Mr. MACINTYRE. That chart simply shows this: The broken line is that indicating price. The solid line, the relation of production to productive capacity.

You will note that in March 1937, the price on the basis of the Pittsburgh base was slightly under $1.70, just slightly over $4.70 up to March 1937, and at that price relatively low compared to what later happened, demand was increasing.

However, in the early part of March 1937, the industry raised that price from approximately $4.70 on the basis of its Pittsburgh base price to approximately $5.70. Notice what happened to the demand. It plummeted. Despite that fall in demand, the industry held rigidly

For example, in the State of Virginia, there are two cement plants operating today. One of them is a fairly large plant at Norfolk, Va.; another one is a good-sized plant in the valley of Virginia. Combined, those two plants in the past have been, when operating at capacity, more than able to furnish all the cement that the State of Virginia used, and even in eastern Carolina from the Norfolk, Va., plant.

Today I personally know people who live within 20 miles of one of those plants, and they are unable to secure cement. They are compelled to go all the way into Pennsylvania, to send trucks up there and haul cement from Pennsylvania down into Virginia to supply their local needs, even if it is only for 10 or 12 bags of cement, at a cost of about $6 a barrel, whereas, if they could get it down there near the plant, it would be about $1.50 or $2.

Mr. BALLINGER. At what capacity are these plants operating in Virginia?

Mr. MACINTYRE. I don't know, but I would like to know the answer to that. I know that cement is in great demand today. I don't know whether the shortage is really Nation-wide or not, but it certainly seems strange to me that a large plant such as the Norfolk, Va., plant would be shipping cement at a great distance when its customers nearby in the small, rural sections of Virginia are unable to buy cement. I wonder whether or not that is part of a campaign to create dissatisfaction with the law as it now stands.

I think it would be well worth looking into and to determine precisely what the facts are.

I want to call attention to some other artificialities and arbitrariness in the basing-point system. We have pending at the Commission today a number of cases involving the use of these systems. One of them is Docket 4878 against the Chain Institute, et al. In that case, the evidence-it hasn't been decided by the Commission, but I have presented evidence which in my opinion conclusively proves that on welded chain Pittsburgh is the sole basing point in the United States for the pricing of that product.

Yet, it is manufactured in quite a number of localities, including St. Louis. It so operates that it would permit this sort of situation: The Pennsylvania Railroad, running through Pittsburgh and St. Louis, with a need for welded chain on its operations in St. Louis, and with a factory-producing welded chain in St. Louis as well as in Pittsburgh, can buy at the Pittsburgh base price on board its cars in Pittsburgh and haul it to St. Louis with a greater cost to it than if it bought from its St. Louis supplier on board its cars in St. Louis and hauled the chain to Pittsburgh and then hauled it back to St. Louis before using it. In the latter situation, it would be cheaper than buying it in St. Louis and not hauling it at all, or buying it in Pittsburgh and hauling it only one way.

That simply points up the possibilities, disclosing the artificiality and the arbitrariness of the system.

The arbitrariness of the systems is also disclosed in a chart that was put into the brief in the Rigid Steel Conduit case. It appears opposite page 25 of the brief in court, and I would like to offer that for the record, and also supply the members of the committee with copies.

Mr. MACINTYRE. That chart simply shows this: The broken line is that indicating price. The solid line, the relation of production to productive capacity.

You will note that in March 1937, the price on the basis of the Pittsburgh base was slightly under $4.70, just slightly over $4.70 up to March 1937, and at that price relatively low compared to what later happened, demand was increasing.

However, in the early part of March 1937, the industry raised that price from approximately $1.70 on the basis of its Pittsburgh base price to approximately $5.70. Notice what happened to the demand. It plummeted. Despite that fall in demand, the industry held rigidly

to that price without a change until approximately June 1938, almost 18 months, held it so it did not reflect changes in the factors of supply and demand.

You will notice that other changes in price took place, and each time demand started up, the industry raised its price and killed off its market. That actually, as I see it, is short-sightedness on the part of industry itself, as well as being against the public interest.

I would like to refer back again a moment to the Corn Products case, and to the state of that case under these motions:

Just as representatives of that industry pleaded before a Senate committee yesterday, claiming that they were competing, so did they when they appeared before the Commission arguing their motion to dismiss, and in that connection they argued that they had never been found to have violated the antitrust laws as a matter of fact, and not having so been found to violate the law, this ought to be dismissed. Actually, they were attempting to avoid having the evidence presented which would disclose the fact of whether or not they had violated the law. They have been successful in that respect three times in the past. Three times prior to this they have been haled into court for violation of the antitrust laws, and on each occasion they have avoided having the evidence made a matter of record.

This is the fourth time, and they are seeking by motions to dismiss and by actions before Members of Congress and before Senate committees to try to see to it that they are not exposed. Their representatives yesterday told a Senate committee that they are competing. Here is what I told the Commission on October 13 with respect to those motions:

Now they are before tribunals the fourth time, and they don't want an adjudication on the facts now so that they will be able to say in the future, if they should be haled a fifth time, that they have never been found guilty of conspiracy. They have been able to evade and avoid findings of fact on that question for almost a generation. They want to continue to avoid having the spotlight thrown on their actions and facts found of what the real significance of their actions is,

In that connection I want to say they have brought in here arguments on the facts, and again I say that that was improperly done. That is in connection with their argument that they have discontinued. They have told you that they have been out of an association for 2 years, that they have not continued any practices since then that are challenged by the complaint. We sharply disagree with those assertions. They should not have been brought in here. They are factual matters upon which you are to decide this case when the evidence is in.

