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Colonel Kling (continuing). No shipment.
Mr. COURTNEY. He said he knows of no shipment, there may have been an assembly that went through.
Is that your answer?
Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. I have what I hope will be one final short question, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. HÉBERT. Take your time.
Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. On page 3 of your statement there is a reference to the vast and costly overcapacity in the ordnance depot system.
Is it not true that what we are talking about is whether or not to cut down one of four multipurpose depots? And is it not true that one of those installations is roughly the same size as Raritan, and that Raritan is the smallest ?
General LYNDE. Which one do you nominate as being of the same size, sir?
Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Well, you tell me, General. You have got the figures. You presented them to us, didn't you?
General LYNDE. Square feet of covered general storage space, Raritan, 2,000; Letterkenny, 4,000; Savannah-Rock Island complex, 3,700. [Addressing reporter.] Those are millions, or thousand thousands. And Pueblo, 3 million.
Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Well, Pueblo is the one I am referring to, General. You are talking about roughly the same size installations. And if it is true that there is such an expensive and vast overcapacity, why do you choose the smallest one, instead of the one that maybe is medium small, such as Pueblo.
General LYNDE. If you will come over to the column title “Acres," you will find that Pueblo has 24,000—24,800, as opposed to Raritan, 3,200.
Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Now you are talking about the size of the installation.
The only value of the size of with respect to the storage of missiles.
And if we could only get over this obsession, of the necessity of an installation to store missiles in order to be fully effective, I think we might clear the air a little bit.
General LYNDE. At Pueblo we have a [deleted] mission. Pueblo is also very closely identified with the Artillery School at Sill. And I would say that Pueblo is very favorably located to take care of two extremely important national defense activities.
Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Well, this would again be another indication to me that we have done a pretty good screening process on our major installations. And it doesn't necessarily follow that we have got to do any further screening in order to have an efficient depot system. But I can see we can differ on that.
But surely there is not much difference in size between the two so far as storage space is concerned; is that not so?
The acreage, of course, is different; I am not arguing about the acreage.
General LYNDE. Yes.
Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. And, of course, the virtues are different. The strategic importance in one is different from the strategic importance of the other.
Secretary MORRIS. Sir, there is a 50-percent difference, we should recognize, in size2 million versus 3 million.
Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Well, now, we only-you mean we are talking about general covered storage space now.
Secretary MORRIS. Yes. As I understood you statement, you said there was not much difference in storage space. And there is a 50percent difference.
Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Well, we have got as a result of this—you are considering this additional storage space an asset now, is that right, Mr. Secretary?
Because as I understand it, as a result of this you are going to continue to have some of this vast and costly overcapacity. And as you say, you will have, as a result of retaining these three with this 50percent additional over Raritan, of roughly, as I recall, 1 million square feet, is that not so, above mobilization requirements?
I don't know where that figure was.
Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. I recall you said you were going to have an overcapacity beyond what you will need for mobilization today. Which I should think might be conceivably inadvisable, and not advisable.
Secretary MORRIS. Sir, we pointed out, I believe, in the figures you are referring to, that should we take Raritan in combination with the other, we might have a deficit as high as 1 million square feet.
Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Well, I don't know how you can say that, General—I mean Mr. Secretary. If you take the bigger ones and Raritan you might, if you walked all over the factor the wrong way. But if you, yourself, know you need a certain requirement for mobilization, you wouldn't be likely to.
So it is a very unrealistic argument to say: "If we took the combination it would produce a deficit," and that then you would have a deficit. Of course, you would.
But if you took Řaritan because it has a function to serve and you took others in order to get the required storage space, you would have the storage space, or you would have within
115,000 square feet, if I am not mistaken. Is that not so? It would come to 115 if you took the right combination of installations in addition to Raritan.
Secretary Morris. Sir, the important thing and this is a classified matter that we were unable to discuss at our first meeting-is that Pueblo has a [deleted] which makes it inconceivable that we could consider it for elimination.
Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Well
Secretary MORRIS. So you must consider the combinations of the others, omítting Pueblo from that calculation.
Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. This is the first news I have heard today.
Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. To justify one of the reasons why you don't close one or the other of the installations.
There has been nothing of any classified value, so far as what you said, except for this. And I am very appreciative to get that much.
Mr. Chairman, I appreciate very much this opportunity, and I regret imposing on the committee's tíme.
Mr. HÉBERT. You have not imposed, sir.
Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Thank you both, General, and both Secretaries.
Secretary MERRILL. Thank you, sir.
Mr. HÉBERT. What is the policy of the Army in declaring surplus, before the phaseout dates?
Secretary MERRILL. Mr. Chairman, in this case we have notified the congressional committees, as you know, of the excessing of this and other depots
Mr. HÉBERT. That is not my question, Mr. Secretary.
Secretary MERRILL. With the objective of encouraging their use for other purposes, rather than retaining them without excessing them, and thus delaying the time when they might be used for other purposes.
Mr. HÉBERT. What is the policy in declaring excess? That was the question I asked.
Secretary MERRILL. What is the policy? Mr. HÉBERT. What is the policy of the Army in declaring excess! Now do we or they declare it immediately, as in this case, or is this an unusual declaration ?
Secretary MERRILL. In the present case
Mr. HÉBERT. I am not trying to impugn on your reasoning. I just want to know what it is.
