Defense; and the responsibilities assigned to the former ODM, including those carried out by the Defense Production Administration under the Defense Production Act of 1950, as amended.

Under these acts, or by authority of Executive order of the President assigning to me certain functions placed in him by statute, I am responsible for advising the President concerning the coordination of military and civilian mobilization; for coordinating, on behalf of the President, all mobilization activities of the executive branch; for developing and issuing policies and programs for defense mobilization; and for resolving interagency issues which would otherwise require the attention of the President.

În addition, the President by Executive Order 10638 delegated to the Director of ODM the authority to direct the release of materials from the strategic and critical materials stockpile in the event of enemy attack on the United States.

Also, by Executive Order 10705, the President vested in the Director, Office of Defense Mobilization, responsibility for the control of United States telecommunications in time of war. Because wartime powers involving stockpile materials and telecommunications are granted to the President by existing statutes, it was possible for him to centralize responsibility for the exercise of those powers.

You know, of course, that in addition, the Director of ODM has certain responsibilities under the Trade Agreements Extension Act, Internal Revenue Code, and the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act.

In carrying out these responsibilities for mobilization readiness we have been beset by one very difficult problem-technological change in the methods of war.

Today man can fly 40 times faster than he could in 1910--less than 50 years ago. He can shoot missiles even faster than he can fly. We are becoming conditioned to these changes. The same thing is true of the power of weapons. Today's 20 megaton weapon is 1,000 times as powerful as the bomb which destroyed Hiroshima. And now fallout has added a new dimension-arca. A single modern weapon can spread fatal radiation over hundreds of miles."

We have made every effort to keep pace with the growing power of destruction as we plan and prepare to survive it. However, this also requires organizational mechanisms which, so far as possible, are directly responsive to the situation as we now see it, and not as we may have seen it 8 years ago when the Defense Production Act and Federal Civil Defense Act were enacted.

Eight years is just a moment in history but in terms of the changes that have been wrought in weapons technology since the beginning of the thermonuclear age, it seems a very long time indeed.

The thermonuclear age may bring more radical changes over the next several decades than any of us in the room can now envision. But for the present, we need to make the organizational changes necessary and we then need to build into the new organization a greater capacity for change.

It has been said, with respect to this reorganization plan, that this is the first time it has been proposed that such an agency be placed under the direct control of the President in peacetime.

I can only respond that this is the first thermonuclear age that we have been in. And when we find it necessary to spend $40 billion

a year for military purposes, it certainly isn't peacetime in any historical sense.

The problems we face are unparalleled; the solutions must be responsive to the unparalleled problems; not limited to traditional ways of doing things.

Let's look at the way in which the program of the Office of Defense Mobilization has changed in the last 8 years. During the Korean war, as was the case during World War II, we thought of mobilization as involving the rapid conversion of productive capacity from peacetime to wartime production, supplemented by stockpiles of strategic and critical materials and equipment.

Based on that concept, ODM carried out a great many expansion programs to build up a mobilization base which could be quickly converted to war production and accumulated a stockpile costing about $6 billion.

At that time our planning and programs were directed toward a 5-year war.

But as the technology of the nuclear age has developed, the Government has moved away from that concept toward one of a shorter, more devastating war which requires measures designed to increase our readiness to fight without a long conversion period.

We began to talk about a mobilization base that was all ready to produce weapons, as contrasted with a base that was ready to be converted; about plants with "hot," "warm," and "standby" lines for military production. We also became more concerned with nonmilitary defense; with such things as dispersion and continuity of government.

Recently the concept of military forces in being has been more widely accepted, the idea being that we would probably have to fight the next war pretty much with the weapons that we have on hand. On the civilian side, it is equally important that we have mobilization readiness in being,

We believe that if we should be attacked, we might not have sufficient time between the warning and the actual attack to prepare our defenses. This means that we must prepare in advance, insofar as we are able. We must have material things in being: civil-defense equipment, supplies, alternate operating sites and communications systems; and we must also have nonmaterial things in being: chains of command, standby procedures and orders, and training at all levels so that every Government employee and every citizen can do his part for national survival.

We recognize that even a limited war would increase the threat of direct attack and might therefore necessitate full and immediate national mobilization. Accordingly, we must not only be prepared to mobilize the Nation in a fraction of the time we took in World War II and Korea, but must also be ready to take protective measures in preparation for possible attack.

In other words, when we now talk about mobilization, we are including nonmilitary defense. We cannot have one without the other. Now to be more specific, there are several areas in which we and FCDA have overlaps and duplications under the existing division of basic authorities between the two agencies. This has created difficulties which we have not been able to overcome despite the efforts of both staffs.

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Some areas involved, for example, are planning for the mobilization and utilization of resources; preparing for the continuity of Government; and coordinating the defense activities of other Federal agencies.

Let me highlight what I think is the area of greatest difficulty: planning for the mobilization and utilization of human and material

resources.

While this is a central responsibility of ODM, FCDA also has very broad responsibility and authority in this field in a civil-defense emergency. The result has been confusion among Federal departments and agencies having resource mobilization responsibilities, as well as among States and local governments.

FCDA has the authority, postattack, to requisition supplies and materials, and to delegate its requisitioning authority. On the other hand, ODM has broad authority to determine priorities and allocations of materials and facilities for national defense purposes.

Accordingly, under attack conditions, these authorities are bound to collide as they have during past Operations Alert.

One of the ways in which an effort has been made to sort out the responsibilities of ODM and FCDA was by trying to define separate time periods after an attack.

The concept was that there would be a survival period in which FCDA would be in charge, followed by a recovery period in which ODM would be in charge. It does not take a very hard look at this concept to see that it has serious faults.

