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Martin Co., in the amount of $54,000. The description of the contract was

Study to determine the feasibility of defending small hardened targets, such as ICBM launch sites, against an enemy missile threat.

Both contractors apparently came out with the results identically the same, which were as follows:

Technically it is feasible to defend small hardened targets; economically, it may or may not be feasible, depending on the size of the target.

(The contracts data not read is as follows:)

AIR FORCE EFFORTS CONTRACTS

CONTRACT NO. AF 30 (602)-2109

Contractor: United Aircraft Corp., Missile and Space Systems Division. Value: $170,812 (cost shared).'

Description : Study to determine feasibility of defending small hardened targets such as ICBM launch sites against an enemy missile threat.

Results: Technically it is feasible to defend small hardened targets; economically, it may or may not be feasible depending on size of target.

CONTRACT NO. AF 30 (602)-2206

Contractor: The Martin Co.
Value: $54,000.

Description : Study to determine feasibility of defending small hardened targets such as ICBM launch sites against an enemy missile threat.

Results: Technically it is feasible to defend small hardened targets; economically, it may or may not be feasible depending on size of target. Consider above two together. Mr. SANDWEG. Could we speak to those, Mr. Secretary?

Secretary IMRIE. Yes, Mr. Jack Segal, on my right, from the Headquarters of the Electronic Systems Division of our Systems Command is here, as well—from the technical part of the problem, Mr. Charles Meyer is again back on the procurement side.

Now I have one word of caution on this one. I believe that Mr. Segal can cover this with unclassified material-to give you a general idea of the thing. If it must be pursued, I would like to recommend we go into executive session, because of the classified parts of it.

Mr. HÉBERT. We won't touch on that, Mr. Sandweg.

Mr. SANDWEG. All right. Let's refer to the results of both contracts, in which it gives what seems to be a very obvious answer. “Technically it is feasible. Economically it may or may not be.” It seems rather obvious an answer. It seems like a lot of money to have been spent to get that kind of an answer.

Mr. SEGAL. Yes, sir.

Mr. Chairman and Committee members, industry was approached on this particular problem after a new concept for ballistic missile defense was generated with inhouse capability at the Rome Air Development Center. Industry was approached to study the concept as we had presented it to them, to provide approaches to the achievement of this particular system capability in a time period which we requested them to study, and to trade off the various system elements that were involved in this particular concept against the various costs involved. Namely, for varying degrees of technical effectiveness for each particular element one could expand varying amounts of dollars and hopefully achieve an optimum situation.

1 One-half this cost was paid by the contractor.

The reason that there was more than one contractor involved was simply because we felt we would like to have as many approaches to the solution as possible.

Mr. COURTNEY. Was the contractor evaluating his own product for combat effectiveness?

Mr. SEGAL. No, sir. Secretary IMIRIE. You are referring to Martin, I presume? Mr. COURTNEY. Martin, or United. Mr. SEGAL. It turns out in the case of the Martin Co. that a piece of the system, the overall system, was a piece of hardware which they are themselves in production on, and a modification thereof. Thereby incurring a great cost savings, rather than developing a whole new item.

As a result of the study, the Air Force was provided with the necessary groundwork for launching a large-scale development program on a weapons system basis. One of the key outputs of the project was a set of recommendations along the line of research and development that would be required in specific gray areas, where feasibility might have been questionable, to achieve this capability for the time period.

Now, when the reports were received from contractors, the Air Force organized a team of experts in-house, chaired by the Rome Air Development Center since they were prime on the job, to review these final reports and prepare a comprehensive set of conclusions, recommendations, and findings on the Air Force part, and submit this document back through channels, through the Headquarters, Electronics Systems Division, thence to the Systems Command, and thence to Headquarters, U.S. Air Force.

Mr. HÉBERT. Why couldn't this group to whom you refer which reviewed these reports—why could it not have originated and conducted the studr?

Mr. Segal. The elements of the group were made up of people from all over the Research and Development Command, and it would have been very difficult to acquire the various disciplines that were required on a full-time basis, say for 9 months, which these contractors were able to do. But on a 3-week evaluation temporary basis we were able to obtain these various people and experts.

