Despite the dangers and strains of these crises, the United Nations in 1961 took three steps which I believe will be of great future significance to the world's security and well-being.

1. The United Nations created the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee agreed upon by the United States and the Soviet Union as a forum for renewed disarmament negotiations which began this spring in Geneva. 16 In presenting to the General Assembly the United States proposals for general and complete disarmament in a peaceful world, the United States delegation made clear that steps toward disarmament must be matched, at each stage, by steps toward improving the peace-keeping machinery of the United Nations. It is this essential linkage which will make disarmament a practical proposition whenever nations can agree on the necessary goals and safeguards. Every improvement in the machinery of peace will make it easier for us, with confidence, ultimately to begin dismantling the machinery of war. Whatever obstacles and disappointments may lie ahead, the world must some day travel the road to disarmament. For in the nuclear age, armaments no longer offer fundamental security to any nation.

2. The United Nations also laid the groundwork in 1961 for a U.N. Decade of Development to help speed progress toward the economic and social goals of the newly emerging nations.1 The launching of a World Food Program 19 and the decision to hold an international conference on the application of science and technology to the less developed world 20 are only initial steps. The United States intends to propose further measures to focus the resources of the United Nations on this 10-year drive against economic want and social injustice.

3. Finally, the United Nations, in 1961, turned in earnest to the critical search for international cooperation in the exploration of outer space. Within the framework of the newly created U.N. Committee on Peaceful Uses of Outer Space,21 discussions were under way at the end of the year looking toward international cooperation in outer space, including cooperation between the United States and the Soviet Union in the development of communications and weather programs.22

These were major constructive moves of the United Nations in 1961: to work toward the replacement of the machinery of war with the institutions of peace; to help guide the newly developing nations toward modernization; and to seek international cooperation in the exploration of outer space for the benefit of all. The United States played a major role in initiating these progressive steps in the United Nations. They served the foreign policy interest of this country.

16 See post, doc. 569.

17 Text post, doc. 564. 18 See post, docs. 45-47.

19 See post, doc. 60.

20 See the unnumbered title, post, p. 146.

21 See U.N. General Assembly Res. 1472A (XIV) of Dec. 12, 1959; text in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1959, p. 1396.

And they were wholly compatible with the mutually reinforcing policies which we have pursued through the institutions of the North Atlantic Community, through regional organizations, and through diplomatic channels.

Meanwhile, the United Nations continued to play vigorously two indispensable continuing roles. It kept the peace in the Middle East 23 and the Congo.24 And it continued to be absorbed in the often difficult transfer of dependent areas to nationhood.

Finally, it cannot be said too often that the Charter of the United Nations expresses well the basic precepts and standards of conduct that guide our own society. These precepts and standards are not destroyed because this nation or that, consistently or occasionally, violates them. The indestructible principles of the Charter exert a gravitational pull which adds strength to every aspect of our worldwide diplomacy. The United Nations, under that Charter, provides a framework within which we can pursue the highest goal of American foreign policy: a world community of independent nations living together in free association and at peace with each other.

B. Review and Improvement of the United Nations Machinery

13. THE USE OF EXTRAPARLIAMENTARY CONSULTATIONS AS A DEVICE FOR IMPROVING AND STRENGTHENING THE WORK OF THE UNITED NATIONS: Replies Made by the Secretary of State (Rusk) to Questions Asked at a News Conference, the University of California, Berkeley, March 20, 1961 (Excerpts) 1

1

The very increase in membership to 99 underlines the importance of intensive regular consultation among the delegations at the United Nations. We have tried to strengthen our delegation at the United Nations to permit this kind of consultation. If the resolutions of the United Nations turn out to be simply a least common denominator, or if they turn out to be resolutions which encompass many divergent points of view, so that the resolutions themselves are hard to interpret, hard to understand, then the United Nations policy becomes ineffective and unclear. What we hope is by the process of discussion, debate, consultation, and by a pooling of national interest in terms of an

The replies printed here are taken from pp. 522-523 of the Department of State Bulletin, Apr. 10, 1961 (reprint of Department of State press release No. 148, Mar. 21, 1961).

effective United Nations policy interest, that we can improve and strengthen the work of the United Nations.

