be abused in their hands, it still remains true that we cannot give them the relief they desire. And it may be added that if the Commissioners of Emigration were to open the doors to complainants they must do the same thing for others, and the old condition of things would soon be restored. Such at least would seem to be the inevitable result.

No part of the relief which complainants seek on their own behalf can therefore be granted.

In so far as complainants ask an order for the benefit of the immigrants themselves, it is based on three grounds, namely:

I. Excessive charge for transportation. II. Excessive charge for baggage.

III. Unsuitable transportation.

Emigrant fare, when the complaint was filed, was thirteen dollars from New York to Chicago. The evidence which was given to establish the fact that this charge was unreasonable consisted largely of proofs that the charge had formerly been much lower. Not much can be predicated of this fact. There is scarcely a road in the country that has not at some time carried passengers or freight at a compensation that would bankrupt it if long persisted in. This fact is very well known and understood. The other evidence brought forward on the hearing did not so much tend to establish the fact that the charge made was unreasonable, as that the immigrants were not given suitable transportation. Since this case was heard, however, that rate has been reduced five dollars, at which figure it now stands. The reduction is the result of a rate war, brought about, as there is reason to believe, by the payment of commissions to secure the routing of the immigrants. While the war continues the carriers will doubtless do what they can to injure each other in respect to this branch of their business, and in doing so they will at the same time to a greater or less extent break down or weaken the protections devised for the immigrants. Meantime there is no occasion for an expression of an opinion upon the reasonableness of the former rate.

When the complaint was filed the allowance of free baggage to an immigrant was 100 pounds, and the charge for extra baggage was $2.60 per hundred pounds. The allowance of free baggage was increased before the hearing to 150 pounds and the charges for extra baggage reduced to $1.95 per hundred pounds. The charge does not seem to be excessive.

The transportation was supposed to be unsuitable because the vehicles of conveyance were unfit for the purpose, and also because the time made was unreasonably long. On the last point the evidence was not sufficiently specific to enable' the Commission to say that there is clear failure in duty. It is no doubt true that in very many cases immigrant trains do not make the time intended, and that the immigrants and the friends who may be waiting for them at the points of destination are greatly inconvenienced thereby; but this in a great many cases happens with the first-class passenger trains also, and it is not possible at all times to prevent it. The schedule time between New York and Chicago over the different routes at the time of the hearing varied from about thirty-three hours to thirty-nine. This, if the trains were run to it, could hardly be deemed unreasonable for a distance averaging over the several lines about a thousand miles.

As regards the cars used for the transportation of emigrants the Commission deemed personal inspection better than the taking of evidence, and caused one to be made in the several yards at New York city and vicinity and on the routes of the several railroad carriers. The result of the inspection was in some cases satisfactory and in others not. The most unsatisfactory cars were found in use by the New York Central and Hudson River Railroad Company, those employed; on the West Shore road being the worst of all. The attention of the executive officers of the company was at once called to the necessity of improvement in this regard, and assurances were given that the unfit cars then in use on the road should be put in proper condition or be replaced by such as were suitable as soon as it could well be done. Former deficiencies in respect to cleanliness it was also promised should not be discoverable hereafter.

It is suggested on the part of complainants that defendants are guilty of discrimination in refusing to sell tickets to other persons on the same rates that they make to immigrants. But we are not satisfied that this is unjust discrimination. The roads west of Chicago it seems have only first and second class rates; the respondents have an immigrant rate in addition. If they were to give immigrant rates to other persons the distinction on which the rates are made, and which limits them to a particular class of persons, would be done away with, and the second-class rates and the immigrant rates would almost necessarily become merged. We are not satisfied that this would be best, and in any view we might be inclined to take of it, we should not order it to be done in a case where the point is raised so indirectly as it is here, and not by parties interested in it.

