Mr. BALDWIN. May I also make my own presentation to the committee, in addition to asking comments of the Defense Department ? Mr. HÉBERT. You have as much rope as the Department has. Mr. BALDWIN. Thank you.

Mr. HÉBERT. There is a lot of rope around. We just want the record. All right, Mr. Merrill.

Secretary MERRILL. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, and other Members of Congress, propose to proceed by giving a short general statement, if it is agreeable to you, Mr. Chairman, and then proposing to introduce in the record the information that has been submitted to your committee by the Department of Defense.

That would then be followed by statements on each individual depot, to get down to the real meat of this discussion here today, by General Lynde. If that is agreeable?

Mr. HÉBERT. Proceed any way you desire.

Secretary MERRILL. Yesterday Secretary Morris outlined to the committee the governing policy for reducing operations, or inactivating unneeded bases and installations.

These actions take full account of current as well as mobilization requirements. In addition, they provide for retention of trained. personnel.

The program to inactivate unneeded installations is not something recent in the Army. We have been tuned to the Communist threat for some years. Significant progress has been made in improving our depot operations to attain the strongest logistical posture possible to cope with this threat while, at the same time, reducing depot operating costs. We consider that our program in this regard has been realistic-every dollar we can gather from reductions in operating costs of installations or activities makes it possible for us to utilize these resources another way to strengthen our posture.

Past reductions in the size of the Army since the Korean war have drastically reduced customer requirements for material stored in our depots. This in turn plus the depletion of excess stocks supplied under foreign aid has reduced depot rebuild requirements. The combination of the above factors has reduced the Army's need for depots.

The magnitude of this shrinkage throughout the depot system can best be illustrated by a few examples.

In July 1952. the Army cataloged and stocked 1,500,000 items. By May 1960 this was reduced to 900,000 cataloged and only 600,000 stocked. Inventories were reduced from $20.1 to $15.4 billion. From Korea until December 1960, the Army eliminated 45 CONUS depots and depot activities. This resulted in the release of 35 million gross square feet of covered storage space, and 44 million gross square feet of open storage space.

We have divested ourselves of these installations only after making exhaustive studies in line with our two major objectives concerning the Army's depot system which are: to provide the most effective depot system for logistical support of emergency and war operations within the framework of existing depots; and to insure maximum economy in peacetime operations.

The currently announced inactivations are consistent with our objectives and will support our continuing efforts to strengthen our

posture in the face of the Communist threat. The remaining depot space is estimated to be adequate for mobilization requirements. This is demonstrated by the fact that following the announced inactivations, the Army will have 51 depots and depot activities remaining. These will contain approximately 94 million gross square feet of general supply type covered storage space.

To achieve the Army's depot system objectives of supporting emergency and war operations it is essential that the depots selected for retention offer the greatest long-term potential for current and future multimission use. Now our main need is for depots of the multimission type. They must be capable of performing supply, maintenance, and storage support for new weapon systems as well as conventional weapons and general supplies. Many of these functions must be performed within the prescribed safety considerations of an explosive environment. The advent of solid-propellent missiles greatly increases explosive hazards in the storage and handling of these missiles.

In recognition of these changed requirements intensive studies of the entire depot system were initiated in 1959. These studies were made by teams of 8 to 12 experienced personnel. They were selected for their skills, knowledge, and abilities to enable them to arrive at valid and objective conclusions. Each of these teams spent several months in the field studying all depots that might have any potential for performing Ordnance multipurpose missions. Additional studies and surveys were made at the Pentagon staff level over a several months period. Recommendations resulting from these studies were then made and subsequently approved by the Secretary of the Army and the Secretary of Defense, relative to the four bases which will be under discussion today-four depots.

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my remarks on the general overall aspects of these depot inactivations.

Now, if I could propose formally that the information that has been submitted to the committee by the Department of Defense, parts 1, 2, 3, and 4, be introduced in the record?

Mr. HÉBERT. Not altogether, Mr. Secretary. I would rather take them individually, as we discuss them.

In other words, you are asking to submit all of the justifications at one time?