After an attack there would be damaged areas, areas subject to residual radiation, and areas which had not been directly affected by the attack.

But these latter areas might be paralyzed by the destruction of resources in other parts of the country; for example, damage to communications, transportation, and productive facilities.

The nationwide effects of the application of stringent controls in the damaged areas would further complicate this problem. We must be prepared to deal with the situation in all of these areas with a single unified and continuing effort. Furthermore, in the event of repeated attacks, the survival period could extend for many months or years. The actions taken during the survival period to use up resources would profoundly affect our ability to recover later.

In short, we have found that it is impossible to compartmentalize the authorities with respect to civil defense and defense mobilization. It is impossible to separate on the one hand preattack measures for the protection of the people from the effects of attack and on the other hand measures for the protection of facilities to supply the things needed after attack. It is equally impossible to separate postattack measures for immediate survival from the long-run measures needed for national recovery.

Past efforts to sort out the roles of the two agencies have produced a document on the division of basic responsibilities, which was tested in Operation Alert 1957 and found unsatisfactory. Following that, Governor Hoegh and I set up a number of new joint task forces in the various resource areas to attempt to work out a reconciliation of our difficulties.

A lot of fine work was done by the staffs of both agencies but I must confess that the results were not too encouraging.

Accordingly, I have concluded that a merger, such as is contemplated by Reorganization Plan No. 1, is the only satisfactory answer to these problems.

I should like, now, to speak on one other point that I think is particularly important, and that is the necessity that the Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization be set up in the Executive Office of the President.

I feel that this is so because the responsibilities for mobilization readiness, to the greatest possible extent must be spread throughout the Federal Government and downward into the State and local governments.

I think we must get people to look on mobilization readiness as a basic part of their own regular day-to-day jobs.

We must look to the Agriculture Department people throughout the country to plan for supplying food in an emergency. We must look to people in the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare to plan for medical care. We must look to people in the Housing agencies to plan for housing and so on.

These activities must be carried out by the people who have the technical competence and who exist in large enough numbers to make the activities meaningful.

The role of the Office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization should be one of direction, coordination, and stimulation of all of the many efforts throughout the country, which go to make up mobilization readiness. This direction, coordination, and stimulation can best be done by an agency which is close to the President.

In my opinion, the Federal Government cannot afford to continue to have two sets of coordinating agencies concerned with preparedness for nuclear attack.

The current situation has created confusion among the Federal departments and agencies. If allowed to continue, it will create an even greater confusion among the States and Federal agencies in the field as Federal mobilization plans reach the stage where they can be made available not only to Federal field officials, but to State and local officials.

The answer to this confusion is to unify the present authorities and responsibilities in the hands of the President and to allow him, through an Executive Office agency, to provide for a unified direction of all of these activities.

This solution will not, of itself, of course, insure our reaching an adequate state of mobilization readiness. It will, however, clear the way for doing so. In the judgment of those of us who have worked most intensively in this field, the President's reorganization plan respresents the best approach toward the objective.

The President's recommendation recognizes that both ODM's and FCDA's administrative organizations for providing mobilization for defense and civilian preparedness for survival are outmoded in this day of rapid progress in science and technology. As I said to the House committee, the gears of the two organizations need to be meshed to get the job well done with maximum dispatch and minimum

expense.

I believe that the quickest and most effective way to get a full measure of coordination and direction so needed to meet the challenge

of today is for Congress to approve the President's Reorganization Plan No. 1.

Finally, as we recognize the importance of total national survival in the nuclear-missile age, we must not minimize the importance of production readiness, resource allocation, critical materials stockpiling, civil defense emergency relief and welfare planning, emergency public-works restoration, and a host of similar vital activities. I believe the importance of national survival to have greatly expanded each of these activities and demanded that they be considered in relation to the whole.

I believe the President's Reorganization Plan No. 1 makes possible organized attention to this total problem.

Senator HUMPHREY. Thank you very much, Mr. Gray.

I am very interested in your observations as to the necessity of having this new agency in the Office of the President.

My main concern over the plan has not been that, as you have possibly noted. Senator Potter had strong reservations about it, but we, I think, all recognize the changed technology of weaponry and the possibility of sudden attack and the need for prompt, almost immediate decisions.

Therefore, anything that we can do to equip the Government, and in this instance, since it relates to the overall defense, the President, with this authority I think is to the good.

Here again, however, once having concentrated this great responsibility and authority in the office of the President, it seems to me all the more important that the Congress have a pretty good idea what the agency is going to look like.

You see, really we are discussing philosophy here up to this point. What you are saying to me no one can deny, that there has been a change, that our Government must move with these changes, that the plans that we had 10 years ago, 5 years ago, have to be altered.

We cannot face the reality of an intercontinental ballistic missile or rocketry or the new types of thermonuclear weapons without knowing that we have to equip the Government in the terms of the overall defense of the Nation with new authorities and new responsibilities.

I concur with the theme of your testimony; but I become all the more concerned about the kind of an administrative organizational structure that is going to take on these tremendous responsibilities. Really what this amounts to is having an agency that has overall brainpower, at least mobilizationwise, in terms of plans, designs, programs, projects of the total economy. This new agency, the office of Defense and Civilian Mobilization, is to be the defense brain trust, so to speak, of the Nation.

I would like to know where these people are all going to end up. I mean what kind of structure are we going to have here to get this job done. It is like making a speech on the one hand and having to deliver on the other. The easiest thing to do is just talk about it-and not act upon it.

Mr. GRAY. You discussed that at some length in this hearing with Mr. Finan, who discussed the thinking of the Bureau of the Budget about this. I trust you will not consider me uncooperative when I point out to you that it would not be my prerogative to discuss with the committee the new organization which is contemplated.