Mr. BIEMILLER. This is precisely the reason that we supported the Gore-Holifield bill and will continue to support that kind of legisla tion. The CHAIRMAN. Any further questions? Representative PRICE. Will you tell us something about the difficulties you have been having in getting amendments to workmen's compensation laws throughout the country? Mr. BIEMILLER. To the best of my knowledge, there are only two States in the Union that have anything approaching an adequate workmen's compensation law today so far as proper protection as to radiation hazards is available. Representative PRICE. What two States? Mr. BIEMILLER. New York and California. Representative PRICE. Were those recent recognitions, or were they in the law before we began the atomic era? Mr. BIEMILLER. No. Those are fairly recent. Now, let me give you a concrete illustration of the reverse kind of situation, of the kind of thing that bothers us. There is a recent decision in the State of South Carolina, in which, after all, atomic development is no small problem today, in which a worker was judged to have received a serious occupational disease from radiation. But the second part of the decision was that compensation was not available, because the statute of limitations had run its course. Now, that is the kind of concrete problem that we are trying to get at. We won't know, of course, until the end of the sessions of the 44 legislatures that are now in session as to what progress is made. But there are still, over and above the statute of limitation problems, some 9 or 10 States that do not even recognize radiation disease as a compensable item under workmen's compensation laws. Representative PRICE. Would you say that in a good number of the general assemblies now in session there is consideration being given to providing for radiation accidents in their compensation laws? Mr. BIEMILLER. I cannot answer that question accurately. The information is coming in to us at the moment. But, offhand, I recall noting only half a dozen in which some attention is being given. The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Biemiller. Mr. Clyde Ellis is the next witness. Mr. Ellis is our former colleague in the House. We are glad to have you here with us this morning. I note that you have a summary, and you have a lengthy statement. Do you just want to read the summary and put the rest of your statement in the record, or how do you wish to proceed? STATEMENT OF CLYDE T. ELLIS, GENERAL MANAGER, NATIONAL RURAL ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE ASSOCIATION Mr. ELLIS. Mr. Chairman, I understood you required a summary. I would prefer to present the entire statement, but of course I am at the command of the committee. The CHAIRMAN. You may proceed, then, on that basis. Mr. ELLIS. My name is Clyde T. Ellis. I am general manager of the National Rural Electric Cooperative Association. NRECA is a national service organization representing 92 percent of the operating rural-electric systems. These systems serve about 3,800,000 farm families and rural establishments in 43 States and Alaska. Most of the nearly 1,000 rural-electric systems in the country are distribution systems only, and don't have their own sources of power, The rural-electric systems are currently paying in excess of $150 million a year for wholesale power. Their use of wholesale power is doubling every 4 to 5 years, and more than one-fourth of them are in difficulty on their wholesale supply one way or another. The members of this committee are aware of the continuing interest the rural-electric systems have had in the atomic-energy program. In each of our 10 regional meetings held last fall, covering in the aggregate all the States, at least 1 resolution was passed concerning the atomic-energy program. And in all of these resolutions there is one common request that the atomic-energy program be speeded up. More specifically, these resolutions urge that: (1) Congress appropriate funds for the Federal construction of the necessary atomic powerplants to act as a yardstick on costs; (2) Private and public agencies do everything in their power to lend their aid and assistance to the speedy attainment of production of electricity from atomic energy at low costs; and (3) Congress direct the AEC to construct civilian atomic powerplants of different types and sizes in order to accelerate the civilian atomic-power program which is stalled on dead center. This authori zation would be similar to the Gore-Holifield bill. In addition, several of the resolutions adopted stress the fears that existing policies threaten to transfer control of this invaluable treasure to a few great corporations without properly safeguarding the public interest, despite the fact that for all practical purposes the entire program has been financed by the Federal Government. I'm sure we need not dwell long on the point that our economy, as well as the economies of all other industrialized nations, is based on a low-cost source of energy. Improved living standards in our own Nation, and in underdeveloped nations, can come about only through the increased use of low-cost power. It has been demonstrated that there is a high correlation between the per