freight cars, both wood and steel, planing mill, cabinet and bench carpenter work, pattern and flask making and all other carpenter work in shops and yards, except work generally recognized as bridge and building department work; carmen's work in building and repairing passenger train motor cars; building, repairing, and removing and applying wooden locomotive cabs, pilots, pilot beams, running boards, foot and headlight boards, tender frames and trucks, pipe and inspection work in connection with air brake equipment on freight cars; applying patented metal roofing, operating punches and shears, doing shaping and forming; work done with hand forges and heating torches in connection with carmen's work; painting, varnishing, surfacing, decorating, lettering, cutting of stencils and removing paint (not including use of sand blast machine or removing vats); all other work generally recognized as painters' work under the supervision of the locomotive and car departments, except the application of blacking to fire and smoke boxes of locomotives in engine houses; joint car inspectors, car inspectors, safety appliance and train car repairers; oxyacetylene and electric welding on work generally recognized as carmen's work; and all other work now generally recognized as carmen's work.”

The carrier does not contend that the work was not performed on Kansas City Terminal Railway Company property.

If the carmen's work performed on Kansas City Terminal Railway Company property does not belong to carmen on that property why did the parties place Rule 43 in the agreement, which reads as follows:

"Where employes are sent out on the road at the request of the carriers who use the facilities of the Kansas City Terminal Company, the employes will be compensated at the same rate as at home station and will receive expenses in accordance with road work rules of the carrier who uses the services of the Terminal employes."

It is evident that the parties in making the agreement understood no request was necessary from the carriers who use the facilities of the Kansas City Terminal Company in the performance of work when same is performed on such facilities. Insofar as the agreement is concerned the only time a request is necessary is when the work to be performed is out on the line of road, and had it been the understanding that a request was necessary in all cases the parties certainly would have provided for it the same as they did for road work.

The action of the carrier in arranging with the Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Railway Company management for that carrier to have three (3) employes perform the carmen's work on freight train 2ND No. 39, in the Kansas City Terminal Railroad yards on September 13, 1959, with carmen who hold no seniority as such with the Kansas City Terminal Railway Company was in clear violation of the provisions of the current agreement effective July 1, 1936. Therefore, we request your Honorable Board to render an award sustaining the employes' statement of claim.

CARRIER'S STATEMENT OF FACTS: The facts giving rise to the claim can be briefly stated:

The claim date is September 13, 1959. Santa Fe train 2/39 was a through freight proceeding toward its terminus, Argentine Yard of the Santa Fe. The train had originated on the Santa Fe and, to reach Argentine, located in

Kansas, it made use of the Kansas City Terminal main line trackage.

At Brooklyn Avenue, on this date, the train pulled a draw bar out of freight car, Central of Georgia 5008. Three Santa Fe carmen were sent from Argentine; the car was chained up and moved by Santa Fe crew to Argentine. Outside of participation in the chaining of the car, no other work or repairs was performed by San Fe carmen on this property. The car was moved by Santa Fe employes and not set out or delivered to the Kansas City Terminal.

Local Chairman McLaren filed claim for eight hours overtime on behalf of himself and two other carmen because of this incident. Master Mechanic Lehman declined the claims in a letter of November 5, 1960; appeal was taken to Superintendent Mathews. He likewise declined the claims; appeal was taken to Manager of Personnel Harris by General Chairman Herman. At conference on January 18, 1960, the claims were declined, the manager of personnel confirming his denial of them by letter of January 19, 1960.

POSITION OF CARRIER:

I.

The Kansas City Terminal Railway Company is owned by twelve other carriers. It operates the Union Station in Kansas City, Missouri; maintains the usual facilities for the servicing and switching of passenger trains and conducts freight operations of its own. It has its own force of employes engaged in such activities.

The Terminal Company services, switches and repairs its own equipment and, likewise, services, switches and repairs the equipment of the ownertenants to the extent that they turn such work over to the Terminal. Thus, aside from what arises from its own freight operations and the work necessitated by its own equipment, the work of the Terminal flows in from the owner-tenants. It services and repairs passenger equipment originating and terminating at the Union Station, performing the bulk of that work for all the owner-tenants with passenger service into and out of Kansas City.1 Even for those trains, the owner-tenants may use its own forces for some types of work, such as inspections and repairs of road train diesels moving through Kansas City.2 Traditionally, even reaching back into the steam engine days, mechanics of the tenant lines have performed some work-particularly on the motive power--on passenger trains making use of Union Station. However, the bulk of servicing, inspection and repair work on trains originating and terminating at Kansas City Union Station is done by Terminal empolyes of the respective crafts.

