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of the Longshoremen's and Harborworkers' Compensition Act to the bases acquired since January 1, 1940, and to Guantanamo Bay.16 When one reads the comprehensive definition of the reach the the Fair Labor Standards Act, it is difficult to formulate a boundary to its coverage short of areas over which the power of Congress extends, by our sovereignty or by voluntary grant of the authority by the sovereign lessor to legislate upon maximum hours and minimum wages. Under the terms of the lease, we feel sure that the house of assembly of Bermuda would not also undertake legislation similar to our Fair Labor Standards Act to control labor relations on the base. Since citizens of this country would be numerous among employees on the bases, the natural legislative impulse would be to give these employees the same protection that was given those similarly employed on the islands of the Pacific.

Under subdivisions 2 and 3, supra, we have pointed out that the power rests in Congress under our Constitution and the provisions of the lease to regulate labor relations on the base. We have also pointed out that it is a matter of statutory interpretation as to whether or not statutes are effective beyond the limits of national sovereignty. It depends upon the purpose of the statute. Where as here the purpose is to regulate labor relations in an area vital to our national life, it seems reasonable to interpret its provisions to have force where the nation has sole power, rather than to limit the coverage to sovereignty. Such an interpretation is consonant with the Administration with the Administrator's inclusion of the Panama Canal Zone within the meaning of "possession."

We think these facts indicate an intention on the part of Congress in its use of the word "possessions" to have the Act apply to employer-employee relationship on foreign territory under lease for bases. Such a construction seems to us to carry out the remedial enactment in accord with the purpose of Congress. Affirmed.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

No. 22.-OCTOBER TERM, 1948.

Vermilya-Brown Company, Inc., Necaro Company,)
Inc., et al., Petitioners,

v.

John Joseph Connell, Eugene T. Fitzpatrick, William L. Flanagan, et al.

[December 6, 1948.]

MR. JUSTICE JACKSON, dissenting.

On Writ of Certiorari to the
United States Court of
Appeals for the Second
Circuit.

The serious question in this case is not as to the meaning of the Fair Labor Standards Act. It means just what it says when it provides that it shall apply in any Territory or possession of the United States and I would apply it to every foot of soil that, up to the time of this decision, has been regarded as our possession.

The real issue here, and it is a novel one, is whether this Court will construe the lease under which the United States occupies a military base in Bermuda as adding it to our possessions. The labor for which overtime under the Act is sought was performed for a government contractor on this military base. The base did not exist when the Act was passed and it does not either expressly or impliedly purport to cover work in that area, unless the word "possession" shall be construed to include the leased lands. Whether it is appropriate or permissible to hold as matter of law that our tenure there constitutes the lease

16 Defense Base Act, 56 Stat. 1035, 42 U. S. C. 1651 (1942). This act extends the coverage of the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act to "any employee engaged in any employment—

(1) at any military, air, or naval base acquired after January 1, 1940, by the Uinted States from any foreign government; or

"(2) upon any lands occupied or used by the United States for military or naval purposes in any Territory or possession outside the continental United States (including Alaska; the Philippine Islands; the United States Naval Operating Base, Guantanamo Bay, Cuba; and the Canal Zone);

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This extension was necessary because of the prior limited language of the Act which covered injuries "occurring upon the navigable waters of the United States," the term "United States" being defined to mean "the several States and Territories and the District of Columbia, including the territorial waters thereof." 44 Stat. 1424, 33 U. S. C. §§ 902, 903.

It will be noted that Guantanamo Bay and the Canal Zone were included in the lists as "possessions."

hold area a possession obviously turns on a reading of the lease from Great Britain.

The Court of Appeals read the lease to give "sweeping powers" to the United States and declared that "the areas are subject to fully as complete control by the United States as obtains in other areas long known as 'possessions' of the United States." It names as comparable possessions Alaska, Hawaii, Puerto Riso, Guam, Samoan Islands, Virgin Islands, and the Canal Zone. This Court seems to approve that premise because it affirms, citing some if not all of the same examples; but it also says, “*** it is difficult to formulate a boundary to its [the Act's] coverage, short of areas over which the power of Congress extends to legislate upon maximum hours and minimum wages.'

