Mr. COURTNEY. How high in the professional ranks do you go? Mr. GOLDWAG. It is not a question of that. Cornell Aeronautical Laboratory is a separate entity. The professors are not particularly involved. However, the president of Cornell University is president of Cornell Aeronautical Laboratory. The executive vice president is the effective de facto head of the laboratory.

Mr. HARDY. If you require so many Ph. D.'s, you don't know whether they come from Cornell's staff. Actually, you don't know whether there are people from Cornell's staff serving on this contract or not. Mr. GOLDWAG. We know the people serving there and we know where they come from.

What I said, sir, was the contract itself, the contractual document does not specify the names of the people. It specifies the caliber. By separate arrangements we have agreed on specific people.

At the time the contract was placed, all of the key people came down from Cornell, Buffalo, from the laboratory.

Mr. HARDY. You didn't borrow anybody from the university?
Mr. GOLDWAG. No, sir.

Mr. HARDY. So we are getting up to the questions the chairman has been working on lately, in this case it is not demonstrable that we are subsidizing higher education.

Mr. GOLDWAG. That is correct.

Mr. HÉBERT. The next case.

Mr. SANDWEG. I think we can finish up, then, with two contracts by the Corps of Engineers, contracts Nos. DA44-009-ENG, 4515, with Jered Industries of Nazel Park, Mich., to study an assault ferry, $64,780, and also contract No. DA-004-ENG, 4517, with Food Machinery & Chemical Corp. of San Jose, Calif., also to study an assault ferry for $116,575.

The results of the contracts are both the same. Each of the contractors made various recommendations. I correct myself. Jered Industries made various recommendations, none of which were adopted which have not already been adopted by USAERDL.

Food Machinery made various recommendations, the most important of which was that the design prepared by USAERDL be used for this bridge.

Again it appears here you might have drilled a couple of dry holes, and I wondered if we could have some explanation of that, since the results were (1) not adopted which had already been put into effect by USAERDL, and the other recommendation was one that was being used by USAERDL.

Mr. NORBLAD. Pardon me. What contract was this, what company at the top?

Mr. SANDWEG. Well, it is a separate page, Mr. Norblad, both of them are together.

Mr. NORBLAD. Thank you.

General TRUDEAU. Mr. Mullins.

Mr. MULLINS. Howard H. Mullins, chief, Bridge and Research Group, Engineering Research and Development Laboratories, Fort Belvoir.

General TRUDEAU. Would you respond to Mr. Sandweg's question? Mr. SANDWEG. Would you want me to repeat it again?

Mr. MULLINS. I believe you said it looked like we drilled a couple of dry holes.

Mr. SANDWEG. Yes. One corporation made recommendations which had already been adopted by the Army, and the other made recommendations to use a design already prepared by the Army.

Mr. MULLINS. Well, now, I don't believe that the statement that you are reading there quite reflects the exact situation.

Now, I don't know how the statement got there, it was probably picked up from some report that is not just exactly so.

Mr. SANDWEG. This is what we had to proceed on.

Mr. MULLINS. I realize that, sir.

I would like to read here, and I think if I read it I probably would do a little better than if I tried off the cuff, you know.

Mr. SANDWEG. That is quite all right.

Mr. MULLINS. I believe this will explain it.

In September 1959, we at the laboratories heard that we would be asked to design a bridge of the mobile floating type. This is the type that you gentlemen are looking at. We had not yet received the military characteristics for the bridge, but we immediately began making sketches to determine as many different concepts for doing the job as possible.

In November 1959, I discussed the proposed bridge with engineering representatives of several outside firms to determine if these firms would be interested in doing work on such a bridge, and if they had any worthwhile ideas as to how the problem should be solved.

This was being done because we anticipated that the time allotted for the complete design of this bridge would be so short that we could not with the force we now have prepare the complete designs for the hull, the superstructure, and all of the machinery in time to ask for quotations in fiscal 1961.

In January 1960, several of these firms submitted unofficial proposals showing how they would solve the problem.

