ADDITIONAL ARTICLES, LETTERS, AND STATEMENTS

(This information is referred to in Under Secretary Thaddeus R. R. Beal's statement.)

Dr. JOHN S. FOSTER, Jr.,

Director, Office of Defense Research and Engineering, Department of Defense, Washington, D.C.

DEAR JOHNNY: I transmit to you herewith a report prepared by a committee I appointed on behalf of the National Academy of Sciences, in accordance with your request of May 14, to give technical advice on a plan developed by the Department of Defense and alternate plans, for the disposal of certain overage and surplus chemical warfare agents and munitions. The members of the committee were selected to bring a broad range of relevant expert scientific and engineering knowledge to bear on this matter, including chemistry, biology, toxicology, physiology, and oceanography, as well as practical experience in the manufacture, handling, transportation, and disposal of hazardous materials, including explosives and chemical warfare agents.

I believe you will agree with me that the committee should be commended for the intensive study they have been able to give to this complex problem, in the interest of public service, on such short notice. I am confident the unanimous conclusions they have reached represent the best judgment of the scientific and engineering community, and trust their recommendations will be helpful to you in deciding upon a course of action.

Sincerely yours,

FREDERICK SEITZ, President.

DISPOSAL HAZARDS OF CERTAIN CHEMICAL WARFARE AGENTS AND MUNITIONS (Prepared by an Ad Hoc Advisory Committee of the National Academy of Sciences)

This Committee was appointed by the President of the National Academy_of Sciences in response to a request of May 14, 1969 from Dr. J. S. Foster, Jr., Director of Defense Research and Engineering, Department of Defense, for an assessment of hazards involved in the execution of "Operation CHASE" (and alternate plans) for the disposal of certain surplus chemical warfare stocks of the U.S. Army. Dr. Foster noted that, because of seasonal considerations, an early response would be most helpful.

This limitation on time precluded an exhaustive study by the Committee of all alternatives and factors involved. Prior to meeting, the Committee reviewed printed material submitted by the Department of Defense relating to Operation CHASE, and additional relevant material from a variety of other sources. Individual members of the Committee studied the records of pertinent hearings before the Subcommittee on International Organizations and Movements of the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Subcommittee on Conservation and Natural Resources of the Committee on Government Operations of the U.S. House of Representatives, and consulted with a representative of the Colorado Committee for Environmental Information and with Mr. Louis Garona of Edgewood Arsenal. Various members visited Edgewood Arsenal, Rocky Mountain Arsenal, and Naval Ammunition Depot Earle (including a flight over the adjoining territory and the tracks of the Central Railroad of New Jersey to the city of Elizabeth). Personnel at these facilities were cordial and cooperative, and discussions with them were most helpful in providing the Committee with background information based upon experience in handling the agents and munitions concerned.

The committee met subsequently for two full days of briefings and executive sessions. Briefings, with responses to questions from the Committee, were given

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on various aspects of Operation CHASE and alternate methods of disposal by the following personnel from the Department of Defense:

Army. Mr. Samuel Berlin, Mr. Paul R. Chagnon, Mr. S. Eckhaus, Dr. Joseph Epstein, Mr. Norman G. Hansen, Mr. Robert Hurt, Mr. E. J. Jordan, and Col. John J. Osick.

Navy. Mr. Frank Dunham, and Mr. Alfred Fernandes.

The following representatives of the Department of Defense, who also attended the meetings, responded to many queries from the Committee members:

Army.-Acting Assistant Secretary (R&D) Charles L. Poor, Brig. Gen. James A. Hebbeler, Dr. Van M. Sim, and Mr. R. K. Webster.

Navy.-Assistant Secretary (R&D) Robert A. Frosch and Dr. William P.

Raney.

Messrs. W. C. Jennings of the Department of Transportation and T. P. McCormack of the Federal Aviation Administration responded to questions about railroad transportation and about flight patterns and regulations at the Denver airport. Officials representing other agencies of the federal government also were present.

The committee appreciates the cooperative attitude of all these individuals and the wealth of technical and other factual information that they provided.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

We are very much aware that continuing inaction will not reduce the hazards of eventual disposal of the chemicals and munitions intended for disposal in the 1969 Operation CHASE, and in some instances will increase them.

Furthermore we are aware that many activities of the federal government unavoidably involve some hazards to the personnel involved and also to private "bystanders". In this respect, government activities resemble those of private manufacturing and transportation organizations. We believe, however, that the government should set an example to private organizations and individuals of minimizing risks to humans and damage to the environment, even though this may complicate and make more costly its own operations. Therefore we recommend that Operation CHASE as originally conceived be modified as follows. Five types of materials are included in the plan:

I. AF M34 bomblet clusters containing GB, a "nerve gas."

II. Bulk containers of Mustard.

III. M55 rockets containing GB in concrete "coffins."

IV. Contaminated and water-filled bulk containers.

V. Drums containing cans of CS agent in concrete.

We recommend that disposal of these materials should be as follows:

I. A total of 21,108 M34 clusters, each containing 76 bomblets, each of which is loaded with 2.6 lb of GB (volatile liquid "nerve gas"), 0.55 lb of tetryl burster charge, and fuze, are stored now at Rocky Mountain Arsenal (RMA), the site of their manufacture some sixteen years ago.

