The most important consideration is to assure that the yield of the device is large enough so that there will be no uncertainty about the destruction of the material. A detailed calculation of temperatures vs distance which included the attenuation of shock pressure due to the gaps between coffins and the other inhomogeneities in the stacked system would be very difficult. Therefore, we have calculated a simple system and must include a large factor of safety. Figure 1 gives the radius of vaporization and the radius at which material will reach 500°C as a function of yield for explosions in dry tuff. It is expected that the temperatures in a concrete medium would be fairly similar to those in tuff.

In the homogeneous tuff, 40 KT would be required to include the volume of interest (7 meters radius) within the radius of vaporization. Although GB will decompose in less than a minute at 500°C, it is more conservative to require the higher temperatures at the radius of vaporization. Using a radius of 10 meters

or 100 KT should be adequate to account for the inhomogeneities, spacing between blocks and other factors which would tend to reduce the shock pressure and thus the temperature.

Hon. STANLEY R. RESOR,
Secretary of the Army,
Washington, D.C.

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR,

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY, Washington, D.C., December 2, 1969.

DEAR MR. RESOR: We are enclosing our report reviewing the Army's proposal to dump 418 coffins containing M55 GB rockets in the Atlantic Ocean. We concur with the following recommendations made by our Committee:

1. That the Department of the Interior reaffirm its opposition to the use of the ocean as a dumping ground for toxic materials.

2. That the Department of the Interior accept the dumping of these munitions in the ocean at the designated site as a necessary but undesirable expediency (see report for details).

3. That the ship used for disposal be instrumented to determine:

(a) whether ship explodes and if so, at what depth.

(b) precise location of ship on ocean floor.

4. That position of coffins dumped off New Jersey Coast be precisely charted. 5. That aerial determination of ocean surface temperature be made on both dumping sites on a monthly basis for one year.

Sincerely,

(Sgd) C. F. LAYTON.

(For Leslie L. Glasgow, Assistant Secretary for Fish and Wildlife, Parks, and Marine Resources).

Enclosure:

SECOND REPORT OF THE DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR-WORKING GROUP ON OCEAN DUMPING OF CHEMICAL MUNITIONS, NOVEMBER 13, 1969

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

1. We recommend that the Department of the Interior reaffirm its opposition to the use of the oceans as dumping grounds for toxic materials.

2. Because of the present hazards to human safety and to the aquatic and terrestrial environments posed by the remaining 418 coffins containing GB rockets, we recommed that the Department of the Interior accept the dumping of these munitions in the ocean at the marked dumping site centered at 29°20′N, 76°0'W as a necessary but undesirable expediency. Two conditions should be placed on this acceptance. The first condition is that Interior be assured that adequate consideration was given to destruction of the munitions by underground detonation of a nuclear device and that this method of disposal was rejected for valid reasons. The second condition is that Interior obtain assurance from the Army that this will be their last need for ocean disposal of material of such potential toxicity to marine resources.

3. We recommend that the ship used for disposal be instrumented so that explosions can be detected and the depth at which they occur determined.

4. We recommend that the ship used for disposal be instrumented so that its position on the bottom can be precisely located.

5. We recommend that the position of ships used previously for dumping identical coffins off New Jersey be located and precisely charted.

6. We recommend that aerial surveys of surface temperature of the two dumping sites be made on a monthly basis for at least one year to detect possible upwelling. The data from these surveys should be provided routinely to the Fish and Wildlife Service for analysis.

INTRODUCTION

The working group met on November 10, 1969, to consider the Army's proposal to dump obsolete rockets containing GB nerve agent in the Atlantic Ocean. These rockets are encased in concrete and steel "coffins" or vaults and are a part of the chemical munitions considered in our previous report of June 27, 1969. In that report we indicated that the possible damage to marine resources of dumping these "coffins" was considerably less than the damage which might be caused by dumping the M 34 GB cluster bombs, but the extent of this damage could not be accurately assessed. We, and the National Academy Committee, recommended that the Army seek alternate methods for their disposal.

Two major developments were considered at the current meeting of our working group. First, the report (dated July 25, 1969) of an Ad Hoc Committee of Technical Experts called together by the Army to investigate hazards involved in a variety of alternate methods of disposal of the rockets encased in concrete was available for review. Second, the site proposed by the Army for this disposal differs from the one previously considered by our group. In our meeting, we carefully reviewed the report of the Army's Ad Hoc Technical Committee, the information we were able to assemble on the oceanography of the new proposed site, and the information previously available to us on these munitions.

EVALUATIONS

We are still of the opinion that encasing such highly toxic material in concrete and steel and dumping it in the ocean is not a proper method for its disposal. We consider it inimical to human well-being and to the maintenance and enhancement of the marine environment to dump any poisonous materials into the ocean.