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Thus application of the Act to the leased area is put on two grounds: first, that the area is a possession of the United States; and second, since the Act applies to those "engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce," it operates wherever Congress has power to act with respect to commerce. Presumably the Court will not shrink from applying the converse of the latter proposition; that the Act does not apply where this country or its nationals are not engaged in commerce.

Bermuda and like bases are not, in my opinion, our possessions on a juridical and geopolitical footing with the possessions enumerated. I also believe that there is not and under the lease there can not be in the leased area any "commerce" subject to the Act.

To consider the bases as possessions in that sense is incompatible with the spirit of the negotiations and with the letter of the lease by which the bases were acquired. It enlarges the responsibilities which the United States was willing to accept and the privileges which Great Britain was willing to concede. This will appear from the history of the transaction whose meaning we interpret. When organized resistance in the Low Countries and in France went down and the German Wehrmacht stood poised on Europe's Atlantic seaboard, it was suspected, as it since has been proved, that the design for conquest embraced seizure of Atlantic islands as a pathway for future operations against the United States.3 Disasters on land and sea had brought threat of invasion of the British Isles nearer to reality than at any time since the Spanish Armada. Consequently, Great Britain could divert no forces to the defense of her island possessions in our hemisphere, which after all were strategic spots to assail our commerce and stepping stones to our gateways.* Great Britain, however, desperately in need of destroyers to defend her shores, intimated a readiness to put the United States in a position to defend these islands and the Americas as a quid pro quo for overaged American destroyers."

Among those who saw in the development of air warfare a necessity for moving our air defense outposts seaward from the cities which dot our own shores, an influential and respected group favored asking England to cede her island possessions in this hemisphere to us as an outright transfer of sov

1 This is the more striking because it is said concerning an Act which we have held does not, even in Continental United States, exercise or purport to exercise the full scope of the commerce power. See, e. g., McLeod v. Threlkeld, 319 U. S. 491, 493; Kirshbaum Co. v. Walling, 316 U. S. 517.

2 Section 6 of the Act requires every employer (as defined therein) to pay the prescribed rates to each employee who is "engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce"; and 87 forbids overtime employment, except at prescribed rates, of any employee who is "engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for commerce." U. S. C. §§ 206, 207.

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3 On October 29, 1940, Major (General Staff) Freiherr von Falkenstein, from the Fuehrer's headquarters, wrote a secret "resumé of the military questions current here." The 5th item thereof reads:

"The Fuehrer is at present occupied with the question of the occupation of the Atlantic Islands with a view to the prosecution of war against America at a later date. Deliberations on this subject are being embarked upon here. Essential conditions are at the present:

"a. No other operational commitment,

"b. Portuguese neutrality.

"c. Support of France and Spain.

"A brief assessment of the possibility of seizing and holding air bases and of the question of supply is needed from the GAF."

3 Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression (GPO 1946), p. 289; 3 Trial of Major War Criminals (GPO 1947), 389, document No. 376-PS received in evidence Dec. 10, 1945; see Nazi Conspiracy and Aggression: Opinion and Judgment (GPO 1947), p. 45.

4 "I understand that in the view of the American technical authorities modern conditions of war, especially air war, require forestalling action, in this case especially in order to prevent the acquisition by Hitler of jumping-off grounds from which it would be possible, bound by bound, to come to close quarters with the American Continent." Mr. Churchill to House of Commons, July 9, 1941. Churchill, "The Unrelenting Struggle," pp. 175–176. 5 Stimson, "On Active Service," Vol. II, pp. 356–358.

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ereignty. If this cession had been asked and granted, the Court would now rightly hold the bases to be our "possessions." But it was President Roosevelt himself who determined for this country that it was the part of wisdom neither to seek nor to accept sovereignty or supreme authority over any part of these islands. He decided that it was in our self-interest to limit the responsibilities of the United States strictly to establishment, maintenance and operation of military, naval and air installations. His reasons have been partially disclosed and one of them, apparent to anyone even casually travelled in those islands, was the great disparity of social, economic and labor conditions between the islands and our Continent. Also he knew full well the different customs and institutions prevailing there, particularly the relations between the white, colored and native races, and the difficulty of assimilating them into the American pattern-a prospect that would arouse emotional tensions in this country as well as in the Islands and which indeed caused some anxiety even in Westminster." Thus it was settled American policy, grounded, as I think, on the highest wisdom, that, whatever technical form the transaction should take, we should acquire no such responsibilities as would require us to import to those islands our laws, institutions and social conditions beyond the necessities of controlling a military base and its garrison, dependents and incidental personnel.