However, in addition to its station and facilities for passenger trains, Terminal is also a "bridge". Its tracks are used by the owner-tenants for freight train movements through Kansas City and for transfer between carriers. In those cases, except for the fact that Terminal towermen, operating the signal and interlocking facilities control the movement over Terminal

1One of the owner-tenants still maintains its own servicing facilities for passenger equipment.

2In 1955, the President of the Company replied to a complaint about tenant lines using their own inspectors and mechanics on road diesels as follows: "As you know, this Carrier is a servicing organization for its proprietary lines. Resultingly, the only work performed by our employes on proprietary lines equipment is that requested by the proprietary lines". The complaint was then dropped.

tracks, no work is performed by Terminal employes in connection with the movements. The moves originate and terminate outside the Terminal; they employ Terminal tracks for transit only, performing no switching or other work and the movements relate solely to the business of the owner-tenants. Such movements were specifically provided for in the original operating agreement of 1909. The Terminal, therein, agreed to grant to each of the ownertenants:

"... the right and privilege . . . of running its freight trains drawn by its own motive power and manned by its own crews upon and over said Terminal facilities or any part hereof."

Such a movement was involved in the instant case. Santa Fe 2/39 was a through freight originating outside the Terminal; it merely used Terminal tracks to reach Argentine Yard located on the Santa Fe. It performed no work on Terminal property; it was not delivered or yarded at the Terminal. The Terminal had no connection with it.

When the draw bar broke on a car in this train, Santa Fe officials properly sent Santa Fe carmen to the point of the break-in-two. The car was chained up and moved by the Santa Fe crew to Argentine Yard. This was the extent of the work done and it was done on a Santa Fe train moving towards a Santa Fe destination. It was not done on equipment delivered to or turned over to the Terminal for repairs or servicing.

In circumstances such as this, responsibility for the train would lie with the Santa Fe. It might, of course, request Terminal to send forces to repair the car and get the train moving. Likewise, if the situation had created an emergency, blocking the passage of Terminal traffic, Terminal might intervene to clear up the emergency. It did not, however; the car was chained up and delivered by the Santa Fe train. Terminal was not requested to furnish carmen for the operation and did not do so.

II.

The position of the employes, their claims to the work, rests upon only the fact that the incident occurred on Terminal property. They do not claim any other connection with the work; they do not deny that this was a Santa Fe train, originating and terminating outside the Terminal; they do not deny that the train was merely using Terminal tracks to reach its destination, and they do not deny that it performed no work on the Terminal.

The Santa Fe, in using the Terminal tracks for this movement, was acting under long established rights. The chaining up of the car to permit the continuation of the move was no infringement upon the rights of Terminal carmen. The work that they perform flows, chiefly, from the outside ownertenants: The servicing of passenger equipment that originates, terminates or stops over at the Union Station; the freight equipment delivered to the Terminal; or the freight business handled and switched from industries served by Terminal. In this case, however, the work claimed fits none of the categories we have listed. It was not work that the owner-tenant had requested the Terminal to perform. The Santa Fe train was merely handling its own business over Terminal tracks as it had the right to do and the work performed could not be said to be the exclusive work of the Terminal carmen.

The claim should be denied.

FINDINGS: The Second Division of the Adjustment Board, upon the whole record and all the evidence, finds that:

The carrier or carriers and the employe or employes involved in this dispute are respectively carrier and employe within the meaning of the Railway Labor Act as approved June 21, 1934.

This Division of the Adjustment Board has jurisdiction over the dispute involved herein.

Parties to said dispute waived right of appearance at hearing thereon.

The Carrier operates the Union Station at Kansas City, Missouri. It maintains facilities for servicing and switching passenger trains and conducts freight operations of its own. It employs a working force necessary to perform such work. It is owned by twelve other carriers which lease its facilities.

The Carrier is also a "bridge" line. Its tracks are used by the ownertenants for freight train movements through Kansas City and for transfers between carriers. In such instances, the trains originate and terminate outside the Carrier's facilities, using its tracks for transit movements only. The instant grievance arose out of such a transit movement.

