concluding that the Soviet complaint is not motivated by genuine concern but by a desire to promote its own objectives in the Congo. Certainly full material and political support for the Congo force would be a much better way to help the Congolese people than recourse to such distorted charges as are contained in document S/4614 and in the speech of Mr. Zorin yesterday.28

Mr. President, we have heard the statement of the Soviet representative that, ostensibly on the basis of this incident, Belgium should be removed as Administering Authority in the Trust Territory of Ruanda-Urundi and that territory be given immediate independence. The suggestion that Belgium should be forced to lay down its responsibilities in this way is, of course, a continuation of Soviet irresponsibility. So far as the independence of Ruanda-Urundi is concerned, as the Belgian representative pointed out yesterday, the necessary arrangements to this end are now under way in accordance with resolutions approved overwhelmingly by the General Assembly.29 A United Nations commission is now en route to the territory to supervise elections. The commission will subsequently attend a roundtable conference in the territory to promote its development toward independence. This commission will report to the Trusteeship Council and to the General Assembly, which must be satisfied that the necessary steps toward the goal of independence have been taken.30 Thus the Soviet statement can be seen for what it is: an effort to sow seeds of uncertainty and distrust and to promote the pattern of chaos from which that area of Africa has already suffered far too much.

We must, however, ask ourselves what the Security Council should do at this point. The objective of isolating the territory of RuandaUrundi from direct involvement in the struggles in the Congo would seem to be met in the representations of the Secretary-General and the assurances of the Belgian authorities. Meanwhile, the general principles which must be pursued in the Congo situation remain quite clear. All nations should faithfully and fully carry out the spirit and letter of the outstanding United Nations resolutions dealing with the Congo. The Congolese people should be enabled themselves to reconcile their internal differences peacefully. The United Nations Command should redouble its efforts to maintain law and order. If these principles, already repeatedly endorsed by the United Nations, are given the full support of all concerned, we will be able to look toward a significant improvement in this troublesome situation so fraught with danger for the peace of the world.

I feel compelled, Mr. President, to express one further thought on this question. As I have already said, outside intervention in the internal affairs of the Congo is the fundamental problem with which the Security Council and the General Assembly have had to deal. We have regrettably been only partially successful. The Soviet

28 See U.N. doc. S/PV.924, pp. 1-10.

29 See especially U.N. General Assembly Res. 1579 (XV) of Dec. 20, 1960; text in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1960, pp. 644–646.

30

For the reports of the commission, see U.N. docs. A/4706 and Add.1 and A/4727.

Union bears a major share of the responsibility for the present state of affairs. But it is necessary to say, if the record is to be clear, that the Soviet Union is not alone guilty of using the unfortunate Congolese people for its own purposes. Pious statements against outside interference in Congolese affairs have been made in the United Nations by those whose own governmental policy, perhaps for different reasons than those of the Soviet Union, has included the same type of interference. Membership in the Security Council itself, whose primary responsibility is the maintenance of international peace and security, has not, I am afraid, prevented this. The record must not fail to show this fact.

"THE POSITION OF ONUC [RESPECTING REBEL ACTIVITIES IN ORIENTAL AND KIVU PROVINCES] HAS BEEN ... STRICTLY CONSONANT WITH THE MANDATE GIVEN IT": Letter From the Special Representative of the U.N. Secretary-General in the Congo (Dayal) to the President of the Republic of the Congo (Kasavubu), January 14, 1961 31

CONGOLESE REQUEST FOR THE RECALL OF THE SPECIAL. REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNITED NATIONS SECRETARY-GENERAL IN THE CONGO: Letter From the President of the Republic of the Congo (Kasavubu) to the U.N. Secretary-General (Hammarskjold), January 14, 1961 32

344. THE UNITED NATIONS SECRETARY-GENERAL'S REJECTION OF THE CONGOLESE REQUEST FOR THE RECALL OF HIS SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE IN THE CONGO: Letter From the U.N. Secretary-General (Hammarskjold) to the President of the Republic of the Congo (Kasavubu), January 15, 1961 33

34

I have the honour to acknowledge receipt of your letter of 14 January 1961 about which I had received information through the news agencies several hours before it was transmitted, these news releases covering also a Press conference given by Mr. Bomboko providing pertinent explanations of the background to the letter.

I wish to recall that I had the privilege of visiting you when I was in Leopold

"Section II of U.N. doc. S/4630. The abbreviation ONUC stands for Opération des Nations Unies au Congo.

