B. Efforts To Improve Soviet-United States Understanding-the Kennedy-Khrushchev Meeting at Vienna

228. "PRESIDENT KENNEDY AND PREMIER KHRUSHCHEV ... HAVE AGREED TO MAINTAIN CONTACT ON ALL QUESTIONS OF INTEREST TO THE TWO COUNTRIES": Joint Communiqué Issued at Vienna by the President of the United States (Kennedy) and the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R. (Khrushchev), June 4, 1961 1

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President Kennedy and Premier Khrushchev have concluded two days of useful meetings, during which they have reviewed the relationships between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., as well as other questions that are of interest to the two States. Today, in the company of their advisors, they discussed the problems of nuclear testing, disarmament, and Germany. The President and the Chairman reaffirmed their support of a neutral and independent Laos under a government chosen by the Laotians themselves, and of international agreements for insuring that neutrality and independence, and in this connection they have recognized the importance of an effective cease-fire.2 The President and the Chairman have agreed to maintain contact on all questions of interest to the two countries and for the whole world.

229. THE SUBSTANCE OF THE KENNEDY-KHRUSHCHEV TALKS AT VIENNA, JUNE 3-4, 1961: Address by the President (Kennedy) to the Nation, June 6, 1961 (Excerpt) 3

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I went to Vienna to meet the leader of the Soviet Union, Mr. Khrushchev. For 2 days we met in sober, intensive conversation, and I believe it is my obligation to the people, to the Congress, and to our allies to report on those conversations candidly and publicly.

'White House (Vienna) press release dated June 4, 1961 (text as printed in the Department of State Bulletin, June 26, 1961, p. 999). President and Mrs. Kennedy were in Vienna June 3-4, 1961. For these meetings, which took place in the American and Soviet Embassies, the President had as advisers Secretary Rusk, Ambassadors Llewellyn E. Thompson, Foy D. Kohler, and Charles E. Bohlen. For the announcement of this meeting, see ante, doc. 225. For the texts of Soviet aide-mémoires handed to President Kennedy by Chairman Khrushchev, June 4, 1961, and the U.S. replies, see post, docs. 231, 239 and 576–577. Secretary Rusk and Ambassador Kohler respectively advised President de Gaulle and Chancellor Adenauer of the results of these talks.

2 See post, docs. 489-528.

3 White House press release dated June 6, 1961 (text as printed in the Department of State Bulletin, June 26, 1961, pp. 991-995). The President's address was carried by the principal radio and television networks.

Mr. Khrushchev and I had a very full and frank exchange of views on the major issues that now divide our two countries. I will tell you now that it was a very somber 2 days. There was no discourtesy, no loss of tempers, no threats or ultimatums by either side. No advantage or concession was either gained or given; no major decision was either planned or taken; no spectacular progress was either achieved or pretended.

This kind of informal exchange may not be as exciting as a fullfledged summit meeting with a fixed agenda and a large corps of advisers, where negotiations are attempted and new agreements sought; but this was not intended to be and was not such a meeting, nor did we plan any future summit meetings at Vienna.

But I found this meeting with Chairman Khrushchev, as somber as it was, to be immensely useful. I had read his speeches and his published policies. I had been advised on his views. I had been told by other leaders of the West, General de Gaulle, Chancellor Adenauer, Prime Minister Macmillan, what manner of man he was. But I bear the responsibility of the Presidency of the United States, and it is my duty to make decisions that no adviser and no ally can make for me. It is my obligation and responsibility to see that these decisions are as informed as possible, that they are based on as much direct, firsthand knowledge as possible.

I therefore thought it was of immense importance that I know Mr Khrushchev, that I gain as much insight and understanding as I could on his present and future policies. At the same time, I wanted to make certain Mr. Khrushchev knew this country and its policies, that he understood our strength and our determination, and that he knew that we desired peace with all nations of every kind.

