Mental Causation: A Counterfactual TheoryOur minds have physical effects. This happens, for instance, when we move our bodies when we act. How is this possible? Thomas Kroedel defends an account of mental causation in terms of difference-making: if our minds had been different, the physical world would have been different; therefore, the mind causes events in the physical world. His account not only explains how the mind has physical effects at all, but solves the exclusion problem - the problem of how those effects can have both mental and physical causes. It is also unprecedented in scope, because it is available to dualists about the mind as well as physicalists, drawing on traditional views of causation as well as on the latest developments in the field of causal modelling. It will be of interest to a range of readers in philosophy of mind and philosophy of science. This book is also available as Open Access. |
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actual values actual world antecedent argument aspirin assume assumption background conditions c-fibre firing causal graph causal modelling theories causal relation causation in terms claim closest worlds condition for causation counterfactual conditionals counterfactual dependence default value Descartes difference-making distinct double prevention dualists electrocution epiphenomenalism equations example exclusion problem firing c-fibres firing squad follows formulate fragile given Hammerfest hand’s Hitchcock hold identical inference instance instantiated ladder laws of nature Leibniz Lewis M-instance mental causation mental events mental properties metaphysically dependent minimally sufficient miracles approach model MC muscle contraction necessitates neuron nomological non-causal non-reductive physicalism non-reductive physicalists occurred off-path variables opacity opacity-instance overdetermination P*-instance physical causes physical effects physical properties physical quantity principle about causation psychophysical laws Ptotal realizer of headaches reductive physicalism represent Section seems strong Kimian account strong supervenience strongly supervene sufficient causes sufficient condition super-nomological dualism supervene on physical total realizer transference views true vacuous truth