In that connection I want to say that counsel in support of the complaint now stands ready to proceed with an exposure of the evidence of respondents' activities. If respondents' motion should be granted, no opportunity would be afforded to expose in a public record the evidence relating to respondents' unlawful pricefixing activities. Counsel in support of the complaint stand before you as public servants and present to you the plea that respondents' motions be denied and that we thereby be permitted to proceed in the interests of the public with the presentation of evidence which we believe will adequately support the allegations of the complaint that these respondents are maintaining an unlawful pricefixing combination.

Mr. PATMAN. May I interrupt there? I am compelled to go.
Mr. MACINTYRE. I will finish in about 1 minute.

Mr. PATMAN. Fine. Go ahead.

Mr. MACINTYRE (reading):

In that connection we offer to prove, if you do not grant the respondents' motion and thereby foreclose us, that respondents have engaged in an unlawful price-fixing combination and that they are continuing unlawful price-fixing activ

ities and are continuing related trade restraints through a continuation of collusive action.

We stand ready to prove that not only through presentation of evidence and other information which the Commission had before it at the time the Commission issued its complaint and upon which the Commission based its statement that it had reason to believe that these respondents are engaged in the maintenance of an unlawful price-fixing combination, but we also stand ready to present a substantial amount of additional evidence in support of the complaint which we have accumulated since the Commission issued its complaint, and much of that additional evidence has been secured in recent weeks.

Mr. PATMAN. Mr. MacIntyre, I didn't intend to cause you to stop because of my leaving. I wish you to continue. I am compelled to leave because I have to catch a train, but I certainly hope that you put everything in the record that is pertinent to your testimony: Excerpts from reports, findings, or anything else to which you have access, and especially the identical bids of the different cement companies on different contracts.

Mr. MACINTYRE. I shall be glad to take that out of the public record that we have in the Cement case down there, and present it at any other time that the committee may afford me an opportunity to do so. There is an abundance of that evidence.

Mr. BALLINGER. I think you want him to present it in this record rather than in some future record.

Mr. PATMAN. I want it filed in this record as part of your testimony here today, and if you will pick up the arguments that are made as justification for the basing point and submit your arguments in answer to them, it would be appreciated.

Mr. MACINTYRE. I shall be glad to do that. In fact, I have some of those now.

In this connection, I would like to offer the findings of fact and the order of the Commission in the Conduit case for inclusion in the record. (The document referred to follows:)

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, BEFORE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION AT A REGULAR SESSION OF THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, HELD AT ITS OFFICE IN THE CITY OF WASHINGTON, D. C., ON THE 6TH DAY OF JUNE A. D. 1944 COMMISSIONERS: Robert E. Freer, Chairman, Garland S. Ferguson, Charles H. March, Ewin L. Davis, William A. Ayres.

Docket No. 4452

In the Matter of RIGID STEEL CONDUIT ASSOCIATION, an unincorporated association; its officers: HERBERT S. BLAKE, President, LAWRENCE R. QUINN, Treasurer, PAUL WEISS, Assistant Treasurer, ROBERT S. BOOTH, Executive Secretary; its board of directors: I. A. BENNETT, Chairman, J. M. BARTON, H. G. MORROW, LAWRENCE R. QUINN, H. S. WALKER, A. E. NEWMAN; and its members: CENTRAL TUBE COMPANY, CLAYTON MARK & COMPANY, COHOES ROLLING MILL COMPANY, ENAMELED METALS COMPANY, FRETZ-MOON TUBE COMPANY, INC., GARLAND MANUFACTURING COMPANY, GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY, LACLEDE STEEL COMPANY, LACLEDE TUBE COMPANY, NATIONAL ELECTRIC PRODUCTS CORPORATION, STEELDUCT COMPANY, TRIANGLE CONDUIT & CABLE COMPANY, INC., WALKER BROTHERS, YOUNGSTOWN SHEET AND TUBE COMPANY, corporations, individually and as representative of the members of the Rigid Steel Conduit Association; GENERAL ELECTRIC SUPPLY CORPORATION, SPANG CHALFANT, INC., STEEL AND TUBES, INC., REPUBLIC STEEL CORPORATION, THE M. B. AUSTIN COMPANY, GEORGE L. HATHEWAY, REGINA G. HATHEWAY, KATHERINE R. HATHEWAY, and JANE HATHEWAY, partners, trading as CLIFTON CONDUIT COMPANY; CHARLES DONLEY; FRANK C. HODKINSON; ORGANIZATION SERVICE CORPORATION, a corporation, and its officers; HERBERT S. BLAKE, President, HERBERT S. BLAKE, Jr., Vice President, N. MYLES BROWN, Vice President, THOMAS B. JORDAN, Vice President,