I wanted to present our views to him directly, precisely, realistically, and with an opportunity for discussion and clarification. This was done. No new aims were stated in private that have not been stated in public on either side. The gap between us was not, in such a short period, materially reduced, but at least the channels of communication were opened more fully, at least the chances of a dangerous misjudgment on either side should now be less, and at least the men on whose decisions the peace in part depends have agreed to remain in contact.

This is important, for neither of us tried to merely please the other, to agree merely to be agreeable, to say what the other wanted to hear. And, just as our judicial system relies on witnesses appearing in court and on cross-examination instead of hearsay testimony or affidavits on paper, so, too, was this direct give-and-take of immeasurable value in making clear and precise what we considered to be vital, for the facts of the matter are that the Soviets and ourselves give wholly different meanings to the same words-"war," "peace," "democracy,' and "popular will." We have wholly different views of right and wrong, of what is an internal affair and what is aggression, and, above all, we have wholly different concepts of where the world is and where it is going.

Doc. 229

Only by such a discussion was it possible for me to be sure that Mr. Khrushchev knew how differently we view the present and the future. Our views contrasted sharply, but at least we knew better at the end where we both stood. Neither of us was there to dictate a settlement or convert the other to a cause or to concede our basic interests. But both of us were there, I think, because we realized that each nation has the power to inflict enormous damage upon the other, that such a war could and should be avoided if at all possible since it would settle no dispute and prove no doctrine, and that care should thus be taken to prevent our conflicting interests from so directly confronting each other that war necessarily ensued.

We believe in a system of national freedom and independence. He believes in an expanding and dynamic concept of world communism, and the question was whether these two systems can ever hope to live in peace without permitting any loss of security or any denial of freedom of our friends. However difficult it may seem to answer this question in the affirmative as we approach so many harsh tests, I think we owe it to all mankind to make every possible effort.

That is why I considered the Vienna talks useful. The somber mood that they conveyed was not cause for elation or relaxation, nor was it cause for undue pessimism or fear. It simply demonstrated how much work we in the free world have to do and how long and hard a struggle must be our fate as Americans in this generation as the chief defenders of the cause of liberty.

The one area which afforded some immediate prospect of accord was Laos. Both sides recognized the need to reduce the dangers in that situation. Both sides endorsed the concept of a neutral and independent Laos, much in the manner of Burma or Cambodia. Of critical importance to the current conference on Laos in Geneva, both sides recognized the importance of an effective cease-fire. It is urgent that this be translated into new attitudes at Geneva, enabling the International Control Commission to do its duty, to make certain that a cease-fire is enforced and maintained. I am hopeful that progress can be made on this matter in the coming days at Geneva, for that would greatly improve international atmospheres.5

No such hope emerged, however, with respect to the other deadlocked Geneva conference, seeking a treaty to ban nuclear tests. Mr. Khrushchev made it clear that there could not be a neutral administrator, in his opinion, because no one was truly neutral; that a Soviet veto would have to apply to acts of enforcement; that inspection was only a subterfuge for espionage, in the absence of total disarmament; and that the present test-ban negotiations appeared futile. In short, our hopes for an end to nuclear tests, for an end to the spread of nuclear weapons, and for some slowing down of the arms race have been struck a serious blow. Nevertheless, the stakes are too important for us to abandon the draft treaty we have offered at Geneva.7

But our most somber talks were on the subject of Germany and Berlin. I made it clear to Mr. Khrushchev that the security of Western Europe and therefore our own security are deeply involved in our presence and our access rights to West Berlin, that those rights are based on law and not on sufferance, and that we are determined to maintain those rights at any risk and thus meet our obligation to the people of West Berlin and their right to choose their own future. Mr. Khrushchev, in turn, presented his views in detail, and his presentation will be the subject of further communications. But we are not seeking to change the present situation. A binding German peace treaty is a matter for all who were at war with Germany, and we and our allies cannot abandon our obligations to the people of West Berlin.