Discussion: We consider the Army's plans for minimizing the hazards of possible GB leakage during railroad transportation, including prevention of accidents and provisions for treatment of injured people, to be well developed. However, we cannot exclude the remote possibility of a catastrophic explosion in connection with transportation of large numbers of M34 clusters. Conceivably a sniper's high-velocity bullet could initiate a burster charge, and tests have shown that this induces sympathetic detonation of several adjacent bomblets; or, the collision of a gasoline truck with the train on a grade crossing could start a fire that could detonate the contents of many clusters. Other possible hazards associated with rail transport could also release large amounts of GB from M34 clusters. This could cause casualties far beyond the capacity of the attendant medical staff to handle.

Moreover, the Navy's plans for loading and towing the CHASE ship to the disposal grounds and sinking it there cannot preclude the remote possibility of a collision at sea or some other major accident that could conceivably result in the release of large quantities of GB.

There is some possibility of a large detonation of M34 clusters upon sinking of the ship in the ocean. As already noted, limited sympathetic detonation in a cluster has been observed in a test in air. The better impedance match of water invites a massive sympathetic detonation should a bomolet detonate. We consider that this is a probable event upon the impact of the ship's hulk on ocean bottom (7,200 ft deep), which it reaches at a speed that has been estimated from 10 to 100 ft/sec. While the consequences are impossible to predict precisely, lethal contamination of several cubic miles of the ocean (spread near the bottom downstream from the

dump in a layer covering many square miles) for a period of many days likely, on the basis of calculations involving the rates of hydrolysis (and thus of detoxification) of GB, its convective diffusion, and expected (very slow) sea currents. With no massive detonation, GB would be gradually released upon progressive corrosion of its thin-walled steel containers. Calculations such as those above suggest contamination of a small fraction (0.1 to 0.01) of a cubic mile of sea water as a bottom layer near the dump, lasting a few to many months, depending on the corrosion rate. In either case live fish are likely to be attracted into the contaminated layer by dead animals. The effects of these events on the oceanic ecosphere cannot be estimated but could be very serious. We are not fully convinced that a massive detonation upon the upending of the sinking hulk while still near the surface can be wholly excluded. If this were to happen, of course, the results could hardly be less serious.

We have considered and rejected (as the Army did earlier) various ways of entombing the M34 clusters on dry land. In essence, real disposal would thereby merely be postponed, while the stage would be set for an accident or even a major catastrophe for a future generation of Americans, when the records of such entombing would have been lost and human activities not now thought of would have been undertaken.

The burying of the clusters in a deep cavern, followed by the explosion of a small nuclear device there, could incinerate and detoxify the clusters. However, the hazards involved in various stages of this operation and the time required for its completion make this an undesirable plan.

Over a period of many years, RMA personnel have disposed of more than 2,200 leaky M34 clusters by disassembling them and chemically destroying or salvaging the GB without "lost time" accidents.

Recommendation: We recommend, therefore, that the M34 clusters be disassembled and the withdrawn GB be destroyed chemically either by acid or alkaline hydrolysis. This procedure would result in waste materials without "nerve-gas" properties and not more hazardous than larger volumes of industrial waste that are routinely discharged elsewhere.

On balance, weighing various hazards, we recommend that this disassembly be undertaken at RMA because (i) the hazards arising from transportation by rail will be eliminated; (ii) RMA has an experienced staff that has already disassembled M34 clusters; (iii) RMA has facilities that can be fiarly rapidly expanded for the recommended operation. We consider the addition of waste waters from hydrolysis to the sealed pond on the grounds of RMA not to be an issue since it would be only a small increment of similar waste now in the pond. If this recommendation is adopted, however, we urge the Army to proceed as rapidly as possible with the implementation of the plan, which may take from 18 to 30 months. In the meantime, immediate measures should be taken to protect the stores of M34 clusters from lightning and excessive direct sunlight, and also to distribute them so as to minimize the effects of the unlikely event of an aircraft crashing on the stores.

If, for any reason, the disposal of M34 clusters cannot be carried out at RMA, we recommend that they be moved by rail to the Tooele Army Depot and there disposed of by disassembly and chemical destruction of GB, as above. Tooele is recommended because (i) it offers a shorter haul by rail from RMA through a less-populated area (with the major exception of the passage through a part of Denver); (ii) it is located in a sparsely populated region and has a large land area; (iii) the Army has transported to Tooele other munitions containing "nerve gas" so that, when the time comes for their disposal, the disposal facilities that will have to be constructed at Tooele for M34 clusters would make further railroad transportation unnecessary.

