be the teachers of tomorrow, to train younger men, should our Nation be engulfed in another conflict. Those within age requirements and physically qualified would fill many tables of organization and equipment unit vacancies should mobilization occur. They are the men, too, who would man our posts, camps, and stations, points of embarkation and debarkation; men who would administer our Government in occupied territory or represent it where a civil-affairs program is required.

There should be no arbitrary age requirement on men of experience, men who have maintained their readiness status, who will be called upon to instruct, to pass their training, wisdom, and knowledge on to others—or men who will fill positions not requiring the agility of youth.

Is it not better to have competent, well-trained men already in the Reserve than to have to offer direct commissions to men whose sole experience is civilian, who have no military training, and who are then expected to be looked up to by military men as their leaders?

(e) Present age limitations imposed on USAR School enrollment are too low and were designed for the sole purpose of cutting the Active Reserve officer strength of the Nation.

Now, let's look at the supply.

6. With service schools anxious to train officers in their respective branches. with warehouses bulging with supplies, no training materials are authorized for issuance to auditor students-only for those so enrolled in courses that they will be attending 2 weeks of summer training in a paid status.

An enrolled officer student is one fortunate enough to meet the stringent requirements established for participation in the program and who looks forward to 2 weeks of summer training with pay and credit for completion of the course. An auditor student is one who attends classes regularly, who receives no pay or other remuneration, who cannot be given credit for completing the course, who cannot go to summer camp, who is serving voluntarily because he is a real reservist. He is not even authorized to receive materials dealing with the subject he is studying.

(a) Here is one of the glaring weaknesses in the Reserve program. Here are men, anxious and willing to continue their military training without cost to the Government, being denied even the use of materials and supplies from which they can gain knowledge and thereby increase their value to the country.

(b) Materials supplied to officers enrolled in extension courses are now denied the officer who prefers classroom study to working alone in his home.

Make the classrooms, training aids, supplies, and materials available to the USAR school reservists. This means more than monetary remuneration.

(c) In the event of actual conflict today, it would still require every available reservist-officer and enlisted-to fill the void. It happened before in World War I, in World War II, and Korea. Without training the Reserves-our main line of defense are being weakened and made worthless.

A PROGRAM FAILS

1. Just a few years ago, the emphasis was on the establishment of a strong Reserve. Special inducements were offered young men to enroll for 6 months of active duty and providing for 7 years of Reserve service as a means of fulfilling their military obligation to the Nation. Paid drill periods for the duration of the Reserve service were held forth as an inducement.

The same Reserve officers who were themselves training, voluntarily, went forth into the land to spread this gospel-speeches in schools and before church groups and organizations-enroll in the Reserve, serve your country at your convenience. Yet, the program did not produce the desired results.

2. This year we are about to reap the benefits of another program-the 2-year draft with a 2-year active Reserve obligation. Men discharged from the active duty phase are supposed to continue in the Active Reserve for 2 years, and in the Standby Reserve for 2 more years. In many cases, they are not doing it. The program is falling apart because the law establishing it has no teeth. And, if it were successful, it would fail because there would be inadequate facilities to house all the units required. What's more important, if the law could be enforced and the facilities were available, the necessary officer leadership would be missing because so much of the Reserve Officer Corps has been dissipated.

3. Over the past 5 years, we of the 1044th Paramus United States Army Reserve School endeavored to recruit enlisted men just discharged from active duty. We needed only a handful for the staff. More than 2,000 letters produced not a single reply. The reason-gained from a few who came in voluntarily without receiving the letter-dissatisfaction with the keeping of preinduction promises and the fear of being summarily recalled to active duty.

RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Strengthen the Reserve Officer Corps by strengthening the USAR School program:

(a) Paid status for staffs and faculty members only.
(b) No remuneration for officer students.

(c) Summer field training only for those officer students where actual practical work is required to maintain proficiency, and then at bases as close to home as possible.

