to look at it in its legislative form, that there would be something there upon which operations might be based, or performed, as the case might be.

Senator TOWNSEND. Have you copies of that bill so that the committee might have an opportunity to study it?

Mr. BROWNLOW. I have two or three copies with me. If the committee desires them I would be glad to send them copies.

Senator TowWNSEND. I would like to see one very much.

Representative WARREN. Is this the bill you refer to [indicating]? Mr. BROWNLOW. Yes.

Representative COCHRAN. Mr. Brownlow, is it your viewpoint that it would be advisable for the Congress to pass to the President unlimited power to do all these things that you suggest, with no veto power for the Congress and no limitation in the time that it should be accomplished?

Mr. BROWNLOW. The answer to that question depends somewhat upon the definition of the term "unlimited." It is our recommendation that the Congress give the broad power of the management of the organization to the President.

Answering the third phase of your question last, whether or not there should be a time limit placed upon the President, that is, 1 or 2 years, or something, we do not agree with that, as to the time limit, because, in our opinion, this is a continuing process. The executive branch of the Government and its work is dynamic. If the Archangel Michael could come down and arrange it perfectly by the 1st day of March 1937 by the 1st day of March 1938 you would need another Archangel to come down and adjust it. That is the reason for our recommendation. It is a continuing process.

Now, with respect to the so-called congressional veto, it has been our idea, which is expressed here, I do not recall for the moment how clearly, that with the increased machinery for the accountability of the Executive to Congress by an improved auditing system, and with the opportunity that the Congress has annually to review the entire executive establishment in connection with the Budget, that it would give the Congress a power to check the Executive on those occasions.

The history of those two things is that under the Hoover administration either House acting independently could suspend the Executive order, and then under the act of 1933 it required joint action, which meant, of course, that if the President did not agree it required two-thirds vote by both Houses. We thought by bringing it back in this general way, in the budgetary procedure annually, the Congress would have, by majority vote, unless the President wanted to veto an entire appropriation bill, adequate control. That is our opinion, Mr. Cochran.

Representative COCHRAN. The power that you suggest be given to the President would enable him, if he so desired, to abolish, say, the Federal Trade Commission, the Tariff Commission, the Communications Commission, or any other independent agency that is now set up in the executive branch of the service, would it not? I seek information.

Mr. BROWNLOW. Well, he might. In fact I think he did abolish two such organizations under the last plan, the Farm Loan Board and the Shipping Board, therefore it has not been limited, but he could not abolish a function for which an appropriation is made.

Representative COCHRAN. He could abolish the Board and place an individual in charge. In some cases that would be sound, in others just the opposite.

Mr. BROWNLOW. Was not the setting up of a single commissioner under Executive order?

Senator MCNARY. You were speaking of the Farm Board that was abolished, but some of its activities were sent to the Farm Credit. Mr. BROWNLOW. The Farm Credit organization was set up by Executive order.

Senator MCNARY. Whatever was done, was done by the Congress. Senator BARKLEY. Before the Congress passed the Farm Credit Act the President, by Executive order, created the Farm Credit Administration as a substitute for the Farm Board, and set up the organization.

Senator MCNARY. We repealed the act creating the old Farm Board.

Mr. BROWNLOW. In my opinion, if you gave the President this power, it would require 2 or 3 years for even the best organization that he could get in the Research Division of the Budget to complete this reorganization. In the meantime you will see in our report that we recommend that there be continuing committees of Congress also at work on the problem. Now, the decision should be by the Executive, but I think there could be very useful work done by the congressional committees.

Representative TABER. Now, did you have in mind, when you referred to the commission or board, a definite idea of how the departments should be set up when such a law as you suggested is passed?

Mr. BROWNLOW. We had a definite idea of how each of the 12 departments should be set up. We did not have a definite idea of how these particular things could be placed in particular departments, and we have said we do not believe that can be done without much further study and without much further research.

Representative TABER. Would not you think that in submitting a program for the creation of new departments, and the setting up of particular departments, that we should have in front of us the particular functions of each department to build on?

