act as the chief agents in the political life of the country; even more intolerable is a situation in which armed units act on their own initiative, as has only too frequently occurred in the last six months or so. I am familiar with the argument that the units under the control of General Mobutu are legal units of the Republic of the Congo, whereas those owing allegiance to other authorities now functioning in the Congo are not." You are no doubt familiar with the statements which have been made which reverse the position and give legal status only to the authorities in Stanleyville." For the United Nations, the task is of course described by the resolution alone. I am personally convinced, as I have stated in the Security Council, that no political conciliation is possible without the elimination of armed units from the political life." I may add that only those who hope for a military solution in the Congo-in my view an indefensible stand-and consequently wish to impress their own will on the people by force are likely to express themselves in opposition to this provision of the resolution. I trust that the United Nations can count on your support and thus lay the foundation for a Congo army which, like that of other democratic countries, serves the country and no political or geographical sections thereof.

360. INITIAL STEPS TAKEN TO IMPLEMENT THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION OF FEBRUARY 21, 1961: Report of the U.N. Secretary-General (Hammarskjold), February 27, 1961 48

1. In pursuance of the statement which the Secretary-General made in the Security Council on 21 February 1961," following the adoption of the resolution on the Congo,50 the Secretary-General has consulted the Advisory Committee on the Congo with regard to questions relating to the implementation of that resolution.

61

2. The members of the Advisory Committee, while asserting that the initiative with respect to the implementation of this resolution remained, as before, with the Secretary-General, expressed for the guidance of the Secretary-General their views concerning concrete steps to be initiated by him.

3. As to the urgent matters emanating from part A, operative paragraphs 2 and 3 of the resolution, the Secretary-General sent, on 22 February 1961, the day following the adoption of the resolution, a letter to the Government of Belgium which is reproduced in annex I of this report. The reply of the Government of Belgium was received on 27 February 1961; it is reproduced as annex II.53

54

4. In further implementation of part A, paragraphs 2 and 3 of the resolution, the Secretary-General sent on 23 February 1961, to all Members of the United Nations, a letter, which is reproduced in annex III of this report. Thus far the Secretary-General has received no replies for transmission to the Security Council.

5. Concerning part A, paragraph 1 of the resolution, the Secretary-General, after consultation with the Advisory Committee, instructed the United Nations Command in the Congo to take appropriate steps in the direction and in the spirit of the resolution, in respects indicated by the Command itself, taking into

"For the establishment of the U.N. Advisory Committee on the Congo, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1960, p. 563.

Cited as an unnumbered title, ante, p. 784.

Cited as an unnumbered title, ante, p. 786.

Not reprinted here.

account, on the one side, the availability of troops and the likely developments in that respect and, on the other side, the stands taken by the Governments of Ethiopia, Sudan and Tunisia, to the effect that they do not wish to become third parties in any conflict between opposing sides in the Congo.

6. For the purpose of securing the full co-operation of the Congo authorities in the implementation of this paragraph of the resolution, and also in order to prepare the groundwork for the implementation of the provisions of part B of the same resolution, the Secretary-General addressed, on 27 February 1961, a letter to the President of the Republic of the Congo which is reproduced in annex IV. The Secretary-General has also requested his Special Representative to bring the substance of this letter to the immediate attention of other autborities in the Congo.

7. The Secretary-General has received from his Special Representative in the Congo advice that the implementation of the resolution adopted by the Security Council would require a substantial increase in the strength of the Force under the United Nations Command. The Secretary-General thereupon, on 23 February 1961, approached the Government of Morocco, which had previously announced the repatriation of its contingent from the United Nations Force-a repatriation which is not yet completed. The telegram is reproduced in annex V. He also approached the Government of Indonesia, which had previously requested that its contingent under the United Nations Command should be repatriated upon completion of its six months' tour of duty. This telegram is reproduced in annex VI.57

8. The Secretary-General further addressed to certain African States requests for troops to be attached to the United Nations Command. These letters are reproduced in annex VII. The Governments of Libya and Togo were not approached for this purpose, since they had previously informed the SecretaryGeneral that they had no military units available for overseas service.

9. In the discussion relating to the implementation of part A, paragraph 4 of the Security Council resolution, it was the opinion of the members of the Advisory Committee that a certain lack of precision in the paragraph made "immediate" implementation, as decided by the Security Council, difficult to carry out. It was thought necessary that, as a first step, a panel of three independent judges-an African serving as Chairman, an Asian and a Latin American-be appointed to undertake an impartial investigation to ascertain the circumstances of the death of Mr. Lumumba and his colleagues. Members of the Advisory Committee wished, however, to give the matter further consideration and to undertake consultations. On the advice of the Committee, the Secretary-General addressed a telegram to the Acting President of the International Court of Justice, in his private capacity, for the purpose of securing names of suitable candidates. The Secretary-General wishes to inform the Security Council that as soon as the Advisory Committee has concluded this stage of the consideration of the question, the Security Council will be informed. 10. With reference to the discussion in the Security Council of a draft resolution relating to deportations and executions of Congolese political leaders, the Secretary-General sent a letter dated 21 February 1961 to Mr. Kasa-Vubu, and requested his Special Representative to despatch similar messages to certain other Congolese leaders. The letter to the President of the Republic of the Congo is reproduced in annex VIII."

