SOVIET PROTEST OF "VIOLATION OF THE AIRSPACE OF THE GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC BY MILITARY AIRCRAFT OF THE BUNDESWEHR": Note From the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the American Embassy in Moscow, September 17, 1961 78

EXPLANATION OF THE EMERGENCY USE OF EAST GERMAN AIRSPACE BY TWO AIRCRAFT OF THE BUNDESWEHR: Note From the American Embassy in Moscow to the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs, September 26, 1961 79

278. PROGRESS OF THE SOVIET-UNITED STATES "EXPLORATORY TALKS" ON THE PROBLEM OF GERMANY AND BERLIN: Replies Made by the President (Kennedy) to Questions Asked at a News Conference, October 11, 1961 (Excerpts) 80

We are still anxious to have a solution [to the problem of Germany and Berlin] which will lessen the threat of war and which, we would hope, could improve the security of the people of West Berlin. We have had not negotiations but exploratory talks-Mr. Rusk with Mr. Gromyko on three occasions,81 and I had a talk with him, and the Prime Minister [of the United Kingdom talked with him] yesterday 83—in an attempt to determine the precise position of the Soviet Union on the various questions dealing with access [to Berlin], the [concept of a] free city, the question of boundaries, and all the rest. We have not, as I have said, carried out any negotiations, nor will we.

We will now continue the [Soviet-United States exploratory] talks with Ambassador Thompson in Moscow, I hope. He is back here [for consultation] for that purpose and will be returning shortly. And we are going to be now in the process of consulting with our allies in order to determine a common Western position on these matters [of procedure] which are at issue.

78 Unofficial translation in the Department of State Bulletin, Oct. 16, 1961, pp. 632-633. Similar notes were delivered to the Embassies of France and the United Kingdom in Moscow; for an official text in English, see Documents on Germany, 1944-1961, pp. 801–803.

79 Department of State press release No. 663; the Department of State Bulletin, Oct. 16, 1961, p. 632. Similar notes were delivered by the Embassies of France and the United Kingdom.

The replies printed here are taken from pp. 657, 659-661, and 664 of Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1961.

In London; Foreign Minister Gromyko met with Lord Home in New York City, Sept. 25 and 28.

So I don't think that we can come to any conclusion as to what the ultimate outcome will be, though the talks which we had with Mr. Gromyko did not give us immediate hope that this matter [the problem of Germany and Berlin] would be easily settled.

I don't think really it's particularly useful at this time to attempt to go into precise detail [on the exploratory talks]. . . . A good deal of the information on the talks has already been printed in the press. These talks, if they're not going to turn into merely exchanges of propaganda, should at least have the value of some degree of privacy.

I've stated that we have not been engaged in negotiations, no agreements have been reached but merely an attempt [has been made] to explore what are the positions of the various powers.

I've already characterized my view of these talks and I think that with the information [printed in the press], which has been quite lucid and only slightly inaccurate, I think we can proceed to additional talk.

I see no evidence yet that there is any clear solution to Berlin. . . . there still are very major differences of view.

I feel that the three talks he [Secretary of State Rusk] had and the talk I had at least helped to make more precise those differences.

We now will continue [the exploratory talks] some more and in addition-and I think this is most important-the Germans will have a new government shortly and [they will] be able to participate with perhaps more vigor in making Allied policy with the other NATO countries, and then we can get a better idea as to how it's all going to end up.

There... have been, as I have said, no negotiations in the sense that we made proposals and they made them.

What there has been is a description of the kind of solution that they would like to see. And I must say that I have not found substantial changes in that policy as it was expressed some months ago.85

There has been . . . a desire to discuss these matters and ... statements about a desire to reach a peaceful accord. But on the substance we are not in sight of land.