Knowledge of that policy and purpose gives a measure of the novel and dubious grounds for the Court's present determination to put these bases upon the legislative and juridical footing of "Territories and possessions." It is a first step in the direction of the very imprudence that was sought to be avoided by the limited tenure devised for the bases.

But if American interests neither require nor admit of the assumption that the bases have become our possessions, the bounds of the grant as understood and expressed by Great Britain deny it with even more compelling force. The confined character of the granted privileges and their incompatibility with either sovereignty or proprietorship on our part appear from the letter of the Marquess of Lothian to Secretary Hull of September 2, 1940, which committed the United Kingdom to grant to the United States "the lease for immediate establishment and use of Naval and Air bases and facilities for entrance thereto and the operation and protection thereof," on the Great Bay of Bermuda. All of the specific provisions of the formal lease were subsidiary to and within the general measure of the rights yielded. It comprehended all that it was intended to bestow and all that we intended to take. Its dimensions were well defined by Mr. Stimson as "the right to fortify and defend." "

Details of the formal lease do but emphasize the common purpose of Great Britain to so confine the concession and that of President Roosevelt to so circumscribe our responsibilities. The leasehold right of the United States, in war time or emergency, to conduct military operations on land, water or in the air, which was the heart of the matter for us, is without bounds or restrictions except for a pledge of good neighborliness and friendly cooperation in their exercise. The leasehold terms, however, are well chosen, carefully to deny every commercial and political right to the United States except as they are incidental and appurtenant to this primary military usufruct. American nationals cannot go there for any purpose other than governmental except in conformity to Bermudian laws. Its immigration laws are relaxed only to admit "any member of the United States forces posted to a leased area" and "any person (not being a national of a Power at war with His Majesty the King) employed by, or under, a contract with the Government of the United States in connection with the construction, maintenance, operation or defense of the Bases." Even so, the lessee must submit to measures to identify such persons and to establish their status. In what formerly recognized possession of the United States mentioned by the Court is American citizens' privilege of ingress and egress, of transit and of residence, so limited?

Hull, "Memoirs," p. 834; Stimson, "On Active Service," Vol. II, pp. 356-358. The former points out of the President that "He also knew the penurious condition of the native populations of most of the Islands, and consequently did not want to assume the burden of administering those populations. Therefore he had changed, during my absence from Washington, from his original idea of outright purchase of the bases to that of ninety-nine-year leases. I had originally favored outright cession, but was willing to agree to leases instead.' P. 834.

See Parliamentary Debate, Commons, Vol. 370, p. 255, et seq., and Vol. 376, p. 567, et seq. 855 Stat. 1560, 1572; Executive Agreement Series 235, Department of State (GPO 1942), pp. 14-15. Stimson, "On Active Service," Vol. II, p. 356.

Private trade and commerce by our citizens likewise is wholly in control of the Colony and is no more dependent upon our laws than in any other part of the United Kingdom or any foreign country. Bermudian customs duties are waived only on material for construction and maintenance of our bases, for consumption by our garrisons and supporting personnel, and on their household goods; and we undertake to prevent abuse of this customs privilege and to prevent resale of such imports. This is not greater than the immunity allowed by every foreign country to our diplomatic corps and staffs, and the power reserved by Britain over imports and customs is wholly inconsistent with the concept that these are our possessions.

The lease also expressly and unconditionally provides that no business can be established in the leased area and that no person shall habitually render any professional services except for the Government and its personnel. No wireless or submarine cable may be operated except for military purposes. Are such stifling restraints by another state consistent with the idea of our possession? Payment of local income and property taxes are only waived as against those in the area when they are members of our armed forces, employees engaged in our works or contractors with our Government. In short, no actual possession of the United States used by the Court as a standard of reference is so insulated from the United States in fiscal, social, economic, commercial and political affairs. In none is the commerce power of Congress so stripped of subject matter for regulation or our permissible range of activity so circumscribed.

