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the Marshall Plan for economic aid needed to build up the strength of our friends in Western Europe. In 1949, the Senate approved the North Atlantic Treaty under which each member nation agrees that an armed attack against one is an armed attack against all. Congress immediately implemented the North Atlantic Treaty by authorizing military assistance to nations dedicated to the principles of mutual security under the United Nations Charter.' The concept of mutual security recently has been extended by treaty to friends in the Pacific.

Our treaties represent not merely legal obligations but show congressional recognition that mutual security for the free world is the best security against the threat of aggression on a global scale. The need for mutual security is shown by the very size of the armed forces outside the free world. Defendant's brief informs us that the Soviet Union maintains the largest air force in the world and maintains ground forces much larger than those presently available to the United States and the countries joined with us in mutual security arrangements. Constant international tensions are cited to demonstrate how precarious is the peace.

Even this brief review of our responsibilities in the world community discloses the enormity of our undertaking. Success of these measures may, as has often been

562 Stat. 137 (1948), as amended, 63 Stat. 50 (1949), 64 Stat. 198 (1950).

*63 Stat. 2241, 2252 (1949), extended to Greece and Turkey, S. Exec. E, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. (1952), advice and consent of the Senate granted. 98 Cong. Rec. 930.

763 Stat. 714 (1949).

8 S. Execs. A, B, C and D, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. (1952), advice and consent of the Senate granted. 98 Cong. Rec. 2594, 2595, 2605.

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observed, dramatically influence the lives of many generations of the world's peoples yet unborn. Alert to our responsibilities, which coincide with our own self-preservation through mutual security, Congress has enacted a large body of implementing legislation. As an illustration of the magnitude of the over-all program, Congress has appropriated $130 billion for our own defense and for military assistance to our allies since the June, 1950, attack in Korea.

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In the Mutual Security Act of 1951, Congress authorized "military, economic, and technical assistance to friendly countries to strengthen the mutual security and individual and collective defenses of the free world, . Over $52 billion were appropriated for military assistance for fiscal year 1952, the bulk of that amount to be devoted to purchase of military equipment.10 A request for over $7 billion for the same purpose for fiscal year 1953 is currently pending in Congress." In addition to direct shipment of military equipment to nations of the free world, defense production in those countries relies upon shipment of machine tools and allocation of steel tonnage from the United States."

Congress also directed the President to build up our own defenses. Congress, recognizing the "grim fact . . . that the United States is now engaged in a struggle for survival" and that "it is imperative that we now take those necessary steps to make our strength equal to the peril of the hour," granted authority to draft men into

965 Stat. 373 (1951).

10 65 Stat. 730 (1951); see H. R. Doc. No. 147, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1951).

11 See H. R. Doc. No. 382, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. (1952).

12 Hearings before Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on the Mutual Security Act of 1952, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 565-566 (1952); Hearings before House Committee on Foreign Affairs on the Mutual Security Act of 1952, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 370 (1952).

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the armed forces." As a result, we now have over 3,500,000 men in our armed forces."

Appropriations for the Department of Defense, which had averaged less than $13 billion per year for the three years before attack in Korea, were increased by Congress to $48 billion for fiscal year 1951 and to $60 billion for fiscal year 1952.15 A request for $51 billion for the Department of Defense for fiscal year 1953 is currently pending in Congress." The bulk of the increase is for military equipment and supplies-guns, tanks, ships, planes and ammunition-all of which require steel. Other defense programs requiring great quantities of steel include the large scale expansion of facilities for the Atomic Energy Commission " and the expansion of the Nation's productive capacity affirmatively encouraged by Congress.18

Congress recognized the impact of these defense programs upon the economy. Following the attack in Korea, the President asked for authority to requisition property and to allocate and fix priorities for scarce goods. In the Defense Production Act of 1950, Congress granted the powers requested and, in addition, granted power to stabilize prices and wages and to provide for settlement

1365 Stat. 75 (1951); S. Rep. No. 117, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1951).

14 Address by Secretary of Defense Lovett before the American Society of Newspaper Editors, Washington, April 18, 1952.

15 Fiscal Year 1952, 65 Stat. 423, 760 (1951); F. Y. 1951, 64 Stat. 595, 1044, 1223, 65 Stat. 48 (1950-1951); F. Y. 1950, 63 Stat. 869, 973, 987 (1949); F. Y. 1949, 62 Stat. 647 (1948); F. Y. 1948, 61 Stat. 551 (1947).

16 See H. R. Rep. No. 1685, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1952), on H. R. 7391.

17 See H. R. Rep. No. 384, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1951); 97 Cong. Rec. 13647-13649.

18 Defense Production Act, Tit. III. 64 Stat. 798, 800 (1950), 65 Stat. 138 (1951).

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of labor disputes arising in the defense program." The Defense Production Act was extended in 1951, a Senate Committee noting that in the dislocation caused by the programs for purchase of military equipment "lies the seed of an economic disaster that might well destroy the military might we are straining to build." " Significantly, the Committee examined the problem "in terms of just one commodity, steel," and found "a graphic picture of the over-all inflationary danger growing out of reduced civilian supplies and rising incomes." Even before Korea, steel production at levels above theoretical 100% capacity was not capable of supplying civilian needs alone. Since Korea, the tremendous military demand for steel has far exceeded the increases in productive capacity. This Committee emphasized that the shortage of steel, even with the mills operating at full capacity, coupled with increased civilian purchasing power, presented grave danger of disastrous inflation."

The President has the duty to execute the foregoing legislative programs. Their successful execution depends upon continued production of steel and stabilized prices for steel. Accordingly, when the collective bargaining agreements between the Nation's steel producers and their employees, represented by the United Steel Workers, were due to expire on December 31, 1951, and a strike shutting down the entire basic steel industry was threatened, the President acted to avert a complete shutdown of steel production. On December 22, 1951, he certified the dispute to the Wage Stabilization Board, requesting that the Board investigate the dispute and promptly report its recommendation as to fair and equitable terms of settlement. The Union complied with the President's

19 Note 18, supra, Tits. IV and V.

20 S. Rep. No. 470, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1951). 21 Id., at 8-9.

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request and delayed its threatened strike while the dispute was before the Board. After a special Board panel had conducted hearings and submitted a report, the full Wage Stabilization Board submitted its report and recommendations to the President on March 20, 1952.

The Board's report was acceptable to the Union but was rejected by plaintiffs. The Union gave notice of its intention to strike as of 12:01 a. m., April 9, 1952, but bargaining between the parties continued with hope of settlement until the evening of April 8, 1952. After bargaining had failed to avert the threatened shutdown of steel production, the President issued the following Executive Order:

"WHEREAS on December 16, 1950, I proclaimed the existence of a national emergency which requires that the military, naval, air, and civilian defenses of this country be strengthened as speedily as possible to the end that we may be able to repel any and all threats against our national security and to fulfill our responsibilities in the efforts being made throughout the United Nations and otherwise to bring about a lasting peace; and

"WHEREAS American fighting men and fighting men of other nations of the United Nations are now engaged in deadly combat with the forces of aggression in Korea, and forces of the United States are stationed elsewhere overseas for the purpose of participating in the defense of the Atlantic Community against aggression; and

"WHEREAS the weapons and other materials needed by our armed forces and by those joined with us in the defense of the free world are produced to a great extent in this country, and steel is an indispensable component of substantially all of such weapons and materials; and

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