This will be a gradual process in which everyone will be working, we hope, straight along. It will become easy on certain questions; it will be far more difficult on others. But we hope that some consensus can be produced through these discussions up there that will make sense from the point of view of the total world community. One of the efforts that we made shortly after January 20th was to renew the discussion on the Congo among governments by going to them and talking about the problems there, and the role of the United Nations, in the hope that a clearer United Nations policy could be evolved. We think that some improvement resulted from the United Nations' policy about the Congo but that depends upon the developments of consensus in the United Nations itself, because in the absence of that consensus the United Nations cannot possibly be effective.

14. THE ROLE AND FUTURE OF THE UNITED NATIONS ORGANIZATION: Introduction to the Annual Report of the U.N. Secretary-General (Hammarskjold) on the Work of the U.N. Organization During the Period June 16, 1960-June 15, 1961, Submitted August 17, 1961 (Excerpt) 2

After this brief review of the principles of the Organization, of the character of its decisions and of its structure, especially as regards arrangements for executive action, presented only as a background for the consideration of what basic concepts and approaches should guide the development of the Organization, it may be appropriate, in conclusion, to give attention to the activities of the Organization and their relevance to the current international situation.

For years the Organization has been a focal point for efforts to achieve disarmament. This may still be considered as the main standing item on the agenda of the General Assembly. However, in recent years these efforts of the Organization have been running parallel to other efforts which are either outside of it or only loosely tied to the work of the United Nations. This may be justified on the basis that a very limited number of countries hold key positions in the field of armaments, so that any effort on a universal basis and by voting, to reach a decision having practical force, would be ineffective, unless founded on a basic agreement between those few parties mostly concerned. Therefore, direct negotiations between those countries are an essential first step to the solution, through the United Nations, of the disarmament problem, and do not in any way derogate from the responsibilities or rights of the Organization.

The situation may serve as an example of a problem which has become increasingly important in the life of the Organization: the right way in which to balance the weight of the big Powers and their security interests against the rights of the majority of Member nations. Such a majority naturally cannot expect the big Powers, in questions of vital concern to them, with their superior military and economic strength, automatically to accept a majority verdict. On the other hand, the big Powers cannot, as Members of the world community, and with their dependence on all other nations, set themselves above, or disregard the views of, the majority of nations. An effort to balance the big Power element and the majority element is found in the Charter rules regarding the respective competence of the General Assembly and the Security Council and U.N. doc. A/4800/Add. 1.

regarding the special position of the big Powers within the Council. Other efforts to solve the same problem are reflected in the way in which the disarmament problem has been attacked in recent years. No fully satisfactory or definitive formula has been found, but it must be sought, and it is to be hoped that when the time comes for a Charter revision, agreement may be reached on a satisfactory solution.

What is true of the disarmament problem is, of course, true also of those more specific questions in which security interests of big Powers are or may be directly involved, as for example the Berlin problem. The community of nations, represented in the United Nations, has a vital interest in a peaceful solution, based on justice, of any question which-like this one-unless brought to a satisfactory solution, might come to represent a threat to peace and security. However, the problem of the balance to be struck between the rights and obligations of the big Powers and the rights and obligations of all other nations applies, in a very direct way, also to this problem which is now so seriously preoccupying the minds of all peoples and their leaders. The United Nations, with its wide membership, is not, and can, perhaps, not aspire to be a focal point in the debate on an issue such as the Berlin question, or in the efforts to solve it, but the Organization cannot, for that reason, be considered as an outside party which has no right to make its voice heard should a situation develop which would threaten those very interests which the United Nations is to safeguard and for the defence of which it was intended to provide all Member nations with an instrument and a forum.

Reference has already been made in this Introduction to the work of the Organization devoted to furthering self-determination, self-government and independence for all peoples. In that context it was recalled that the General Assembly, at its last session, adopted a resolution regarding the colonial problem which elaborates the basic principles of the Charter in their application to this problem.

This is, likewise, a question which for years has been before the General Assembly and it is likely to remain a major item until a final result is achieved which reflects full implementation of the basic principles in the direction indicated by last year's resolution. Experience has shown that peaceful progress in that direction cannot be guaranteed solely by decisions of the General Assembly or the Security Council, within the framework of a conference pattern. Executive action is necessary, and neither the General Assembly nor the Security Council-which has had to deal with situations in which the liquidation of the colonial system has led to acute conflict-has abstained from such action in support of the lines upheld. As in the past, executive action by the Organization in the future will undoubtedly also be found necessary if it is to render the service expected from it under the terms of the Charter.

