The Special Representative stated that he would convey the above conditions to the Secretary-General immediately, pointing out the inadmissibility of the first four. As regards (e) General McKeown stated that he had tried for a fortnight to obtain the co-operation of the ANC Acting Chief of Staff for the establishment of joint ONUC-ANC patrols in Leopoldville city, but without result. He would also consider withdrawing existing orders, which had to be issued in view of the attacks on United Nations personnel, regarding the carrying of personal arms.

The conference thus ended on this inconclusive note.

363. THE PRESENCE OF A UNITED STATES NAVAL TASK FORCE IN CONGOLESE WATERS: Reply Made by the Secretary of State (Rusk) to a Question Asked at a News Conference, March 9, 1961 (Excerpt)72

Some 2 weeks ago the presence of this small [U.S. naval] task force in the Congo waters was beginning to stir up some speculation. They had been there on a good-will visit as part of a long-scheduled visit to the west coast of Africa, but they had been called upon to undertake certain chores for the United Nations while they were in that vicinity. When their presence there gave rise to some questions, which we felt were unnecessary, the Secretary of Defense and I consulted and the task force resumed its earlier schedule to go down the west coast before heading north again. Then this week, or several days ago, the American Ambassador in Léopoldville, faced with a situation in the Congo of fighting between U.Ñ. and Congolese forces and himself carrying heavy responsibilities for American citizens involved, and considering the possibility that the U.N. itself might call for some assistance in this situation, requested the commander of the force to turn north. The commander, as was proper, got immediately in touch with Washington through his own command channels, which operate very quickly, and the Secretary of Defense and I again consulted and agreed that he should turn north. Then, after the situation in the Congo was clarified and we found that the situation was not deteriorating in the way that might have happened, given the circumstances in which the Ambassador found himself, the task force was ordered to resume its normal visit to the south.

72 The reply printed here is taken from pp. 433-434 of the Department of State Bulletin, Mar. 27, 1961 (reprint of Department of State press release No. 122).

364. RECOMMENDATION OF MEASURES TO RECONCILE THE RIVAL FACTIONS IN THE CONGO: Report of the U.N. Conciliation Commission for the Congo, Signed at Geneva, March 10, 1961 (Excerpt)73

144. The Commission concluded its work in the Congo on 20 February, but its principal conclusions, which form the basis of this chapter of the report, were transmitted in an interim message to the Advisory Committee on the Congo on 15 February. There have been a number of important developments since then. It is therefore necessary that those conclusions be viewed against the background of subsequent events. The situation in the Congo is changing almost daily. It is not possible for the Commission to comment on all these developments, but it has felt it necessary to make the following supplementary observations.

145. The Commission has noted with special interest the Security Council's resolution (S/4741) of 21 February 1961,74 which it welcomes as a positive contribution towards the attainment, in co-operation with the Congolese people, of solutions of present difficulties in the Republic of the Congo. It notes with satisfaction that its own conclusions and recommendations and the above resolution are generally in accord.

146. With regard to the Commission's conclusion on the subject of the Loi fondamentale (paragraphs 123 and 124),75 it is felt that technical assistance could be extended by the United Nations in the form of a team of experts who could co-operate with the Congolese authorities in their endeavour to return to legality and constitutionality, in the revision of the Loi fondamentale and the drafting of a new constitution for the country, in the drafting of new laws and their implementation, as well as in the administration of justice.

147. As regards the "provisional government" (paragraphs 125 and 126), the Commission feels that the present "provisional government" cannot bring about an improvement in the situation or contribute to the solution of the crisis until it includes representatives of the main trends of political opinion in the Congo, so that a de facto truce can be arranged which would lessen the present antagonisms. Thus, with these considerations in mind, the Commission recommends the establishment of a provisional government of national unity whose task would include the following:

To arrange a truce between the different factions in the Congo; To restore law and order, with the assistance of the United Nations;

TU.N. doc. A/4711 and Corr. 1 and Add. 1 and 2. For the membership of the Conciliation Commission, see footnote 6 to doc. 354, ante. The Representatives of Ghana (see annex XX to the source text) and Morocco (absent) did not sign this report. The note of clarification of the Representative of India and the notes and reservations of the Representative of Nigeria constitute annexes XXI and XXII to the source text, respectively.