(d) Provide the necessary materials and supplies and training aids in sufficient quantities that every participating officer student might have what is required for sound instruction.

2. Maintain the Reserve Officer Corps by continuing the present policy of promotions and achievement of retirement status upon reaching the age of 60 and completion of 20 or more years of service.

3. Maintain interest in remaining active in the Reserve Officer Corps by(a) Insuring that the individual knows what lies ahead for him; eliminating uncertainties by constant and rapidly changing directives.

(b) Being realistic about age requirements and physical capabilities for various echelons of commmand and the various type of units.

(c) Selling the Reserve program while men-officer and enlisted-are on active duty regardless of the particular program under which they are serving.

4. Estabilsh a program whereby those in the Regular Army in charge of Reserve affairs may have the competent advice of Active Reserve officers on programs, directives, and operations relating to the Reserve program. These should be Reserve officers with an intimate knowledge of the Reserve situation in the area in which they are located. Their services should be made available to the Regular Army commanding officers of all echelons from the Department of the Army down through army and corps levels.

5. Insure the dissemination of information to all levels in sufficient time to allow proper implementation without long periods of uncertainty and indecision. 6. Make greater use of the reservists in the civil defense-disaster control program. The Reserves-Army, Navy, Air Force, Marines, and Coast Guard-officer and enlisted, are trained. They can be assembled quickly and they have the knowledge required to protect an uninstructed civilian populace. They would be accepted as civil defense-disaster control leaders because they are basically civilians with above average military training.

CONCLUSION

Just as the explosion of the first atomic bomb over Hiroshima heralded the dawn of a new era for mankind, so the advent of Russia's sputnik and our own Jupiter satellite herald the birth of an even more advanced period in the life of man. We are today enamoured of space.

We have our eyes and dreams on celestial travel, on missiles that can cross oceans, transcend mountains, and explode on targets far from our shores. We realize we are equally vulnerable to attack from enemy nations with knowledge comparable to ours. We plan our defenses accordingly. We place our confidence and draw our strength from the wonders of science.

We are drawing ourselves behind a curtain of electronics wherein the blowing of a simple fuse a thin strand of wire-can open a huge gap in our defense, can put a complete radar unit out of operation, can cause the misfire of a Niki, Jupiter, Vanguard, or any other missile at the crucial moment when it is needed most.

If this Nation were attacked tomorrow, all the airplanes, all the nuclear bombs, all the guided missiles at our disposal would bring us no victory without trained men to move in behind to take and hold the ground gained as we moved against our enemy. The present strength of our Armed Forces would not be sufficient to solidify gains made by intercontinental missiles, nuclear bomb-carrying aircraft, nor nuclear powered and armed naval craft.

The regular Army, Navy, Air Force, Marines, and Coast Guard cannot defend our country alone, nor would they be capable of carrying a flight to an aggressor. Satellites, missiles, and counter-measures to their use will not give us control over an aggressor or a conquered territory.

We need the Reserves to support our regular Armed Forces. Let's end jealousies between services and between regulars and reservists within each service. In an emergency, the Regulars need the Reserves and the Nation needs the protection.

Let the armed services do the public relations job while they have the menmake them want to continue in the Reserves after active duty. Then, let's keep the Reserves strong in all its branches-mobile, ready for action whenever called upon.

This the Reserve-is the cheapest defense plan our Nation can buy. Thank you for the opportunity of presenting these comments for the consideration of your committee.

ANSON W. MARTIN,
Ridgefield Park, N. J.

STATEMENT OF ROSCOE TURNER, CHAIRMAN, AERONAUTICS COMMITTEE OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY COMMISSION OF THE AMERICAN LEGION

Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, my name is Roscoe Turner. I am chairman of the American Legion's nation aeronautics committee, which is a part of the national security commission. I am grateful to the subcommittee for affording us this opportunity to state our position in the matter of granting term retention contracts to Reserve officers. The American Legion's interest and my appearance before your subcommittee is based on the adoption of Resolution No. 30 by our 1957 national convention.

