Colonel Johnston has told you that the number of pieces of equipment, electronic equipment, have doubled since World War II. As a matter of fact, the number of electronic emissions in the battle area have probably increased by a factor of 5, and will increase by a factor of 10. In other words, there will be 10 times as many electronic emissions going on in a given battle area in 1970 as there were in World War II.

Now because we have learned a lot more about radio spectrum, we can break up the frequencies into much smaller frequencies than we could before.

In the band that is allotted for our tactical radios, we used to think if we got 80 or 120 channels in there, so that different companies or battalions could use different frequencies, this was good.

Our new radio sets have 900 channels in them. It doesn't mean every man has access to 900, but it means we have the selectivity to use 900 channels.

Furthermore, modern science has found out that when we state electronic emissions we are talking not only about radio and we are talking not only about telephone; we are talking about radar, we are talking about infrared signals, we are talking about amazing things that are happening that interrelate the light spectrum with the electronic spectrum.

Consequently nobody knows, not only in the Army but in the United States, as to whether when all these electronic emissions are occurring in an area, whether it is going to function or whether through intentional jamming on the part of the enemy or unintentional jamming because of the complexity of this equipment, whether it is going to work or not.

So there are two steps.

Mr. COURTNEY. This is a test of equipment, then, isn't it?

General TRUDEAU. There are two steps being taken. When this man brings up this program, this war game here, he will program in that there are so many emissions occurring at a certain rate and for a certain length of time, let's say 020.2, if this is the channel, and there are so many more on 020.4 and 050.3, and then he is cranking in also the number of frequencies or emissions that are occurring, and for how long on the part of the enemy, into a data computer to find out whether this is feasible.

We need the best brains in industry on this, and if you think that this is expensive, let me tell you that in order to lay this out on the ground with the actual pieces of equipment which will be also ready before 1963, that the Army is now spending $30 million at Fort Huachuca, the environmental test ground, and this is proceeding.

This is like a paper exercise, and the next thing is to get your troops out for maneuver. This is expensive, and there isn't enough talent in the United States to tell you whether this is all going to work together until we test it.

Mr. HÉBERT. Well, General, what you are saying then, as I understand your testimony, it is this: In reality and as we understand it, you are testing the equipment under certain conditions.

General TRUDEAU. This is correct.

Mr. HÉBERT. And you have asked them to simulate a war condition and that is the reason why you had to get the people who prepared this thing, or who are familiar with it, to simulate these two areas in order to test it.

General TRUDEAU. That is correct.

Mr. HÉBERT. But actually as to the term "war games," we are not talking about that.

General TRUDEAU. That is right.

Mr. NORBLAD. What was the figure given between 1962 and 1965, Major?

Major BEAM. I made the comment that we were developing a communications system for our 1962 to 1965 Army.

Mr. NORBLAD. I see.

Major BEAM. And that one of the uses of this system-we will apply that system in this exercise and determine how it can be approved. We will validate that system, and we hope to achieve significant savings in equipment, personnel, and other areas.

Mr. NORBLAD. CEIR is an electronics outfit, I take it.

General TRUDEAU. Yes.

Mr. NORBLAD. Is that the place I go past on U.S. 1 every day here? General TRUDEAU. They have an operation here.

Mr. NORBLAD. They are in Los Angeles, too?

General TRUDEAU. They are worldwide, or U.S.-wide.

Mr. NORBLAD. They have been 32 years on this contract and you have had no results at all, is that correct?

Major BEAM. No, sir; this was a 5-year effort. This was what our feasibility study showed.

Mr. NORBLAD. The contract was entered into on the 1st of April 1958. No recommendations or suggestions submitted to date after 312 years for a modern war game.

Major BEAM. This was a 5-year effort. The division model has been delivered and its starting test is at Fort Huachuca the end of this year.

Mr. COURTNEY. We set the format for the discussions and these are the responses that appear under the questions.

