C. The Aftermath of the Kennedy-Khrushchev Meeting at Vienna-United States-Soviet Confrontation on the Issues of Germany and Berlin

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231. "THE SOVIET GOVERNMENT STANDS FOR THE IMMEDIATE CONCLUSION OF A PEACE TREATY WITH GERMANY... TRANSFORMING [WEST BERLIN] INTO A DEMILITARIZED FREE CITY": Aide-Mémoire Handed by the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R. (Khrushchev) to the President of the United States (Kennedy) at Vienna, June 4, 1961 (Excerpts) 1

Proceeding from a realistic evaluation of the situation, the Soviet Government stands for the immediate conclusion of a peace treaty with Germany. The question of a peace treaty is one that concerns the national security of the U.S.S.R. and of many other States. The time has already passed for allowing the situation in Germany to remain unchanged. All the conditions for the conclusion of a peace treaty matured a long time ago and this treaty must be concluded. The point is who will conclude it and when, and whether this will entail unnecessary costs.

The U.S.S.R. deems it necessary in the interests of consolidating peace formally to recognize the situation which has developed in Europe after the war, to legalize and to consolidate the inviolability of the existing German borders, to normalize the situation in West Berlin on the basis of reasonable consideration for the interests of all the parties concerned.

In the interests of achieving agreement on a peace treaty the Soviet Union does not insist on the immediate withdrawal of the Federal Republic of Germany from NATO. Both German States could for a certain period, even after the conclusion of a peace treaty, remain in the military alliances to which they now belong.

The Soviet proposal does not tie the conclusion of a peace treaty to the recognition of the German Democratic Republic or the Federal Republic of Germany by all the parties to this treaty. It is up to each Government to decide whether or not to recognize this or that State.

If the United States is not prepared to sign a joint peace treaty with the two German States, a peaceful settlement could be achieved on the basis of two treaties. In that case the States that participated in the anti-Hitlerite coalition would sign a peace treaty with two German States or with one German State, at their own discretion. These treaties need not be completely identical in wording but they must contain the same kind of provisions on the most important points of a peaceful settlement.

The conclusion of a German peace treaty would also solve the problem of normalizing the situation in West Berlin. . . .

At present, the Soviet Government does not see a better way to solve the West Berlin problem than by transforming it into a demilitarized free city. The implementation of the proposal to turn West Berlin into a free city, with the interests of all parties duly taken into consideration, would normalize the situation in West Berlin. The occupation regime now being maintained has already outlived itself and has lost all connection with the purposes for which it was established, as well as with the Allied agreements concerning Germany that established the basis for its existence. The occupation rights will naturally be terminated upon the conclusion of a German peace treaty, whether it is signed with both German States or only with the German Democratic Republic, within whose territory West Berlin is located.

1 Department of State Bulletin, Aug. 7, 1961, pp. 231–233.

The position of the Soviet Government is that the free city of West Berlin should have unobstructed contacts with the outside world and that its internal regulations should be determined by the freely expressed will of its population. The United States as well as other countries would naturally have every possibility to maintain and develop their relations with the free city. In short, West Berlin, as the Soviet Government sees it, should be strictly neutral. . . . The U.S.S.R. proposes that the most reliable guarantees be established against interference in the affairs of the free city on the part of any State. Token troop contingents of the United States, the United Kingdom, France and the U.S.S.R. could be stationed in West Berlin as guarantors of the free city. The U.S.S.R. would have no objections, either, to the stationing in West Berlin, for the same purpose, of military contingents from neutral States under the aegis of the U.N. The status of free city could be duly registered by the United Nations and consolidated by the authority of that international organization. The Soviet side is prepared to discuss any other measures that would guarantee the freedom and independence of West Berlin as a free demilitarized city.

All this considered, the settlement of the West Berlin problem should naturally take into account the necessity of respecting and strictly observing the sovereign rights of the German Democratic Republic, which, as is well known, has declared its readiness to adhere to such an agreement and respect it.

The Soviet Government proposes that a peace conference be called immediately, without delay, that a German peace treaty be concluded, and that the problem of West Berlin as a free city be solved in this way. If, for any motives, the Governments of the United States or other Western Powers are not ready for this at the present time, an interim decision could be adopted for a specified period of time.

The Four Powers would appeal to the German States to come to an agreement in any form acceptable to them on problems relating to a peace settlement with Germany and its reunification. The Four Powers would declare in advance that they would recognize any agreement achieved by the Germans.

In the event of a favorable outcome of the negotiations between the G.D.R. and the F.R.G. a single German peace treaty would be agreed upon and signed. If the two German States fail to reach agreement on the above-mentioned issues, steps would be taken to conclude a peace treaty with the two German States or with one of them, at the discretion of the States concerned.

