ference of Foreign Ministers of 1959,8 and of discussions which have taken place at the level of heads of government. In all of these the United States and its allies have been sincerely motivated by a desire to end the tensions over Germany and Berlin which the Soviet threats have created. But such solutions cannot be at the expense of our obligations and of the basic principles of freedom and self-determina

tion.

There are many contradictions and historical fallacies in the present position of the Soviet leaders. Chairman Khrushchev's description, in his speech of yesterday, of the alleged origins of World War II will scarcely impress any serious historian.

The Soviets talk constantly of peace but threaten the obvious peace which exists in West Berlin. Having purported to turn over East Berlin to the so-called German Democratic Republic, in violation of existing agreements, they now propose to move in upon the position of West Berlin. If the world is full of anxiety and uneasiness over Berlin, this arises directly from the threat of the Soviets to the rights of others and to the liberty of the West Berliners rather than to anything in the present situation in Berlin.

Demands and threats which create a crisis over a subject which involves the vital interests of other people do not promote that real peace which the world desires.

The United States and those associated with us are clear and firm about our obligations to ourselves and to the people of West Berlin.

I might just add an informal comment that the Allied Governments. are consulting among themselves and with others about a reply to the recent Soviet aide memoire on the subject of Berlin.10 These consultations will take a little more time, but when that reply is given it will undoubtedly be made public.

I think the principal point on that [convincing the Russians of the firmness of the Western Powers policy respecting Berlin] is that the position of the Western Powers in Berlin is a powerful one, that the NATO alliance is a strong alliance, that the obligations of the Western Powers are clear, and that Mr. Khushchev must be given every opportunity, as he will be, to avoid a miscalculation on a matter of that sort.

I wouldn't use a rather simple and easy word [such as "ultimatum"] to cover a very complex and difficult situation. Obviously the statements made by Mr. Khrushchev before, during, and after Vienna are serious statements and ought to be taken seriously. The substance of what he said is very similar to the positions taken some 2 years ago about Berlin, but I think it would be wrong for us to try to cover a

8 See ibid., 1959, pp. 588-759.

See ibid., pp. 759-764 and 921-931, and ante, docs. 228-230. 10 Ante, doc. 231.

situation of this sort with too simple a characterization, such as this word "ultimatum."

This [current crisis on Berlin] I think is a serious situation, serious enough to engage a lot of our attention-the attention of the Western World-and indeed the attention of all those in other parts of the world who are concerned with building a peace.

If you go back to 1946 and follow the record from there, the West has made many attempts to find a settlement for these problems involving the windup of World War II and has had little or no cooperation from the Soviet Union. This takes us back to the first Berlín blockade; it can take us back to Korea; it can take us back to the earlier negotiations about the reunification of Germany; it can take us back to the settlements in Central Europe and Eastern Europe. There has been a continuous effort on the part of the West to wind up peacefully and honorably and effectively the results of World War II. Had we had anything like a comparable point of view from the Soviet Union on these questions, they would have long since been resolved. I think it would be natural and normal when we receive an aide memoire from the Soviet Union on Berlin and on Germany to talk that question over with other governments who have a direct interest and stake in the question, as well as a number of other governments. We are in West Berlin with the United Kingdom and France. The Government of the Federal Republic of Germany is obviously involved. NATO has expressed itself on Berlin and of course the NATO governments have an interest in that problem, as do other governments in other places. The fact that we are consulting other governments with respect to the reply does not mean that we don't know what to say. We want to be sure that we are in touch with them. We think they have a right to be consulted. From our point of view it is very important they be consulted before we publish a reply to an important communication such as the one Mr. Khrushchev recently made about Berlin.

. . . We will undoubtedly be having further exchanges among governments on Berlin, including exchanges with the Soviet Union, but questions of any special form of discussion are wholly for the future. But you can be sure that there will be representations back and forth from governments on this question for some time to come.

A question of that sort [whether the United States and its allies are willing to sit down and try to negotiate once again with the Soviet Union over the whole question of Germany and Berlin] tends to put any official in somewhat of a box. On the one side you are never in a position to say or would want to say that you are going to quit communicating among governments about any important question. On the other side, the implication that you are going to communicate among governments, and are willing to communicate among governments, is easily interpreted as meaning a radical revision of position. This is not the case. The essential thing is that the three Western Powers, as the President put it, are in Berlin not by sufferance but by right, and those rights can't be terminated by unilateral action

taken by the Soviet Union." You start from there. And our commitments to the people of West Berlin are very strong and very farreaching.

Any attempt to freeze the position in Germany without due regard to the wishes of the German people would be, in our judgment, a very unfortunate step to take. The Soviet Union and its representatives have stood up in the United Nations from time to time and made a great play over their commitment to the notion of self-determination in various parts of the world. They have been unwilling to apply that same principle to Central Europe.

If you want to start at the heart of the matter, our own national interest starts with our position in West Berlin and our commitment to the people of that city. This doesn't mean that this exhausts our interest in it. We also have, stemming out of wartime agreements, an interest in East Berlin. As a nation that was at war with Germany and one of the United Nations, we have an interest in a peace settlement for Germany. But I wouldn't want to water down in any way the heart of our interest, which is our position in West Berlin and our commitments to the people of that city.

.. [Whether the United States would object to having the East Germans sign papers on the access routes to Berlin] is a question I'd prefer to leave for the future. Because obviously, as a policy matter, this is not something that we like at all, and it's something about which we will be very much concerned, and this would be a matter of discussion among governments. But this is all for the future.