Secretary MERRILL. Yes. If I may then

Mr. HÉBERT. I would prefer that you proceed with the one that you want now. And we will put that in the record now. That is the copy that has been furnished the Member of Congress in whose district the installation is located.

Today Benicia and Mt. Rainier-which one do you want to discuss first, Mr. Merrill?

Secretary MERRILL. I would appreciate, Mr. Chairman, if it is possible to discuss Mt. Rainier and Benicia together, as our justifica

tion ties into both of them.

Mr. HÉBERT. It is all right. I will allow the Member from each district to have his time.

Secretary MERRILL. Yes.

Mr. HÉBERT. And in connection with that, I wanted to inform my colleagues that this is an executive session. There is no information

to be given out on this session whatsoever. If either one of you two want to make a statement after the hearing, you make your own statement, but not revealing any discussion in this room.

Mr. BALDWIN. Yes.

Mr. HÉBERT. This is strictly executive. And we have classified the hearings as well, to be doubly sure that nothing goes from this room. And I think Mr. Morris, who was here yesterday, can well appreciate the reason we have classified the hearings.

Secretary MORRIS. Yes, sir.

Mr. HÉBERT. We had matters discussed yesterday which could not be divulged.

Mr. TOLLEFSON. Mr. Chairman, I think you understand our, shall I say "predicament"?

Would it be all right for us to report to our people that we were here?

Mr. HÉBERT. Oh, yes.

Mr. TOLLEFSON. And presented also the same arguments that have

been

Mr. HÉBERT. What I meant was, don't reveal the colloquy, or the examinations in detail, because the hearings are classified.

Mr. TOLLEFSON. That is understandable.

Mr. HÉBERT. Under security. But either one of you can issue any statement you desire and say what you told the committee.

Mr. TOLLEFSON. That is right.

Mr. HÉBERT. I am not trying to censor your statements in any manner, shape or form. We are here to help, and not block.

I just wanted to caution you that these are classified hearings. Mr. BALDWIN. Yes.

Secretary MERRILL. Then if I may modify my request, then Mr. Chairman, we introduce nothing in the record at this time except our statement. At the conclusion of General Lynde's comments on the individual depots, we would then propose to introduce the data that has been submitted to the committee in the record.

Mr. HÉBERT. All right.

Mr. Sandweg, the two members that are interested have already received copies?

Mr. SANDWEG. They have.

Mr. HÉBERT. They have both received copies, and have been able to study them?

Mr. SANDWEG. Yes.

Secretary MERRILL. Mr. Chairman, if I could ask your permission, for General Lynde to give a summary of the reasons for the actions taken on Mount Rainier and Benicia?

Mr. HÉBERT. Very happy to hear you, General. Proceed as you desire.

General LYNDE. I am Maj. Gen. Nelson M. Lynde, Jr., Chief of Field Service, Office, Chief of Ordnance, Department of the Army. This is a discussion of the reasons for reducing the number of ordnance depots in the Western States.

At present there are six ordnance depots located in the seven Western States. Two of these are special-purpose ammunition storage

(Navajo, Ariz., and Umatilla, Idaho) and are not concerned in this discussion. The remaining four are designed as general-purpose depots to perform storage, maintenance, and distribution for Army Ordnance activities served from the western area.

The studies which have been described led to the conclusion that our future requirements under both peacetime and mobilization conditions justified retaining only two of the present four depots, since we are now using only about half of their present capacity and expect this utilization to decline within the next 4 years to a point where we will be utilizing only about one-third of the total capacity. During the intensive evaluations, each of the four depots was rated on a number of factors. On the basis of these comparisons, it was found that the two inland depots located at Tooele, Utah, and Sierra, Calif., have the greatest long-term potential, and that Benicia and Mount Rainier should be chosen for inactivation for the following

reasons:

1. First, Tooele and Sierra are each much larger in capacity and in Federal investment:

In terms of investment, the acquisition cost of Sierra was almost $69 million and of Tooele $62 million. The acquisition cost of Benicia was $33 million and of Mount Rainier $18 million.