To avoid delaying a peace settlement it is essential to fix a time limit within which the Germans should seek possible ways for agreements on problems within their internal competence. The Soviet Government considers that not more than 6 months are needed for such negotiations. This period is quite sufficient for the G.D.R. and F.R.G. to establish contacts and to negotiate, since an understanding of the necessity of putting an end to the vestiges of the Second World War in Europe has matured during the sixteen post-war years. The Soviet Government is prepared to consider any constructive proposals of the United States Government on a German peace treaty and on normalizing the situation in West Berlin. The Soviet Government will show a maximum of good will in order that the question of a German peace treaty may be settled by mutual agreement between the U.S.S.R., the United States, and other States concerned. The signing of a German peace treaty by all the members of the anti-Hitlerite coalition and the settlement of the question of a neutral status for West Berlin on this basis would create better conditions for trust among States and for the solution of such important international problems as disarmament and others. But, if the United States does not show that it realizes the necessity of concluding a peace treaty, we shall deplore it because we shall be obliged to sign a peace treaty, which it would be impossible and dangerous to delay, not with all the States but only with those that wish to sign it. The peace treaty would specifically define the status of West Berlin as a free city, and the Soviet Union, just as the other parties to the treaty, would of course observe it strictly; measures would also be taken to ensure that this status be respected by other countries as well. At the same time, this would mean putting an end to the occupation regime in West Berlin, with all its implications. In particular, questions of using the means of communication by land, water or air within the territory of the G.D.R. would have to be settled

solely by appropriate agreements with the G.D.R. That is but natural, since control over such means of communication is an inalienable right of every soVereign State.

The conclusion of a German treaty would be an important step towards the final post-war settlement in Europe for which the Soviet Union is persistently striving.

[UNITED KINGDOM-UNITED STATES "REVIEW OF THE WORLD SITUATION" IN THE LIGHT OF THE KENNEDYDE GAULLE AND KENNEDY-KHRUSHCHEV TALKS: Joint Communiqué Issued at London by the President of the United States (Kennedy) and the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom (Macmillan), June 5, 1961-Ante, doc. 206]

232. "WE... WILL SIGN A PEACE TREATY WITH THE GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC AT THE END OF THIS YEAR": Address by the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R. (Khrushchev) at Ceremonies Marking the Twentieth Anniversary of "the Great Patriotic War," Moscow, June 21, 1961 (Excerpts) 2

The Soviet people do not want war, and for this very reason we are striving to eliminate the causes of its outbreak. For the sake of this, we and the other peace-loving states will sign a peace treaty with the German Democratic Republic at the end of this year.

The Soviet Union is not proposing war or an alliance of some countries against others for the purpose of amassing strength for war. We have only one aspiration-a lasting peace. It is to strengthen peace that it is necessary to conclude a peace treaty and thereby eliminate the vestiges of the second world war. We openly state this and want everyone to understand us correctly. The Soviet Union wants to sign a peace treaty with Germany together with our former allies.

In urging the conclusion of a peace treaty we by no means threaten West Berlin, as the advocates of the preservation of international tension are screaming. We would sincerely like to reach agreement on this question, as well, with those countries with whom we fought against Hitlerite Germany and with whom we have common obligations with respect to Germany.

We propose giving West Berlin the status of a free city. We do not at all intend to change West Berlin's social and political system. This is the internal affair of its population. Neither the Soviet Union nor the German Democratic Republic intends to restrict West Berlin's ties with all countries of the world. But, in accordance with international law, the sovereign rights of the German Democratic Republic, through whose territory the communications linking West Berlin with the outside world pass, must be respected.

In regard to West Berlin, the Governments of the U.S.A., Britain and France are defending the past.

The Soviet Union proposes taking the actual and legal situation that has formed as the initial basis for a solution. No one demands disrupting the exist

These excerpts are taken from the English-language text printed in The Current Digest of the Soviet Press, vol. XIII, No. 25, July 19, 1961, pp. 6-9 and 20.

ing way of life of the West Berlin population, and no one intends to interfere in its affairs. But it is not to be expected that the Soviet Union will agree to an encroachment on the territorial integrity of the German Democratic Republic, to an infringement of the latter's sovereignty.

We propose the conclusion of a peace treaty with Germany that would not infringe the rights and interests of a single side and would not place one state in an advantageous position over the others. The Soviet Union merely proposes confirming what has long since formed and exists in life. We propose giving legal form to the existing borders of Germany.