32 Section I of U.N. doc. S/4629 and Add.1. This request was repeated by President Kasavubu in messages of Jan. 24, to the U.N. Secretary-General (S/ 4629/Add.1), and of Feb. 1, 1961, to the President of the U.N. Security Council (Dean) (S/4667).

* Section II of U.N. doc. S/4629 and Add.1.

24 Cited as an unnumbered title, supra.

ville on 5 January. I note that, on that occasion, you did not raise with me the question of a recall of Mr. Dayal, although practically all of the considerations which you now invoke as reasons for your demand for his withdrawal should have been before you at that time. Naturally, I would with pleasure have met with you alone if you had wished to discuss anything with me of that nature. It is regrettable that such an opportunity to exchange views personally about such a delicate and important matter was not utilized.

I further note that the memorandum 38 to which you refer in the first paragraph of your letter was not mentioned by you at our meeting, although it was transmitted soon thereafter when, as was known, I had left for South Africa; in the circumstances it will not surprise you that I did not see your memorandum until Thursday night, 12 January. A reply was dispatched to you" before the transmittal of your letter and, in fact, less than two days after I had first been able to see it. In this case I regret likewise the failure to use our meeting for a personal discussion of all the various points raised in your memorandum.

In your letter you refer specifically to two concrete cases regarding which you wish to put the blame on the United Nations authorities, in particular on the Special Representative of the Secretary-General in Leopoldville.

In the case of the alleged death of the Minister of Education of Kivu, you go so far as to speak about "complicity in the murder". However, the very same day that I received your letter, the representative of the United Nations in Stanleyville visited the Minister of Education. He found that the Minister had been exonerated of all charges, was free and is to return to Kivu as soon as there is a plane available. He was comfortably lodged at the Hotel des Chutes and was recovering from an attack of malignant malaria for which he had been treated at the hospital. He was still under medical care and did not show any visible marks of manhandling. While I take pleasure in informing you about these facts and about the falsity of statements to the effect that the minister had been killed, I must at the same time express my great surprise that an allegation such as this one, with which you link such serious political conclusions, had not been properly checked by your collaborators before it was presented in your letter.

As regards the incident at Bukavu," in which certain members of the provincial government were abducted, the facts of the matter were indeed discussed when we met on 5 January 1961. It was pointed out to you that the version that had been given to you by your sources was not correct and that when the question was submitted to United Nations authorities in Leopoldville, as the circumstances had then developed, these authorities acted in accordance with the general mandate of the ONUC and the precedents. You will also recall that it was explained at the meeting that Mr. Dayal was not a party to the instructions as he was away from Leopoldville. However, in spite of these clarifications given you at our meeting, you accuse him in your letter of having refused the necessary authorization to the Nigerian Commander in Bukavu. For a more detailed account of the incident I refer to the reply to your memorandum as transmitted to you on 14 January 1961.

In your letter you further raise the question of the general policy of the United Nations, requesting, inter alia, that we assist the President of the Republic and the central authorities of the country to disarm "the rebellious bands of Gizenga and Lundula". In view of the question of principle to which this request gives rise, this cannot be done by me or the United Nations Force short of new instructions from the Security Council. Your criticism as well as your request should, therefore, be addressed to that body. Under no circumstances can any blame for a failure to disarm the Armée nationale congolaise groups under the control of Mr. Gizenga be placed on Mr. Dayal who has acted strictly

The U.N. Secretary-General arrived in Léopoldville and conferred with the U.N. Conciliation Commission for the Congo, Jan. 4, met with the President of the Republic of the Congo, Jan. 5, departed Léopoldville for Kamina, and arrived in Pretoria, Union of South Africa, Jan. 6, 1961.

38 Cited in footnote 10 to the unnumbered title, ante, p. 751.

37 Cited as an unnumbered title, ante, p. 755.

38 See ante, docs. 340 and 343.

in accordance with the general rules laid down by the Security Council in not taking action to that effect.

Let me finally add that, under instructions from Mr. Dayal, consistent and objective efforts have been made, through diplomatic means, to secure the release and, pending release, good treatment of personalities imprisoned by Mr. Gizenga and his supporters as well as by others.

I must in this context also draw your attention to Mr. Dayal's status which you, in your formal demand, seem to overlook.

