196 OPINION SCHNEIDER v. SMITH. No act of sabotage or espionage or any act inimical to the security of the United States is raised or charged in the present case. In United States v. Rumely, 345 U. S. 41, the Court construed the statutory word "lobbying" to include only direct representation to Congress, its members, and its committees, not all activities tending to influence, encourage, promote, or retard legislation. Id., at 47. Such an interpretation of the statute, it was said, was “in the candid service of avoiding a serious constitutional doubt" (ibid.)-doubts that were serious "in view of the prohibition of the First Amendment." Id., at 46. The holding in Rumely was not novel. It is part of the stream of authority which admonishes courts to construe statutes narrowly so as to avoid constitutional questions." The Court said in Rumely, "Whenever constitutional limits upon the investigative power of Congress have to be drawn by this Court, it ought only to be done after Congress has demonstrated its full awareness of what is at stake by unequivocally authorizing an inquiry of dubious limits. Experience teaches us to tread warily in this domain." 345 U. S., at 46. The present case involves investigation, not by Congress but by the Executive Branch, stemming from congressional delegation. When we read that delegation with an eye to First Amendment problems, we hesitate to conclude that Congress told the Executive to ferret out the ideological strays in the maritime industry. The words it used "to safeguard . . . from sabotage or other subversive acts"-refer to actions, not to ideas or 5 United States v. Delaware & H. Co., 213 U. S. 366, 407-408; United States v. Harris, 347 U. S. 612, 618, n. 6; International Machinists v. Street, 367 U. S. 740, 749; Lynch v. Overholser, 369 U. S. 705, 710-711; United States v. National Dairy Corp., 372U. S. 29, 32. 196 OPINION SCHNEIDER v. SMITH. beliefs. We would have to stretch those words beyond their normal meaning to give them the meaning the Solicitor General urges. Rumely, and its allied cases, teach just the opposite-that statutory words are to be read narrowly so as to avoid questions concerning the "associational freedom" that Shelton v. Tucker protected and concerning other rights within the purview of the First Amendment. Reversed. MR. JUSTICE BLACK, while concurring in the Court's judgment and opinion, also agrees with the statement in MR. JUSTICE FORTAS' concurring opinion that the statute under consideration, if construed to authorize the interrogatories involved, is offensive to the First Amendment. MR. JUSTICE MARSHALL took no part in the consideration or decision of this case. MR. JUSTICE FORTAS, concurring. I concur in the opinion of the Court. Reversal is dictated because the interrogatories which petitioner refused to answer offend the First Amendment. Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U. S. 479 (1960). (They also pass the outermost bounds of reason. No agency may be permitted to require of a person, subject to heavy penalty, sworn essays as to his "attitude toward the form of government of the United States" or "full particulars," under oath, without time limit, as to contributions made and functions attended with respect to 250 organizations.) I agree that since Congress did not specifically authorize a personnel screening program, authority to impose procedures of the comprehensive type here involved, necessarily impinging on First Amendment freedoms, may not be inferred from dubious general language. The fault, however, is not that there was an inadequate or improper delegation, but that Congress did not authorize the type of investigation which was launched. Needless to say, Congress has constitutional power to authorize an appropriate personnel screening program and to delegate to executive officials the power to implement and administer it. See United States v. Robel, U. S. (1967). MR. JUSTICE STEWART, agreeing with the separate views of MR. JUSTICE FORTAS, concurs in the judgment.. MR. JUSTICE WHITE, with whom MR. JUSTICE HARLAN joins, concurring in the result. I agree with the Court that the Magnuson Act did not authorize the inqury undertaken by the Coast Guard Commandant and that therefore the judgment of the District Court must be reversed. I express no opinion as to the scope of inqury which Congress could constitutionally provide with respect to applicants for the position of merchant seaman. References: (a) Executive Order 10865, Safeguarding Classi- (b) DoD Directive 5220.6, Subject: Industrial Per- (c) DoD Directive 5220. 22, DoD Industrial Security Program, dated July 30, 1965 (d) DoD Directive 5515.9, Settlement of Claims Under the Provisions of the Federal Tort Claims Act (28 U.S. Code; Sections 26712680) (Delegation to the Secretary of the Army) dated November 15, 1961 (e) DoD Directive 5210.8, Policy on Investigation and Clearance of DoD Personnel for Access to Classified Defense Information, dated February 15, 1962 PURPOSE In accordance with reference (a) this Directive establishes the standard and criteria for making security clearance determinations when persons employed in private industry require access to classified defense information, and sets forth procedures which shall be followed for cases arising under the DoD Industrial Personnel Security Clearance Program (hereinafter referred to as the Program). CANCELLATION Reference (b) is hereby superseded and cancelled, effective 30 days from the date hereof. 94-756 68 pt. 2 --8 |