I think that without going into details, as I said at the beginning, it's quite obvious that we're not only talking about the freedom of the city [of Berlin] but also its viability, economic as well as political, and it operates under the greatest possible difficulties, 100 miles within an area controlled by the Soviet Union, so that this tie with the WestWest Germany and the other sections of the west-is very vital to its

84

The Federal Diet (Bundestag) of the Federal Republic of Germany reelected Dr. Konrad Adenauer, Federal Chancellor, Nov. 7, 1961; Dr. Adenauer and his coalition cabinet of the Christian Democrat and Christian Social, and the Free Democrat Parties were sworn in Nov. 14.

remaining more than just a shell, so that we will be concerned with the viability and vitality-economic vitality-of the city in any agreement that we're able to make- if we can make an agreement.

279. SOVIET REFUSAL TO FACILITATE THE DISTRIBUTION OF "MATERIALS IN THE SOVIET UNION PRESENTING AMERICAN VIEWS ON THE BERLIN QUESTION": Statement Issued by the Department of State, October 13, 1961 (Excerpt) 86

During the past few months the Crosscurrents Press, a firm chartered in the United States but registered with the Department of Justice as an agent of the state publications export monopoly of the U.S.S.R., has been distributing in substantial quantity Soviet propaganda material on Germany and Berlin. In view of the wide dissemination given this material in this country, the U.S. Government, in a note delivered to the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs on September 22, 1961, asked the Soviet Government for the necessary facilities to distribute comparable materials in the Soviet Union presenting American views on the Berlin question. In this way, the U.S. Government note pointed out, the Soviet people would be given an opportunity, as the American people have had, to study in some depth both sides of this critical problem.

Yesterday the Soviet Government replied to this request.88 In essence the Soviet Government denied the facilities asked for, asserting that the Soviet Government could not agree to the distribution of materials which, in its view, are not "constructive.”

280. SOVIET CONDITIONAL WITHDRAWAL OF A FIXED TIME-LIMIT FOR THE SIGNING OF A PEACE TREATY WITH EAST GERMANY: Address by the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R. (Khrushchev) Before the Twenty-second Congress of the Communist Party of the U.S.S.R., Moscow, October 17, 1961 (Excerpts) 89

The problem of doing away with the vestiges of the second world war is of the greatest importance for the preservation and consolidation of peace. The fact that no peace settlement with Germany has been effected 16 years after the victory over the Hitlerite aggressors cannot be tolerated. The Western powers,

'Department of State press release No. 708 (text as printed in the Department of State Bulletin, Oct. 30, 1961, p. 717).

87 Text ibid., p. 718.

Text ibid., pp. 718–719.

89

The excerpts printed here are taken from pp. 4-5 of The Current Digest of the Soviet Press, vol. XIII, No. 41, Nov. 8, 1961.

headed by the United States, are wholly responsible for this inexcusable delay. Flouting the interests of the peoples, just as soon as the war was over they steered their course for the revival of German militarism.

The absence of a peace treaty has already played into the hands of the Bonn revanchists. With the aid of the American imperialists they have rebuilt their army for new aggression. The West German militarists dream in their sleep of how to take advantage of the unstable situation in Europe for bringing their former enemies the powers in the anti-Hitler coalition-into conflict with one another. They dream of swallowing up the German Democratic Republic, enslaving other neighboring countries and taking revenge for their defeat in the second world war.

We have held all along that a peace treaty, having made permanent the German borders defined by the Potsdam Agreement," would tie the revanchists' hands and discourage them from adventures. The socialist countries have long held off on signing a treaty, hoping that common sense would prevail in Washington, London, and Paris. We are still today prepared to join with the Western powers in seeking a mutually acceptable and agreed settlement through negotiations. Recently, while attending the United Nations General Assembly, Comrade Gromyko, U.S.S.R. Minister of Foreign Affairs, had talks with the Foreign Secretary and Prime Minister of Great Britain." These talks left us with the impression that the Western powers were showing a certain understanding of the situation and that they were disposed to seek a settlement of the German problem and the question of West Berlin on a mutually acceptable basis.

However, a strange trait is to be discerned in the Western countries, and, above all, in the United States. One thing is said there during talks between statesmen and another thing in the press, although there is every indication that the press has been informed of the character of the talks. The Western press has been presenting the question of a German peace treaty in unreasonable and unrealistic terms. The reproach is heard, for example, that someone is trying to give an apple in return for an orchard in settling the German question. This figure of speech may perhaps please its authors, but it fails to reflect the true picture in this case.