CONGOLESE INTENTION TO ESTABLISH A MILITARY ORGANIZATION TO COMBAT FOREIGN INTERVENTION: Protocol of Military Agreement, Signed at Elisabethville by Representatives of the Léopoldville, Bakwanga, and Elisabethville Authorities, February 28, 1961 61

UNITED NATIONS REQUEST FOR "IMMEDIATE MEASURES" BY BELGIUM FOR THE EVACUATION OF ALL BELGIAN MILITARY PERSONNEL AND POLITICAL ADVISERS FROM THE CONGO: Note Verbale From the U.N. Secretary-General (Hammarskjold) to the Belgian Representative at the U.N. (Loridan), March 2, 1961 62

UNITED NATIONS OFFER OF MILITARY AND POLITICAL PERSONNEL TO THE CONGOLESE AUTHORITIES TO REPLACE BELGIAN AND OTHER FOREIGN MERCENARIES: Letter From the U.N. Secretary-General (Hammarskjold) to the President of the Republic of the Congo (Kasavubu), March 2, 1961 63

BELGIAN AGREEMENT TO DISCUSS WITH A REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNITED NATIONS SECRETARYGENERAL IN BRUSSELS EVACUATION OF CERTAIN BELGIAN PERSONNEL FROM THE CONGO: Note Verbale From the Belgian Representative at the U.N. (Loridan) to the U.N. Secretary-General (Hammarskjold), March 4, 1961 64

CONGOLESE CONDITIONAL AGREEMENT TO CONSIDER REORGANIZATION OF THE ARMÉE NATIONALE CONGOLAISE: Letter From the President of the Republic of the Congo (Kasavubu) to the U.N. Secretary-General (Hammarskjold), March 5, 1961 65

Le Monde, Mar. 2, 1961; also Benoit Verhaegen, op. cit., p. 25. This agreement was signed for the Léopoldville authorities by the Prime Minister (Iléo), for the Bakwanga authorities by the President of South Kasai (Kalonji), and for the Katanga authorities by the President of Katanga (Tshombé). They decided to postpone the round table conference which had previously been scheduled to meet at Elisabethville, Mar. 1, and to convene a summit conference of Congolese leaders at Tananarive, Mar. 5 (see post, doc. 365).

Section I of U.N. doc. S/4752/Add.1. This note was in reply to the note of Feb. 27, 1961, from the Belgian Representative at the U.N., cited as an unnumbered title, ante, p. 786.

Section II of U.N. doc. S/4752/Add.1. A similar message was sent to Mr. Tshombé, Mar. 2, 1961; sec. III of U.N. doc. S/4752/Add.1.

"U.N. doc. S/4752/Add.2. This note was in reply to the U.N. SecretaryGeneral's note verbale of Mar. 2, 1961, cited in footnote 62 above.

U.N. doc. S/4752/Add.3. This letter was also signed by the Minister for

Foreign Affairs and for External Trade (Bomboko).

361. PROTEST OF CONGOLESE ATTACKS AGAINST UNITS OF THE UNITED NATIONS FORCE AT BANANA AND MATADI: Telegram From the U.N. Secretary-General (Hammarskjold) to the President of the Republic of the Congo (Kasavubu), March 5, 1961 66

In the light of the grave events of the past few hours and with further reference to my letter to you dated 3 March 1961," I have the honour to protest to you most strongly concerning the unlawful acts which since 3 March have been perpetrated by the ANC, with the apparent involvement of Ministers of the Iléo régime, in the region of the Lower Congo against units serving under the United Nations Command. These developments raise the most serious questions of principle regarding the operation which the United Nations has undertaken, after an appeal from the Government of the Republic, upon the decision of the Security Council, in pursuance of its function of maintaining international peace and security.