74 Ante, doc. 357.

75 Not reprinted here.

To reorganize the administration and enable it to function;

To reorganize the army, in co-operation with the United Nations; and

To take steps to enable Parliament to adopt a constitution which would provide the Congo with a lasting constitutional structure. 148. In connexion with military operations (paragraphs 127 and 128), the Commission welcomes the Security Council resolution (S/4741) of 21 February 1961, which urges the United Nations to "take immediately all appropriate measures to prevent the occurrence of civil war in the Congo, including arrangements for ceasefires, the halting of all military operations, the prevention of clashes, and the use of force, if necessary, in the last resort".

149. It must be pointed out that under its terms of reference the Commission was required to direct its efforts "without interference in the internal affairs of the Congo, towards the attainment by the Congolese of solutions of the present difficulties". The decisions for the speedy restoration of parliamentary institutions in the Republic of the Congo have therefore to be reached by the Congolese themselves. Because of the constantly deteriorating situation in the Republic even before its arrival in the Congo, and ever since, culminating in the murder of Mr. Lumumba and many other political leaders, the Commission was not able to carry out its mission effectively. However, it is hoped that its efforts will in time produce some beneficial results leading towards reconciliation and a normalization of the situation in the Republic of the Congo.

365. CONGOLESE INTENTION TO ESTABLISH A CONFEDERATION OF CONGOLESE STATES: Communiqué Issued at Tananarive at the Conclusion of a Conference of Congolese Authorities, March 12, 1961 76

The Congolese authorities have concluded their conference in Tananarive after adopting three resolutions-" the first regarding foreign policy and relations between the member states represented here of the former Belgian Congo; the second concerning the maintenance of order; and the third relations with the United Nations.

75

76

Not reprinted here.

English-language text as printed in the New York Times, Mar. 12, 1961. The signatories of the resolutions adopted at this conference, which took place Mar. 8-12, 1961, were as follows: President of the Republic of the Congo (Kasavubu), President of the State of Katanga (Tshombé), Prime Minister of the Republic of the Congo (Iléo), President of the State of Léopoldville (Kamitatu), President of the State of Central Kongo (Moanda), President of the State of Oriental Congo (Bondekwe), President of the State of Lomami (Kabangi), President of the State of North Kasai (Mukenge), President of the Autonomous State of South Kasai (Kalonji), Vice Prime Minister, delegate of Equator (Bolikango), President of the State of Maniéma (Omari), Minister of Interior of the State of Léopoldville and delegate of Kwango (Kulumba), and Minister of Justice and of the Civil Service of the State of Equator-Mongo delegate (Ndjoku).

77 Texts in Benoit Verhaegen, op. cit., pp. 37-40.

They also addressed a telegram to the President of the General Assembly and the Secretary General of the United Nations" asking for the annulment of the Security Council's resolution of Feb. 21, this no longer having any raison d'être since reunion has been achieved between authorities.

The Congolese authorities also decided a conference of [Congo] heads of state I will meet soon before the round-table conference in Elisabethville.“1

80

The two conferences will have the task of specifying measures which have to be taken to apply the decisions taken by the present conference.

So far as relations between member states are concerned and foreign policy the conference decided the ex-Belgian Congo will form a confederation of states represented on the international plane by a president of the confederation. Mr. Joseph Kasavubu was proclaimed President of the confederation.

A Council of States composed of the President of the confederation and Presidents of the member states will determine the general internal and international policies of the confederation. An executive body called the Coordinating Body between states will carry out the Council's decisions.

The Central Government [in Leopoldville] will cease to exist when the Coordinating Body is set up.

