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decision as to those which appeared sound and those which should be deferred.

It was on the basis of this kind of conference that Mr. Stahr, in turn, transmitted to Mr. McNamara his recommendations for action.

Mr. KITCHIN. So there was no preparation of a memoranda [sic] or any form of summary submitted to the respective Secretaries on the respective bases

Secretary MORRIS. They had a wealth of information reviewed, with them. This is a normal exercise in staff work on problems as they occur every day in our Department.

Mr. KITCHEN. Now, I think we are—I am either unable to explain my point or we are misinterpreting the question.

The respective Secretaries--get back to Secretary Stahr. At the time you made this presentation to him, was it only an oral presentation made to him? The worksheets, the records and the information in your possession and in the possession of his top man in charge of logistics And no memorandum was prepared for his information summarizing the data on each of these individual bases?

Secretary MORRIS. Sir, the type—the final information transmitted by the Secretary of Army, who is the responsible agent in this case to recommend to the Secretary of Defense, contained the kind of summary information you see in these 30 pages.

Mr. KITCHIN. That is the question I asked originally.
Secretary MORRIS. Yes, sir.

Mr. KITCHIN. So available at the time you received the first letter from Mr. Vinson was this summary type information submitted in the 30 pages which was transmitted, I believe, on the 12th of May

Mr. SANDWEG. Tenth of May.
Mr. KITCHIN. Is that right--10th of May?

Secretary MORRIS. Plus substantial material in our files which I personally discussed with the Secretary of Defense.

Mr. HARDY. Could I follow that?
Mr. KITCHIN. Yes.
Mr. HARDY. Because I am a little bit bothered.

Now, Mr. Secretary, I understand you to say that you personally spent an hour with Secretary Stahr going over these things.

Secretary MORRIS. Yes, sir.
Mr. HARDY. Was that the first information he had about them?

Secretary MORRIS. Sir, I can't speak for how he had inquired into each of these individually over time.

Mr. HARDY. Well, who sent them to him for inquiry?

The decision was made in the Secretary of Defense's office and they were sent on over there, were they not-to Secretary Stahr.

Now, I get the impression from your testimony--and if it is wrong I would like to have it corrected.

But I get the impression from your testimony that you go over there and you get the Chief of the Staff of the Army or somebody from his outfit sitting in there with you, and you spent 2 or 3 hours discussing this business with Secretary Stahr, a whole flock of installations, and based on that conversation he makes a judgment that we are going to close them. Well, now, if that is the way this thing has been done, then, by George, I think that you just ought to back up and straighten it out a little bit.

Secretary MORRIS. Sir, we are having difficulty communicating. Let me take the Army situation by way of illustration. There are four arsenals, or depots, on the list that you will wish to consider.

Studies have been going on of the Army ordnance depot system for over 2 years, by extensive teams of civilian technicians

Mr. HARDY. Stahr hasn't been in on it.

Secretary Morris. I am trying to explain, sir, the body of information that has been generated that gives a top executive confidence in the validity of the findings.

Mr. Hardy. That is the point.

So he based his findings on his confidence in the presentation which you and the Chief of Staff made to him, and not on any personal knowledge or study which he made.

Secretary MORRIS. Well, sir, executives have to depend on their staff's.

Mr. HARDY. I understand.
But I want you to get us clear as to what happened in this case.

I know executives have to take the word of somebody else. They can't do it all. I appreciate that. But I want to understand what did happen here.

And I think that is what happened. And I don't think Stahr knew one earthly thing about half of the stuff he passed on. He accepted somebody else's judgment. Isn't that essentially what happened?

Secretary MORRIS. Sir, you would have to ask him that question. Mr. Hardy. Well, if you sat with him and gave him the basis on which he formed his judgment—and I am thinking about your statement just a while ago—then I would have to conclude that that was where he got the bulk of his knowledge—at that one meeting.

Mr. KITCHIN. Mr. Chairman.
Mr. HÉBERT. Mr. Kitchin.

Mr. KITCHIN. I think if he will narrow it down to the specifics upon which this meeting is proposed this morning.

The colonel here is in tħe position to at least answer for the Air Force concerning these particular bases in which we have an interest this morning, as not only as to the chronology but to the information that was available to his Chief of Staff and to the respective Secretaries.

Mr. HÉBERT. I think the question is very good.
Mr. Gavin. Before you get down to that, I have a question to ask.
Mr. HÉBERT. Yes, sír.