Mr. BROWNLOW. Well, I think we have set out here the functions, but not the particular agencies. I started a while ago, and was interrupted, to complete the department of welfare, for instance. You have there the activities relating to public health, education, consumer agencies, the Veterans' Bureau, the eleemosynary institutions, the probation and parole; even if there had been no relief, if relief is to be stopped, you still have, and have had for 25 years, a very, very large number of activities which have been fitted into departments, that have either been independent or fitted into departments where they did not belong such as the health service in the Treasury, for instance, and just as recommendations were made, as far back as 1920 or 1921 for the department of welfare and department of works, at that time there were in the Governmentso it was held at that time-a sufficient number of these organizations that would be better administered if they were gathered together under departments where there was some functional kinship with respect to welfare and work.

Representative WARREN. Do you propose to place all of the independent agencies under the Cabinet head for administrative purposes?

Mr. BROWNLOW. That is our recommendation; yes, sir.

Representative WARREN. You stated a while ago that those agencies having quasi-judicial functions, their entity probably would not be disturbed.

Mr. BROWNLOW. No. The administrative work of those agencies, under our recommendation here, would be under a department. The board that heard the causes would not be under the department, except for its housekeeping functions, its budgeting, just like the Federal courts are under the Department of Justice as far as budgeting is concerned.

Representative WARREN. You mean then that the Interstate Commerce Commission would go on as it is now but it would be under a department head for budgeting and administrative purposes?

Mr. BROWNLOWw. With respect to any particular one of these commissions we say that there should be further research. We agree that the administrative work that would be put under the regular departments would vary. For some of them perhaps you would put a very great deal of the administrative work under the department. I do not know, because we have not examined it, but it is conceivable that under this theory the Interstate Commerce Commission, its safety work probably, and maybe its accounting, would go over to the department, but that would have to be set up separately, after examination, with respect to each department.

Representative WARREN. The Federal Trade Commission would come in the same class, would it not?

Mr. BROWNLOW. Yes; the Federal Trade Commission presents the same problem. Again we have made no particular study of that. That presents also a slightly different picture, because in the case of the Federal Trade Commission its own agents make investigations. Cases come to the Commission. The Commission tries them by the adversary method, and then when the decision is made the decision is enforced by the same Commission as against not only the parties in interest but against all others, and there is some resultant confusion.

Representative WARREN. How about the Power Commission?

Mr. BROWNLOW. Again, Mr. Warren, we have made no particular study of these things, except insofar as to say that we believe that in bringing them together under all of their housekeeping functions we would eliminate some of the delay incident to their work, depending upon whether some of them are mostly administrative or mostly quasi judicial, and that would have to be determined in . respect to each particular department.

Senator O'MAHONEY. Did you make a study with respect to any agency?

Mr. BROWNLOW. No, sir; not a detailed, intensive study, only from the overhead management point of view.

Senator O'MAHONEY. So this recommendation about the transfer of the housekeeping functions, as you refer to them, is based upon an opinion that it might result in a saving?

Mr. BROWNLOW. No, sir. We think it would. It is based upon the central theory of the report, that there are three coordinate branches

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of the Government of the United States, and that if we go on as we have been going for the past 50 years, creating an ever increasing number of independent agencies that report neither to the President nor the Congress, that you build up an irresponsible fourth branch of the Government, and at least for all of them the housekeeping and bugetary functions ought to be brought clearly into the executive department. We have done that for the courts, we think it ought to be done for the commissions.

Representative TABER. Now, this is what it would result in: Your bugetary functions would be transferred from the budget officer of the Interstate Commerce Commission, for instance, to a department. Likewise there would be myriads of other commissions transferred in the same way, and you would superimpose an extra overhead between the Budget and the Commission, and that department would do just like all the other departments do. We have made a close study of their appropriations. They juggle the appropriations around to suit their own needs rather than the needs of the commissions. You might better have the commissions deal directly with the Budget and have better and closer control over them.