39

Ambassador Dayal is not a diplomatic representative accredited to the Government of the Republic of the Congo and he can therefore not be subject to a declaration that he is persona non grata with the effect generally given in diplomatic practice to such declarations. He is a senior official of the United Nations Secretariat assigned as Special Representative of the Secretary-General to be in over-all charge of the United Nations operations in the Congo. His assignment is thus established under the special authority of the Secretary-General of the United Nations in accordance with Article 101 of the Charter. Further, Article 100 of the Charter stipulates that the Secretary-General shall not seek or receive instructions from any Government and that each Member of the United Nations undertakes not to seek to influence him in the discharge of his responsibilities. You will appreciate that it is difficult to reconcile your formal demand regarding Mr. Dayal with the status of the Secretary-General and of his Special Representative as established by the two Articles of the Charter to which I have thus referred.

In the circumstances, and taking into account the lack of facts in support of your accusation of Mr. Dayal for inconscience et partialité as well as his status, I find, as Secretary-General, that it is impossible to accede to your demand for his recall. You will remember that, in the course of your visit to New York, you presented a similar demand orally which, however, you dropped when I stated that I personally shouldered responsibility for the actions of Mr. Dayal on which you seemed to base your stand.

In view of the seriousness of this démarche from your side as regards both the general question of policy and as regards Mr. Dayal, I will put your letter and this reply before the Security Council for such action as the Council may find warranted.

At the end of your letter you express yourself in favour of close collaboration with the United Nations. May I, in this context, bring again to your attention my suggestion in a letter to you of 21 December 1960 " that you give publicly a clarification which would provide a basis for improved co-operation. I have not received any reply to this letter nor am I informed about any initiative from your side which would meet the need to which I drew your attention.

UNITED NATIONS CONCERN FOR THE FAIR TREATMENT OF MESSRS. LUMUMBA, MPOLO, AND OKITO FOLLOWING THEIR TRANSFER TO THE CUSTODY OF THE KATANGA AUTHORITIES: Message From the U.N. SecretaryGeneral (Hammarskjold) to the President of the Katanga Government (Tshombé), January 19, 1961 41

20 For the text of the U.N. Charter, see American Foreign Policy, 1950–1955: Basic Documents, pp. 134–161.

40 Section I of U.N. doc. S/4606.

Section II of U.N. doc. S/4637. See also the letters of Jan. 19 and 20, 1961, from the U.N. Secretary-General to President Kasavubu; secs. I and III ibid.

UNITED STATES SUBSTANTIAL INCREASE OF ITS CONTRIBUTION TOWARD RELIEVING THE FAMINE IN THE CONGO: Statement Issued by the White House, January 25, 1961 42

345. THE SERIOUS IMPLICATIONS OF INTENDED WITHDRAWALS OF CERTAIN CONTINGENTS FROM THE UNITED NATIONS FORCE IN THE CONGO: Report of the U.N. Secretary-General (Hammarskjold) to the U.N. Security Council, January 26, 1961 13

1. The definite dceisions of three Governments to withdraw their contingents of troops from the United Nations Force in the Congo, which have been conveyed to the Secretary-General in recent days, have implications for the future of that Force so serious as to need to be called to the attention of the Security Council. 2. The projected withdrawals, without replacements, are the following.

3. The Government of Indonesia has notified its intention "to repatriate the Indonesian contingent at the earliest possible date, since in February next it will in any case have to finish its six months' field duty". The Indonesian contingent numbers approximately 1,150 officers and men.

4. The Government of Morocco has communicated its intention to "repatriate, before January 31, 1961" the troops of the Moroccan contingent serving in the Congo, numbering approximately 3,240 officers and men.

5. The Government of the United Arab Republic has made an oral request for the repatriation of its contingent, numbering approximately 510 officers and men, by 1 February.

6. Previous reductions of the Force have occurred as a result of the withdrawal, now in process, of the contingent of Guinea, approximately 749 officers and men, and of the 21 Yugoslav members, who left at the end of December.

44

7. Messages dated 14 December 1960 and 25 January 1961 " from the Secretary-General to certain Governments concerning the proposed withdrawals are appended as annexes I and II of this report."

CONGOLESE THREAT TO SEEK MILITARY ASSISTANCE OUTSIDE THE FRAMEWORK OF THE UNITED NATIONS PENDING REORGANIZATION OF THE ARMÉE NATIONALE CONGOLAISE: Letter From the President of the Republic of the Congo (Kasavubu) to the U.N. Secretary-General (Hammarskjold), January 28, 1961 47

42

'White House press release dated Jan. 25, 1961; the Department of State Bulletin, Feb. 13, 1961, p. 218.

43 U.N. doc. S/4640.

44

To the Governments of Ceylon, Guinea, Indonesia, Morocco, the United Arab Republic, and Yugoslavia.

45

To the Governments of Indonesia, Morocco, and the United Arab Republic. 40 Not reprinted here.

47 Section I of U.N. doc. S/4643.