Mr. GAVIN. In view of the fact that conditions have changed greatly in the past several weeks in world affairs, don't you think it is logical that you would again review this whole structure to determine whether it is sound to close some of these installations you referred to?

You say here on page 4: In 1956 we required a training base structure to produce 9,000 pilots and navigators per year in support of the 137 wing force level. In the current fiscal year our program calls for the training of only 2,700 pilots and navigators.

(Secretary Morris nods).

Mr. GAVIN. With world affairs as they are now, we may be called upon to need these pilots and these navigators.

Do you think it is the logical thing to do under the present circumstances, to cut back on these training programs?

Secretary MORRIS. Sir, as I indicated at the end of my statement, I took this specific question up with Secretary McNamara this morning, having in hand the letter which we just received from you.

Mr. GAVIN. Yes.
Secretary MORRIS. And I have a signed reply to you.
Mr. Gavin. Well, read the letter, and then read the reply.
Secretary Morris. Sir, I do not have the incoming letter with me.
Mr. FORE. Yes, we have.
Mr. COURTNEY. This is Mr. Gavin's letter.
Mr. HÉBERT. Which brings it up to date.

Secretary MORRIS. Letter from the Honorable Leon Gavin, dated July 11, to Secretary of Defense McNamara.

MY DEAR MR. SECRETARY: In a world which is faced with a crisis perhaps unequaled since the Korean conflict, namely the pending crisis with regard to Berlin, may I urgently request that you, as the Secretary of Defense, issue an order suspending all further action toward the closing of our military bases here and abroad.

I submit this proposal to you without regard to where the bases are located and without regard to any thought other than the fact that we may be faced with the need for every type of military support activity now in our possession. I can think of nothing that would play a greater role in convincing the Soviet Union that we mean business than to suspend all action now contemplated or underway that envisions the closing of any of our military bases.

In a response letter, dated July 13, from Secretary McNamara :

DEAR MR. GAVIN : Your interest, as expressed in your letter of July 11, in assuring a strong military posture at this time is very much appreciated. We must take all necessary steps to provide strength where strength is needed and to eliminate any unnecessary or wasteful activities or operations. Retention of excess installations not needed for support of modern warfare serve only to dissipate our resources at a time when we can least afford it.

Our decision to close certain bases was made only after careful analysis of their essentiality in support of a full-scale war effort. The bases identified for disposition are not required for this. If heightening world tensions make any change at all in our plans for base closures, it is more likely to be in the direction of accelerating these actions rather than suspending them. This would release manpower and resources for urgent assignment in support of today's military requirement.

We agree with the importance of convincing the Soviet Union that we mean business, and propose taking all necessary steps to make this quite clear. We sincerely hope that we can count upon your continued complete support of those measures best designed to accomplish this.

Mr. Gavin. Well, I haven't received that letter yet. Secretary MORRIS. May I deliver it, sir? Mr. HÉBERT. May I ask, in view of the letter and the statement of the Secretary in the letter, and also in your own statement: Are you saying that an acceleration of the closing of all these bases is necessary to strengthen our millitary posture?

Secretary MORRIS. I am not, sir. Mr. HÉBERT. Well, what is he saying? Secretary MORRIS. We are saying that we badly need the resources of military manpower, civilian manpower and money to put into the higher priority assignments that are accelerated at a period like this, and that if any reevaluation is made, it would be more likely to indicate that we step up the obtaining of these resources whereever practicable, rather than slowing down or discontinuing such action.

Mr. HÉBERT. But you are closing up the physical installations, aren't you? Aren't you saying—if you are going to close them upyou say you must accelerate it to get this manpower.

Now, how does that reconcile with the statement of the Deputy Secretary of Defense, that we have to look for the acceleration of manpower through Reserves and the National Guard.

How do those two statements reconcile? Are you also saying further that in case war does come, that a number of these installations are going to be used or will be unnecessary?

Secretary MORRIS. We are saying the latter, sir.
Mr. HÉBERT. You are saying what?

Secretary MORRIS. We are saying the latter: That this consideration was taken into account by the studies made before a decision was made, that is, that under mobilization, we did not need the capacity represented by the installation.

The acceleration refers only to the fact that where we are gaining savings by combining overheads of two installations into one, we might well find it desirable to do this somewhat sooner in order to get the savings sooner.