After grave developments, first at Banana and then, graver yet, at Matadi, in which ANC soldiers without provocation attacked units of the United Nations Force engaged in their assigned activity, there occurred an inadmissible threat of the use of force to compel evacuation of the Sudanese unit of the United Nations force from Matadi. In this connexion I must draw your urgent attention to the following points:

First, United Nations, under the Security Council mandate, must keep complete freedom of decision as regards the deployment of national contingents in performance of the United Nations operation. In the exercise of its responsibility the placement of specific contingents will, of course, always be made with due regard to all the pertinent circumstances. I am bound to consider unacceptable any attempt by force or otherwise to influence ONUC in this respect, including the setting of conditions as to the selection of units for Matadi. The forced withdrawal of the Sudanese detachment from Matadi today cannot be interpreted as derogating from this position of principle.

Secondly, the presence of the United Nations Force in Matadi is a vital condition for the carrying out of the United Nations operation in the Congo, especially for the prevention of civil war and the halting of military operations, for which, as you know, the Security Council resolution authorizes the use of force, if necessary, in the last resort. This point is necessarily subject, as regards placement of specific contingents, to the principles laid down in the preceding paragraph in the implementation of which the United Nations, on its own responsibility, takes into account all factors essential for the fulfilment of the task of the Force.

There is scarcely any need to emphasize that the decisions taken by the Leopoldville authorities within the next few hours will be crucial if the Leopoldville authorities are to convince the world that they continue to be committed, as you have assured me, to co-operation with, rather than defiance of the United Nations. I request you to initiate urgent action for immediately locating and returning to their units the one Canadian, one Tunisian and seven Sudanese soldiers missing, as well as for the observance of the cease-fire that has been ordered. In this connexion also the next few hours will provide the Congolese authorities with a major opportunity to demonstrate that they are prepared to repudiate deplorable acts and attitudes and, with United Nations co-operation and assistance, to reassert control over unruly and irresponsible ANC and civilian elements. In any case full responsibility for the past events must attach to you and to these authorities.

In concluding I must reiterate the importance of the principles established in the paragraphs above. If, against my firm expectation, the situation in Matadi should not be redressed forthwith, the matter will of course become an urgent concern of the Security Council.

CONGOLESE RENEWED DEMAND FOR REPLACEMENT OF THE SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNITED NATIONS SECRETARY-GENERAL IN THE CONGO: Decision of the Council of Ministers of the Republic of the Congo, Adopted March 6, 1961 69

362. CONGOLESE CONDITIONS FOR FUTURE COOPERATION BETWEEN THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE LÉOPOLDVILLE AUTHORITIES: Report of the Special Representative of the U.N. Secretary-General in the Congo (Dayal), March 8, 1961 (Excerpt) 70

At the meeting held on 8 March with Acting Prime Minister Massa, Acting Foreign Minister Kasongo and Acting Minister of the Interior Delvaux, the Special Representative reiterated his wish to discuss the procedures for the speediest possible return of the United Nations Force to its previous stations in Banana and Matadi. The Acting Prime Minister replied that this question could be discussed only after the United Nations had withdrawn the statement to the effect that it was the Congolese who had opened fire at Matadi. The Force Commander pointed out that the inquiries held by a committee of investigation, none of whose members were either of Sudanese or Canadian nationality, have fully substantiated the information given to the Secretary-General, on which he based his telegram to President Kasa-Vubu mentioned in paragraph 33." Nevertheless, the Acting Prime Minister maintained that no return of the United Nations Force to Matadi could be discussed so long as the question of responsibility was not settled and he expressed the firm view that the Sudanese troops of the United Nations Force were responsible for the hostilities. If however the United Nations made this admission, he was ready to agree to the immediate discussion of the return of United Nations troops to Banana and Matadi. This position was of course quite inadmissible.

Upon the Special Representative's request that the Acting Prime Minister should clearly state the position of the Leopoldville authorities with regard to the peaceful restoration of the United Nations position in Banana and Matadi, so that this information could be transmitted to the Secretary-General, the Acting Prime Minister stated that he considered it inadvisable, in view of the existing tension, for the United Nations to send its troops to Matadi. The question of the Special Representative as to what steps the Congolese authorities were taking to reduce this tension remained unanswered.

Finally, the Acting Prime Minister made the following demands as a condition for future co-operation between the United Nations and the Leopoldville authorities:

(a) No United Nations troopships may enter Matadi and river pilots have been forbidden to lend their services to such vessels;

(b) All United Nations air traffic must be controlled by the Congolese authorities and subject to their permission;

(c) Joint control must be established over all airfields and other strategic points now under the control of the United Nations Force;

(d) All permanent movements of United Nations troops must be subject to the control of the Government and United Nations troops must obtain entry and exit permits;

(e) All patrolling of United Nations troops with arms in Leopoldville city must cease.

Congopresse, No. 97, Léopoldville, Mar. 9, 1961; also Benoit Verhaegen, op. cit., p. 144. See also the unnumbered title, ante, p. 755.

70 U.N. doc. S/4761. 71 Ante, doc. 361.