So they finally settled on Frank L. Leerburger after they had explored the Air Training Command at Randolph Field, to get this rate specialist to do this work. And the Air Force still wanted the third, disinterested party, and not Air Force people. So the result was Leerburger was employed at $9,000, instead of the $9,750, on authority from AFSC, reviewed by AFSC and approved. Mr. COURTNEY. Mr. Duncan, is this any more than a personal service contract? How does this come under the category of research and development? Secretary IMIRIE. It doesn't. Mr. COURTNEY. Doesn't it? Mr. DUNCAN. Not a research and development contract, as such, sir. Mr. COURTNEY. Well, what is it? It is a service contract, isn't it? Mr. DUNCAN. It is a consulting engineering-personal service. . Mr. MORRILL. Yes. Mr. COURTNEY. And the authority to enter into this contract is delegated out to where? Mr. DUNCAN. It is delegated to the command. Mr. COURTNEY. To the command. Mr. DUNCAN. At AFSC. Mr. COURTNEY. AFSC. Secretary IMIRIE. Systems Command. Mr. COURTNEY. And would this come within the $100,000 limitation? Secretary IMIRIE. This value was $9,000. Mr. COURTNEY. No. I understand. But does it come within the $100,000 ceiling? Is this the governing Secretary IMIRIE. This follows the procurement rules. Mr. COURTNEY. That is right. Secretary IMIRIE. As against the research. Mr. COURTNEY. As against the research. Mr. HÉBERT. Do you have the next one, now, Mr. Sandweg? Mr. SANDWEG. Let's revert back to the contract with the American Institute for Research, of Washington, D.C. Air Force Contract 01 (600) 2611, in the amount of $37,150. Subject matter of the contract was "Data and analysis to systematically evaluate efforts of AFROTC curriculum." And the results were a report, the nature of which we don't know? Secretary IMIRIE. Dr. Kenneth Groves, who is Chief of the Evaluation Service of the Air University, is here to speak to that point. Dr. GROVES. This program is part of an overall evaluation program of our AFROTC 4-year curriculum. That, in turn, is part of an overall evaluation program of the entire Air University, which is the officer education center of the Air Force. This contract is part of what is left over after we have done everything that we can with our own resources. It produces recommedations for changes in our instructional techniques, recommendations for changes in our textbooks, recommendations that can be used in placement of appropriate staff members in the proper detachment roughout the country. The program was conceived in 1954. We never got it off the ground until about 1956. At that point we did everything we could with our own resources for about 2 years. And other programs came in, such as our extension course program, which raised the requirements that were placed upon the command." Therefore, about 1959, we began to contract out certain portions of the entire evaluation program. This $37,100 was the amount that was spent in 1959. Mr. SANDWEG. Well, what particular capability does the American Institute for Research have that the Air Force itself didn't have to warrant this contract? Dr. GROVES. In quality they have a greater number of professional people than we do. Actually, the whole evaluation program of ROTC was conducted by one man and one sergeant, for about 4 years. And they did surprisingly well. My office at the headquarters of the command helped them for a number of years, and our own data processing center helped us. But our equipment and the number of professional personnel that we had to do this job was simply too limited. You can't do this kind of a job with one man. Mr. COURTNEY. Does this have anything to do with accreditation— those studies? Dr. GROVES. No, sir; not in this contract at all. All it does is tell us what the cadets learn, what kind of effect did we have on them over the 4-year period, are they going to stay with us for a career in the Air Force later on. We check them after they get out to see did they learn what we wanted them to learn, so that they are successful in the early years of their career. Mr. COURTNEY. Is this a questionnaire proposition? Dr. GROVES. It is construction of comprehensive examinations. I think this particular contract called for the construction of 1,000 test questions covering a 4-year curriculum period. Mr. COURTNEY. Which was circulated among the Dr. GROVES. Yes. It was administered in 180 detachments in colleges and universities throughout the country. Mr. SANDWEG. Was it decided to contract this out because of lack of capability