In acreage, Sierra occupies 97,000 acres and Tooele 44,000. Benicia and Mount Rainier contain only 2,300 and 1,300 acres respectively. In square feet of covered storage space, Tooele has 3.8 million and Sierra 2.8 million square feet. Benicia has only 1.6 and Mount Rainier 1.9 million square feet.

2. A second important requirement for a multipurpose depot is the availability of ammunition storage space. Mt. Rainier has no ammunition storage and Benicia has only 227,000 square feet. By contrast, Tooele and Sierra have vast ammunition storages-1.7 million square feet at Sierra and 2.3 million square feet at Tooele.

3. Thirdly, and very important, is the requirement for a detached area at each multipurpose base, measuring 2 miles by 3 miles, to provide safety protection against the problems of explosive hazards in maintaining solid-propellant missiles. An area of approximately 4,000 acres is needed just for this purpose. Neither Benicia nor Mount Rainier have this much total acreage, whereas both Tooele and Sierra have virtually unlimited desert-type acreage where facilities are already in place to meet these new requirements.

4. From the point of view of vulnerability, the protected Tooele and Sierra locations are well removed from strategic target areas, whereas both Benicia and Mount Rainier are in exposed areas.

In summary, neither Benicia nor Mount Rainier, as presently constituted, are equipped to perform a full multipurpose depot mission for general supplies, guided missiles, conventional ammunition, and special weapons. It is estimated that to reconstitute them for this purpose would cost on the order of $25 million in the case of Benicia, and $17 million in the case of Mount Rainier.

ECONOMIC BENEFITS

By consolidating the activities of the four general purpose depots at Tooele and Sierra, it is estimated that net savings of approximately $28 million per year will be realized. This includes a reduction in

the personnel required of 2,273 spaces. A major reason for this savings arises from the fact that in almost every function now performed, the utilization of existing staffs and facilities is marginal. Also, in overhead functions, the consolidation of headquarters staffs, motor pools, fire departments, guard forces, and so forth, will produce sizable economies.

Against these savings are phaseout and relocation costs of approximately $12 million. These include over $3 million for the payment of employee moving expenses, retraining expense and terminal leave. Most of the remaining cost is involved in the shipment of parts, supplies, and equipment to the consolidated locations. However, as will be noted, these one-time costs would be paid off from savings in the first 6 months after phaseout.

Finally, I would like to note that an extensive inactivation program of the type described cannot be accomplished hastily, either in the interest of maintaining our defense capability or in the interest of minimizing the impact on employees and the communities involved. Thus our time-phasing plans call for an orderly readjustment over a period of 3 years.

Sir, that concludes my statement.

Mr. HÉBERT. General, I understand-you are the commanding general with supervision over these installations?

General LYNDE. I am the Chief of the Field Service, in the Office of Chief of Ordnance. I exercise operational control over these depots.

Mr. HÉBERT. Well, you would be the individual to be consulted in event of closing, in the discussion of closing?

General LYNDE. Yes, sir.

Mr. HÉBERT. Were discussions had with you?

General LYNDE. Oh, yes, sir. I directed the planning about 2 years ago, and made the recommendations based on the conclusions as a result of that plan.

Mr. HÉBERT. Well then, the recommendations to close these two installations are your recommendations?

General LYNDE. That is correct, sir.

Mr. HARDY. That is originally, General, and not after somebody else made the decision for you?

General LYNDE. No, sir.

Mr. HARDY. That is what we want to be certain of. You don't concur. You recommended and concurred in your own recommendations? General LYNDE. The studies that I have mentioned here were initiated when I assumed my office in 1959, sir, as a matter of routine. I wanted a look at my operations. I felt that my budget was declining. It has declined, and I knew that I was forced into economies. I therefore initiated a very extensive survey of all of my facilities, the results of which are the recommendations for the closure of these installations.

Mr. HÉBERT. And it was a military decision?

General LYNDE. Yes, sir.

Mr. HÉBERT. All right.

Mr. HARDY. Now, General, you indicated that you were initially moved by a recognition that the budget was shrinking.

Now, was this decision a budgetary decision, or a military decision? General LYNDE. Let me say, sir, that this is a military decision.