It is in conflicts relating to the development towards full self-government and independence that the Organization has faced its most complicated tasks in the executive field. It is also in the case of executive action in this context that different concepts of the Organization and of its decisions and structure have their most pointed expressions. As regards this specific aspect of the work of the United Nations, the front line has not been the usual one between different bloc interests, but more one between a great number of nations with aims natural especially for those which recently have been under colonial rule or under other forms of foreign domination, and a limited number of powers with other aims and predominant interests. This seems understandable if one takes into account that a majority of nations wishes to stand aside from the big Power conflicts, while power blocs or big Powers tend to safeguard their positions and security by efforts to maintain or extend an influence over newly emerging areas. The United Nations easily becomes a focal point for such conflicting interests as the majority looks to the Organization for support in their policy of independence also in relation to such efforts, while power blocs or countries with other aims may see in the United Nations an obstacle in the way of their policies to the extent that the Organization provides the desired support. How this is reflected in the attitude towards the development of the executive functions of the United Nations can

U.N. General Assembly Res. 1514 (XV) of Dec. 14, 1960; text in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1960, pp. 110-111.

be illustrated by numerous examples. It may be appropriate in this context to say in passing a word about the problem of the Congo and the activities of the United Nations in that country.

Different interests and Powers outside Africa have seen in the Congo situation a possibility of developments with strong impact on their international position. They have therefore, naturally, held strong views on the direction in which they would like to see developments in the Congo turn and-with the lack of political traditions in the country and without the stability which political institutions can get only by being tested through experience the doors have been opened for efforts to influence developments by supporting this or that faction or this or that personality. True to its principles, the United Nations has had to be guided in its operation solely by the interest of the Congolese people and by their right to decide freely for themselves, without any outside influences and with full knowledge of facts. Therefore, the Organization, throughout the first year of its work in the Congo, up to the point when Parliament reassembled and invested a new national Government,' has refused-what many may have wished-to permit the weight of its resources to be used in support of any faction so as thereby to prejudge in any way the outcome of a choice which belonged solely to the Congolese people. It has also had to pursue a line which, by safeguarding the free choice of the people, implied resistance against all efforts from outside to influence the outcome. In doing so, the Organization has been put in a position in which those within the country who felt disappointed in not getting the support of the Organization were led to suspect that others were in a more favoured position and, therefore, accused the Organization of partiality, and in which, further, such outside elements as tried to get or protect a foothold within the country, when meeting an obstacle in the United Nations, made similar accusations. If, as it is sincerely to be hoped, the recent national reconciliation, achieved by Parliament and its elected representatives of the people, provides a stable basis for a peaceful future in a fully independent and unified Congo, this would definitely confirm the correctness of the line pursued by the United Nations in the Congo. In fact, what was achieved by Parliament early in August may be said to have done so with sufficient clarity. It is a thankless and easily misunderstood role for the Organization to remain neutral in relation to a situation of domestic conflict and to provide active assistance only by protecting the rights and possibilities of the people to find their own way, but it remains the only manner in which the Organization can serve its proclaimed purpose of furthering the full independence of the people in the true and unqualified sense of the word.

The United Nations may be called upon again to assist in similar ways. Whatever mistakes in detail and on specific points critics may ascribe to the Organization in the highly complicated situation in the Congo, it is to be hoped that they do not lead Members to revise the basic rules which guide the United Nations activities in such situations, as laid down in the first report of the SecretaryGeneral to the Security Council on the Congo question," which the Council, a year ago, found reason, unanimously, to commend.

Closely related to a policy aiming at self-government and independence for all is the question of economic and technical assistance, especially during the first years of independence of a new Member State. The United Nations and its agencies and affiliated organs have at their disposal only very modest means for the purpose, but a rich experience has been gathered and the personnel resources are not inconsiderable.

Last year the Economic and Social Council and the General Assembly had to consider proposals designed to open up new possibilities for the Organization to respond to the demands of Member Governments facing all the problems of newly achieved independence." Naturally, the problems which are of special importance for such countries are basically the same as those which face all countries which have been left behind in economic development. Therefore, the urgent attention

• See post, doc. 386.

B See American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1960, pp. 530–531 and 542543.

6 See U.N. General Assembly Res. 1527 (XV) of Dec. 15, 1960; text ibid., pp. 92-95.