To understand how this crisis has been brought about, let us trace the history of land-credit legislation in the Congress of the United States:

1. March 4, 1913, Congress authorized the President to appoint a commission of seven to go abroad and study rural credits. The commission was appointed, made its trip to Europe, returned, submitted its report, and prepared a land-credit bill, which was introduced in the Senate and House.

2. The committees on Banking and Currency in the House and in the Senate appointed sub-committees on rural credits, to which were referred the Commission Bill, and all other bills on rural credits. These sub-committees held joint hearings, and agreed upon a bill, which was introduced in the Senate and House.

3. The Banking and Currency Committee of the Senate agreed upon a land-credit bill, and reported it favorably to the Senate as a substitute for the Sub-committee Bill.

4. A Land-credit Bill introduced by Senator Porter J. McCumber of North Dakota was placed as a "rider" upon the Agricultural Appropriation Bill in the Senate. This was referred to the Committee on Agriculture of the House, which came back to the House with a report that the Senate Committee Bill be substituted for the McCumber amendment, and the House, with some modifications, adopted the recommendations of the Committee on Agriculture.

5. The Rural-credit Bill went to the committee on conference, which reported as a substitute therefor a provision, authorizing the appointment of a joint-committee of the two houses, to consider the subject, prepare a bill, and report to Congress, not later than January 1, 1916.

6. The joint-committee of the two houses was appointed, and its report will no doubt be forthcoming within the time prescribed by law.

Every person interested in rural-credit legislation, and

that should include all who are interested in the welfare of the country, should know the line along which rural-credit legislation has drifted. He should know the starting point, the stopping point, and the intervening route that has been traveled. Many bills have been introduced in Congress. Various plans have been proposed, able speeches have been made before committees and the two houses of Congress, but all this may count for little in actual legislative progress. The line of progress is marked by the action taken by the United States Commission and the Sub-committees, and the Senate Committee. The United States Commission prepared a bill and submitted it to Congress. This was official action. The Sub-committees of the two Houses agreed upon a bill and through the chairmen this bill was introduced in the two Houses. This was a step forward. The Senate Committee agreed upon a bill and reported it favorably to the Senate. This was progress. The actions of the Commission, the Subcommittees and the Senate Committee mark the course rural-credit legislation has followed. To know where we are now, we must ascertain the contents of the Commission Bill, the Sub-committee Bill, and the Senate Committee Bill. There is a widespread opinion that these bills differ materially. They do differ in some particulars. They do not differ fundamentally. They all create the same kind of an institution. They all propose to bring into existence purely private, profit-sharing, dividend-paying, surplus-creating land banks as the instruments to direct, control and manage the land-credit system for the farmers of the United States. They all propose the same type, the same character of institution. This is fundamental. In this respect these bills agree with each other, but in this particular they disagree with practically all the land-credit systems of Europe. As things stand to-day, the "powers that be" propose to give our farmers private, profit-sharing land banks, in

stead of public or semi-public, non-profit-sharing, farmcredit institutions, such as serve nearly all the farmers of Europe.

These three bills are alike, in that they propose to create a system of land banks, which gives no assurance that it will furnish the farmers of the United States with the amount of credit they need, thus leaving them without adequate credit facilities for many years to come, compelling them to pay in the meantime a much higher rate of interest than is paid by the farmers of European countries. These three bills agree in this, that they authorize the land banks to charge the farmers 1 per cent. annually on their loans for administration expenses and profits, a sum four times greater than the average charge by European land-credit institutions for the same purpose. These three bills agree in this, that they do not fix the rate of interest the banks may charge on loans, neither do they establish a maximum rate that may be charged. These bills agree in establishing a system of land banks that can not be economically operated, which will add that much additional burden upon the borrowing farmers. These three bills agree, in that they propose to exempt privateprofit-sharing land banks their profits, resources, surpluses and incomes from Federal, State and local taxation, which must add additional tax-burdens to other private property, rob the State and local governments of millions of dollars of revenue, when exemption from taxation is a privilege not extended to any of the private, profit-sharing land banks of European countries.

These bills are alike, in that they all propose a system of land banks which will place the farmers in competition with each other in marketing their securities a policy that will increase the rates of interest on farm-mortgage bonds, which necessarily means a corresponding increase in the rate of interest paid by farmers on mortgages. These three bills are similar, in that they authorize numerous land

banks to issue and sell farm-mortgage bonds, which will distribute these bonds among investors in all the money markets of the country to the loss and disadvantage of the farmers. These three bills correspond in this, that they do not recognize the importance of centralization and unity in our bond-issuing institutions, as a means to strengthen the farmers' credit, and give the investing public confidence in their securities. These bills harmonize with each other in this, that they propose to permit banks to issue mortgage bonds, whose capital stock will be so small as to actually vitiate and discredit the farmers' securities in the eyes of investors. These three bills are in the same class in this, that they propose to establish a large number of rural banks, which will largely increase the annual expenditures of the Federal government in their supervision. These three bills are identical in that the land banks created thereby do not follow the vast majority of the land-credit systems of Europe, which are associations of borrowers, or institutions founded and conducted solely in the interest of borrowers. These three bills are one and the same in this, that they all create land banks over which the farmers will have no control, but which will be owned, directed and dominated by private capital, invested in these banks purely as a money-making proposition, without any altruistic purpose and under no obligation to serve the public interest. These three bills are identical in this, that they limit the length of loans from 30 to 35 years, too short a period to meet the needs of farm-tenants, farm-laborers, and others of limited means who desire to acquire farm-homesteads, thus discriminating against the poor, and again refusing to follow the European institutions which grant farm loans for periods extending as long as 75 years. These three bills parallel each other, in failing to require sufficient reserve, guaranty or insurance funds, to meet all possible losses, and thus make the mortgage bonds absolutely secure, a thing

that is regarded as fundamental in all European countries. These three bills coincide in establishing a land-credit system that will not be uniform in its benefits throughout the country, giving to the farmers of one State better facilities for credit, at a lower rate of interest, than will be given to those in another State; a system which is unjust, unfair, discriminating and sectional, and at variance with European land-credit systems. These three bills are of the same family, because none of them proposes a land-credit system that is national in its design, national in its aim, national in its construction, national in its administration, or through which the Government at Washington may carry out a distinctive, affirmative, national policy toward agriculture. Finally, while the Sub-committee Bill does contain a provision for governmental aid, along a certain line, these three bills are analogous in this, that none of them proposes the proper kind and character of government aid, or such use of the funds and credit of the Federal government as will bring into existence a landcredit system that will furnish to the farmers of the United States the credit to which they are entitled, or that will insure that expansion in agriculture which is essential in order that our republic may reach its greatest glory, and its citizens attain the highest good!

To undertake now to change the course along which land-credit legislation is moving is like attempting to change the channel of a river. It is no easy task to wipe the slate clean and begin anew. The position now occupied has not been attained by chance, or accident. Intelligent forces have been at work. Progress has been made, sentiment has been created, ideas have been developed, impressions have been made, opinions have been formed, conclusions have been reached, and definite positions have been taken. The foundation for land-credit legislation has been laid, the frame-work is up, and the superstructure is all but complete. Any material change now means rebuild