fhewing to what great and inexplicable difficulties it reduced this truly learned Prelate, in his defence of types and fecondary prophecies, against Mr. Collins, the author of The grounds and reasons, &c.

It may be the more feasonable to review this debate, fince Lord Bolingbroke feems fo well fatisfied in his ridicule of these modes of information; which he confiders only as fo many convict impertinencies and whims, unworthy the attention of a rational and thinking man. Now as he has not condefcended to reafon on the fubject, or to fpecify and point out his particular objections, we can at best but conjecture what they might be. And as he was not famous for ftriking out any new lights of his own, we may reasonably prefume, that Mr. Collins was his Oracle on this occafion as well as on others; and that he looked upon the arguments, advanced in The grounds and reafons, against types and fecondary prophecies, as so many unanfwerable truths.

Thefe arguments fuppofe, first, that the modes of information are neither reasonable, just, nor proper; as not agreeable to the rules of fair criticism and found logic.

c Vol. iv. p. 283, &c. " There is no room for reafon"ing about the two former." i. e. types and figures.

2dly, Had they been properly and strictly logical, yet they would not have been made ufe of in a revealed Religion, because such a one can have nothing to hide from those to whom it is delivered.

My Lord Bishop replies as follows: "It "can hardly be supposed, that God intending finally to fave the world by Chrift, and the preaching of the Gofpel, fhould give an "intermediate Law, which had no respect "nor relation to the covenant, which he in"tended to establish for ever: And whoever "will be at the pains to confider feriously "the whole administration of providence "together, from the beginning to the end, may fee, perhaps, more reason than he ima"gines, to allow of types and figures in the Jewish Law "

He undertakes to fhew, that we may naturally and reasonably expect to find types and figures in the Old Teftament. It was his bufinefs then to prove, that they were properly and strictly logical, and not the product of a warm and heated imagination, but founded on real and folid principles of reafon. Now, as he has not attempted to do this, he leaves the first objection of his adverfary unanswered, and even untouched.

Difcourfes on prophecy, p. 145. Fourth Edition.

To

To affume the logical fitnefs and propriety of these modes of information in a dispute with the author of The grounds and reafons, is plainly begging the queftion, which the rules of difputation required should be proved.

To tell the infidel, that they are really found in the Old Teftament, unless you have previously cleared and rescued them from the charge of being unfcholaftic, groundlefs, and abfurd; would be furnishing him with fuch an occafion of triumph, as the learned Prelate, I dare fay, did not intend to give him.

It is then a great, and even fundamental, defect in his Lordship's reafoning, that he did not previously explain and vindicate the logical fitness and propriety of these figures. A second defect is, that his reasoning does not come up to the point which he undertakes to prove. He is to prove, that in the Old Teftament we may reasonably look for types, or that particular mode and fpecies of prophecy, distinguished by this appellation. All he performs, is, that the Law must have fome fort of reference and relation

• The clear and full elucidation of this curious and important point was referved for the hands of a mafter critic. See D. L. Vol. ii. Book 6. Sect. 6.

to the Gofpel, manner, or other.

muft predict it in fome But to what purpofe is

it to fhew, that we may reasonably look for prophecy in general, or fome kind of prophecy, in the Old Teftament, when the question relates to that particular species and precife mode of prophecy, which we call typical?

His Lordship, therefore, profeffes one thing, and proves another. He afferts the reafonableness and propriety of types in particular, but labours only to fhew the reasonableness and propriety of prophecy in general.

Nay, had he evinced the logical fitness and propriety of types, his argument had been still infufficient; fince he was to prove, that this particular and precise mode of prophecy might reasonably be looked for in the Old Teftament, as being well adapted to the nature and genius of the Jewish Religion.

Now he has not only failed to support the affirmative, but has laid down fuch principles as would naturally lead one to affert the negative, or to maintain that types are contrary and foreign to the nature and genius of the Jewish Religion, and confequently are not to be expected in the Old Teftament. He fuppofes, and it is allowed on all hands, that the fpiritual bleffings, promifed

promised in the Gofpel, were the subject of the ancient types. He fuppofes also, that the Jewish Religion was to predict and difplay these bleffings clearly and openly, for the present information of the Jewish Church. Now if the nature and genius of the Law required this open and immediate instruction, what occafion was there for fo dark and obfcure a medium of conveyance as that of Types?

Since his Lordship is forced to acknowledge, that even the metaphorical and figurative fense of the ancient prophecies was used for a veil or cover, much rather should he have seen that the typical and fecondary sense was intended for this purpose. If therefore he will contend that types and Secondary prophecies are properly connected with, and neceffarily flow from, the nature and genius of the Jewish Religion, he muft, in confequence, reverse his other principle, and fay, that this religion was not given to reveal, but to hide, the spiritual bleffings of the Gospel-Dispenfation.

This feems to be the only idea of the Jewish Religion, which can fupport us in making it the proper refidence and feat of Types and fecondary Prophecies. We must

f Second Difcourfe.

H

therefore