Secretary MERRILL. Yes. In this case the policy is to declare them excess as soon as possible.
Mr. HÉBERT. Is this the first one you declared as soon as possible?
Secretary MERRILL. We are doing these more rapidly than they have been done in the past, that is correct.
Mr. HÉBERT. And you will continue to excess them as rapidly as possible in order to expedite the clearance?
Secretary MERRILL. In order to expedite the use of them for other purposes, sir.
Mr. HÉBERT. That is right.
But it does not mean that the target date would be moved up by the declaration of excess?
Secretary MERRILL. No, it would not.
Mr. HÉBERT. And that is-I think it is very commendable that you do this in these cases.
Secretary MERRILL. Yes, sir.
Secretary MERRILL. Yes, sir.
Secretary MORRIS. If I might comment, Mr. Chairman: As you know, President Kennedy instructed us to establish a full-time effort to work with communities on phaseout plans. This we have been doing now for about 2 months.
We find that in order to work effectively with communities we must bring GSA in and other Government agencies, such as HEW.
Under the rules of the game, they can't realistically work with us and consider the possibilities of these installations until they are in a clear excess status. That is the reason we are moving a little more quickly.
Mr. HÉBERT. That is all right. I was asking the question. I wasn't arguing the point.
Secretary Morris. Yes, sir.
Mr. FRELINGHUYSEN. Just a point of information. How much success have you had in cooperating with the communities in the area surrounding Raritan?
Secretary MORRIS. I would be happy to ask Mr. Steadman who is working on this, to comment.
Mr. STEADMAN. Yes, sir. Mr. Chairman, we began to make contacts in the area to see what interest there may be in attracting new industry to this site or possible other public uses for the site. We have had quite an enthusiastic response from a number of people in the community about such possibilities.
Mr. HÉBERT. Now
Mr. HARDY. About this one point-you are making a distinction here, are you not, in the declaration of excess as contrasted to a declaration of surplus?
Mr. COURTNEY. No.
Mr. Hardy. Those two words don't mean the same thing, I don't think.
Secretary MORRIS. It is a declaration, sir, of excess to the needs of the Department of Defense,
Mr. HARDY. Well, under the statutory requirements, I don't believe you turn it over to the General Services Administration until it becomes surplus.
Secretary MORRIS. After we have the excess declaration and reported it to the committees, we then may declare it to GSA.
Mr. HARDY. Actually—yes, but you are in effect operating under a procedure here now which enables you to do some talking about its being available for disposition.
Secretary MORRIS. Yes, sir.
Mr. HARDY. Prior to the time that it actually becomes surplus, because it doesn't become surplus until you finish your phaseout.
Secretary MORRIS. That is right.
Mr. HÉBERT. It allows them to close the gap in expediting it, which is commendable.
Now, Mr. Secretary, we asked you for some information before the noon recess.
Secretary MORRIS. Yes, sir.
Secretary MORRIS. Yes. I would like my associate, Mr. Fore, to report this, please.
Mr. FORE. Mr. Chairman, my name is Allen Fore. I am a civil engineer employed in the Office of the Secretary of Defense.
The installation to which Mr. Baldwin referred is located in the Naval Ammunition Depot, Concord, Calif. [Deleted.]
To make use of this facility, it must be located near the storage area. The storage area of the Navy ammunition area, at Concord, is programed for full utilization and there isn't space there to handle the Army requirement, which is one of the reasons we are moving from Benicia.
I believe that is about the story in response to Mr. Baldwin's query.
Mr. HÉBERT. As I recall the question that was raised in that connection, it wasn't for the Army to use the Navy facility. As I recall it, the general testified that Benicia could not be used because of its locale for the type of work
Mr. FORE. Safety distance.
Mr. HÉBERT. The safety. So why does not—and I think the question was raised for this reason: Why is it safe for the Navy and why isn't it safe for the Army?
Mr. FORE. A structure could be built in the Benicia area with sufficient safety area around it, if we wanted to do that, and go to the expense in that populated area of purchasing additional land.
However, it would then be far distant—900 miles from the nearest storage area where we expect to be stocking the explosives that would be tested in that area.
So you would test them and then ship them a long distance, at the termination of which they would require retesting. So it is not a feasible arrangement.
Mr. HÉBERT. All right.
Mr. HARDY. Now, Mr. Chairman, there is just one thing that I think maybe for the record we ought to clear up.
I don't want to pose as being an expert on matters that we have here as far as the decisions are concerned.
But I am concerned about the processes that we go through in making these decisions and the procedures that we use in announcing them, and that is the point that has particularly bothered me ever since before the hearings began.
Now, General, you have indicated that over a period of time you have been analyzing these specific installations from the standpoint of determining whether or not they should be discontinued; that you have been making studies to determine their relative usefulness, I believeand if I am misstating it, I want you to correct it.
I would like, and I think the record ought to indicate just exactly what has been your part in arriving at the decisions which you have made from a standpoint of recommendations.
Now you have made recommendations, and initially you referred to them as decisions. But I would like to understand and I think this is pretty important from the standpoint of the record and of understanding just what we are doing and how we are doing it and why.
I would like to understand just what you have done; that is, what has been your part in reaching the conclusions that you have reached in order to make the recommendations which you have made?