We proceed from the actual situation that has taken shape since the crushing defeat of Hitlerite Germany, from the existence of two German states and of the borders that were fixed after the war. Any war, however grim and bloody, should end with the signing of a peace treaty. You must bear responsibility and must pay for aggression, for unleashing a war. That is the way things are. What has an orchard, what have apples, to do with it?

A German peace treaty must and will be signed, with or without the Western powers.

The status of West Berlin will also be normalized on the basis of this treaty. West Berlin will be a free, demilitarized city. The Western states and all other countries must enjoy the right of access to West Berlin in accordance with international law-that is, they must make appropriate arrangements with the government of the German Democratic Republic, inasmuch as all of West Berlin's communications with the outside world run through the territory of the G.D.R. Some Western spokesmen say that our proposals that a German peace treaty be concluded this year" are an ultimatum. But this is an erroneous contention. After all, the Soviet Union's proposals on concluding a peace treaty and, on that basis, settling the question of West Berlin, turning it into a free city, were put forward as early as 1958. A good deal of time has passed since then. We have

93

References to secs. V and VIII (b) of the Protocol of Proceedings of the Berlin (Potsdam) Conference; A Decade of American Foreign Policy: Basic Documents, 1941-1948, pp. 42 and 43-44.

91 See footnote 83 to doc. 278, ante.

92 See ante, doc. 232.

9 See American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1958, pp. 591-596.

not rushed settlement of the question, hoping for the achievement of mutual understanding with the Western countries. Where, may I ask, is the ultimatum? In proposing conclusion of a German peace treaty, the Soviet government has been presenting no ultimatum but has been moved by the necessity of finally settling this compelling question.

The Soviet government still insists that the German question be settled as promptly as possible and is against endlessly deferring its settlement. The question of a time limit for the signing of a German peace treaty will not be so important if the Western powers show a readiness to settle the German problem. We shall not, in that case, absolutely insist on signing the peace treaty before December 31, 1961. The main thing is to settle the question, to do away with the vestiges of the second world war, to sign a German peace treaty. That is basic, that is the heart of the matter.

SOVIET-UNITED STATES REVIEW OF PROGRESS IN 19601961 AND PROSPECTS FOR 1962-1963 IN MOTION PICTURE EXCHANGES: Memorandum of Agreement Issued at Washington by the United States-U.S.S.R. Standing Committee on Cooperation in the Field of Cinematography, October 17, 1961 94

281. CONTINUATION OF EXPLORATORY TALKS WITH THE SOVIET UNION “TO DISCOVER WHETHER A BASIS FOR NEGOTIATION [OF THE PROBLEMS OF GERMANY AND BERLIN] EXISTS": Statement Read and Replies Made by the Secretary of State (Rusk) to Questions Asked at a News Conference, October 18, 1961 95

I know that you will wish to know whether I have any comments on Chairman Khrushchev's speech of yesterday." Let me say that I have not yet received the full text in translation and would not wish to characterize it in general terms. In a speech of this character the excerpts which are received early might be affected by additional material which would be in the complete text, and these matters in fine print sometimes are important. From the portions which I have seen it is clear that Chairman Khrushchev ranged widely over the field of foreign affairs and said a good many things which could not be supported by the record.

Today, however, I would comment on one statement he made. He said:

If the Western Powers show readiness to settle the German problem, then the question of the time of signing a German peace treaty will not be of such

"Department of State Bulletin, Nov. 6, 1961, pp. 770-771. The Standing Committee, established in accordance with par. 8, sec. VII of the U.S.-Soviet Agreement of Jan. 27, 1958 (text in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1958. pp. 823-832), met from Oct. 2 to 17.

The statement and replies printed here are taken from pp. 746-747 and 748 of the Department of State Bulletin, Nov. 6, 1961 (reprint of Department of State press release No. 720).