Mr. BROWNLOW. I only answer that with my opinion that it would be very much easier for the Appropriations Committee and the Bureau of the Budget to deal with all of these channels through 12 departments than through the hundreds.

Representative GIFFORD. Mr. Brownlow, you made a suggestion that the investigations were now carried on by the Interstate Commerce Commission, and others by their own appointees, and then they sit in judgment on their own investigator's reports. Does that mean that some of the departments ought to furnish the investigation to members of the independent commissions to sit as a court? Do you think they could be fair in their judgment?

Mr. BROWNLOW. In a great many instances. I do not think it is so much a question that they are fair in their judgments. Of course we have got that in our so-called legislative courts, although it is slightly different, it is true. The Bureau of Internal Revenue does the investigating with respect to income taxes, but you have got the Board of Tax Appeals.

Representative GIFFORD. May I bring up the F. C. C., which is a rather new one. We hope we have some initiating policy there. You want to have some outside department determine the investigating feature of it and then they simply sit as a court on policy and have no initiative?

Mr. BROWNLOW. No, sir; I am sorry if I have given that impres sion. In no case would it be outside. It would be a different unit within that same organization. Your F. C. C., or any of these things, would not be reduced, as we tried to say here, to the level of a mere bureau of a department, but would have a semi-autonomous status in the department, but they would report to the President through the department head.

Representative GIFFORD. Have you studied the F. C. C., Mr. Brownlow?

Mr. BROWNLOW. No, sir; not in detail.

Representative GIFFORD. You did not look into it?

Mr. BROWNLOW. We look at this from the point of view of general management, not the particular operation.

Representative GIFFORD. I want to get a bird's eye view of the whole report, and learn if it is in harmony with the administration. Do you regard this as an administration report?

Mr. BROWNLOW. No, sir; except to the extent that the President, after the report was made, expressed his views in his message to the Congress. We worked quite independently, sir.

Representative GIFFORD. Will you tell me if the number of assistants mentioned in this report was suggested by the administration? Mr. BROWNLOW. No, sir; it was suggested by this committee. Representative GIFFORD. And approved by him?

Mr. BROWNLOW. They were approved by him, I assume.

Representative GIFFORD. Was this report rewritten to conform to the wishes of the administration?

Mr. BROWNLOW. You mean the President?

Representative GIFFORD. I would like to know if this is an administration report, if it was received favorably by the administration. Mr. BROWNLOW. The President, in his message to the Congress, has made a statement about the report. We were appointed. We did not see the President. We had a staff, we got a great many reports, we talked to a great many people in and out of the Government, we got a great mass of reports, some of which we used. We had no communication with the President of the United States whatsoever from the time this thing was begun until it was practically in its completed form. We had two or three conversations with him. One immediately before he went to Buenos Aires and three or four after the work was done.

Representative GIFFORD. The question I am asking, do you consider that this has the approval of the administration?

Mr. BROWNLOW. I do not want to undertake to speak for the President of the United States without authority. He has already spoken to the Congress in his message.

Representative GIFFORD. I have one more question and then I am done. Of course, your whole report certainly leans to giving more power to the administration. You believe it ought to be done. Was that the underlying thought that you had?

Mr. BROWNLOW. We believe that the Chief Executive should be given more authority over the management of the executive branch, in order to make that authority more nearly commensurate with his responsibility, a responsibility clearly set out in the Constitution, clearly set out in the laws, and even more clearly in the tradition and popular estimation.

Now, we believe, as we have said here, that the law should be made by the Congress, after democratic discussion, but once the laws are made by the Congress that the execution should pass to the executive branch.

Representative GIFFORD. You recall there is a chapter on his being held to accountability. To whom?

Mr. BROWNLOW. The accountability?

Representative GIFFORD. Yes.

Mr. BROWNLOW. To the Congress, for the manner in which he has executed the law.

Representative COCHRAN. Under the terms of your bill, Mr. Brownlow, would the President have the power to place an independent agency in a department, abolish the commission that might be con