that management's rights were impaired during the war. Because this cry was raised much more vociferously in the last years of the war, the impres sion prevails that the decisions of the War Labor Board progressively became more pro-labor. It is unquestionably true that wage controls were somewhat more liberally interpreted in the last years of the war; at this time also some new "fringe" adjustments were allowed, and others were liberalized. It is the author's belief, however, that the opposite trend developed with reference to nonwage issues involving "management rights." Both inside and outside the Board, opposition to what industry considered encroachment upon management rights was intensified as the war drew toward a close. Very certain it is that on many nonwage issues about which the Industry Members were very much concerned the Board's orders became narrower and more qualified in its later decisions. Among these issues were such matters as arbitration of disputes arising during the life of a collective bargaining agreement, seniority in relation to promotions and transfers, and payment of union committeemen for time spent in adjustment of grievances and fixing of piece rates.

in fact a compromise worked out in the first year of the Board's existence, with the active participation of at least some of the Industry Members. In a few cases in this early period the Board was unanimous for union maintenance of membership. But the Industry Members soon changed their position and thereafter always voted against union maintenance of membership, just as the Labor Members in the last years of the Board's existence always voted against the denial of wage increases. And, of course, when the Industry and Labor Members were thus arraigned in opposition, the Public Members cast the deciding votes.

Principally because of the Board's orders, maintenance of membership grew apace in the war years, being in effect at the end of the war in collective agreements governing the conditions of employment of not less than 4,000,000 workers, including half of all those employed under collective agreements in manufacturing industries. This device operated to reduce greatly the number of strikes over union organization and security, which in no year of the war accounted for as many as 15% of all strikes, as against more than 50% in the years 1935 to 1941. Many of the Industry Members of the Board never were very much concerned about union. maintenance of membership, but many outsiders regarded this as the clearest proof of the pro-labor bias of the Board.

The War Labor Board throughout its existence took the position that it would not normally direct employers to establish sick benefit or pension funds, sick leave plans, or group insurance; but despite these decisions all these institutions made great headway during the last years of the war, particu larly in the East, through voluntary agreements made by employers with

unions. Similarly, orders approving "fringe" adjustments were preceded by so many voluntary agreements that on most such issues the Board was merely following prevailing practice in the industry and area. Loss of management prerogatives, particularly of the right to discharge and discipline, about which there was much complaint in the last years of the war, was a result far more of management's fear of trouble and its practice of giving in whenever a wildcat strike occurred than of any decisions of the War Labor Board.

As is the case with the labor complaints, it is impossible to determine whether management would have fared better had there been no War Labor Board. It is quite conceivable, however, that in the sellers' market for labor which prevailed the unions might well have made even greater gains at the expense of management than they actually did. With all their objections to union maintenance of membership, for example, only a few employers have made any serious effort to get rid of this form of union security since the War Labor Board went out of existence. On the other hand, unions in some cases have been able to force acceptance of union shops where before they enjoyed only maintenance of membership.

But whatever might have been, the fact remains that management, like labor, generally was not satisfied with the decisions of the War Labor Board. It endured them while the country was at war; but as the end of the war approached, more and more sentiment developed in the management ranks for a return to freedom of action at the earliest possible date.

Termination of War Labor Board

The details of the termination of the National War Labor Board lie beyond '

the scope of this article. Suffice it that this was a process begun as early as August 18, 1945, four days after the surrender of Japan. After that date the Board accepted only a few new dispute cases other than cases in which both parties agreed in advance that they would abide by the Board's decision. After October 22, 1945, it accepted no new cases whatsoever. But the Board completed the processing of all dispute cases certified to it during the war. It concluded its work on December 31, 1945. Its wage stabilization functions, considerably restricted through Executive orders, were turned over to the newly created National Wage Stabiliza tion Board. No successor agency took over its functions in labor dispute cases. Actually the wartime adjustment of labor disputes pretty much ended with V-J Day, except for the comple tion of old cases.

Long before the War Labor Board concluded its work, there were numer ous expressions of astonishment that it had been allowed to go out of existence. In the press generally this was called a mistake, and the Administration was criticized for the blunder. President Truman conferred with the Board on October 15, 1945, to try to persuade it to continue functioning pretty much as it had in wartime. In this conference, however, the Board unanimously advised him that the dispersal of its staff and its loss of prestige had proceeded so far since the process of its liquidation had been begun in August that there was no hope that it could successfully deal with the many difficult labor relations problems of the reconversion period. So there was nothing to do but to limit the Board to the completion of its old cases and to announce an early date for its final dissolution.

Whether it was sound timing to ter

minate the wartime adjustment machinery and policies as soon as the shooting war ended is doubtful. There is no question, however, that the President, in taking the first and decisive step on August 18, 1945, toward the early liquidation of the War Labor Board, believed that he was acting in accordance with the wishes of all concerned, and there is much evidence that this was in fact their wish at that time.

While some of the liquidation provisions were not exactly what the War Labor Board had originally wanted, the Board unanimously approved the policy of liquidation embodied in the President's statement and Executive Order of August 18 before their issuance. Throughout all its existence, the War Labor Board, particularly in the persons of its Public Members, had emphasized in numerous public state ments that it was a wartime agency only and expressed the view that it should not be continued in peacetime. The same position was taken by Secretary of Labor Perkins and in resolutions adopted by the National Association of Manufacturers and the Executive Council of the American Federation of Labor. While the CIO Members of the National War Labor Board in August, 1945, agreed to the policy of the early liquidation of the Board only after many expressions of misgivings, many of the sharpest critics of the wartime policies were to be found in the ranks of this labor group.

The sentiment to the effect that free collective bargaining should be restored once the war was ended was as nearly unanimous as any we ever get in this country on public questions. It is still the author's belief that this popu

lar view also represented the course of sound policy. If there was an error in the timing of the liquidation of the War Labor Board, this was the result of the failure of nearly every one to appreciate that the war in fact continued beyond the cessation of hostilities. It is now evident that, in a total war such as the last one, the war is not over when the shooting stops but only when demobilization and reconversion have been completed and something like normal conditions of supply and demand have been re-established. But the error of mistaking the end of the shooting for the end of the war was one we made not only in dealing with labor disputes but in relation to many other economic problems. It was an error made not only by the Administration but also by the "opposition," and it was in response to the almost unanimous opinion of the American people during the period of national rejoicing following V-J Day.

Similarly, while it seems to the author that the United States dealt with labor disputes in wartime in an intelligent and reasonably successful manner, it is very certain that the wartime policies left many sore spots. These tended to snowball toward the end of the war, with both labor and management having many grievances. In large part these grievances were probably inevitable, developing out of the abnormal restrictions and tensions of wartime. For an understanding of what has happened since then, the question whether these grievances were justified or not is far less important than the simple fact that they existed. In them lies at least a part of the explanation of why we have had so much labor trouble since V-J Day.