within the Air Force, or lack of manpower? Dr. GROVES. Lack of equipment. Not enough professional manpower and programers at that particular time. We have been in the process of converting our electronic data processing equipment since about 1958. We inherited a Univac I from the Air Force which helped our situation some. This is being used primarily for Extension Course Institute, which has over 300,000 airmen and officers enrolled throughout the Air Force. Mr. HÉBERT. Does this have anything to do with the curriculums of the Air Academy? Dr. GROVES. No, sir: nothing. Mr. HÉBERT. This does not affect the Air Academy? Dr. GROVES. No, except as some of our findings might be applicable to the Air Academy. Mr. HÉBERT. This only relates to the ROTC? Dr. GROVES. Yes, sir. Mr. HÉBERT. Mr. Secretary, the Air Force doesn't have a contract like West Point does, to find out how to get finer talents into the Air Academy. Secretary IMIRIE. No, sir. Dr. GROVES. No, sir. Mr. HÉBERT. You are satisfied with your talent? Secretary IMIRIE. Yes, sir. Mr. HÉBERT. It seems like West Pointers are the only ones not satisfied, that they are not getting the best. We spent $40,000 to find out we have to attract better young men to West Point. Dr. GROVES. No, sir. We are satisfied. Mr. COURTNEY. A better grade of men. Mr. HÉBERT. A better grade of men, a finer grade-I forget what the expression was. Mr. HARDY. In connection with this contract, Doctor, couldn't you have employed people to conduct this survey with just as much competence as you are contracted for? It sort of surprises me that the Air University Dr. GROVES. The man we lost-the man who developed and designed the contract we lost only a year ago. We have been trying, shaking the bushes to find somebody ever since. Mr. HÉBERT. I think it is interesting here, and well to point out, that during the conflict-of-interest investigation, this committee expended itself to the extent of two young lawyers to do that job, and I think they did a very fine job. And what did it cost us? Two months' salary for each one, I think, Mr. Courtney? Mr. COURTNEY. Well, summer salaries. Mr. HÉBERT. Summer salaries. It didn't cost us anything like $37,000 to find that out. I would like to have that kind of money to operate this committee. We would probably be in hearing afternoons, mornings, afternoons, mornings, and nights. Mr. NORBLAD. We are, Mr. Chairman. Mr. HÉBERT. That is what amazes us. Dr. GROVES. It is a very large program, sir. In the whole area of evaluation, it is about the only money that we spent outside. I guess our overall evaluation program involves close to half a million people, in courses that go from a few weeks to a year in length. It is a large operation. Frankly, my personal opinion is we are operating it in this particular aspect of it-we are operating on a bare minimum level. Mr. HÉBERT. We can understand that. The next one, Mr. Sandweg. Mr. SANDWEG. We have two others that we might consider together, since they seem to be the same type of contract. They are Air Force contracts AF 30 (602) 2109, and AF 30 (602) 2206. They are identical contracts, one with the United Aircraft Corp., Missile and Space Systems Division, for a total valuation of $170,812, half of which cost was paid by the contractor. The other with the Martin Co., in the amount of $54,000. The description of the contract was Study to determine the feasibility of defending small hardened targets, such as ICBM launch sites, against an enemy missile threat. Both contractors apparently came out with the results identically the same, which were as follows: Technically it is feasible to defend small hardened targets; economically, it may or may not be feasible, depending on the size of the target. (The contracts data not read is as follows:) AIR FORCE EFFORTS CONTRACTS CONTRACT NO. AF 30 (602)-2109 Contractor: United Aircraft Corp., Missile and Space Systems Division. Value: $170,812 (cost shared).1 Description: Study to determine feasibility of defending small hardened targets such as ICBM launch sites against an enemy missile threat. Results: Technically it is feasible to defend small hardened targets; economically, it may or may not be feasible depending on size of target. CONTRACT NO. AF 30 (602)-2206 Contractor: The Martin Co. Value: $54,000. Description: Study to determine feasibility of defending small hardened targets such as ICBM launch sites against an enemy missile threat. Results: Technically it is feasible to defend small hardened targets; economically, it may or may not be feasible