However, judging from the report of the Ad Hoc Committee of Technical Experts, the remaining 418 rockets represent an unacceptable hazard where they are now located and must be disposed of as soon as possible. According to the report of that Committee, encasement of the rockets in concrete and steel has created a situation so dangerous that time is of the essence in their disposal. That Committee, after considering a number of possible methods of disposal, recommended only two as feasible within a reasonably safe period. The first and most desirable method is complete destruction of all vaults by underground detonation of a nucelar device. The second and less disirable method is dumping them in the ocean in deep water (15,000 feet or more in depth).

According to the information available to our working group, the first and most desirable of these methods has been rejected. It appears, therefore, considering the present hazards to human safety and to the aquatic and terrestrial environment and the unavailability of alternate methods for disposal that the Department of the Interior has no choice but to accept ocean disposal of these hazardous materials as a ncecessary, though undesirable, expediency.

As scientists, devoted to the wise use, maintenance, and enhancement of the quality of the marine and aquatic environments and their resources, we agree wholeheartedly with the statement in Assistant Secretary Leslie L. Glasgow's memorandum of November 5, 1969, that

"Should Interior concur with this ocean disposal, we should obtain assurance from the Army that this will be the last need for ocean disposal of material of such potential toxicity to marine resources."

There remained then, for the working group to consider two items: The disposal site and the possibility of monitoring adverse effects on marine resources.

Concerning the site, we consulted with several recognized experts in oceanography and assembled and examined the available information. We drew up a balance sheet comparing the advantages and disadvantages of this site over the previously used site and some other site in deeper water. The site selected in our opinion is the least undesirable. It is in deeper water than the site previously used, where, from available information, marine life is sparser. Because of its greater depth, the site is less susceptible to technological use. It is on the seaward side of the Gulf Stream in a less productive area; the bottom currents are small (about 0.5 knot) so that toxic material eventually leaking from the containers should be confined to a rather small area; there is no evidence of upwelling at the site; and, finally, the site is already marked as a disposal area for explosives and chemicals. We considered in some detail possible methods for monitoring the adverse effects on marine resources of dumping the remaining 418 coffins, as well as the effects from the previous 1706 dumped off New Jersey. We do not consider it practical to carry on a continuous monitoring program to measure the effects of these dumpings. If the coffins reach the bottom intact, there is no way of predicting how long it will take before they deteriorate and release their toxic contents. We do feel, however, that certain actions and studies are desirable. First, the Navy and the Army should instrument the current CHASE ship to allow determination of whether explosions occur; and if so, at what depth. They should also instrument the ship so that its final position can be determined accurately. It is even more desirable to know the precise position of the previous chemical CHASE ships since they are in depths susceptible to exploration by current technology.

We further consider it desirable to conduct aerial surveys of sea surface temperatures in the two sites at monthly intervals for at least a year. These surveys

would detect possible upwelling. During such surveys, information about the distribution of surface swimming animals could be obtained and charted.

Members of the Working Group on Ocean Dumping of Chemical Munitions of the U.S. Department of the Interior.

Dr. GEORGE J. RIDGWAY (Chairman),

Bureau of Commercial Fisheries, DR. LIONEL A. WALFORD,

Bureau of Sport Fisheries and Wildlife, Mr. WALTER J. HUNT,

Federal Water Pollution Control Administration.

DUKE UNIVERSITY, DEPARTMENT OF CHEMISTRY, Durham, N.C., May 15, 1970.

OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE
ARMY FOR RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT,
The Pentagon, Washington, D.C.

GENTLEMEN: On 18 March 1970 the Army Research Office-Durham was requested by Office, Chief of Research and Development to review the progress being made at the Tooele Army Depot on implementing the recommendations of the Ad Hoc Committee to Investigate Disposal Hazards of Certain Chemical Munitions submitted to the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Research and Development on 25 July 1969.

Accordingly, a group of five technically competent individuals visited the Tooele Army Depot at Tooele, Utah on 9 April 1970 to study the experimental program designed to determine the safest and most practical method for the disposal of the vaults containing obsolete M55 rockets. The report appended hereto describes the findings of this group.

After reviewing the findings included within this report, I cannot urge you strongly enough to take immediate action to dispose of these munitions. While the individual components of this weapon have a reasonable storage life while in good condition, there is reason to believe that an element of instability is present that provides a potential of great danger particularly when one realizes what might happen if the contents of some of these vaults were released in their present storage areas so close to populated centers. Beyond these considerations there is the ever present danger of sabotage in storage and in transit.

Sincerely yours,

PAUL M. Gross,

Professor of Chemistry & Chairman of Committee.

