of such spirits in one sentence: "Nor shall there be imported into the United States any distilled spirits." The language is comprehensive and unambiguous. Undoubtedly it prohibits the importation of distilled liquors for any purpose, and without regard to where or when produced.

The revenue act approved October 3, 1917 (40 Stat. 300. 308), under the title "War tax on beverages," provides (sec. 300) for an additional tax on distilled liquors, and then (sec. 301):

"That no distilled spirits produced after the passage of this act shall be imported into the United States from any foreign country, or from the West Indian Islands recently acquired from Denmark (unless produced from products the growth of such islands, and not then into any State or Territory or District of the United States in which the manufacture or sale of intoxicating liquor is prohibited), or from Porto Rico, or the Philippine Islands Under such rules, regulations, and bonds as the Secretary of the Treasury may prescribe, the provisions of this section shall not apply to distilled spirits imported for other than (1) beverage purposes or (2) use in the manufacture or production of any article used or intended for use as a beverage."

This section deals alone with distilled spirits produced after the passage of the act. As to these, the prohibition is just as broad and comprehensive as that contained in the Food-Control Act, except that it does not apply (1) to spirits produced from products the growth of the West Indian Islands recently acquired from Denmark and (2) to spirits imported under such rules, regulations, and bonds as may be prescribed by the Secretary of the Treasury for other than beverage purposes.

The question is: To what extent, if any, does the later act repeal the earlier?

There is no repealing clause, and, therefore, there has been no repeal except by implication. It can not be said that the entire provision of the food-control act is repealed unless it appears that the later act covers the whole subject of that provision and embraces new provisions

plainly showing that it was intended as a substitute therefor. But the whole subject of the food control act provision is the importation of distilled spirits whenever or wherever produced, while the subject of section 301 of the revenue act is more limited, being only the importation of such spirits produced after October 3, 1917. The latter is undoubtedly embraced in and a part of the former, but certainly does not cover the whole of it.

I have no difficulty, therefore, in reaching the conclusion that the whole of the provision of the food control act in question has not been repealed, but that, except to the extent that it is modified by the later act, it is the law. Since the later act does not deal at all with the subject of spirits produced prior to its passage the broad prohibition against the importation of such liquors is still in force.

The question then is, to what extent does section 301 modify the prohibition against the importation of spirits produced after October 3, 1917?

Two rules of construction are applicable in determining the answer. (1) So much of the earlier act as is repugnant to the later is repealed. (2) If it is apparent from the face of a later act that the intent is to provide a complete scheme of legislation applicable to the subject dealt with, all provisions of earlier acts on the same subject are repealed.

The subject dealt with in section 301 of the revenue act is not the importation after its passage of distilled spirits, but the importation of such spirits produced after its passage. Apparently, it covers the whole field and leaves nothing lacking to make a complete scheme of legislation on that subject. As to spirits produced after its passage, it (1) enlarges the language of the former act so as to remove any doubt as to whether the word "imported" includes shipments from our insular possessions, (2) it introduces an exception in favor of importations from our West Indian Islands, and (3) it makes an exception in favor of importations for other than beverage purposes.

It is, in my opinion, plain, therefore, that section 301 of the revenue act is the law on the subject of the importation

of spirits produced after October 3, 1917, whether that section be regarded as repugnant to or a modification of the earlier law, or as itself providing a complete scheme of legislation on the subject. Under its provisions, spirits (produced after October 3, 1917) may be imported, for whatever purpose, from our West Indian Islands if produced from products the growth of those islands, and such spirits (produced after October 3, 1917), wherever produced, may be imported for other than beverage purposes under such rules, regulations, and bonds as you may prescribe. All other importations of spirits are prohibited by one or the other of the acts.

