57 Agric. Dec. 1 AGRICULTURAL MARKETING AGREEMENT ACT COURT DECISION GORE, INC. d/b/a PURE MILK CO. v. GLICKMAN. No. 97-50047. Decision filed April 2, 1998. (Cite as: 137 F.3d 863) Prejudgment interest - Milk producer-settlement fund. The sole issue before the Fifth Circuit was whether Gore was entitled to prejudgment interest on funds the court previously ordered to be refunded from the producer-settlement fund. The court reviewed the question de novo. The AAA and the Department's regulations are silent as to the issue of prejudgment interest, so the court looked to whether the award of interest would further congressional policy under the AAA and considered legal precedent of other courts, as well as the implications of sovereign immunity. In so doing, the court concluded that awarding prejudgment interest was warranted. United States Court of Appeals, Before KING and JONES, Circuit Judges, and WERLEIN,* District Judge. WERLEIN, District Judge: The sole issue in this appeal is whether Plaintiff-Appellant Gore, Inc. is entitled to prejudgment interest on a refund it recovered in Gore, Inc. v. Espy, 87 F.3d 767 (5th Cir.1996) ("Gore I"). In "Gore I" this Court held that Gore was entitled to recover from the milk producer-settlement fund the sum of $366,772.28 in payments that Gore had made into that fund pursuant to an erroneous determination made by the Secretary of Agriculture. We now hold that Gore is also entitled to recover from the producer-settlement fund prejudgment interest on those payments, and we therefore REVERSE the judgment of the district court that denied prejudgment interest. 'District Judge of the Southern District of Texas, sitting by designation. Background The background of this lawsuit, and various policies underlying the Agriculture Marketing Agreement Act of 1937' ("AAA"), are set forth in "Gore I." The details may be found there of how Gore paid $366,772.38 into the producer-settlement fund in 1990-91, and then successively sought-as required by law-administrative review by the Secretary of Agriculture, which review was conducted and decided by an administrative law judge, further review and decision by the Secretary's chief judicial officer, and finally judicial review in the courts. Not until this Court's decision in July, 1996, which held that the Secretary's determination under 7 C.F.R. § 1126.4 was arbitrary, capricious, and plainly inconsistent with the text of the regulation, was Gore's position finally vindicated. Thereupon, this Court rendered judgment that Gore recover from the producersettlement fund a refund of the full sum, and remanded the case for appropriate disposition. The district court appropriately entered judgment in Gore's favor for the principal sum of $366,772.38, on November 7, 1996, but later denied Gore's motion to amend the judgment to add prejudgment interest on the refund, which by then had been withheld by the producer-settlement fund for approximately six years. Gore now appeals from the judgment of the district court that denied prejudgment interest. Analysis The availability of prejudgment interest under the AAA is a question of law, which is reviewed de novo. Carpenters Dist. Council of New Orleans & Vicinity v. Dillard Dep't Stores, 15 F.3d 1275, 1281 (5th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1126, 115 S.Ct. 933, 130 L.Ed.2d 879 (1995) ("Questions of law are subject to de novo review while findings of fact will be disturbed only if we find that they are clearly erroneous."). The AAA does not expressly provide for or prohibit an award of prejudgment interest in a refund case. Likewise, the regulations of the Department of Agriculture promulgated under the AAA also are silent on the subject. It is provided, however, that "[a]ny monies found to be due a handler from the market administrator shall be paid promptly to such handler. . . ." 7 C.F.R. § 1126.77 17 U.S.C. § 601 et seq. (1980 & Supp. 1997). 57 Agric. Dec. 1 (1997).2 In a variety of situations the United States Supreme Court has provided the principles for determining whether prejudgment interest should be awarded when a specific statute is silent on the subject. In Rodgers v. United States, 332 U.S. 371, 373, 68 S.Ct. 5, 7, 92 L.Ed. 3 (1947), the Court put it this way: [T]he failure to mention interest in statutes which create obligations has not been interpreted by this Court as manifesting an unequivocal congressional purpose that the obligation shall not bear interest. Billings v. United States, 232 U.S. 261, 284-288, 34 S.Ct. 421, 425-427, 58 L.Ed. 596. For in the absence of an unequivocal prohibition of interest on such obligations, this Court has fashioned rules which granted or denied interest on particular statutory obligations by an appraisal of the congressional purpose in imposing them and in the light of general principles deemed relevant by the Court. In City of Milwaukee v. Cement Div., Nat'l Gypsum Co., 515 U.S. 189, 194, 115 S.Ct. 2091, 2095, 132 L.Ed.2d 148 (1995), a unanimous Court (J. Breyer not participating) stated: Although Congress has enacted a statute governing the award of postjudgment interest in federal court litigation, see 28 U.S.C. § 1961, there is no comparable legislation regarding prejudgment interest. Far from indicating a legislative determination that prejudgment interest should not be awarded, however, the absence of a statute merely indicates that the question is governed by traditional judge-made principles. See also Monessen Southwestern Ry. Co. v. Morgan, 486 U.S. 330, 336-337, 108 S.Ct. 1837, 1842-43, 100 L.Ed.2d 349 (1988); West Virginia v. United States, 479 'The "market administrator" is selected by the Secretary, and heads the agency for the administration of a federal milk marketing order. 7 C.F.R. § 1000.3 (1997). The nation is divided into more than 40 marketing areas, and the Secretary issues numerous marketing orders (a few of which apply to more than one marketing area). 7 U.S.C. § 608c(5) (Supp.1997). This case arises from events in the Texas marketing area, which geographically consists of most of the State of Texas. See 7 C.F.R. § 1126.2 (1997). The market administrator for the Texas marketing area is required to establish and maintain "a separate fund known as the 'producer-settlement fund,' into which he shall deposit the payments made by handlers. ..." 7C.F.R. § 1126.70 (1997). It is into this specific producer-settlement fund for the Texas marketing area that the market administrator was required to deposit the payments erroneously ordered to be paid during 1990-91. |