capita income of the Nation and the per capita consumption of electrical energy. Nations with a low per capita income have a corresponding low per capita consumption of electricity. Any assumption made to the effect that we can continue to increase our standard of living without an ever-expanding supply of low-cost energy is by definition fallacious. This is particularly true as long as our economy is so heavily burdened by the cost of war and cold war. The great hope, it seems to us, is nuclear power. The problems and we fully recognize they are not small ones--are to speed the development of nuclear technology and to see that the fruits of this technology are neither delayed by short-run private financial requirements nor blighted by private monopolistic restraints of whatever kind, for whatever purpose. PROGRESS IN THE UNITED STATES ATOMIC-ENERGY PROGRAM It appears to us that we can measure progress in the atomic-energy field in terms of: (a) The economic resources employed in research into the technology and feasibility of developing the atomic-energy program, viewed against the background of public policy-the adequacy of the law, adequacy of finance, and the vision and responsibility manifested by those responsible for administering and promoting this program so vital to the national welfare; (b) Concrete plans for construction of commercial power reactors backed by firm financial commitments; (c) Commercial power reactors actually under construction: (1) by any producer or manufacturer; (2) by Government to ascertain accurate costs and a yardstick; (d) Commercial power reactors actually in operation. Naturally, all these indicators should be measured by the variety of reactor types and sizes multiplied by kilowatt capacity. It is easier to discuss these progress indicators in reverse order. As regards the number and variety of commercial power reactors actually in operation, the answer is short and simple "none," but the Argonne Laboratory 5,000 kilowatt boiling water reactor, if it is to be counted as one. As regards the commercial power reactors actually under construction, we are informed that there is only one which we can actually say has progressed to a stage where completion seems assured. (Possibly the General Electric 5,000 kilowatt boiling water reactor and the North American Aviation 10,000 kilowatt sodium graphite reactor will also go into operation this year, but they are small ones.) This is the 60,000 kilowatt initial capacity reactor under construction at Shippingport, Pa., and, as you know, this reactor is being subsidized nearly 100 percent by the Federal Government, considering both the direct AEC subsidy and the indirect accelerated tax amortization benefits. In reference to plans for commercial reactors backed by firm commitments, we have heard many rumors and have been informed of many private utility combines banding together to engage in the construction of nuclear reactors, such as the Power Reactor Development Co. and the nuclear-power group, the Florida group, Carolina power group, et cetera, but all of these proposals are still more or less in the formative stage and we cannot count them as being actualities until real construction has been under way. Senator GORE. You mean real construction, or digging a hole in the ground? Mr. ELLIS. I mean real construction. Senator GORE. Not a political ground breaking. Mr. ELLIS. No, sir. That is very important, I think. As regards our first indicator of the measure of progress in the atomic-energy field, I would like to make the following observations. To all of us who are essentially "laymen" in the field of atomic technology, the adequacy of resources devoted to research can be measured only by the fruits of that research. This is true for many reasons but primarily because we do not seem to be able to cut through the conficting, extravagant, and sometimes, I fear, even less-than-honest claims being made in this area. Over the past 16 years the AEC, private industry, the universities and other agencies have accumulated a vast amount of technical data on the production of power from nuclear energy. The results of research and development in areas such as fabrication of fuel elements, 89517-57-pt. 2-3 studies of metallurgy, et cetera, combined with the progress made in the construction of pilot- and full-scale plants have all helped in pushing back the barriers of the unknown in the atomic energy field. But the fact still remains that we will not really know what the costs of generating commercial atomic power will be until commercial power reactors have actually been constructed and operated. What we really need, it appears to me, is not only construction but also actual operating experience from which to draw experimenta data applicable to commercial scale production of electricity from nuclear fission. Without such experience we are, in effect, reaching for something in the dark, and a guess from one expert seems as goo as another. We have been told that the cost of installed capacity for commercial. scale atomic reactor plants would be from $300 per kilowatt up t $800 per kilowatt. This is no guess at all-merely mental gymnastic We are told that it will be 10 to 20 years