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Mr. NORBLAD. There is a million and a half dollars of the taxpayers' money involved, too.

Major BEAM. Let me elaborate how this works.

Colonel Johnston says, our objective is to compare communications systems, one against the other, and, if I may use the example, we would propose to do it by using this system on this basis: we will take a specific military organization of division size and we will then establish within that division size organization a specific communication system which we will call communications system No.1.

Through the war-gaming process which we will use, we will fight that division with that communications system against a specific enemy, and we will either take or not take our objective.

We will then use that same organization in the next phase, apply to it communications system No. 2, and then go throught the same process.

Now we can control the environment when we do this on what we call CPX's, or map exercises and maneuvers; the human element is there, which, of course, changes our response and gives us a result which may or may not be true. It is true within certain parameters.

Under the systems where we compare one system against the other, we have a controlled environment and there are many things which we can do.

We can determine whether system No. 1, communications system No.1—what effect it will have upon the outcome of the battle.

Mr. COURTNEY. Are these mechanical systems or electronic systems or what?

Major BEAM. This is a system using an electronic computer.
Mr. HÉBERT. You have bought the system?
Major BEAM. We rent it.

Mr. HÉBERT. You rent the system and pay somebody else to tell you how to use it?

Major BEAM. The computer is a rented device. The model, and it is å mathematical model, is something we are developing in this particular problem.

Mr. HÉBERT. The thing, Major, that we are trying to get at is why is it necessary to spend over a million dollars to develop war games with any system or any weapon which is in the hands of the Army or any branch of the service. Aren't you people trained in this field?

Major Beam. The answer to your question, sir, is that none of our other war games are suitable for this particular purpose.

Our purpose is to compare the effects of a particular war game on the communications system. We change the system and there are many advantages that we can see. For instance, we can design a system and we have done this for the 1962–65 Army, we have designed a system for this particular army.

İt may or may not be the best system that could be designed. It is, however, the system that we can live with.

We have equipment in that system which has particular characteristies, that is, you may communicate between certain points by a certain

a number of communications channels.

Now we are faced continuously with the question: is that an adequate number of channels of communications to give this organization the communications capability that it requires?

If we say that 12 channels between these two points

Mr. HÉBERT. I don't want to keep interrupting you, these details are interesting for information, but we want to apply ourselves to the overall principle.

Now you are saying that you do not have the competence in the Army.

Major BEAM. That was my original response to your question, sir, yes.

Mr. HÉBERT. Now if I may ask this question to pursue it, to get down to what we are interested in, why is it that you do not have the competence? Is it lack of manpower? Is it lack of brains? Why isn't a man in uniform which the Government has spent thousands and thousands of dollars to train at West Point and train at the universities of our country, why do we have to go outside of the uniform to develop war games?

Major BEAM. We must go back to 1956 to answer your question, sir. In 1956 the proposal was made that we might develop a system of this type. The Army decided that a feasibility test was necessary to find out whether it would continue the effort on this.

It went right to its military people and determined it didn't have the capability in 1956. It then went to probably the recognized leader in the field, which was Rand Corp., and Rand Corp. said that they could not do this job for the Army. They suggested the ORO, Johns Hopkins, be contacted.

Johns Hopkins said that they did not have the capability. Johns Hopkins suggested that the General Analysis Corp., which had broken off from Rand, might have the competent people to do it.

Mr. COURTNEY. What are you determining precisely, the mathematical probabilities of communicating via A, B, C, or many different methods? Is that what you are determining?

Major BEAM. To great extent this is true, sir.

We hope to bring this down to the point that we can say we can use a cheaper piece of gear than what we have designed, or that we can use one piece of gear instead of four pieces of gear to satisfy our communications requirements.

Mr. COURTNEY. Well, are you testing the gear, or are you merely computing on a machine-I don't know what the answer is, maybe I have it stated entirely wrong, but I am trying to think through to what you are getting at.

Are you testing the equipment under certain conditions that are devised by this organization, which is a noncombatant outfit, I would suppose?

Major Beam. We are not testing the equipment. We are utilizing the characteristics of that equipment in our model.

Mr. COURTNEY. Well, does this company devise the deployment of the troops in a given battle condition or combat condition, both friendly and adversary, and then does it figure out the different movements of the troops!

Major Beam. This is what this company is doing; yes, sir.

Mr. COURTNEY. Well, why wouldn't that be within the competence of the military people to determine the kind of game that you are having?

General TRUDEAU. Let me take this over, Major.

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Colonel Johnston has told you that the number of pieces of equipment, electronic equipment, have doubled since World War II. As a matter of fact, the number of electronic emissions in the battle area have probably increased by a factor of 5, and will increase by a factor of 10. In other words, there will be 10 times as many electronic emissions going on in a given battle area in 1970 as there were in World War II.

Now because we have learned a lot more about radio spectrum, we can break up the frequencies into much smaller frequencies than we could before.

In the band that is allotted for our tactical radios, we used to think if we got 80 or 120 channels in there, so that different companies or battalions could use different frequencies, this was good.

Our new radio sets have 900 channels in them. It doesn't mean every man has access to 900, but it means we have the selectivity to use 900 channels.

Furthermore, modern science has found out that when we state electronic emissions we are talking not only about radio and we are talking not only about telephone; we are talking about radar, we are talking about infrared signals, we are talking about amazing things that are happening that interrelate the light spectrum with the electronic spectrum.

Consequently nobody knows, not only in the Army but in the United States, as to whether when all these electronic emissions are occurring in an area, whether it is going to function or whether through intentional jamming on the part of the enemy or unintentional jamming because of the complexity of this equipment, whether it is going to work or not.