"Resolution No. 30. Urge legislation to implement the Cordiner Committee Report

"Whereas the American Legion has consitsently believed that national defense and national security can only be maintained with strong, capable and efficient Armed Forces in-being; and

"Whereas such forces in being can be realized by a truly professional force composed of long-term, experienced, highly trained officer and enlisted personnel; and

"Whereas modernization of the military pay structure is a recommendation contained in the Cordiner Committee Report (Defense Advisory Committee of Professional and Technical Compensation); and

"Whereas implementation of the Cordiner Committee proposals will result in: Improved combat capabilities of our Armed Forces; savings and gains of billions of dollars annually; sharp reductions in training accidents and military and civilian personnel losses; reduction in the number of military personnel required to produce a given level of national security; a long-term solution to the basic manpower problems of the armed services; and improved attraction, retention and motivation of the professional and technical civilian personnel in the Department of Defense; now, therefore, be it

"Resolved, That the American Legion, in national convention assembled in Atlantic City, N. J., September 16-19, 1957, petition the President and the

United States Congress to enact legislation implementing the Cordiner Committee Report."

We applaud the motives which caused the Cordiner Committee to devote its time and talent to measures which would serve to steady the manpower of our Armed Forces. Certainly, no one can question the wisdom and desirability of reducing the great turnover in service personnel and the hugh expenditures for retraining such personnel.

Today our interest centers on the plight of the Reserve officer on active duty, who would be benefited by the enactment of H. R. 10171 into law. With the exception of a few minor points which I shall discuss later in this statement, we heartily endorse the provisions of this bill. A vital portion of the Cordiner report, term retention, is a major step forward in the solution of the overall manpower problem. We believe the revised pay structure, with certain modifications, will likewise aid in the solution of the problem.

For the past 11 years there has existed great tension between the free nations of the world and the Communist bloc. International relations have degenerated to a point where citizens, military leaders, and Members of Congress openly discuss the likelihood of surprise attack against the United States by the Soviet Union. Yet in the face of this ever-present danger we have reduced the strength of our standing forces.

The American Legion has no desire whatsoever to oppose reductions in the size of our military forces which result from reorganization of Army divisions or Air Force wings or naval units. In these cases of organic change in which firepower and strength are increased and modernized, no legitimate protest should be made.

If the above had been present when the initial reduction of 100,000 men was made last year or when the second cut of 100,000 men was ordered there would be no cause for concern. However, the facts are that the cut was purely budgetary. The services had overspent their budgets or inflation had reduced the amount of security that could be purchased with budgets approved 2 years before.

Certainly the state of world affairs had not improved sufficiently to justify the cuts nor had the attendant need for a strong military deterrent posture noticeably diminished. To further compound what appears to be an unnecessary gamble with American security, proposals are now being advanced for a budget which would drastically reduce the size and composition of the Army Reserve and National Guard.

Traditionally the United States has followed a policy of replacing strength taken from the Active Forces with equal numbers in the Reserve. Our national commander has already expressed the strong opposition of the American Legion to this new policy of concurrently reducing our Active and Reserve Forces. We fail to see the wisdom or necessity for this action.

We are of the opinion that this series of events is a pathetic contrast of unbelievably poor planning: On the one hand, a maximum effort is being exerted by the military departments to foster the enactment of the Cordiner recommendations designed to retain skilled technicians and needed officer personnel in service. Concomitantly though, we find thousands of good officers being forced out of active service.

This intermittent pattern of retention and wholesale discharge of reservists is not new. Thousands of reservists were induced to remain on active duty after World War II and by inference, if not by word, lead to believe that they could count on making the Armed Forces a career. In 1949 and 1950 they discovered to their sorrow that this was not to be so.