My conclusions are: (1) The prohibition against the importation of spirits produced before October 3, 1917, has not been affected by the enactment of the revenue act, and the importation of such spirits for any purpose is unlawful; (2) the importation of spirits produced after October 3, 1917, is controlled by section 301 of the revenue act, and, under it, spirits produced after that date may be lawfully imported from our West Indian Islands for any purpose if produced from products the growth of those islands; and (3) all distilled spirits produced after that date may be imported for other than beverage purposes under such rules, regulations, and bonds as the Secretary of the Treasury may prescribe.

Accordingly, I reply specifically to the questions submitted as follows:

1. Distilled spirits produced before the passage of the War Revenue Act may not be imported for beverage purposes.

2. Distilled spirits produced before the passage of the War Revenue Act may not be imported for any purpose.

3. Distilled spirits produced after the passage of the War Revenue Act may be imported for other than beverage purposes under such rules, regulations, and bonds as the Secretary of the Treasury may prescribe.

4. Distilled spirits produced in the West Indian Islands recently acquired from Denmark, if produced from products the growth of those islands and produced after the passage of the war revenue act, may be imported for any

purpose, but if produced before the passage of the War Revenue Act, their importation for any purpose is pro

hibited.

Respectfully,

T. W. GREGORY.

TO THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY.

EMPLOYEES' COMPENSATION ACT-DR. VON EZDORF. Dr. von Ezdorf, a surgeon in the Public Health Service, having been appointed by the President by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, was an officer of the United States, and therefore not within the operation of the Federal employees' compensation act of September 7, 1916 (39 Stat. 742), which provides pensation for employees of the United States suffering injuries while in the performance of their duties."

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,

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com

November 22, 1917.

SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge receipt of your letter of October 29, 1917, inclosing a communication from the chairman of the United States Employees' Compensation Commission and requesting an opinion on the questions therein submitted.

The specific case stated is that Dr. von Ezdorf, a surgeon in the Public Health Service, was engaged in the special work of investigating the suppression and control of malarial fever in Lincoln County, N. C., and to escape a sudden storm ran about 100 yards to a cabin, upon reaching which he dropped dead. The question is, whether compensation can legally be paid to his widow under the Federal compensation act of September 7, 1916 (39 Stat. 742). The answer to this question must depend upon the answer to another, Was he a civil employee of the United States?

The act, in section 1, provides broadly that the United States shall pay compensation "for the disability or death of an employee" as specified in that and following sections. And in section 40 it is provided that "the term 'employee' includes all civil employees of the United States and of the Panama Railroad Co." Clearly, the word "civil" was intended to exclude those employed in the military and naval

service. And the question is what civilians in the service of the United States are described by the word "employee." In its broadest sense, an employee is anyone who is engaged in the service of or is employed by another. In this sense. all who serve the Government, from the highest official to a laborer employed by the day, are employees. But usually it is applied only to clerks, workmen, laborers, etc., and but rarely to the higher officers of a corporation or government. In the usual acceptation of the term, it is understood to apply to those, other than officers, in the service of the Government. No one would think of calling a Cabinet officer, a Senator, or a Justice of the Supreme Court an employee of the Government. They are all civilians in the service of the Government. They can be distinguished from employees only upon the ground that they are officials or officers and, therefore, not employees as that word is commonly understood. In other words, "there are two classes of public servants, officers, or those whose functions appertain to the administration of Government, and employees, or those whose employment is merely contractual." Moll v. Sbisa, 25 South. 141. Ordinarily, without doubt, the term in question is understood as including only the latter class. The most that can be claimed is that it is possible to use that term in a broader sense, and that, therefore, the intent of Congress must be determined from the context and by applying the accepted rules of construction. In the present case, the actual context gives but little, if any, help, for no qualifying words are used. The most that can be said is that the act, as a whole, shows that the chief concern of Congress was those whose compensation was small. No one is excluded because receiving compensation in excess of $100. But the monthly benefits received are in no case to exceed two-thirds of a salary of $100 a month.

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It is always permissible to consider the sense in which Congress has been accustomed to use a given word. I am rot aware that it has ever been held that the term employee" of the Government in an act of Congress includes officers. And Congress has evidently understood that, if it intended to include officers, it must name them. Thus,