The case of Smith v. Northern Pacific Railroad Company (1 Int. C. C. Rep., 208), is cited against the right to make the distinction between immigrant and second-class rates, but we do not think it applicable. In that case a distinction in charge was attempted to be made between classes of persons who could not by any practicable tests be distinguished and who were all to enjoy the same accommodations. In the case before us we have a class of persons readily distinguishable from the general public, and so far constituting a special class that up to the time when they are received upon the cars they are subject to exceptional regulations for reasons which, being accepted as a basis of legislation, must be deemed sufficient. This special class of persons are given accommodations essentially different to those provided for others, in cars specially set apart for their use, and which are commonly made up into trains by themselves, and returned to the seaboard empty. The service is thus seen to be special, and the rates charged correspond to it.

We cannot say that under such circumstances the classing them by themselves on the rate sheets is either illegal or wrongful. It harmonizes with the policy of legislation on the general subject so far as it has been expressed, and it wrongs nobody else to give them rates restricted to the particular class exclusively. There is no such danger of fraud through

other persons passing themselves off as immigrants as was pointed out in Smith v. Northern Pacific Railroad Company in the case of pretended land explorers.

The result of this opinion is that the complaint must be dismissed.

JAMES F. SLATER v. THE NORTHERN PACIFIC RAILWAY COMPANY.

Complaint filed June 6, 1888.

Answer filed June 27. Hearing at Dubuque, Iowa, July 27. Decided November 23, 1888.

A complaint made for the purpose of retaliation for a fancied wrong, as to get even with a carrier for the revocation of complainant's pass, does not commend itself to the Commission.

A carrier which has conformed to the ruling of the Commission should not be prosecuted for alleged violations of law in that respect which occurred before such ruling was made and under a construction of the law then approved by the carrier's counsel.

Free transportation issued in the form of an annual pass to a person not in the regular and stated service of the carrier nor receiving any wages or salary under a contract of employment, but requested by him as compensation for throwing in its way what business he conveniently could, held to be illegal.

James F. Slater, complainant, pro se.

J. C. Bullitt, Jr., for defendant.

WALKER, Commissioner:

A complaint filed by James F. Slater, of Highland Park, Illinois, alleged that the defendant, about July, 1887, issued free transportation to one Frederick Fischer, from St. Paul, Minnesota, to Tacoma, Washington Territory, and return; that said Fischer was not a railway employee at the time, and that said transportation was used by him.

The answer admits that transportation was issued to said Fischer as alleged, but asserts that a justification therefor existed, consisting in the fact that it was furnished for the

purpose of promoting the sale of its land and the settlement of the country along the line of its road; and further states that after the decision of the case of W. U. Smith against the same defendant by this Commission in November, 1887, the defendant changed its rules and regulations in that respect.

At the hearing, testimony was given on the part of the defendant, in substance, as follows: That the complainant, James F. Slater, in July, 1887, represented to the defendant that he had found respectable parties in Illinois whom he could interest in a plan for irrigation in the Yakima Valley, in Washington Territory, which was important for the sale of lands owned by the defendant in that section; that the gentlemen would first wish to make an examination of the country which it was proposed to irrigate and the sources of supply; that a conference was had in Chicago by the officials of defendant's land department with Mr. Slater and his friends, at which the irrigation project was discussed, and something also was said about the establishment of a wholesale grocery house at Tacoma; that free round-trip tickets to Tacoma were provided, which were used by Mr. Fischer and two other gentlemen, who, however, failed to stop in the Yakima Valley, but went directly through Tacoma to Seattle, where a wholesale grocery house was established by one or more of them.

That afterwards, in the fall of 1887, the complainant Slater wrote various letters to officials of the transportation department of the defendant, which were produced in evidence; and in compliance with requests therein made he was furnished by defendant with an annual pass, in which he was described as an "employee," being considered in the nature of an emigrant agent; that some time after this the land department of defendant's road learned that complainant Slater was traveling with an employee's annual, and protested against his being so employed by the company; that the pass was thereupon immediately cancelled; that Slater then wrote the defendant that he had a record of several violations of the Act to regulate commerce on its part, which he proposed to look after and which were good cases for investigation by