We had asked these people to submit these unofficial proposals with drawings depicting just how they would attack the problem, because we wanted to see what they could do and to make sure that they had an overall appreciation of the problems involved.

We were not interested in having these people come in and just tell us what a fine job they could do. We were interested in having them prove that they were competent.

While this was going on here at the laboratories, we proceeded to work on the design concept which we had worked out, and we considered most satisfactory. We started preparing the details for the hull, the superstructure, and we also made a machinery layout and determined the horsepower requirements at the various speeds when operating as a ferry.

In the meantime we had come to the conclusion that since this was such an extremely expensive and complicated piece of equipment it would be wise before committing ourselves to a final design and expending any money thereon, that we make sure beyond all reasonable doubt that we were on the correct road, that we had the correct design. We thought it advisable that we bring some outside engineering talent to bear on the subject. It occurred to us that outside firms working independently might perhaps come up with a more simple and more economical design.

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We thought that, if we were going to do so, this engineering talent should be brought to bear in the very early stages of the design.

As a result of this thinking, we recommended to the Chief of Engineers that we be allowed to let some contracts on overall studies to outside industry. We did not feel we should depend on one contractor only, and we recommended that we be allowed to let more than one contract. This recommendation was approved.

As a result of that approval we let the two contracts under discussion, that is, to Food Machinery & Chemical Corp., and Jered Industries.

In setting out the scope of this work we tried to list everything that we could think of that we wanted these people to investigate. In other words, these were specific things that they must look into, and we emphasized to these people many times that the sky was the limit so so far as their investigation was concerned, that anything that they could design or invent would be satisfactory with us so long as it was practical and could be used.

We made it very plain to them that we did not want a lot of socalled harebrained ideas which would be of no practical value to us and which we could not incorporate in our final design.

After these contracts were let, we decided that it would not be a good idea for these contractors to go home and work for 4 months, which was the period the contracts were to run, and come back with the same layout we had worked out here.

We had been working on this job for some months now, and had many drawings quite well along. So we decided to show the contractors everything that we had done so they would know as much as possible about the job before starting their work.

We emphasized to them that they were acting as consulting engineers to us and we expected them to come up with recommendations at the end of these studies as to exactly the type of structures we should use, the arrangement of the machinery, the type of drive line, the type of suspension, the type of water propulsion system, and every other item involved.

Now, that, sir. I think is the statement which will give you the reason why we thought we should let contracts to outside firms to make sure that we had not missed the boat, because this is to be an extremely costly job, and I suppose that we might assume that when completed and adopted that based on military bridges we have bought in the past that we can expect a minimum of probably $100 million will be involved in procurement of such equipment.

Mr. HARDY. Well, you gave them all the design work that you had done; you made that available to them.

Mr. MULLINS. We showed them everything that we had worked out.

Mr. HARDY. And they came back and said, OK, boys, you did a good job, that is what you ought to go ahead with."

Mr. MULLINS. Not exactly. We got very extensive reports and also this is the type of report, Mr. Hardy, that we got.

Mr. HARDY. Which one is that, Food Machinery?

Mr. MULLINS. Yes.

Mr. HARDY. You said $116,000 for that.

Mr. MULLINS. No, sir. We paid $51,000 for that. At the same time that we let these study contracts, the question came up: Should this vehicle have installed as the drive system a mechanical drive line, an electric drive line, or a hydraulic drive line?

Now, that is a very difficult problem to determine.

Mr. HARDY. What had you already recommended?

Mr. MULLINS. I had not recommended either yet, and that was the particular thing that we wanted these people to investigate, was all of those drive lines. And, of course, if they could come up with a scheme that was better than ours we would set ours aside and adopt theirs.

Mr. HARDY. It would be a whole lot easier for them to use what you had, though, wouldn't it?