Korea saw the recall of 600,000 reservists, in the main, veterans of World War II. Many of these men, some of our finest Reserve officers, after contemplating their years of service spent in World War II and Korea, decided in favor of making the military service a career. Again there was no written guaranty that these men would ever be permitted to accumulate the minimum 20 years needed for retirement. Last year many of these same officers were forced out of service with little or no recourse. Requests were made of the military services to accommodate these manpower cuts by attrition. This was not done. We believe that a clear policy statement on the role of Reserve Forces is very sorely needed. If the American leadership believes that the next conflict will be wholly nuclear, thereby abbreviating the necessity for Reserve Forces, then this policy should be proclaimed publicly. To this particular point the American Legion addressed itself at its 1957 national convention by adoption of Resolution No. 303.

"Resolution No. 303. Support Military Establishment With Well-Rounded Capabilities and Oppose Squeezing Our Military Forces Into a Nuclear Straitjacket

"Resolved by the American Legion in national convention assembled in Atlantic City, N. J., September 16-19, 1957, That we support a Military Establishment with well-rounded capabilities to insure our Government the freedom of action it must have to meet its world responsibilities. We shall oppose any attempt to squeeze our military forces into a nuclear straitjacket."

Term retention contracts for Reserve officers is long overdue. It is a necessary minimum guaranty to the Reserve officer and his family that they are to be given reasonable assurance of a permanent military career.

There can be little doubt that shortsighted policies have dimmed the luster of active duty for Reserves. We honestly hope that the passage of H. R. 10171 will increase service attractiveness.

We offer for the committees' consideration an amendment to provide for the full payment of the unexpired time of the contract which is presently the practice in private business. As an alternative, we present the recommendation that this legislation be at least strengthened by providing for payment of at least 2 months severance pay for each year the contract has to run rather than for the period of the contract that has been served.

Another means of attracting younger qualified officers would be an amendment to Reserve Officers Personnel Act to provide that officers with 15 years of active duty be permitted to complete their 20 years of service.

Long-range manpower and fiscal planning appear to be an indispensable requirement for strong national security. The American Legion sees no easy solution to our security requirements. Certainly, we know of no proposition or contingency which, at the present time, would make unnecessary a strong Reserve. We therefore endorse and support H. R. 10171 and express our deep appreciation to your committee for the privilege of this presentation.

STATEMENT ON H. R. 10171 BY COL. JOHN T. CARLTON, USAR, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, RESERVE OFFICERS ASSOCIATION OF THE UNITED STATES

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, we appreciate the opportunity of appearing before you to discuss the need for legislative action to prevent the recurrence of injustices to Reserve officers during the reduction in force in the Nation's military strength during the past fall.

This association previously has made known to you our concern about this reduction in force. We have protested before this committee, as well as to every other authority concerned, the unnecessary hardships visited upon the several thousand Reserve officers released. Of greater importance, of course, was the fact that this weakening of our standing military forces came at a time when world tensions were as great as they had been; that they were enforced as a pure dollar-saving program; and that they occurred while we are in the dangerous transition period between 2 military eras, or 2 weapons systems, which are radically different.

Mr. Chairman, it seems to us that the armed services have not acted as promptly as circumstances demanded to devise and recommend an appropriate Reserve officer retention law. We feel that the Nation deserves highest standard of performance from all officers, including the Reserves. To demand that the highest caliber officers respond to calls to duty is unrealistic unless there are morale incentives, and some assurances of service security.

All we are asking is that the Reserve officer be told what his status is, where he stands, or what the score is.

Since World War II there has been a continuing series of programs by the services. Thousands of our finest Reserve officers who have given the best part of their lives to the services, have been released, irrespective of the hardship inflicted.

In the 2 years immediately following World War II (1946 and 1947) the armed services found it necessary, if our world commitments were to be met and adequate national security provided, to retain thousands of Reserve officers on extended active duty. It is true that in most cases no written promise was made to individuals in this category. By word of mouth from members of the Active Forces, it was either promised or implied that these officers would serve an indefinite time.

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