Mr. SANDWEG. Then this basically was a cost differential?

Mr. SEGAL. Cost effectiveness was a very interesting portion of the study, yes.

Mr. SANDWEG. It was not lack of capability within the Air Force ? Mr. SEGAL. I wouldn't necessarily say that, sir, no.

The capability does exist in-house, but maybe one can't obtain it altogether at the same time on the same day it is needed for a long continued period of 9 months.

Mr. SANDWEG. Is that considered at the time a contract like this is let out, when it is sent up for review?

Mr. Segal. I am not quite sure.
Maybe Mr. Meyer could possibly answer that question.

Mr. MEYER. Well, it is not generally considered during the contractual handling of the requirement.

But I am sure it was considered during the conceptual phase.

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Mr. SEGAL. Yes.

When we initiate action for a procurement, this thought has gone through our mind, that the reason we are going out of house is because of this particular problem, sir.

Mr. MEYER. At Rome Air Development Center I know there is a special group of technical people that do get together before they initiate a requirement to procurement.

Mr. SEGAL. There is.

Mr. MEYER. To consider the possibilities of doing it inhouse other ways.

Nr. SEGAL. This is shared by the technical director of the Rome Air Development Center.

Mr. HLÉBERT. The next one, Mr. Sandweg.

Mr. COURTNEY: May I have one question for the record from Colonel Riemondy, on his presentation from yesterday?

Whether or not the cyclic arrangement you have worked out, the 5-year cycle, can be accomplished within the limits of your manpower resources ?

Colonel RIEMONDY. The plan which I showed the committee yesterday can be accomplished within the manpower which we expect to have on board.

Mr. COURTNEY. That is right.
Colonel RIEMONDY. For the next 5 years.

Mr. COURTNEY. So there is no question of manpower ceilings or additions or subtractions involved?

Colonel RIEMONDY. That is correct.
Mr. COURTNEY. That is all I have.
Mr. SANDWEG. That is all.

Mr. HÉBERT. Well, thank you, Mr. Secretary, and gentlemen who have appeared. We appreciated your appearance.

The committee will stand in recess until 2 o'clock, at which time General Trudeau will be here representing the Army to close out the Army phase.

Thank you, gentlemen, very much.
Secretary IMIRIE. Thank you, sir.

(Whereupon, at 12:15 p.m., the subcommittee recessed, to reconvene at 2 p.m. of the same day.)

AFTERNOON SESSION

(The subcommittee for Special Investigations reconvened at 2 p.m.) Mr. HÉBERT. The committee will be in order. Mr. Courtney.

Mr. COURTNEY. Mr. Chairman, we have for discussion this afternoon the research and development contracts, or at least a selected few of them, as to which the committee had some questions.

Mr. Sandweg has a list and so has the Department of the Army, and I would presume we would be ready to speak to them now.

General Trudeau is the head of research and development now. Aren't you, General Trudeau ?

General TRUDEAU. That is correct.

Mr. COURTNEY. You can parcel out the answer yourself, or parcel out the subject as the contracts would indicate. I think you have the same number in order that we have, General.

General TRUDEAT. I believe so.

Mr. HÉBERT. General, for the record, let me on behalf of the committee welcome you.

General Trudeat. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. HÉBERT. This is your first opportunity to sit in the electric chair, whether we pull the current or not. We of course know you favorably and well in the full committee, and I have the pleasure of personal acquaintance with you.

General Trudeat. It is a mutual pleasure, Jr. Chairman.
Mr. HÉBERT. Particularly in New Orleans.
General TRUDEAU. It is a mutual pleasure.

Mr. SaxDWEG. We will begin where we left off with the contract CEIR, to design and develop and build a war game.

(The description of the contract is as follows:) Type of effort: Feasibility study Contractor: CEIR, Inc. (formerly General Analysis Corp), Research Center, 11753 Wiltshire, Los Angeles 25, Calif.

Contract No.: DA36-039-sc-80004.
Date of award : March 31, 1958.
Cost of contract: $1,419,868; partially funded in amount of $962,913.
Completion date: March 31, 1963.