Perhaps the present borders do not suit the West German revanchists, but they have no one to blame. It is not we who began a war to change the borders. The present borders of Germany were formed as a result of the defeat of Hitlerite Germany, as a result of the defeat of those who unleashed the predatory war. The new borders restored historical justice, which was violated by the forefathers of the present German militarists.

We are told that the peace treaty that we intend to conclude with the G.D.R. will be a separate treaty. I have already pointed out in my radio and television address that when the U.S.A. signed a peace treaty with Japan, it did not take us into account, although we were its allies in the war against Japan.' It thereby showed that it felt it had the right to sign a treaty without us, although our rights, as one of the victorious countries, were indisputable. Now we, in turn, want in the German question to enjoy the same rights enjoyed by the U.S.A. and its friends in the Japanese question. We are following their example, no more.

As for those who are trying to threaten us with war if we sign a peace treaty with the G.D.R., they will bear full responsibility for their actions.

"The portion of Chairman Khrushchev's June 15, 1961, address here referred to is not included in the excerpts printed in doc. 230, ante.

In reply to this particular allegation the Secretary of State said the following at his June 22, 1961, news conference:

"There are several important differences between the Japanese Peace Treaty and this proposal to sign a treaty with the so-called East German Republic. In the case of Japan, there was a representative, elected government representing a unified nation with which to sign a peace treaty. There were 49 nations, I believe, which did in fact sign that peace treaty. The Soviet Union was consulted by the then Ambassador, John Foster Dulles, in the early stages and had an opportunity to consult freely prior to the meeting of the Japanese Peace Conference in San Francisco. They did not avail themselves of the full opportunity that was there for them for consultation.

"At the conference itself, the Russians attended, and the conference agreed to proceed to sign a treaty. That treaty did not purport to, nor did it, affect any tangible rights of the Soviet Union in Japan.

"The situation in Berlin involves quite a different situation, with the United States and France and the United Kingdom exercising very specific rights and obligations in West Berlin. There was nothing like that in the Japanese situation at all. Nor did we have a representative government in Germany to decide for all of Germany, and certainly not a representative government in the so-called East German Republic. I think the situations are quite different." (Department of State Bulletin, July 10, 1961, pp. 56–57)

233. “THE UNITED STATES COULD NOT ACCEPT THE VALIDITY OF ANY CLAIM TO EXTINGUISH ITS POSITION IN BERLIN BY UNILATERAL ACTION": Statement Read and Replies Made by the Secretary of State (Rusk) to Questions Asked at a News Conference, June 22, 1961 (Excerpts)*

These days the ticker seems to be bringing in news from many quarters. In view of the current interest in the subject, I should like to begin with a comment on Germany and Berlin.

Due to the de facto division of Germany, the entire situation in that country is abnormal. The Soviet position in regard to this matter is predicated on the belief that the division of Germany is normal, that the division of Berlin is normal, and that the sole abnormality that persists is West Berlin. This is not a formulation of the problem which is acceptable to the United States.

5

The militant tone of the speeches made yesterday in Moscow by Chairman Khrushchev and other Soviet leaders must be a source of keen disappointment to those who seek to advance the cause of peace. The effect of these speeches, as the Soviet leaders must have known, can only be to heighten world tensions. The Soviet leaders are aware that they cannot, by any action on their part, extinguish the rights of the Western Powers in Berlin. Although cloaked in the propaganda line that all that they propose to do is to sign a peace treaty with a portion of Germany which they control, their intention is to renounce unilaterally obligations assumed in solemn international agreements. In this connection I might recall that the State Department on March 24, 1960, released the text of the basic agreement concerning the areas which the respective forces of the four occupying powers would occupy in Germany and Greater Berlin.

6

The United States and its allies have assumed certain basic obligations to protect the freedom of the people of West Berlin. Western forces are in the city by right and remain there to protect those freedoms. The people of West Berlin welcome and support those forces, whose presence gives tangible expression to our obligation. It is obvious that the United States could not accept the validity of any claim to extinguish its position in Berlin by unilateral action.

Since the Soviets precipitated the present Berlin crisis in November 1958, the United States and its allies have repeatedly confirmed their position both on the substance of the problem and on their willingness to seek peaceful solutions. I need not review here the history of the long and frequent exchanges of diplomatic notes, of the Geneva Con

The statement and replies printed here are taken from pp. 51-52, and 53-56 of the Department of State Bulletin, July 10, 1961 (reprint of Department of State press release No. 428).

B See supra.

6 See American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1960, p. 396.

7 Reference to the Soviet note of Nov. 27, 1958, to the Governments of France, the United Kingdom, and the United States; text in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1958, pp. 591–596.