RESOLVES:

1. To convoke a Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs to serve as Organ of Consultation, in accordance with Articles 6 and 11 of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, in order to consider the threats to the peace and to the political independence of the American states referred to in the preamble of this resolution, and particularly to point out the various types of threats to the peace or certain acts that, in the event they occur, justify the application of measures for the maintenance of the peace and security, pursuant to Chapter V of the Charter of the Organization of American States and the provisions of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, and to determine the measures that it is advisable to take for the maintenance of the peace and security of the Continent.

2. To set January 10, 1962, as the date for the inauguration of the Meeting.

3. To authorize the Chairman of the Council to present to the Council, at the appropriate time, after consultation with the representatives of the member states, a recommendation on the site of the Meeting of Consultation.50

119. "THE CASTRO REGIME IN CUBA": Document Submitted to the Inter-American Peace Committee by the U.S. Representative on the Council of the OAS (Morrison), December 6, 1961 (Excerpt) 51

SUMMARY [CONCLUSION]

From the time the Castro regime came to power on January 1, 1959 it has deliberately tried to undermine established governments in Latin America and destroy the inter-American system. In the process it has associated itself with the Sino-Soviet bloc in an active partnership and adopted totalitarian policies and techniques to cement dictatorial control over the Cuban people. This situation confronts the nations of the Western Hemisphere with a grave and urgent challenge.

The challenge does not stem from the fact that the Castro regime came to power by revolution or that it advocates social and economic reform. The world welcomed the fall of Batista and the advent of a new government which promised political freedom and social justice. for the Cuban people and respect for Cuba's international obligations. The challenge results from the fact that the Castro regime has betrayed its own revolution by delivering it into the hands of powers alien to the hemisphere and by transforming it into an instrument

50 By its resolution of Dec. 22, 1961 (OAS doc. OEA/Ser.G/III/C-sa-430 (1)), the OAS Council changed the date of the meeting to Jan. 22, 1962, and established its site at Punta del Este, Uruguay.

51 Department of State Bulletin, Jan. 22, 1962, pp. 129-130.

deliberately intended to suppress the hope of the Cuban people for a return to representative democracy and to subvert established governments of other American Republics.

Since August 1960, when the Foreign Ministers of the American Republics considered the problem of Cuba and the Castro regime rejected the decisions taken,52 this pattern has crystallized with alarming rapidity and unmistakable clarity. The leaders of the Castro regime now frankly admit and publicly proclaim that their revolutionary dogma is to be exported with the objective of bringing about Castro-like revolutions in all the American Republics. The activities of Cuban diplomats and other agents, the training of foreigners in Cuba in sabotage and subversive techniques, and the intensive propaganda campaign throughout the hemisphere clearly demonstrate the manner in which the ground is being prepared in other countries for such action.

During this period the Castro regime has established such extensive and intimate political-military, economic and cultural ties with the Soviet Union, Communist China and the countries associated with them as to render Cuba an appendage of the communist system. Far from rejecting the efforts of the Sino-Soviet bloc to exploit social and political problems within this hemisphere, the Castro regime is working with the international communist movement to advance this exploitation.

Ideologically, the Castro government has placed Cuba in the communist camp. This was clearly demonstrated in the Cuban-Soviet joint communique of December 19, 1960 53 in which the two countries endorsed their respective domestic and foreign policies and pledged to work together. On May 1, 1961, Dr. Fidel Castro proclaimed Cuba to be a "socialist" state.54 The brand of "socialism" referred to is not, of course, Western social democracy but rather the second stage in the newly proclaimed communist three-stage theory of political evolution: national liberation, socialism, and communism.

The Castro regime has established diplomatic relations with all the members of the Sino-Soviet bloc, except East Germany. It is currently engaged in an extraordinary military buildup which has literally transformed the country into an armed camp. Cuba's ground forces are now larger than those of any other country in Latin America, and at least ten times greater than those maintained under the Batista regime. The receipt of thousands of tons of military equipment from the Sino-Soviet bloc made this possible.

Through a series of trade and financial agreements, the Castro regime has moved toward the adaptation of Cuba's economy and industrial plant to that of the Sino-Soviet bloc. The major result of the trip of Major Guevara to Moscow during the last two months of 1960 was to reorient Cuba's trade toward the bloc and plan the reorganization of the Cuban economy in accordance with the communist design. The degree to which Cuba has become economically depend

See American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1960, pp. 217 and 218–221. 53 Ante, doc. 82.

"See ante, doc. 106.

ent on the bloc is evidenced by the fact that approximately 80 percent of its trade is now tied up in barter arrangements with Iron Curtain countries. At the beginning of 1960 only two percent of Cuba's total foreign trade was with the bloc.

Culturally, the Castro regime is rapidly orienting Cuba toward the Sino-Soviet bloc. This orientation is not taking the form of a mere cultural interchange with communist countries such as several Western nations are conducting. On the contrary, the emerging pattern is one of extensive cultural identification with the bloc in which Cuban cultural patterns are being rapidly altered and the traditional cultural ties with countries of this hemisphere and Western Europe deliberately severed. This is to be seen in the comprehensive cultural agreements with bloc countries, the increasing exchange of students, performing artists and exhibitions with the Soviet Union and Communist China and their satellites, the impediments placed before students wishing to study anywhere except in Iron Curtain countries, the virtual halting of the flow of movies, books and magazines from free countries with a commensurate rise in the influx of these materials from the Sino-Soviet bloc, and the attacks on Western culture in general and that of United States in particular.