before nuclear power wi be competitive with power from other fuels, but on the other hand we are told that economic production with large-scale plants is nor feasible in areas of high conventional fuel costs. Still others urg us to more or less forget the problem because we have adequate fossi fuels for many years. And still others, for instance, tell us that nuclear powerplants wil be competitive by 1980, and the Atomic Energy Commission recently took the optimistic view that within 10 to 15 years economic nucle power generation would be a reality, and by 1975 we could expect installed capacity of 80 million kilowatts of nuclear power generation But AEC officials seem to say all things. I seem to recall Chairma Strauss saying some 3 years ago that electricity generated from atomic power would be too cheap to meter. Did he mean in America? An if so, when? Senator GORE. Are you quoting? Mr. ELLIS. That is the substance of his statement. No; I am not quoting exactly, but that is what he said. I could go on citing other examples of estimates made by the expert: which agree with, are slightly at variance with, or are diametrical opposed to one or several of the estimates related above. This al serves to point up one thing-we just don't know what we can expect We have no real, direct experience to give us a clue or the answer the question: Which types of reactors will produce power cheap enough to be competitive with other sources? We have the fail that some will. And, as I have said, the main reason we do not know the answer this important economic question is that we do not have, for all pra tical purposes, any reactor operating today in this country designe specifically to produce commercial power. The National Rural Electric Cooperative Association's princip area of emphasis in this area has been public policyadequacy of the law, adequacy of public finance, vision and responsibility mat fested by those responsible for administering, and promoting this program We have insisted from the beginning that if we were to get results reasonable time public funds would be required-direct or subsid Our views seem to have been substantiated-it is over 10 years sin the McMahon Act, almost 3 since the 1954 amendments. The priva utilities and Mr. Strauss have repeatedly said: "No! We do not need a dynamic federally financed atomic power program, private industry will do it." They promise, they hedge, they retreat from earlier prognostications and claims under a smokescreen of new claims. We were told in a nationwide ad appearing in many metropolitan newspapers last summer that the United States had built 55 reactors. This ad was sponsored by 120 private power companies and the ad implied that the sponsors were responsible for the construction of these reactors. Under questioning by a congressional committee, however, we find that the private power companies had nothing to do with the building of these reactors, and further, the witness admitted that the United States could not depend at this time solely on the private power industry to foster the growth and development of the atomic energy program. We were amazed to learn that this advertisement was shown to officers of the AEC prior to its publication, and in spite of the obvious fraud in the ad, the AEC did not offer any criticism. We have been told by Admiral Strauss, in a speech before the New York Board of Trade on October 10, 1956, that all is well with our civilian atomic energy program, and that we were making amazing progress in this field due to the policies of the Commission. Admiral Strauss said that the people of the United States had built 82 reactors "of all types and all sizes, for all purposes." He failed to reveal the fact that 68 of the 82 reactors were low-pressure types and not suited for commercial power production. Continuing his remarks, the admiral said that: In terms of strictly civilian atomic power, our program includes 30 reactors in operation in the United States, under construction or planned, for experimental or for actual full-scale use. Eighteen of these thirty plants will provide civilian commercial power for homes and industries, beginning with the Shippingport plant next year. Now, gentlemen, that statement appears, at least to me, to be the boldest kind of facetiousness. To say that there are 30 reactors "in operation* *** under construction or planned *** for experimental or for actual full-scale use" would be like my saying that I have 30 rabbit hutches in operation, under construction or planned, for experimental or for actual full-scale use. That word "or" is the catch. I do have 30 planned for experimental use. This misuse of the word "or" is one of the crudest tricks known to humanity for giving the wrong impression. Yes, AEC has one under construction (two if you count the little 5,000-kilowatt-job at Argonne), and maybe some planned, but it certainly does not have one in operation for full use in electrical production. Senator GORE. You have heard of the rabbit and mule stew, have you not? Mr. ELLIS. I do not believe so, sir. Senator GORE. One rabbit and one mule? Mr. ELLIS. Yes, sir. Senator GORE. Would you mind giving the date of this speech? Mr. ELLIS. October 10, 1956. |