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might become a benefit.17 In any case, the uncertainty in

the analysis is larger than the result.

In sum, no compelling argument has been made, on the basis of the cost estimates provided by the applicants, for the proposition that granting this exemption would serve the public interest by siginificantly lowering the cost of the Clinch River project.

Putting Clinch River on a Fast Track

Should Congress, nevertheless, want this reactor to be built earlier than contemplated by the licensing schedule, it would be best for Congress to exempt Clinch River from NRC licensing altogether. If NRC could easily accommodate an accelerated review, I would come to a different conclusion. However, it cannot. I am concerned not only about the impact of a fast track breeder licensing review on NRC's other responsibilities, but also about the quality of NRC's work if there is heavy pressure to accelerate the review. Even if this project were exempt from licensing, the NRC could still conduct a safety review, on the same "best efforts" basis as it performs others reviews for DOE.

To exempt Clinch River entirely from licensing may seem at odds with one of the original goals of this program -- to demonstrate the licensability of a breeder reactor -- but that goal is no longer as important as it once was.

Such a

demonstration was important when the CRBR was thought to be the prototype for dozens of commercial breeder power plants which were to follow on its heels. It now seems unlikely that there will be any commercial breeder plants in the United States for decades. And, even if breeders are built in the distant future, it is doubtful that the standards applied to this plant will be a satisfactory model for the later plants.

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10 CFR 50.12 governs the grant of an exemption from the requirements of 10 CFR Part 50. The Commission may grant an exemption if it finds that the exemption is authorized by law, will not endanger life or property or the common defense and security, and is otherwise in the public interest. Section 50.12(b) prescribes that, in deciding whether to permit construction prior to the issuance of a construction permit, the Commission will consider and balance: (1) whether the construction will have a significant adverse impact on the environment; (2) whether any adverse impact can reasonably be redressed; (3) whether the construction would foreclose the subsequent adoption of alternatives; and, (4) the effect of delay on the public interest, including the need for the power to be generated by the proposed facility, the availability of alternate sources of energy, and the cost of delay to the applicant and to consumers.

DOE presently seeks permission to clear and grade the site, build access roads and construction facilities, and excavate the reactor's foundations. These are the type of activities normally permitted under an LWA 1. The installation of structural foundations prior to the issuance of the construction permit normally requires the issuance of an LWA 2. This requires the Licensing Board to find that the requirements of an LWA 1 have been satisfied and that there are no unresolved safety issues that would constitute good cause for not allowing the activities proposed under the LWA 2 to proceed.

DOE expects that beginning site preparation in 1982 will enable construction to be completed one year earlier than if site preparation were to begin in 1983.

42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq.

There is a view that nothing of the sort is involved here, and that we have only to deal with an isolated exemption. This used to be called salami tactics. The modern name is segmentation of decisionmaking.

I am aware that the NRC staff recently informed the Commission that speeding up Clinch River licensing would not require much additional effort. This does not relieve my concern over resources; the staff estimate is implausible unless the Clinch River review and the development of its licensing criteria are to be superficial affairs. If anything, the staff estimate heightens my concern about how the staff would interpret a Commission decision to authorize a speedup in the Clinch River licensing schedule.

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Letter from Secretary Edwards to NRC Chairman Palladino,
November 30, 1981.

Letter from Deputy Assistant Secretary Chipman to NRC
Chairman Palladino, December 31, 1981.

DOE Submission to the Chairman, "Re: Clinch River Breeder
Reactor Plant", January 28, 1982.

10. In its report, DOE states that the monthly carrying costs of the completed units... would be incurred even if the units operated and are therefore not part of the direct costs of the delay." DOE went on to explain that "any cost that would be incurred with or without the delay does not affect this cost differential and is therefore not part of the cost of the delay." See letter of April 14, 1981, from Richard E. Weiner, Director, Division of Power Supply Reliability, Office of Utility Systems, Economic Regulatory Agency to Darrell G. Eisenhut, Director, Division of Licensing, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation, Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

At the hearing, the Commission asked the Deputy Secretary to provide it with the Economic Regulatory Agency's views on DOE's method of calculating the gains to be realized by granting the section 50.12 exemption. DOE's written response states that DOE no longer provides cost analyses to the House Appropriations Committee and that in view of recent reorganizations within the Department, the Office of Policy, Planning and Analysis is the organization with the relevant responsibility and expertise for this review." Letter from Deputy Secretary Davis to the Commission, "Re: Clinch River Breeder Reactor Plant", February 25, 1982.

11. Letter from Deputy Secretary Davis to the Commission, "Re: Clinch River Breeder Reactor Plant", February 25, 1982, p. 3.

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13. Letter from Arthur Andersen & Co. to the Commission,

February 23, 1982, p. 3.

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Arthur Anderson submitted the attached chart which purports
to demonstrate that completing the illustrative project one
year earlier will result in a savings of $563 million in the
overall project cost. As can readily be seen from the
chart, however, the cost of the accelerated project is
measured in 1994 dollars while that of the unaccelerated
project is measured in 1995 dollars.

If the cost of the accelerated project is measured in 1995
dollars, using Arthur Andersen's assumption of an 11 rate
of interest, the cost of the project is $8,903 million
($8,021 plus 11). This cost is $317 million greater than
the cost of the $8,584 million cost of the unaccelerated
project (also measured in 1995 dollars).

Eugene L. Grant, W. Grant Ireson, Principles of Engineering
Economy, New York, 1970, p. 315.

DOE has assumed an inflation rate of 81 and interest rate of
118. These assumptions result in an effective discount rate
of 3 and, in this case, a saving of approximately $30
million.

I would also note that DOE initially valued the deferred
power output of Clinch River at $6 million per year but that
it has revised this estimate to $10-20 million. There does
not seem much point in quibbling, however, about this
figure.

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