FOLLOW-UP REPORT ON IMPLEMENTATION OF "REPORT OF THE TECHNICAL GROUP TO INVESTIGATE DISPOSAL HAZARDS OF CERTAIN CHEMICAL MUNITIONS," MAY 15, 1970

REFERENCES

1. Report of the Disposal Hazards of Certain Chemical Warfare Agents and Munitions prepared by an Ad Hoc Advisory Committee of the National Academy of Sciences (NAS)—Chairman, Dr. George B. Kistiakowsky, 25 June 1969

2. Report of the Ad Hoc Committee to Investigate Disposal Hazards of Certain Chemical Munitions-Chairman, Dr. Paul M. Gross, 25 July 1969

3. Test Report M55 Rocket Vault Study, May 1970

4. Operation Plan "CHASE", 29 December 1969

I. Background

Reference 1 describes the nature of the problem that was responsible for the appointment of an ad hoc committee to study ways and means of disposing of obsolete and deteriorating munitions having component materials injurious to health. This report made a number of recommendations directly responsive to the disposal of all munitions except the "coffins" containing M55 rockets presently being stored at the Anniston (Alabama) and Blue Grass (Kentucky) depots. This committee further recommend that, since it has no members that would qualify as demolition experts, the Army convene a group of technically qualified individuals who could study the problems involved in the safe disposition of the M55 rockets and make implementing recommendations.

Within this report were a number of conclusions that have been investigated by the Army and reported under reference 3. Among these are:

1. The "coffins" should survive the wreck of a slowly moving train (35 mph or less, according to Army plans);

2. A fire would take a long time to heat the large concrete mass of a "coffin" to a temperature high enough to cause rocket explosion;

3. A sniper's bullet could not penetrate to a rocket to cause explosion;

4. Sympathetic propagation of the explosion of any one rocket is not likely. There is no evidence to disprove the first. The data presented in reference 3 under Incineration indicates that the time to deflagration or detonation of a rocket exposed to heat may not be as long as the second conclusion implies.

While reference 3 does not show that a sniper's bullet could cause explosion if fired into a vault, it does demonstrate that such a projectile is capable of penetrating the metal encased concrete vault and releasing agent from the warhead of one or more rockets. Also, the fact that a spent bullet was found within a warhead under the same conditions strongly suggests that, had it lodged in the motor, a deflagration or detonation might have ensued.

Finally, data taken from a number of experiments described in reference 3 shows that the sympathetic propagation of either a "deflagration” or “detonation" is certainly possible.

Reference 2 describes the deliberations of the committee of technically qualified individuals convened by the Army to implement the above described recommendation of the NAS committee concerning M55 rockets. The essence of its findings resides in two primary and alternate recommendations, four secondary and general recommendations and comments concerning nine methods for possible disposal of the rockets. No further consideration will be given to the four secondary recommendations in this report since they primarily address future possibilities rather than the immediate problem. The recommendations and suggestions of that committee are as follows:

"1. To minimize the possible hazards:

(a) Immediately separate the vaults by at least three feet while in storage. (b) Coat the exposed vaults with a reflective paint.

(c) If these vaults are to be transported, to maintain a safe separation between them in transit.

2. Dispose of all 418 vaults by 1 August 1970 by:

(a) Use of a nuclear device to completely destroy them in one explosion. (b) If the above cannot be accomplished, to sea dump them in as deep water as possible.

3. Although it is outside the scope of this Committee's objectives, the following general recommendations are also submitted:

(a) Munitions should not be encased in concrete because of the difficulty of disposing of them when obsolete.

(b) The Army immediately undertake the design and construction of an adequate, safe disposal facility which will accommodate all chemical munitions. (Full consideration should be given to surplus ICBM launch facilities.) (c) Pending establishment of such a facility, stocks of obsolete or unserviceable chemical munitions be stored in adequate and safe locations or be disposed of in appropriate facilities.

(d) Future munition designs should take into account the possible need for large scale disposal and, to the extent possible, incorporate features which will minimize the hazards associated with munition disassembly and agent disposal.

Alternate Disposal Methods Explored (continuation of Reference 2).—(a) Using an underground detonation of a nuclear device, completely destroy all vaults in a single explosion. The results are predictable and complete. This will require an underground cavity of at least 1,600 cubic yards to contain the vaults.

(b) Sea dump the vaults in the "as is" condition, but explore encasing each vault with or without the top lid removed in an outer shell with sufficient void between the inner and outer casings to contain enough decontaminating solution to neutralize the GB in the vault. The material of the outer shell should be such that it would maintain its integrity for long periods of sea water exposure.

(c) Immersing the vaults in a solution, such as 28 percent hydrochloric acid (HCl), disintegrate the concrete and expose the entire rocket to the solution which would dissolve the metallic warhead skin and hydrolyze the GB agent. Controlled tests would be required to determine the effects of the selected solution on the various explosives involved. Also total dwell time would have to be determined. The overall feasibility of this procedure should be investigated to see whether the time required is adequate.