Mr. HÉBERT. Yes, but what are more important: savings or capability?

Mr. GAVIN. That is it.

Mr. HÉBERT. Are you going to show a profit from the Defense Department at end of the fiscal year? Is that what your aim is?

Secretary MORRIS. No, sir. Our aim is to have resources as represented by manpower and dollars.

Mr. HÉBERT. And not physical installations?

Secretary Morris. The point is we have an excess of physical resources, but not of human and financial resources.

Mr. HÉBERT. This is what you say now. But we are in a time of crisis, as Mr. Gavin has pointed out. Are we to understand that in case of full mobilization, these installations are not going to be desired or needed?

Secretary MORRIS. May I take an illustration, sir, that I think will help indicate this point!

At the Laughlin Air Force Base, which Mr. Fisher is interested in, and very properly, we have at present a marginal use of a facility that is generating an extensive overhead use of military personnel to the extent, as I recall, of about 960 military manpower billets.

By moving that marginal-sized mission from Laughlin to an existing larger SAC base, we can save those 960 positions quickly and reassign them to productive tasks in higher priority military requirements.

Mr. HÉBERT. But you will need that base.
Secretary MORRIS. At this time, sir, we did not need the capacity.
Mr. HÉBERT. In full mobilization, you will need the base.
Secretary MORRIS. At this time, sir, we see no need for that capacity.
Mr. HÉBERT. Are you declaring that base surplus?

Secretary Morris. The plan is to excess the base approximately July of 1962.

Mr. HÉBERT. Well, then, you are closing the base
Secretary MORRIS. That is correct, sir.
Mr. HÉBERT. And disposing of the property.
Secretary Morris. That is correct, sir.

Mr. HÉBERT. Which you may need in time of mobilization. you are saying you don't need these sites in time of mobilization?

Secretary MORRIS. We have more capacity, sir, as we project our requirements, even under mobilization, than is needed.

Mr. HÉBERT. I am afraid, Mr. Secretary, you are putting yourself away out on the limb, if war should come and then we go back to recapture these bases which you are declaring excess.

You know very well in wartime what we need. And we are on the brink of it right now. Let's face the situation as it is.

Mr. GAVIN. Let me read the second paragraph again to you. Our decision to close certain bases was made only after careful analysis of their essentiality in support of a full-scale war effort.

Mr. HÉBERT. That is right. Mr. Gavin. (continuing reading): The bases identified for disposition are not required for this. If heightening world tensions make any change at all in our plans for base closures, it is more likely to be in the direction of accelerating these actions rather than suspending them. This would release manpower and resources for urgent assignment in support of today's military requirement.

We agree with the importance of convincing the Soviet Union that we mean business, and propose taking all necessary steps to make this quite clear. We sincerely hope that we can count upon your continued complete support of those measures best designed to accomplish this.

Do you think that we will show any signs of conviction when it is publicly announced that we are closing 73 military installations, where we are trying to build a great national defense program? Is that any indication to the Soviets, when we are cutting back now, instead of building up to meet any emergency that is made upon us any time anywhere in the world?

Secretary Morris. We do, sir, if by these actions we free manpower which is being wasted today

Mr. HÉBERT. Yes, but Mr. Secretary-may I interrupt?

You are not only freeing manpower, you are declaring and disposing in excess real estate and bases that we own right now.

Mr. Gavin. And may need.

Mr. HÉBERT. That is what you are doing. You are declaring it excess to GSA.

Secretary MORRIS. That is correct, sir.
Mr. HÉBERT. All right, then. You are closing down the bases.
You are closing them. And then you must recapture them in time of
full mobilization.

Mr. GAVIN. And the experienced personnel on those bases are gone.
Mr. HÉBERT. The civilian personnel are losing their jobs.
Secretary MORRIS. Yes, sir.

Mr. HÉBERT. And we are not talking about the economy of it now. We are talking about the disposition of the skilled people who are there available to you now. And which will be developed later in other bases, and not these particular two.

Mr. Hardy. Well, the substance of what he is saying is that he is not going to need those skills.

Mr. HÉBERT. He is not going to need those skills—is that what you are saying!

Secretary MORRIS. Sir, we are saying two things. One is, we do not need the physical properties because we have excess physical properties, of these types. Mr. HÉBERT. All right. Now let's stop right there.

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