Subject matter: Services to conduct a study for period of 60 months beginning April 1, 1958, and ending March 31, 1963.

The primary objective is the development of a war game specifically designed to aid the study, analysis, development, and synthesis of combat systems of particular interest to the Signal Corps. Such systems include communications systems, electronic warfare systems, battle area surveillance systems, and automatic data processing systems.

In addition to the general purpose war game there shall be developed a variety of modifications of the game especially suitable for particular applications of the game.

The game shall be comprehensive in that it will take full account of the various interactions of signal systems with combat elements. It shall be capable of measuring the contribution of signal systems to combat effectiveness.

The game shall be mechanized, using suitable computing and analog equipment so that it can be played rapidly.

The ruleg shall use terms familiar to military personnel and shall be sufficiently clear and simple that the game can be played with little or no special training.

Recommendation or suggestion and to whom made: Contract approximately 60 percent completed. No recommendation or suggestions submitted to date.

Acceptance or rejection of recommendation or suggestion and why: Not applicable.

Mr. HÉBERT. Read the title to the general, Mr. Sandweg.
Mr. SANDWEG. All right.

This is a contract with C-E-I-R, Inc., formerly General Analysis Corp., of Los Angeles, Calif., contract DA36-039-SC-8004, awarded March 31, 1958, in the amount of $1,419,868. It has been partially funded in the amount of $962,943, with completion date on or about March 31, 1953.

The subject matter of the contract was to provide services to conduct a study for the period of 60 months, and the primary objective is the development of a war game specifically designed to aid the study, analysis, development, and synthesis of combat systems of particular interest to the Signal Corps.

Could you take it from there, General, and tell us just what this contract is all about, why was it necessary that this be contracted out, the method by which it was contracted out, and the authority for this contract.

General TRUDEAU. I will call upon the repersentative of the Signal Corps to make a presentation.

Mr. SANDWEG. Would each of the witnesses identify themselves for the reported by full name and title, please.

Colonel Johnson. I am Col. J. W. Johnson, Chief, Research and Development Division, Office of the Chief Signal Officer.

Major BEAM. Maj. W. M. Beam, Office of the Chief Signal Officer, Research and Development Division.

Colonel JOHNSON. If I may, I wouold like to explain briefly that this particular study is to set up a method by which we in the Signal Corps can apply to war games situations, communications systems and electronics systems that are necessary for the support of the tactical army in the field.

This is a very complex problem in the sense that a communications network will react or operate with one organizational grouping in one environment in one way; if you change either the organization itself, or the enviornment in which it operates, it reacts in a totally different way

With the increase in the dependence of the Army upon electronic devices, we felt it essential that we have a method by which we could predetermine, if you will, what this reaction interoperation might be.

think the best way of summarizing this is to mention that at the end of World War II the Army in the field had approximately 30,000 to 35,000 radiating devices, either communications devices, radars, but radiating devices using frequencies.

At the present time in our organization of tables and equipment we are authorized 75,000 radiating devices so we feel this play and interplay of the systems is extremely critical to our capability to provide command control and to insure the effective operation of our electronic systems.

Major Beam is the project officer on this particular contract and can give the committee any specific information that it may desire.

Mr. HÉBERT. Well, the committee is interested in this: Why is it necessary to hire out to a civilian something that the military is trained to do?

Major BEAM. Basically the reason that we have taken this action with regard to this specific contract is that the Army does not possess the technical capability to do this particular job.

Mr. NORBLAD. Of war games?
Major Beam. No, sir; not of war games.

The document which was read into the record specifies that this is a war game, but it is a different type of war game from that with which the military is usually concerned.

Mr. COURTNEY. In what way?

Major BEAM. Normally a war game is a matter of opposing tactics, that is what we normally fight in a war game. In this particular war game, our objective is to compare communications systems or electronic warfare systems and other complex communications devices within the field army.

Mr. COURTNEY. You had better elaborate, because it sounds like these people were selected to determine the posture of the troops— this just says to develop games, this involves troops, their deployment and movements.

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