[NOTE: The Director of the Office of News (White), Department of State, made the following replies to questions asked at a news conference, Mar. 13, 1961:

82

["The Tananarive conference appears to have been a serious effort on the part of the Congolese to come to grips with what is clearly their problem, namely, the nature of the Government of the Congo. It is supposed that subsequent conferences will provide information on the implementation of the general principles agreed upon at Tananarive. You will recall that the conference itself decided to hold two subsequent conferences-one in Bakwanga in Kasai Province and one in Elisabethville in Katanga Province. This Government hopes-that is, the United States hopes that all elements [including the Gizenga group] of the Republic of the Congo will participate in the future discussions.

366. THE BASIS FOR UNITED STATES SUPPORT OF THE UNITED NATIONS MANDATE IN THE CONGO: Address by the Secretary of State (Rusk) at the University of California, Berkeley, March 20, 1961 (Excerpt)R

83

A second large question before us is whether the community of nations can forge the international instruments we must have to resolve conflicts and make cooperation more effective. I am skeptical when I hear that one or another crisis will "decide the fate of the United Nations." Man's hopes for peace will not be so lightly surrendered. But there are times of testing when we learn whether we are moving ahead or slipping backward. The success of the United Nations effort in the Congo is such a test. There the United Nations has been asked to bring order out of chaos, to assist the Congolese to get their house in good array, to provide financial and administrative assistance until the human and material resources of the country are

78 See U.N. doc. A/4707.

79 Ante, doc. 357.

80

See the unnumbered title, post, p. 821.

81 See footnote 61 to the unnumbered title, ante, p. 791.

82 Files of the Office of News, Department of State.

83 Department of State press release No. 146 (text as printed in the Department of State Bulletin, Apr. 10, 1961, pp. 515–519).

mobilized, and to protect the Congo from interferences from the outside which would frustrate both the wishes of the Congolese and the principles of the charter.

It is not my present purpose to enter into the Congolese part of the problem but to draw your attention to the effort to deal with it by international action. The first requirement has been to determine a United Nations policy. Executive agents cannot act effectively unless they know what they are expected to accomplish; armed forces need to be clear about their mission. The determination of policy is, of course, a political process and involves the adjustment of diverse views among those who come to the table. A clear mandate cannot issue from the Security Council or from the General Assembly unless members are willing to agree upon a policy-to reduce the variety of national policies to an understandable and consistent policy for the United Nations itself. The United States supported the most recent Security Council resolution on the Congo 84 not because we thought it was perfect but because we believed it to be a useful improvement upon the previous uncertain mandate.

A second requirement has been the furnishing of troops at the call of the Secretary-General on behalf of the United Nations. In such situations time is of the essence and a ready response is critical. Upon arrival such forces must come under United Nations command and policy, for if the several contingents should act upon national directives utter confusion could result. If, for reasons which seem sufficient to the governments concerned, particular contingents have to be withdrawn, the United Nations should be given considerable discretion as to time and circumstances. While we can be grateful to those countries who furnished troops in full cooperation with the United Nations, experience in the Congo suggests that we must turn once more to the possibility of constituting a permanent United Nations Force, specifically trained and equipped, held in readiness for immediate use.

A United Nations responsibility in a country like the Congo is an expensive operation; it requires money, and in large amounts. The effort cannot succeed unless member governments put aside their particular views and provide the resources properly levied by the General Assembly. These are admittedly burdensome, but conflict is more so, and we are talking about the maintenance of peace. If the United States has thus far assumed more than its share of United Nations costs in the Congo, it is because we believe that United Nations presence and action in that country must not fail because of the financial defaults of some of its members; its failure would involve heavier burdens more costly still.

Recent attacks upon the Secretary-General and proposals to substitute a triumvirate for a single executive agent must be looked upon as an attempt to reduce the United Nations to ineffectiveness. The United States cannot accept so serious an undermining of the agreements and purposes of the charter. We have committed our

"Ante, doc. 357.