So there are two steps.
Mr. COURTNEY. This is a test of equipment, then, isn't it?

General TRUDEAU. There are two steps being taken. When this man brings up this program, this war game here, he will program in that there are so many emissions occurring at a certain rate and for a certain length of time, let's say 020.2, if this is the channel, and there are so many more on 020.4 and 050.3, and then he is cranking in also the number of frequencies or emissions that are occurring, and for how long on the part of the enemy, into a data computer to find out whether this is feasible.

We need the best brains in industry on this, and if you think that this is expensive, let me tell you that in order to lay this out on the ground with the actual pieces of equipment which will be also ready before 1963, that the Army is now spending $30 million at Fort Huachuca, the environmental test ground, and this is proceeding.

This is like a paper exercise, and the next thing is to get your troops out for maneuver. This is expensive, and there isn't enough talent in the United States to tell you whether this is all going to work together until we test it.

Mr. Hébert. Well, General, what you are saying then, as I understand your testimony, it is this: In reality and as we understand it, you are testing the equipment under certain conditions.

General TRUDEAU. This is correct.


Mr. HÉBERT. And you have asked them to simulate a war condition and that is the reason why you had to get the people who prepared this thing, or who are familiar with it, to simulate these two areas in order to test it.

General TRUDEAU. That is correct.

Mr. HÉBERT. But actually as to the term “war games," we are not talking about that.

General TRUDEAU. That is right.

Mr. NORBLAD. What was the figure given between 1962 and 1965, Major?

Major BEAM. I made the comment that we were developing a communications system for our 1962 to 1965 Army.

Mr. NORBLAD. I see.

Major BEAM. And that one of the uses of this system we will apply that system in this exercise and determine how it can be approved. We will validate that system, and we hope to achieve significant savings in equipment, personnel, and other areas.

Mr. NORBLAD. CEIR is an electronics outfit, I take it.
General TRUDEAU. Yes.
Mr. NORBLAD. Is that the place I go past on U.S. 1 every day here?

General TRUDEAU. They have an operation here.
Mr. NORBLAD. They are in Los Angeles, too?
General TRUDEAU. They are worldwide, or U.S.-wide.

Mr. NORBLAD. They have been 31/2 years on this contract and you have had no results at all, is that correct?

Major BEAM. No, sir; this was a 5-year effort. This was what our feasibility study showed.

Mr. NORBLAD. The contract was entered into on the 1st of April 1958. No recommendations or suggestions submitted to date after 312 years for a modern war game.

Major Beam. This was a 5-year effort. The division model has been delivered and its starting test is at Fort Huachuca the end of

Mr. COURTNEY. We set the format for the discussions and these are the responses that appear under the questions.

Mr. NORBLAD. Three and a half years with no report to you is considered perfectly normal, I suppose ?

Major BEAM. No usable product, sir, but this was anticipated, and this was in accordance with our plan.

Mr. HÉBERT. What is the notation at the end, “Not applicable.” That seemed to be the conclusion.

General TRUDEAU. There was no recommendation or suggestion made, and consequently the question of acceptance or rejection is not applicable. Mr. HÉBERT. They have not reached the stage of decision?

H General TRUDEAU. No, sir. There are military people working with them, and if the Army could set several hundred electronics engineers on this study, if they had them above the normal conduct of Army duties, we probably could get in and make a good study ourselves, although we are not the experts on data computers that they are.

this year.

It is the problem of a peak load. Everybody is busy or else we have people we don't need.

Mr. HÉBERT. All right, let's proceed to the next contract.

Mr. SANDWEG. The next contract in line is with the Armour Research Foundation of Illinois. Contract DA-36-039-sc-66476, which is a study of ways and means to improve the Army combat development system.

(The description of the contract is as follows:) Type of effort: Research.

Contractor: Armour Reserach Foundation of Illinois, Institute of Technology, 10 West 35th Street, Chicago 16, Ill.

Contract No.: DA-36-039-8c-66476.
Date of award : June 30, 1958.
Cost of contract: $50,703.
Completion date: March 31, 1959.

Subject matter: A study in ways and means to improve the Army combat development system.

Recommendation or suggestion and to whom made: Recommendations of the contractor were furnished USCONARC.

Acceptance or rejection of recommendation or suggestion and why: Recommendations and final report were accepted by USCONARC as being acceptable and as a result more effective means were developed for collecting, abstracting, distributing, storing, and recalling information used by 31 military agencies engaged in developing new doctrine, new organizations, and requirements for new material.

Mr. SANDWEG. Would that contract be on the same order as this type of contract?

General TRUDEAU. I doubt it.

Whoever is knowledgeable on that should speak to the subject. It is a contract completed in 1959. I am not personally cognizant of it.

Mr. VANCE. I am James Vance from the Signal Engineering Agency, in the Computer System Division.

I served as the assistant project officer in that project, sir, and the project there is an engineering study of the combat development system of the U.S. Army, which is under the Continental Army Command, Fort Monroe.

This study was an engineering study to approve, check the efficiency of, and recommend guidelines for better efficiency in the future operation of the combat development system.

Now would you care for me to explain the combat development system because that is fundamental to an understanding of this contract. This is a term applied to a group of associated agencies whose activities are oriented toward the future of the entire Army in the broad areas of new doctrine, new organization, and new material. The system agencies are organic to the major elements of the Army charged with the developinent and evaluation of future concepts.

Now this combat development system resulted as a byproduct of a study called Project Vista. Project Vista was concerned with a study of the ground and air tactical warfare with special reference to the defense of Western Europe. That final report was submitted in February 1952 and as an outgrowth of the study it was recommended that a combat development group be established for the purpose of carrying out experimental research on the problems of ground combat both in the laboratory and in the field.

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