On September 13, 1959, a freight train of the Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway System (hereinafter referred to as the "Santa Fe") which had originated outside the Carrier's facilities proceeded on the Carrier's tracks to the Santa Fe's Yard at Argentine, Kansas, which is also outside the Carrier's territory. While moving on the Carrier's tracks, the train pulled a draw bar from a freight car. The Santa Fe sent three of its own carmen from Argentine who chained up the car which was then moved by a Santa Fe crew to Argentine.

The three Claimants, J. S. Wolverton, J. H. Klempnaur, and F. J. McLaren, who are carmen in the Carrier's employ, filed a grievance in which they contended that the above described repair work should have been performed by them instead of by the Santa Fe carmen. The Claimants requested compensation in the amount of eight hours each at the applicable overtime rate. The Carrier denied the grievance.

1. The Claimants primarily rely on Rule 71 of the applicable labor agreement which contains a detailed job description of the position of carmen. In order to properly evaluate Rule 71, it must be read together with the Preamble to the agreement which defines the scope thereof and thus qualifies the Rule. See: Awards 1556 and 2198 of the Second Division. For Rule 71 is only applicable here if the work described therein comes under the scope of the agreement. The Preamble reads, as far as pertinent, as follows: “These rules shall govern the hours of service and working conditions of employes in the following departments, crafts and classes:

CAR DEPARTMENT

Carmen

Carmen, Second Class

Carman Helpers. . . ."

The wording of the Preamble is neither clear nor unambiguous. Plausible contentions can be made for conflicting interpretations. Specifically, the language used therein may raise a doubt as to whether the scope of the agreement covers all carmen's work performed within the geographical territory of the Carrier as asserted by the Claimants or whether the agreement only covers

work which the Carrier has the power to assign as claimed by it. The Preamble is, therefore, subject to a reasonable construction. A basic principle commonly observed in the interpretation of a written agreement, the meaning of which is doubtful, is to ascertain, as far as possible, the apparent intent of the parties thereto and to give reasonable effect to such intent. See: Frank Elkouri and Edna A. Elkouri, How Arbitration Works, Revised Ed., Washington, D. C., BNA Incorporated, 1960, pp. 203-204 and references cited therein.

In applying that principle to the facts of this case, we have reached the following conclusions:

The parties are in substantial agreement that the Preamble generally covers carmen's work performed on trains which arrive at and depart from the Kansas City Union Station. However, the train in question did neither originate nor terminate at said Station. It was a freight train in transit from a point outside the Carrier's territory to another point also outside thereof. It was not delivered to the Carrier's freight yard nor to any other point where freight cars or trains are normally delivered to the Carrier. No equipment of the Carrier was used in chaining up the car in question or in moving it to Argentine. The only connection between the freight train under consideration and the Carrier's facilities was that the train was proceeding on the Carrier's tracks when the accident occurred. The work in dispute was assigned by the Santa Fe and not by the Carrier. The latter had no voice in or control over the assignment and performance of the work. What actually occurred here was that work fundamentally the responsibility of the Santa Fe was assigned by it to its own carmen who are covered by a different labor agreement. In other words, the repair work in question was merely performed within the geographical territory of the carrier without any action, authority or control on the part of the Carrier. In the absence of any indication to the contrary in the Preamble, we do not think it was the intent of the parties to the labor agreement to extend the scope thereof to such work. Any other construction would widen the scope of the agreement far beyond any reasonable application. See: Award 2998 of the Second Division.

Since we are of the opinion that the work in question was not covered by the scope of the labor agreement, Rule 71 is inapposite to the decision of the instant case.

2. The Claimants also rely on Rule 43 of the labor agreement which provides, as far as pertinent, that "where employes are sent out on the road at the request of the carriers who use the facilities of the Kansas City Terminal Company, the employes will be compensated at the same rate as at home station and will receive expenses . . ." A careful examination of said Rules has satisfied us that it only prescribes the method of compensation if and when another carrier requests the services of the Carrier's employes on the road. No such request was made by the Santa Fe. Accordingly, Rule 43 does not sustain the Claimants' argument.

3. The Claimants assert, further, that there have been numerous occasions when freight trains of the owner-tenants needed repairs similar to those here performed by the Santa Fe carmen and that carmen of the Carrier have always been called to perform such work. However, the Claimants have not offered evidence of a representative number of specific instances from which we could reasonably conclude the existence of a long-continued, consistent, and mutually