depending on size of target. Consider above two together. Mr. SANDWEG. Could we speak to those, Mr. Secretary? Secretary IMRIE. Yes, Mr. Jack Segal, on my right, from the Headquarters of the Electronic Systems Division of our Systems Command is here, as well-from the technical part of the problem, Mr. Charles Meyer is again back on the procurement side. Now I have one word of caution on this one. I believe that Mr. Segal can cover this with unclassified material-to give you a general idea of the thing. If it must be pursued, I would like to recommend we go into executive session, because of the classified parts of it. Mr. HÉBERT. We won't touch on that, Mr. Sandweg. Mr. SANDWEG. All right. Let's refer to the results of both contracts, in which it gives what seems to be a very obvious answer. "Technically it is feasible. Economically it may or may not be." It seems rather obvious an answer. It seems like a lot of money to have been spent to get that kind of an answer. Mr. SEGAL. Yes, sir. Mr. Chairman and Committee members, industry was approached on this particular problem after a new concept for ballistic missile defense was generated with inhouse capability at the Rome Air Development Center. Industry was approached to study the concept as we had presented it to them, to provide approaches to the achievement of this particular system capability in a time period which we requested them to study, and to trade off the various system elements that were involved in this particular concept against the various costs involved. Namely, for varying degrees of technical 1 One-half this cost was paid by the contractor. effectiveness for each particular element one could expand varying amounts of dollars and hopefully achieve an optimum situation. The reason that there was more than one contractor involved was simply because we felt we would like to have as many approaches to the solution as possible. Mr. COURTNEY. Was the contractor evaluating his own product for combat effectiveness? Mr. SEGAL. No, sir. Secretary IMIRIE. You are referring to Martin, I presume? Mr. SEGAL. It turns out in the case of the Martin Co. that a piece of the system, the overall system, was a piece of hardware which they are themselves in production on, and a modification thereof. Thereby incurring a great cost savings, rather than developing a whole new item. As a result of the study, the Air Force was provided with the necessary groundwork for launching a large-scale development program on a weapons system basis. One of the key outputs of the project was a set of recommendations along the line of research and development that would be required in specific gray areas, where feasibility might have been questionable, to achieve this capability for the time period. Now, when the reports were received from contractors, the Air Force organized a team of experts in-house, chaired by the Rome Air Development Center since they were prime on the job, to review these final reports and prepare a comprehensive set of conclusions, recommendations, and findings on the Air Force part, and submit this document back through channels, through the Headquarters, Electronics Systems Division, thence to the Systems Command, and thence to Headquarters, U.S. Air Force. Mr. HÉBERT. Why couldn't this group to whom you refer which reviewed these reports-why could it not have originated and conducted the study? Mr. SEGAL. The elements of the group were made up of people from all over the Research and Development Command, and it would have been very difficult to acquire the various disciplines that were required on a full-time basis, say for 9 months, which these contractors were able to do. But on a 3-week evaluation temporary basis we were able to obtain these various people and experts. Mr. SANDWEG. Then this basically was a cost differential? Mr. SEGAL. Cost effectiveness was a very interesting portion of the study, yes. Mr. SANDWEG. It was not lack of capability within the Air Force? Mr. SEGAL. I wouldn't necessarily say that, sir, no. The capability does exist in-house, but maybe one can't obtain it altogether at the same time on the same day it is needed for a long continued period of 9 months. Mr. SANDWEG. Is that considered at the time a contract like this is let out, when it is sent up for review? Mr. SEGAL. I am not quite sure. Maybe Mr. Meyer could possibly answer that question. Mr. MEYER. Well, it is not generally considered during the contractual handling of the requirement. But I am sure it was considered during the conceptual phase. |