Mr. NORBLAD. Three and a half years with no report to you is considered perfectly normal, I suppose?

Major BEAM. No usable product, sir, but this was anticipated, and this was in accordance with our plan.

Mr. HÉBERT. What is the notation at the end, "Not applicable." That seemed to be the conclusion.

General TRUDEAU. There was no recommendation or suggestion made, and consequently the question of acceptance or rejection is not applicable.

Mr. HEBERT. They have not reached the stage of decision?

General TRUDEAU. No, sir. There are military people working with them, and if the Army could set several hundred electronics engineers on this study, if they had them above the normal conduct of Army duties, we probably could get in and make a good study ourselves, although we are not the experts on data computers that they are.

It is the problem of a peak load. Everybody is busy or else we have people we don't need.

Mr. HÉBERT. All right, let's proceed to the next contract.

Mr. SANDWEG. The next contract in line is with the Armour Research Foundation of Illinois. Contract DA-36-039-sc-66476, which is a study of ways and means to improve the Army combat development system.

(The description of the contract is as follows:)

Type of effort: Research.

Contractor: Armour Reserach Foundation of Illinois, Institute of Technology, 10 West 35th Street, Chicago 16, Ill.

Contract No.: DA-36-039-sc-66476.

Date of award: June 30, 1958.

Cost of contract: $50,703.

Completion date: March 31, 1959.

Subject matter: A study in ways and means to improve the Army combat development system.

Recommendation or suggestion and to whom made: Recommendations of the contractor were furnished USCONARC.

Acceptance or rejection of recommendation or suggestion and why: Recommendations and final report were accepted by USCONARC as being acceptable and as a result more effective means were developed for collecting, abstracting, distributing, storing, and recalling information used by 31 military agencies engaged in developing new doctrine, new organizations, and requirements for new material.

Mr. SANDWEG. Would that contract be on the same order as this type of contract?

General TRUDEAU. I doubt it.

Whoever is knowledgeable on that should speak to the subject. It is a contract completed in 1959. I am not personally cognizant of it.

Mr. VANCE. I am James Vance from the Signal Engineering Agency, in the Computer System Division.

I served as the assistant project officer in that project, sir, and the project there is an engineering study of the combat development system of the U.S. Army, which is under the Continental Army Command, Fort Monroe.

This study was an engineering study to approve, check the efficiency of, and recommend guidelines for better efficiency in the future operation of the combat development system.

Now would you care for me to explain the combat development system because that is fundamental to an understanding of this contract. This is a term applied to a group of associated agencies whose activities are oriented toward the future of the entire Army in the broad areas of new doctrine, new organization, and new material. The system agencies are organic to the major elements of the Army charged with the development and evaluation of future. concepts.

Now this combat development system resulted as a byproduct of a study called Project Vista. Project Vista was concerned with a study of the ground and air tactical warfare with special reference to the defense of Western Europe. That final report was submitted in February 1952 and as an outgrowth of the study it was recommended that a combat development group be established for the purpose of carrying out experimental research on the problems of ground combat both in the laboratory and in the field.

Following that there was establishment of the Combat Development Group and the Department of Army desired to determine the effectiveness of the group and how it could be improved and the Committee known as the Hayworth Committee, after Mr. Leland J. Hayworth, Chairman, was appointed to perform critical analysis of the functions and relationships of the combat development group. That report to the Secretary of the Army in October 1954 called the Hayworth report, contained an overall evaluation of the system and recommended changes which should be adopted to improve the overall operation.

Now this was the combat development system and it relies on information and data for its effectiveness. The information is obtained from a great variety of sources in a great many different ways and deals largely with very complex subjects and it is disseminated to widely divergent sources, civilian and military and in the process of this work the problems of data transmission processing, storage, and retrieval arise, so this study was initiated by the Continental Army Command, Commanding General Combat Developments, to determine several questions: The nature and extent of use of the body of knowledge at headquarters, terminals inside and outside Conare, which is Continental Army Command, to determine the needs and possible areas of improvement which exist in the combat development system so as to obtain compatible and effective communications and data handling throughout the system.

