did not possess an authority for deciding questions of this nature, and a spiritual illumination, which few Christians of the present day, I should hope, would have the audacity to claim.

Does

Thus far I have considered it undecided what doctrines are fundamental; but admit, for a moment, that those which are assumed to be so are really so. it follow, that a man must know and receive them, and every one of them, or not be a Christian? Strictly speaking, a man is not a Christian because he understands and believes the doctrines which Jesus Christ taught, but because he acknowledges and confides in Jesus Christ as a teacher. If in any way a man could be brought to confide in Jesus Christ as a teacher come from God, from that moment he would be a Christian, though as yet he had not opened the New Testament, and did not know a syllable of its contents. When Martha said, 'Yea, Lord; I believe that thou art the Christ, the Son of God, which should come into the world;' and when Simon Peter said, 'We believe, and are sure, that thou art that Christ, the Son of the living God;' and when the Ethiopian Eunuch said, 'I believe that Jesus Christ is the Son of God;' all of them were, or from that moment became Christians, in the proper sense of that term as used at the present day, and were so regarded by the sacred writers. All of them from that moment became Christians, though as yet it only appeared, that they were prepared to receive the essential and fundamental doctrines of the gospel, and not that they already knew them, and had embraced them.

To be sure, when we come to consider the moral

effect of the doctrines of Christianity, this effect must be expected to be different according as our view of the doctrines is more or less just and perfect. In this respect certain doctrines may be said to be essential to the system itself, to make it what it is, as a dispensation of holiness. Nay, I would go farther than this, and say of every doctrine of Christianity, however minute and subordinate, that it is essential to the system itself, to make it precisely what it is, considered as a dispensation of holiness. When, therefore, certain doctrines are singled out, and treated as essential and fundamental doctrines of Christianity, it is only a loose and inaccurate mode of speaking; not meaning that they are the only doctrines essential to the system, for in this sense all the other doctrines are essential; nor yet that these doctrines are more essential than the rest, for this would be a solecism, essential not admitting of degrees; but merely that these doctrines are peculiarly important for their moral effect. We should be again and again reminded, however, that when we speak of essential doctrines, we mean essential to the system itself, and not that a belief in them is essential.

It is a belief in

the system as a system, that makes a man a Christian, and not a belief in these particular doctrines; though a belief in these particular doctrines may have a tendency to make him a better Christian.

Hence the fallacy of those Exclusionists, who think to justify themselves by saying, that as we differ in essentials and fundamentals, if they are Christians, we are not; and if we are Christians, they are not. For, though we do differ in essentials and fundamentals, it does not follow but that both parties may be Christians;

so that there may be an injustice in denying the name and privileges to either. It may be as in a civil war, growing out of a difference of opinion as to what is best calculated to promote the public weal; in which both parties, though opposed to one another in things essential and fundamental, profess to be patriots, and both parties may in fact be patriots. It may be proper, also, in this connexion, to expose the mistake of those, who argue that we have the same reason to question a man's right to the Christian name and privileges, for errors of doctrine, as for errors of life. A man does not cease to be a Christian merely because he has been guilty of immoralities; for in this case nobody would be a Christian, for there is none that doeth good, and sinneth not, no, not one. But a man's immoralities may be of such a kind, or to such a degree, as to bear heavily on the question of his sincerity and veracity. We wish to know whether a man really believes in Jesus Christ, as the Messiah; and in determining this point we have a right to consider, and indeed we cannot help considering, his actions, as well as his professions. A man's errors of life, therefore, may do what his errors of doctrine cannot. They may destroy all confidence in his assertions, and convince us that he does not believe what he says he believes; in other words, that he is not a Christian, but an impostor.

All this, however, it may be said, is very well to those who think so; but it can have no influence, and it ought to have none, on those who are otherwise minded. So long as the convictions of Exclusionists continue as they are, conscience will not permit them to pursue a different course. How can they conscientiously hold any

intercourse with a man as a Christian, when they do not believe him to be a Christian; especially since such conduct must have the effect to countenance him in holding and propagating doctrines, which they may not only regard as errors, but as fatal errors? Let their principles be ever so false, and their reasonings ever so inconclusive, still if they really believe that a man is not a Christian, must they not act on this belief, and treat him accordingly?

This argument seems to proceed on the assumption that if a man has an opinion on any subject, he is bound in conscience to act on it; but is this assumption well founded? On the contrary, if a man forms an opinion on any subject, is he not bound in conscience, before he acts on it, to consider whether he has weighed the evidence on both sides; whether his previous habits and studies have prepared him to decide the question; and above all, whether the question is one, which from its own nature, any man is competent to decide? Perhaps he cannot help holding his opinion, right or wrong; but he can help acting on it; and he is bound in conscience to do this, until he is convinced, that it relates to a question, which he is competent to decide, and is authorized to decide. Now, as it has been shown that the question whether a man is a Christian or not, is one which no man is competent to decide, or authorized to decide for another, it follows, that instead of being bound in conscience to act on an opinion formed on this subject, we are bound in conscience to refrain from acting. In short, the whole question resolves itself into this; is a fallible man bound in conscience to act as if he were infallible?

But certainly the Exclusionist thinks he is obeying

conscience, which is the same thing. The same thing with what? Even in a moral view, and as respects the individual himself, is it the same thing whether he really obeys conscience, or only mistakes his will for his conscience? Besides, we are not testing men, but measures. The question, therefore, is not, whether he thinks that conscience constrains him to pursue the course he has adopted; but whether he ought to think so, whether he has sufficient reason for thinking so, even on his own principles; and we have shown that he has not. I have no disposition to say of Exclusionists generally, that they are not sincere. Any man is sincere, who acts from an opinion which he really holds, however hastily formed, and however incompetent he may be to decide the question to which it relates. But when we come to speak of what conscience requires or forbids, I maintain that every man is bound by this principle, before he acts on any opinion to the injury of another, to consider and ascertain whether he is competent to decide the question at issue. If, therefore, hurried on by his passions or prejudices, he neglect to do this, I may still admit, that he is sincere; but I cannot sce, how he can be said to have consulted his conscience; and much less, that conscience lays a necessity on him to act in this manner. I repeat it, I have no disposition to call in question the sincerity of Exclusionists, nor is it necessary to the argument; though I must remark, in passing, that the protestations of the party concerned are not the best evidence of sincerity; and furthermore, that there is hardly any virtue, in regard to which men are more liable to self-deception.

Besides, what is there in this plea of conscience, or of