As a bridgehead of Sino-Soviet imperialism within the inner defenses of the Western Hemisphere, Cuba under the Castro regime represents a serious threat to the individual and collective security of the American Republics and by extension to the security of nations anywhere in the world opposing the spread of that imperialism.

THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

120. REQUEST FOR AUTHORITY RELIEVING THE PRESIDENT OF THE OBLIGATION TO PURCHASE FROM THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC A PORTION OF THE SUGAR FORMERLY OBTAINED FROM CUBA: Statement by the President (Eisenhower), Issued January 17, 1961 55

I have instructed the Secretary of Agriculture to transmit to the Congress of the United States a recommendation for extension and amendment of the Sugar Act of 1948, as amended, from its present expiration date of March 31, 1961,56 through December 31, 1961. I have also indicated my belief that a 9 months' extension is imperative to maintain a stable sugar market in the interest of domestic producers and consumers, if the Congress is to have time enough to develop longer range legislation.

65

White House press release dated Jan. 17, 1961 (text as printed in the Department of State Bulletin, Feb. 6, 1961, p. 195).

See American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1960, pp. 797-798.

In accordance with my statement of December 16, 1960,57 I have again asked the Congress to relieve the Executive of the obligation to purchase from the Dominican Republic a portion of the sugar needed to replace that formerly obtained from Cuba.58

121. UNITED STATES SUSPENSION OF TRADE WITH THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC IN PETROLEUM, PETROLEUM PRODUCTS, TRUCKS AND SPARE PARTS, EFFECTIVE JANUARY 20, 1961: Note from the U.S. Interim Representative on the Council of the OAS (Bonsal) to the Chairman of the Council of the OAS (Lobo), January 19, 1961 59

EXCELLENCY: I have the honor to refer to the resolution approved by the Council of the Organization of American States on January 4, 1961 in which it stated that it was feasible and desirable that the Member States extend their suspension of trade with the Dominican Republic to the export to that country of petroleum, petroleum products, trucks and spare parts.60 In the resolution the Council also requested the Member States to prevent the re-export of these items from their territory to the Dominican Republic, and to inform the Council regarding the measures they take with respect to the resolution.

Accordingly, I wish to inform Your Excellency that pursuant to the above-mentioned resolution, the United States Government has taken the necessary action, effective January 20, 1961, to suspend the export of the cited items from the United States to the Dominican Republic. The action taken includes, as well, the re-export of these items to the Dominican Republic.

61

122. "PURCHASE OF ... SUGAR FROM THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC... TO REPLACE [THE EMBARGOED] CUBAN SUPPLIES . . . IS NOT PRESENTLY CONSIDERED... [TO] BE IN THE NATIONAL INTEREST": Statement Made by the Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Martin) Before the Senate Committee on Finance, March 27, 1961 62

I appear here today in support of H.R. 5463, approved by the House of Representatives on March 21, 1961. The Sugar Act of 1948,

"Text ibid., p. 249.

58 For the action taken by the Congress on the President's request, see the Sugar Act of 1948, as amended by Public Law 87-15 (ante, doc. 87).

59

Department of State Bulletin, Feb. 20, 1961, p. 276.

Text in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1960, p. 270.

1 See 26 Fed. Reg. 583.

62

Department of State press release No. 165 (text as printed in the Department of State Bulletin, Apr. 17, 1961, p. 562)..

as amended, expires at midnight on Friday [March 31] of this week.63 If the act is not extended a period of uncertainty over prices and supplies is bound to follow, with unfortunate results for our domestic sugar industry. Foreign suppliers who depend on this market and its quota system would also be injured. It is therefore a matter of urgency that continuing legislation be considered promptly by the Senate. The Department of State fully supports the bill as passed by the House and requests this committee to give it favorable consideration.

The bill would continue the present authority of the President to determine the quota for Cuba. In addition it would give the Executive discretionary authority as to whether any sugar needed to replace Cuban supplies should be purchased from any country with which the United States is not in diplomatic relations. Effectively, this means that the President need not authorize the purchase of that sugar from the Dominican Republic. Under the statutory formula provided in the present law, that country would otherwise be entitled to a major share of allocations made to replace Cuban supplies. It is not presently considered that this would be in the national interest. Mr. Thomas C. Mann, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, is here with me today, and he will be pleased to respond to any questions you may have in this regard. I would like to say that the discretionary authority requested is considered essential to the proper conduct of our affairs in this hemisphere and that such authority was contained in a bill [H.R. 13062] 65 approved by the Senate last September.66

64

In addition to providing certain discretionary authority with respect to sugar from the Dominican Republic, H.R. 5463 would extend the present Sugar Act for 21 months until December 31, 1962. The present balance between foreign and domestic suppliers of the United States market would be maintained during this period. In the meantime the administration can give thoughtful study to the recent sugar report prepared by the Department of Agriculture at the request of the House Committee on Agriculture.67 Adequate time will also be provided for consultation with the domestic sugar industry. Should it prove possible to enact long-term legislation during the present session of the Congress, such legislation could, of course, be brought into force before the expiration of the 21 months provided in the present bill.

In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, I wish to say again that the bill under consideration provides the authority we need at this time in the con

See American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1960, pp. 797-798. "See Sugar: Hearing Before the Committee on Finance, U.S. Senate, 87th Congress, 1st Session, on H.R. 5483, March 27, 1961.

65 86th Cong.

66

Sept. 1, 1960. The Congress adjourned without taking any further action on the bill.

67 See Special Study on Sugar: Report of the Special Study Group on Sugar, Department of Agriculture, February 14, 1961 (Committee print, House of Representatives Committee on Agriculture, 87th Cong., 1st sess.).