This was the most important of all, and following that there were a number of additional purposes of this study such as balancing the current combat development system and its ideals or the ideal system versus what is practical from an economic standpoint, and to develop a set of recommendations for steps to be taken to improve the system, particularly in the areas of transmittal, processing, storage, and rapid data retrieval.

Mr. HARDY. How many people did it take to do all that?

Mr. VANCE. This study was a five-man effort for 6 months time. Mr. COURTNEY. Well, now what special competence does the Armour Research Institute have on it? What you have said pretty much looks as through it would be the soldiers' job to define the doctrine of a competent group or group in combat.

Now the part of it that deals with the information, the papers, whatever you want to call it, is somewhat associated with the library sciences where you would find out what is written on the subject and how it is distributed. This is understandable.

Mr. VANCE. Where it is, what it contains, how consistent it is with your new doctrine and so on.

Mr. COURTNEY. But when you are defining doctrine

Mr. VANCE. Procedures is another term that is often used.

Mr. COURTNEY. Well, doctrine has a pretty well-understood meaning, in these precincts at least, but when you are defining doctrine, isn't this the business of the men in uniform?

Mr. VANCE. Let me explain the difference between the combat development system and this study. This study was directed toward the efficient performance of this function. How efficiently it is being performed.

Mr. HARDY. Couldn't the Army make a determination in that area. without hiring somebody else to do it?

Mr. VANCE. They [Armour Research Foundation] have a staff of about 1,300 personnel of a highly qualified nature.

Mr. HARDY. Well, why do you need these five people to do it then? Mr. VANCE. There was an investigation and scrutiny of the resources of the Signal Corps and the other agencies under the jurisdiction of the Deputy Chief of Staff, Logistics, and the Comptroller of the Army, which indicated that the Department of the Army did not have the personnel with the proper skills that could be made available to conduct this study at that time.

Mr. HARDY. So this is the kind of thing that was going to develop doctrine which the men in uniform were not capable of doing.

Mr. VANCE. Not to develop doctrine, sir.

Mr. HARDY. Well, all right; what else? You said doctrine a while ago, I thought.

Mr. VANCE. That is the function of the combat development system itself, for the doctrine development and the doctrine presentation and testing and investigation. This contract was in order to ascertain better and more effective ways that the combat development people could do their job, better methods of data retrieval and data coordination, where you have libraries scattered throughout the geographic United States-a great deal of it classified-and the job of the project analyst is to scrutinize all of that and to draw his conclusions.

Mr. HARDY. Well, now what are these people that work on this contract, what do they do normally?

General TRUDEAU. They are management consultants.

Mr. HARDY. Management consultants, all right; and so they are expert in the gathering of this data and evaluating this data which the Army itself wasn't able to do.

Mr. VANCE. The Army has not had nearly so much trouble in evaluating the data as in the communications, the information retrieval and filing and the coordination of the data.

Mr. HARDY. I thought that all of the folks over in the Defense Department were past masters at coordinating, and if this is a matter of coordination-that is one of the favorite words they have over there, "implementation" and "coordination," and "finalizing" is another one-but I am just having a little trouble understanding why the Army lacks competence in this particular area.

Mr. VANCE. I would not say that the Army didn't have competent people who couldn't have done this job

Mr. HARDY. You don't want to say that as to any area, but I don't know. I am just trying to understand.

Mr. VANCE. It was a matter, sir, that whether those people that the Army had which might have been capable of doing it were available to do it in relation to their other work.

Mr. HARDY. Did somebody make a determination as to whether the Army did have people who were capable?

Mr. VANCE. Yes, sir.

Mr. HARDY. And if they did, did somebody make a determination that they were so busy doing something more important that they couldn't be spared for this job?

Mr. VANCE. Well, sir, the determination was simply that the Army did not have the personnel with the proper skills that could be made available for this study.