Mr. MULLINS. Sir, I am quite sure that they would not have dared come back on that basis, because they were told:

If you come back and recommend anything other than this, we will want to adopt it, but it has to be proven better than what we have worked out here. Mr. HARDY. Well, you sure did tell them, if you have to prove it better than what we have got, you better take what we have got. Mr. MULLINS. We told them that we were not interested in just coming back and handing us a report, Sir.

Mr. HARDY. Well, I don't know. I would like to know what you got for this money. You say fifty-some-thousand dollars-what is this $116,000 shown?

Mr. MULLINS. That was for the design of an electrical drive line. Now, when this firm came back with

Mr. HARDY. That is in addition to the $51,000?

Mr. MULLINS. That is right.

Mr. HARDY. So in total, you paid Food Machinery $167,000 for this? Mr. MULLINS. No, no.

Mr. HARDY. How much?

Mr. MULLINS. The contract with Food Machinery was for the design of an electric drive line and an overall study. They were given 4 months to complete the overall study, and when they came in with the overall study they recommended that the mechanical drive line be used. As a result, we closed the contract for the electric drive line and paid them off.

Mr. HARDY. You mean because they didn't recommend what you wanted?

Mr. MULLINS. No; they were supposed to recommend what they thought was best. They already had a contract to make the complete drawings and design for an electric drive line for us, but they recommended in their overall study that the mechanical drive line was best; that we were not quite to the state of the art where we could use an electric drive line.

As a result, we closed out the electric drive line.

Mr. HARDY. And used a mechanical line which they did recommend?

Mr. MULLINS Used a mechanical drive line which they recommended.

Mr. HARDY. I was interested in trying to find out just exactly what we got for all this money.

How much money did you pay Food Machinery altogether on this? Mr. MULLINS. The total, we paid $93,260.

Mr. HARDY. That included a drive line business which we have just been talking about, plus a design study?

Mr. MULLINS. That is right, a design study plus what work they had done to the time we closed it out on the electric drive line.

Mr. HARDY. Then this $116,705 figure we have is a wrong figure. Mr. MULLINS. That is not just for the overall study.

Mr. HARDY. Well, what is it for?

Mr. MULLINS. It is for the overall study plus the design of the electric drive line.

Mr. HARDY. But that finally didn't come up to about $95,000.
Mr. NEW. Sir, maybe I can help on this.

Mr. HARDY. Please.

Mr. NEW. The original contract price was set at this figure you have before you, $116,000. That called for two items of work, as just explained, one for the overall study, one for the electric drive system. When the first study was made, the 4-month study, it was determined that the mechanical drive should be adopted, so all work was ordered stopped on the electric drive. Therefore the original amount of the contract was reduced from the $116,000 to the figure just quoted, $93,000, which is the total amount paid or to be paid to Food Machinery. Mr. HARDY. In other words, you amended their contract and stopped what they were doing on the electric drive line?

Mr. NEW. Yes, sir. And had they recommended the electric drive, we probably would have gone on through with the contract, but they said "We think the mechanical drive is better," so we stopped work on the electric drive.

Mr. HARDY. And so instead of $116,000 you had $90-some thousand that you actually paid them?

Mr. NEW. Yes, sir.

Mr. MULLINS. That is right.

Mr. SANDWEG. Well, then the figure we have is incorrect.

Mr. New. It is not incorrect, sir, for the contract as a whole. The contract was a combination; it covered two items.

Mr. HARDY. It was amended.

Mr. SANDWEG. It was my assumption that the figures in here were what was paid.

Mr. MULLINS. No, that is the original figures on the contract. Mr. HARDY. Now did they also carry a recommendation that the contract for the production of this vehicle be negotiated with Food Machinery?

Mr. MULLINS. No, Sir.

Mr. HARDY. They didn't include that recommendation?

Mr. MULLINS. No, sir.

Mr. HÉBERT. That is strange. That is the exception from the rule. Mr. COURTNEY. Mr. New.

Mr. MULLINS. We are still waiting for that.

Mr. HÉBERT. You will get it, don't worry.

Mr. SANDWEG. Have either of these companies ever built assault ferries before? Has anyone built them, of the nature you are speaking of here?