Possessions such as Puerto Rico, Guam, the guano islands, Samoa and the Virgin Islands, which the Court mentions as standards for the treatment of Bermuda, are, in vital respects, as different from it as night from day. Not one of them is subject to even a frivolous claim adverse to our complete ownership. They belong to us or they belong to no one. They are ceded territory over which United States sovereignty is as complete and as unquestioned as over the District of Columbia and they are subject to no dual control or divided allegiance. They are incorporated into our economy, freely trading in our markets, and "protected" by our tariff walls. They are integrated with our social and, in some degree at least, with our political life as well; some of them being authorized to send delegates to our Congress.

On the other hand, however, Bermuda never has ceased in its entirety to be a Crown Colony of Great Britain. Social, industrial and labor conditions prevailing at the Island bases are such that both nations made every effort to insulate them from the damaging effects of our limited occupation for military purposes. It seems to me unsound policy as well as capricious statutory interpretation for the Court blindly to mingle them by imposing statutory policies that were not shaped with their existence or peculiarities in mind. It may be that, in some matters, the same policies suited to our legitimate possessions will also be considered adaptable to the bases. But it is not necessarily or presumptively so, and where the bases are to be brought into our scheme of things, it should be deliberately and consciously done by the Congress, in particular matters and with particular regard to local conditions,10 and perhaps after consultation with the United Kingdom or Colonial authorities. We should not by the process of judicial interpretation impose upon the bases not only the policies of

10 The following statutes use language expressly covering the leased bases or language which seems to imply that the statute will reach as far as there is power to make it reach :

I. Statutes which explicitly cover the leased bases:

55 Stat. 622, as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 1651 (1).

II. Statutes employing the phrase "places subject to the jurisdiction of the United States" or similarly sweeping language:

38 Stat. 270, as amended, 12 U. S. C. § 466; 58 Stat. 624, as amended, 10 U. S. C. Supp. I, § 1213: 56 Stat. 176, 15 U. S. C. § 606b-2 (a); 61 Stat. 512. 16 U. S. C. §776a (c); 40 Stat. 231, 18 U. S. C. § 39; 35 Stat. 1136, 18 U. S. C. § 387; 35 Stat. 1138, as amended, 18 U. S. C. § 396; 54 Stat. 1134, as amended, 18 U. S. C. § 396a; 49 Stat. 494, 18 U. S. C. 396b; 35 Stat. 1148, 18 U. S. C. § 511; 40 Stat. 559, as amended, 22 U. S. C. § 226; 42 Stat. 361, 22 U. S. C. § 409; 52 Stat. 631, as amended, 22 U. S. C. § 611 (m): 58 Stat. 643, 22 U. S. C. § 701; 32 Stat. 172, as amended, 46 U. S. C. § 95; Rev Stat. §4438a, as amended, 46 U. S. C. § 224a (6); 35 Stat. 1140, 46 U. S. C. § 1351; 40 Stat. 217, 219, as amended, 50 U. S. C. §§ 31, 37; 54 Stat. 1179, 50 U. S. C. App. § 512; 56 Stat. 177, as amended, 50 U. S. C. App. § 633 (4), (6): 56 Stat. 185, 50 U. S. C. App. § 643a; 58 Stat. 624, 50 U. S. C. App. § 177; 56 Stat. 390, 50 U. S. C. App. § 781; 60 Stat. 211, 50 U. S. C. App. § 1828 (c).

the Act before us but those of many Acts not involved here and as to which we are even less informed."1

Neither should we embark upon a couse of making the same naked words mean one thing in one Act and something else in another. It cannot be pretended that such an interpretation as the Court announces is in response to any demonstrable intention of Congress on the subject, for when this Act was passed the Bermuda base was not in being nor was it within the contemplation of even the more foresighted.

It should be enough to dispose of this matter to point out that the United States has no supreme authority or sovereign function in Bermuda, where every commercial activity is subject to control by another sovereign which is our political

The following tabulation of statutes whose coverage provisions are so similar to those being construed as to either be governed by today's decision or to require most sophisticated distinctions shows in what a network of legislation the Court is entangling the bases: I. Statutes employing the term "possessions,"

(a) in the phrase "States, Territories, and Possessions" or the like:

43 Stat. 1070, as amended, 2 U. S. C. § 241 (i); 42 Stat. 998, 7 U. S. C. § 3; 42 Stat. 159, 7 U. S. C. § 182 (6); 49 Stat. 731, 7 U. S. C. § 511 (i); 30 Stat. 544, as amended, 11 U. S. C. §1 (1); 48 Stat. 2, 12 U. S. C. § 202; 39 Stat. 601, as amended, 61 Stat. 786, 14 U. S. C. Supp. 1, § 29; 55 Stat. 11, 12, as amended, 14 U. S. C. Supp. I, §§ 302, 307; 48 Stat. 882, as amended, 15 U. S. C. § 78 (c) (16); 54 Stat. 790, 15 U. S. C. § 80a-2 (37); 44 Stat. 1406, 15 Ú. S. C. § 402 (c); 44 Stat. 1423, 15 U. S. C. § 431; 47 Stat. 8, as amended, 61 Stat. 202, 15 U. S. C. Supp. 1, § 607; 61 Stat. 515, 15 U. S. C. Supp. 1, $ 619; 52 Stat. 1250, as amended, 15 U. S. C. § 901 (2); 56 Stat. 1087, 18 U. S. C. 8420g (2); 42 Stat. 1486, 21 U. S. C. § 61 (b); 52 Stat. 1041, 21 U. S. C. § 321 (b); Int. Rev. Code §§ 22 (b), (4), 251, 252, 621 (a), (8), (B), 813 (b); 49 Stat. 1928, 27 U. S. C. § 222 (a); Title 28, U. S. C. § 411 (a); 61 Stat. 150, 29 U. S. C. Supp. 1, § 161 (2); 61 Stat. 85, 89, 29 U. S. C. Supp. 1, §§ 252 (d), 262 (e): 29 U. S. C. App. § 203.7; 55 Stat. 179, 30 U. S. C. § 40; 54 Stat. 1086, 31 U. S. C. §123; Rev. Stat. § 3646, as amended, 31 U. S. C., § 528 (c); 61 Stat. 787, 33 U. S. C. Supp 1, §§ 883a, 883b; 44 Stat. 900, as amended, 39 U. S. C. § 654 (c); 49 Stat. 2038, 41 U. S. C. § 39; 58 Stat. 682, as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 201 (b); 49 Stat. 624, as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 405 (d); 50 Stat. 888, 42 U. S. C. § 1402; 60 Stat. 775, 42 U. S. C. § 1818; 35 Stat. 65, 45 U. S. C. § 62; 52 Stat. 1107, as amended, 45 U. S. C. § 362; 45 Stat. 1492, as amended, 46 U. S. C. § 85; 49 Stat. 888, 46 U. S. C. § 88; Rev. Stat. § 4472, as amended, 46 U. S. C. § 170; Rev. Stat. $ 4370, 46 U. S. C. § 316 (a); 41 Stat. 996, as amended, 46 U. S. C. § 813; 39 Stat. 735, 46 U. S. C. §§ 819, 823, 826, 829; 40 Stat. 901, as amended, 46 U. S. C. § 835 (a), (d); 41 Stat. 998, 46 U. S. C. §§ 880, 882, 883; 41 Stat. 1003, 46 U. S. C. § 951; 29 Stat. 2017, 46 U. S. C. § 1244 (a), (b); 49 Stat. 1212, 46 U. S. C. $1312; 48 Stat. 1065, as amended, 47 U. S. C. § 153 (e), (g); 48 Stat. 1084, 47 U. S. C. § 308 (c); 48 Stat. 1087, 47 U. S. C. § 314; 44 Stat. 568, 572, 573, 49 U. S. C. §§ 171, 176 (c), 179; 52 Stat. 977, 984, 998, 49 U. S. C. §§ 401 (3), (21), (b), (29), (30), 425, 486; 40 Stat. 415, as amended, 50 U. S. C. App. § 5, 60 Stat. 50, as amended, 50 U. S. C. App. § 32 (a), (2), (B); 54 Stat. 890, as amended, 50 U. S. C. App. § 308, 61 Stat. 31, 32, 50 U. S. C. App. Supp. 1, §§ 324, 326 (a), (2), (3); 54 Stat. 859, as amended, 50 U. S. C. at § 403 (b), (A); 56 Stat. 777, 50 U. S. C. App. 8574; 59 Stat. 542, 50 U. S. C. App. 639 (a); 56 Stat. 182, as amended, 50 U. S. C. App. § 701; 55 Stat. 206, 50 U. S. C. App. 8702; 56 Stat. 461-62, 50 U. S. C. App. 88 791, 792, 793, 801; 56 Stat. 1041, 50 U. S. C. App. § 846, 56 Stat. 23, as amended, 50 U. S. C. App. § 901; 56 Stat. 245, as amended, 50 U. S. C. App. § 1191 (i); 57 Stat. 162, as amended, 50 U. S. C. App. § 1472 (a), (A);