As noted earlier, the probability of a catastrophic railroad accident involving M34 clusters is very low, but not zero. To reduce it further we recommend that, in addition to safety measures already planned by the Army, positive steps be taken to close grade crossings in inhabited areas during the passage from RMA to Tooele of trains loaded with explosive munitions containing "nerve gases.'

II. A total of 5,311 one-tone heavy steel containers (like those used commercially for chlorine) filled with Mustard liquid were to be disposed of in Operation CHASE, and are stored at the Rocky Mountain, Anniston, and Edgewood Army establishments. Another 7,332 such containers that were to be disposed of later are at Pine Bluff and Tooele.

Discussion: The transportation of these heavy steel containers by rail should be considered a hazardous operation subject to safety precautions practiced by the Army. However, we consider that such transportation of an almost non

volatile liquid (Mustard H or HD) would involve virtually no hazards of a catastrophic accident because even a strong fire would not rupture the tanks and boil off the Mustard. Hence the safety and security plans adopted by the Army to deal with accidents resulting in minor leaks and even larger local contamination are adequate. Similarly we can conceive of no likely catastrophic accidents occurring during the towing of a CHASE ship to the disposal area.

In the past, various chemical warfare agents have been repeatedly disposed of in the oceans by the United States and other nations (see, for instance, House of Commons Parliamentary Debates, Weekly Hansard, No. 484, 25 March-31 March 1960). We have no information regarding possible deleterious effects of these operations on the ecosphere of the seas.

Most of the one-ton containers of Mustard would probably not rupture upon the bottom impact of the sinking CHASE ship. However, their brass valves (forming an electrochemical couple) would cause moderately rapid corrosion of the steel containers, so that large numbers of cylindrical shapes of solid Mustard weighing about a ton each would eventually be exposed to sea water on the bottom. Considering the very slow rate of solution of solid Mustard in sea water at 3.5°C, the rate of its hydrolysis (and hence detoxification), and the effects of dissolved Mustard on fresh-water fish, we believe that the ocean volume made lethal to fish would in all probability be extremely small, although some pollution would continue for years. We are concerned, however, about the effects of Mustard on the germ cells of fish and on unicellular and larval organisms, concerning which no quantitative data were available. Thus the effects of these large masses of Mustard on the oceanic ecosphere are not predictable.

Mustard is readily combustible and, in the past, about 3,000 tons of it have been destroyed by burning in a special furnace at the RMA. Some of the products of combustion are air pollutants of the same type as those released in some industrial and electric-power-generating activities, namely hydrogen chloride and sulfur dioxide, and none have properties of chemical warfare agents.

Recommendation: We recommend that the Mustard scheduled for disposal in CHASE (and about 6,600 tons more in the 7,332 containers still to be disposed of, as mentioned previously) be burned in government establishments where storage is safe and local air pollution from the resulting SO2 and HCl is not a serious problem. This procedure was successfully followed at RMA in an incinerator having a heat dissipation capacity of about 17 (10) Btu/hr. The products of combustion were dispersed into the air from a 200-ft chimney. Should maximum ground-level concentrations of pollutants prove to be excessive, a simple liquid scrubber should be added to the existing facilities and the effluent sent to the sealed lake. If for compelling reasons the disposal is at a site other than RMA, similar facilities are suggested, with thought being given, during design, to longterm use to incinerate other materials.

III. A total of 418 "coffins" containing M55 rockets are now at the Anniston (Alabama) and Blue Grass (Kentucky) Army establishments. The rockets are distributed evenly in solid blocks of concrete cast into heavy steel boxes with welded lids. Each such "coffin" weighs about 6.4 tons and contains 30 rockets. Each rocket contains 10.8 lb of GB liquid “nerve gas” and about 2.6 lb of Composition B burster charge, as well as rocket propellant and fuze. In previous CHASE operations during 1967 and 1968, 1,706 such "coffins" have been sunk in one location east of NAD Earle at a depth of 7,200 feet.

Discussion: The transportation of the "coffins" by rail should be treated as a hazardous operation, but we conclude that the probability of a catastrophic accident is essentially nil because (i) the "coffins" should survive the wreck of a slowly moving train (35 mph or less, according to Army plans); (ii) a fire would take a long time to heat the large concrete mass of a "coffin" to a temperature high enough to cause rocket explosion; (iii) a sniper's bullet could not penetrate to a rocket to cause explosion; and (iv) sympathetic propagation of the explosion of any one rocket is not likely.

As in the case of the one-ton Mustard containers, the probability of a catastrophic accident during the towing of a CHASE ship loaded with the "coffins" is vanishingly small.

We expect that most, if not all, of these "coffins" would survive intact throughout the sinking of the hulk. Upon the corrosion of the steel containers, sea water will penetrate concrete and corrode the thin aluminum bodies of the rockets, thus allowing GB to diffuse slowly to the outside. Some hydrolysis of GB will take place within the pores of concrete. Where alkaline pH due to concrete prevails, the products of hydrolysis will be polymeric. These and the gelatinous aluminum hydroxide of the corroded rocket bodies may seal the pores in concrete, slowing down diffu