234. "THERE IS PEACE IN GERMANY AND IN BERLIN; IF IT IS DISTURBED, IT WILL BE A DIRECT SOVIET RESPONSIBILITY": Statement Read and Reply Made by the President (Kennedy) to a Question Asked at a News Conference, June 28, 1961 (Excerpts) 12

12

I should like to comment briefly on Germany and Berlin. Soviet and East German leaders have followed the recent Soviet aide memoire 13 with speeches which were apparently designed to heighten tension.14 It is of the greatest importance that the American people understand the basic issues involved and the threats to the peace and security both of Europe and of ourselves posed by the Soviet announcement that they intend to change unilaterally the existing arrangements for Berlin.

"See ante, doc. 229.

12 The text of the statement is taken from pp. 107-108 of the Department of State Bulletin, July 17, 1961 (reprint of White House press release dated June 28, 1961); the text of the reply is taken from p. 478 of Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1961.

18 Text ante, doc. 231.

14 See ante, doc. 232.

Doc. 234

The "crisis" over Berlin is Soviet manufactured. ..

They call upon us to sign what they call a "peace treaty" with the regime they have created in Eastern Germany. If we refuse, they say they themselves will sign such a "treaty." The obvious purpose here is not to have peace but to make permanent the partition of Germany. The Soviets also say that their unilateral action in signing a "peace treaty" with East Germany would bring to an end Allied rights to be in West Berlin and to have free access to the city. It is clear that such unilateral action cannot affect these rights, which stem from the surrender of Nazi Germany. Such action would simply be a repudiation by the Soviets of multilateral commitments to which they solemnly subscribed, and have repeatedly reaffirmed, about the exercise of the rights of the principal powers associated in World War II. If the Soviets thus withdraw from their own obligations, it is clearly a matter for the other three allies to decide how they will exercise their rights and meet their responsibilities. But the Soviets say that, when we do so, we will be subject to the designs of their East German regime and that these designs will be backed by force. Recent statements by leaders of this regime make it very plain that the kind of "free city" which they have in mind is one in which the rights of the citizens of West Berlin are gradually but relentlessly extinguished.

No one can fail to appreciate the gravity of this threat. No one can reconcile it with the Soviet professions of a desire to "coexist" peacefully. This is not just a question of technical legal rights. It involves the peace and security of the people of West Berlin. It involves the direct responsibilities and commitments of the United States, the United Kingdom, and France. It involves the peace and security of the Western World.

In the interest of our own vital security we and other Western countries entered into defense arrangements in direct response to aggressive Soviet moves following World War II. These alliances are wholly defensive in nature, but the Soviets would make a grave mistake if they suppose that Allied unity and determination can be undermined by threats or fresh aggressive acts. There is peace in Germany and in Berlin. If it is disturbed, it will be a direct Soviet responsibility.

There is a danger that totalitarian governments not subject to vigorous popular debate will underestimate the will and unity of democratic societies where vital interests are involved. The Soviet Government has an obligation both to its own people and to the peace of the world to recognize how vital is this commitment.

We would agree that there is unfinished business to be settled as concerns Germany. For many years the Western nations have proposed a permanent and peaceful settlement of such questions on the basis of the self-determination of the German people. Moreover, we shall always be ready to discuss any proposals which would give increased protection to the right of the people of Berlin to exercise their independent choice as free men. The proposals which have now been placed before us move in the opposite direction and are so recognized throughout the world. Discussions will be profitable if the Soviets

will

accept in Berlin-and indeed in Europe-self-determination, which they profess in other parts of the world, and if they will work sincerely for peace rather than an extension of power.

No such proposal [for a partial mobilization to meet the threat in Berlin] has been placed before me at the present time. As you know this matter of what steps we would take to implement our commitments to Berlin have been a matter of consideration. Mr. Acheson, the former Secretary of State, was named to consider this matter in the middle of April.15 His report will be coming in-we're going to discuss it this week 16 and we will be considering other proposals which might be put forward in order to make meaningful our commitment. But the proposals are still-have not still come to the White House officially, and I'm therefore not able to comment because we have not seen any such proposal as you suggested at the present time, though of course we will be considering a whole variety of measures which might be taken.

235. "WE... HOPE THAT THE RECENT VIENNA MEETING... WILL FURTHER... THE URGENT SOLUTION OF PROBLEMS... WHICH THE LAST WAR LEFT TO US": Message From the Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet (Brezhnev) and the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R. (Khrushchev) to the President of the United States (Kennedy), July 3, 1961 17

DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: Personally and on behalf of the Soviet people we send to the American people, and to you personally, our sincere congratulations on the occasion of this important date in the life of the American people, namely, the 185th Anniversary of achieving their independence. While sending our congratulations to you today, we want to express the hope that the recent Vienna meeting, and the exchange of opinions which took place there on questions of interest to both countries, will further the mutual efforts of our governments directed to the urgent solution of problems which long ago became pressing and which the last war left to us after the defeat of the aggressors. History imposed on our peoples, on their governments, and on their leaders an enormous share of the responsibility for the preservation of peace, for the future of humanity. In order to carry out this great historical mission it is necessary to commence building, from both sides, enduring bridges of trust, of mutual understanding and of friendship. The Soviet Union has always striven and strives now to achieve this aim. The Soviet and the American peoples by right must go down in history as the two great peoples who made a decisive contribution to the cause of ensuring permanent peace on earth.

10

1

Other sources indicate this appointment to have been made June 16.

The recommendations were reported to have been submitted June 29.

White House (Hyannis, Mass.) press release dated July 4, 1961 (text as

printed in the Department of State Bulletin, July 24, 1961, p. 164).