(b) qualified, usually in a similar phase, by the word "island" or "insular":

54 Stat. 1137, 1139; 8 U. S. C. §§ 501 (e), 604; 59 Stat. 526, as amended, 12 U. S. C. Supp. 1, § 635; 38 Stat. 730, 15 U. S. C. § 12: 48 Stat. 74, as amended, 15 U. S. C. $77b (6); 61 Stat. 726, 16 U. S. C. Supp. 1, 758a; 56 Stat. 1046, 21 U. S. C. § 188d; 56 Stat. 1063, 22 U. S. C. § 672 (b); Int. Rev. Code §§ 2563, 2602, 2733 (g); 49 Stat. 2011, as amended, 46 U. S. C. § 1204; 46 Stat. 388, 50 U. S. C. § 137; 53 Stat. 812, 50 U. S. C. § 98f.

II. Statutes listed under heading I above, the application of which to the leased bases might cause conflict with Bermudian law :

42 Stat. 998, as amended, 7 U. S. C. § 3 (Commodity Exchange Act); 42 Stat. 159, 7 U. S. S. § 182 (6) (Packers and Stockyards Act, 1921); 49 Stat. 731, 7 U. S. C § 511 (1) (The Tobacco Inspection Act); 54 Stat. 1139, 8 U. S. C. § 604 (Nationality Act of 1940) 59 Stat. 526, as amended, 12 U. S. C. Supp. 1, § 635 (Export-Import Bank Act of 1945) 55 Stat. 11, 12, as amended, 14 U. S. C. Supp. 1, §§ 302, 307 (Coast Guard Reserve Act) 38 Stat. 730, 15 U. S. C. § 12 (Sherman Act); 42 Stat. 1486, 21 U. S. C. § 61 (b) (Filled Milk Act); 56 Stat. 1063, 22 U. S. C. § 672 (b) (Settlement of Mexican Claims Act); Int. Rev. Code §§ 22 (b), (4), 813 (b); 29 U. S. C. App. § 203.7 (Rules and Regulations implementing the National Labor Relations Act as amended by the Labor Management Relations Act); 49 Stat. 624, as amended, 42 U. S. C. § 405 (b) (Subpoena provision of the Federal Old-Age and Survivors Insurance Benefits Act); 50 Stat. 888, 42 U. S. C. § 1402 (Low Rent Housing Act); 60 Stat. 774, 42 U. S. C. § 1818 (Atomic Energy Act); 35 Stat. 65, 45 U. S. C. § 52 (Federal Employers' Liability Act): 52 Stat. 1107, as amended, 45 U. S. C. § 362 (Railroad Unemp. Ins. Act); Rev. Stat. § 4370, as amended, 46 U. S. C. § 316 (a) (Act for the Regulation of Vessels in Domestic Commerce); 41 Stat. 999, 46 U. S. C. § 883 (Merchant Marine Act, 1920); 49 Stat. 2017, 46 U. S. C. § 1244 (a) (Merchant Marine Act, 1936); 49 Stat. 1212, 46 U. S. C. § 1312 (Carriage of Goods by Sea Act); 48 Stat. 1065, 1084, 1087, as amended, 47 U. S. Č. §§ 153 (e) (g), 308 (c), 314 (Communications Act of 1934); 44 Stat. 568, 572, 573, as amended, 49 U. S. C. §§ 171, 176 (c), 179 (b) (Air Commerce Act of 1926); 52 Stat. 977, 49 U. S. C. § 401 (3), (21), (b), (29), (30) (Civil Aeronautics Act); 52 Stat. 998, 49 U. S. C. § 486 (same); 56 Stat. 182, 50 U. S. C. App. 8 640 (Amendment of Nationality Act of 1940); 55 Stat. 206, 50 U. S. C. App. § 702 (Importation Restriction Act); 56 Stat. 23, as amended, 50 U. S. C. App. § 901 (Emergency Price Control Act of 1942).

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