having been made for compulsory investigation indicates that he did not consider it a means of preventing the threatened strike. Yet it is reasonable to ask why, if the President favored arbitration in principle, he was not ready to ask Congress for a law which would make the calling of the threatened strike unlawful unless the disputants first submitted to arbitration. In his address to Congress the President pointed out that the laws supplied no means of compelling arbitration. Neither did the laws provide for a basic eight-hour day on the railroads. It would have been as easy, as far as his power was concerned, to have asked for the enactment of one as for the other. For the Presi

dent to have asked Congress for the enactment of a compulsory arbitration law would, of course, have evoked a tremendous opposition from labor. The President, having already placed all his influence behind a certain plan of settlement, which was accepted by the employees, would have been severely criticized had he given up this plan and insisted on the arbitration which the employers, refusing his proposal, had themselves demanded. It would probably have been better for the President to have postponed the making of a definite proposal until he knew that there was a likelihood of its being accepted. As it was, he shot his bolt early, and could consistently do nothing but insist on the acceptance of his plan. His sympathy with the demand for an eight-hour day, his pique at the employers because of their persistent refusal to accede to his request, and the certain opposition of great numbers of voters were he to change his stand, were also probably important factors in determining his policy. Moreover Mr. Wilson, though favoring arbitration in principle, was probably opposed to compulsory arbitration in times of peace. Had he asked Congress for a law making the arbitration of the dispute compulsory, his request, though arousing tremendous opposition the

country over, might have been granted, but there is a question whether the enactment of such a law would have been effective in preventing the strike. The feelings of the railway employees were at fever heat, they were determined not to arbitrate, and after their hopes had been raised by the proposals of the President the shock of a disappointment might easily have resulted in a decision to defy the govern

ment.

A fourth course would have been for the President to step aside and let the employees strike if they so wished, there being the probability that public opinion would have been so outraged that the strike could only last a short time before a settlement was forced. Such a course would have involved more criticism and complaint than the course actually taken. A strike involving but one class of employees, or one small section of the country, might be permitted to take place without a great deal of harm to the country as a whole. But this strike would have involved 400,000 employees, practically all of those engaged in train operation throughout the country. Such a strike, at the end of a few days, would have caused untold hardships.

There remained the course actually taken by the President. It subjected him to the charge that he had permitted labor to hold up the government, but it seems to have been the course most certain to prevent the strike, and it must be judged from that point of view, unless one assumes that a strike would have been preferable to what critics called "a surrender to the domination of a class."

However necessary one may consider Mr. Wilson's action, one cannot ignore the possible consequences. In the last analysis the affair resolved itself into an attempt at enforcement by law of the President's proposals for settlement. It is evident that labor itself realized the danger of such a precedent, for its leaders promptly declared that they

had not asked for Congressional legislation in its behalf. They saw clearly that the legislation might as easily have provided for the enforcement of proposals unfavorable to them. In war-time such compulsion as the government finds necessary for the successful accomplishment of its work or for the purpose of safeguarding public interest is doubtless permissible, but it may be seriously questioned whether such a method can be justified in times of peace. Its use in the case of the threatened railway strike of 1916 cannot easily be defended, despite the fact that the occasion was as serious a one as any President is likely to face.

II. The Transportation Act of 1920 and the Railway Shopmen's Strike of 1922

This episode of labor history is of current interest for several reasons. The shopmen's strike of 1922 is precedent for the current dispute between railway management and the nonoperating crafts. What are the results of a widespread strike on the railroads which does not involve the operating brotherhoods? The key question is, of course, whether the operating brotherhoods observe the picket lines of the striking crafts.

Second, there are those who presently feel that the Railway Labor Act is defective in its handling of emergency disputes and should be extensively amended or repealed. The documents in this section provide some information about one of the few occasions when Congress was confronted with the problem of how to replace existing labor legislation.

Finally, since the law which replaced title III of the Transportation Act of 1920 was the Railway Labor Act of 1926, these excerpts continue to document the background of our present situation, bridging the gap between, and making the transition from, operation of the railroads by the Federal Government during World War I and operating under the present law.

The interesting thing about the documents is not so much that they reflect a difference of opinion about what should be done when a strike-prevention law doesn't work, as a recognition that congressional versus Presidential initiative in proposing a new law is not the only set of alternatives. In this case, despite proposals for action from both ends of Pennsylvania Avenue, Congress and the President both waited until labor and management got together and agreed on a set of ground rules, which Congress then enacted and the President approved (see III below).

One must note, however, that this was only after the immediate strike situation had been taken care of by a combination of judicial and executive coercion, backed up by military force. For those interested in knowing how our Government may go about breaking a strike, it is documented here.

As the tone of his messages to the Congress indicate, the unfortunate affair greatly upset President Harding. His suggestion for compulsory arbitration by a labor division in the Interstate Commerce Commission prompted a reexamination by the parties involved of the situation, which led to the Railway Labor Act of 1926 (see below). The sweeping injunction by which the strike breaking was accomplished also served as exhibit number one in the brief of the unions for an anti-injunction act (see IV, below). And the idea of compulsory arbitration by the ICC was revived by President Kennedy in 1963, as his solution to the firemen's dispute (see X, below).