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Generally, Mr. Khrushchev did not talk in terms of war. He believes the world will move his way without resort to force. He spoke of his nation's achievements in space. He stressed his intention to outdo us in industrial production, to out trade us, to prove to the world the superiority of his system over ours. Most of all, he predicted the triumph of communism in the new and less developed countries. He was certain that the tide there was moving his way, that the revolution of rising peoples would eventually be a Communist revolution, and that the so-called "wars of liberation," supported by the Kremlin, would replace the old methods of direct aggression and invasion.

In the 1940's and early fifties, the great danger was from Communist armies marching across free borders, which we saw in Korea. Our nuclear monopoly helped to prevent this in other areas. Now we face a new and different threat. We no longer have a nuclear monopoly. Their missiles, they believe, will hold off our missiles, and their troops can match our troops should we intervene in these so-called "wars of liberation." Thus the local conflict they support can turn in their favor through guerrillas or insurgents or subversion. A small group of disciplined Communists could exploit discontent and misery in a country where the average income may be $60 or $70 a year and seize control, therefore, of an entire country without Communist troops ever crossing any international frontier. This is the Communist theory.

But I believe just as strongly that time will prove it wrong, that liberty and independence and self-determination, not communism, is the future of man, and that free men have the will and the resources to win the struggle for freedom. But it is clear that this struggle in this area of the new and poorer nations will be a continuing crisis. of this decade.

Mr. Khrushchev made one point which I wish to pass on. He said there are many disorders throughout the world and he should not be blamed for them all. He is quite right. It is easy to dismiss as Communist-inspired every antigovernment or anti-American riot, every overthrow of a corrupt regime, or every mass protest against misery and despair. These are not all Communist-inspired. The Communists move in to exploit them, to infiltrate their leadership, to ride their

'See post, docs. 231, 239, and 245.

crest to victory. But the Communists did not create the conditions which caused them.

In short, the hopes for freedom in these areas which see so much poverty and illiteracy, so many children who are sick, so many children who die in the first year, so many families without homes, so many families without hope the future for freedom in these areas rests with the local people and their governments. If they have the will to determine their own future, if their governments have the support of their own people, if their honest and progressive measures helping their people have inspired confidence and zeal, then no guerrilla or insurgent action can succeed. But where those conditions do not exist, a military guarantee against external attack from across a border offers little protection against internal decay.

Yet all this does not mean that our Nation and the West and the free world can only sit by. On the contrary, we have a historic opportunity to help these countries build their societies until they are so strong and broadly based that only an outside invasion could topple them; and that threat, we know, can be stopped.

We can train and equip their forces to resist Communist-supplied insurrections. We can help develop the industrial and agricultural base on which new living standards can be built. We can encourage better administration and better education and better tax and land distribution and a better life for the people.

All this and more we can do because we have the talent and the resources to do it, if we will only use and share them. I know that there is a great deal of feeling in the United States that we have carried the burden of economic assistance long enough, but these countries that we are now supporting, stretching all the way along from the top of Europe through the Middle East, down through Saigon, are now subject to great efforts internally in many of them to seize control. If we are not prepared to assist them in making a better life for their people, then I believe that the prospects for freedom in those areas are uncertain. We must, I believe, assist them if we are determined to meet with commitments of assistance our words against the Communist advance. The burden is heavy, and we have carried it for many years. But I believe that this fight is not over. This battle goes on, and we have to play our part in it. And therefore I hope again that we will assist these people so that they can remain free.

It was fitting that Congress opened its hearings on our new foreign military and economic aid programs in Washington' at the very time that Mr. Khrushchev's words in Vienna were demonstrating as nothing else could the need for that very program. It should be well run and effectively administered, but I believe we must do it, and I hope that you, the American people, will support it again because I think it is vitally important to the security of these areas. There is no use talking against the Communist advance unless we are willing to meet our responsibilities, however burdensome they may be.

See post, docs. 644 and 647.