In thus regarding the marriage, and in holding that its effect was not to legalize the presence of the appellee in the United States, we think the court was undoubtedly correct. The man to whom she was married was a Chinese laborer, but just prior to the marriage he had made an application for a certificate of departure from the United States. He, being one of the prohibited class, was not privileged to have his wife in the United States, even if she could, under the circumstances, have lawfully contracted a marriage here. The trial court found that the appellee should be deported to China, whence she came, except for one thing; and that was that, in his opinion, her deportation would in fact be remanding her to a life. of perpetual slavery and degradation. The appellee has moved to dismiss the appeal on the ground that the sole question involved is the application of the thirteenth amendment to the Constitution of the United States, and that therefore the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court is exclusive. We do not see that the decision of the appeal involves the construction or application of the thirteenth amendment. There is no reference to a constitutional question in any of the pleadings in the case. It is true that the thirteenth amendment was adverted to in the opinion of the trial court, but we do not understand that it was made the ground of the decision. The true ground of the decision, from the language of the opinion, would appear to have been that compliance with the statute would be a barbarous proceeding, equivalent to remanding the appellee to perpetual slavery and degradation. The court said: "If sent back to her own country, where she was by her own kindred sold to a cruel master, she must abandon hope, and it is shocking to contemplate that the laws of our country require the court to use its process to accomplish such an unholy purpose." The court, arguendo, proceeded to observe that it was proper to consider that by the thirteenth amendment it is ordained that neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime, whereby the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States or any place subject to their jurisdiction, and said: "This article is a part of the supreme law of this land, whereby all branches of the government must be controlled," and that it was "a mandate from the highest authority, requiring the exercise of all the force necessary for the protection of the liberty of any and every individual whose right to liberty has not been forfeited by conviction of crime." The court said in conclusion: "The effort which the appellant has made to escape from thraldom and to rise from her condition of degradation entitles her to humane consideration, and, because I can see no other way in which to emancipate her from actual slavery, I direct that an order be entered vacating the order for her deportation." In so ruling the court did not, as we understand it, hold that the thirteenth amendment, prohibiting slavery within the United States or in any place subject to their jurisdiction, by its terms prohibited the deportation of the appellee; nor is it contended on this appeal that by virtue of an order of deportation her condition as a slave would be recognized, or that she would be sent into slavery at any place within the United States or within its jurisdiction. The case is one which, from its nature, enlists the sympathy of the court, and we regret that the law is so written that it does not permit us, as we view it, to yield to the humane considerations which actuated the court below. We see no escape from the conclusion that the judgment of the trial court must be reversed, and the appellee remanded to the country whence she came. It is so ordered. AYRES v. CONE et al. (Circuit Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit. May 1, 1905.) 1. BANKRUPTCY OBJECTIONS TO ALLOWANCE OF CLAIM-RES JUDICAta. 2. SAME-OBJECTIONS TO CLAIM BY OTHER CREDITORS-PROCEDURE. Creditors of a bankrupt who desire to contest the allowance of the claim of another creditor, as they may do as parties in interest under Bankr. Act July 1, 1898, c. 541, § 57d, 30 Stat. 560 [U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 3443], must file objections in their own behalf, and cannot become parties to the issue merely by formally adopting objections filed by the bankrupt; nor have they any standing to contest such claim on an appeal taken from the decision of the District Court by the trustee in which they did not join. Sanborn, Circuit Judge, dissenting. Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the District of South Dakota. C. O. Bailey (J. H. Voorhees, J. W. Boyce, and R. H. Warren, on the brief), for appellant. Hosmer H. Keith (Albert Keith, on the brief), for appellees. Before SANBORN, Circuit Judge, and PHILIPS and RINER, District Judges. RINER, District Judge. This was an appeal from an order made by the District Court for the District of South Dakota directing the referee in bankruptcy to allow a claim, the validity of which had been passed upon and allowed by the District Court in the proceedings wherein the appellant was adjudicated a bankrupt. On the 3d of March, 1904, a petition in involuntary bankruptcy was filed by F. S. Cone and W. H. Dryden, copartners under the firm name of Cone & Dryden, A. S. Chambers, and A. R. Priest, against W. J. Gentle, in which it was alleged that Gentle owed debts to the amount of $1,000 and more, and that the petitioners were creditors of Gentle, having provable claims amounting in the aggregate, in excess of securities held by them, to $500 and more. The petition then averred that $500 of the sum claimed by Cone & Dryden to be due to them was for money loaned or advanced by them to Gentle, and that the sum of $5,361 was an indebtedness growing out of a real estate transaction between Cone & Dryden. and Gentle, the petition setting out the facts in relation thereto. It was further averred that Gentle was insolvent, and had within four months next preceding the date of the filing of the petition committed an act of bankruptcy, in that, on the 13th day of January, 1904, he conveyed, transferred, concealed, and removed a stock of goods belonging to him, consisting of groceries, fixtures, book accounts, and other property, to one B. C. Mathews, who represented a portion of the creditors, and that Mathews took possession of the stock of goods, and was selling and disposing of the same for the purpose of paying a portion of the creditors of Gentle, with intent to prefer such creditors over other creditors. On the 11th of March, 1904, Gentle filed an answer to the petition in bankruptcy, in which he denied that he had committed the acts of bankruptcy alleged in the petition; denied that he was insolvent, and alleged that he should not be declared a bankrupt for any cause in the petition alleged; denied that he was indebted to Cone & Dryden, or either of them, in the sum of $500; denied all liability to Cone & Dryden by reason of the real estate transaction set out in the petition, because of certain other alleged transactions between Cone & Dryden and himself, which he sets out at length in his answer. To this answer the petitioning creditors filed a replication, and the matter came on for hearing before the District Judge upon the petition, answer, replication, and evidence, as shown by the stipulation of the parties found in the record, resulting in an order, entered on the 28th of March, declaring Gentle a bankrupt, and referring the matter to the referee to take such further proceedings therein as are required by the provisions of the bankruptcy act. Cone & Dryden presented their claims for the sum of $5,361 and for the sum of $500 to the referee for allowance. The allowance of each was objected to by the bankrupt, he filing written objections thereto, setting out substantially the matters theretofore averred in his answer to the petition. Four other creditors, not parties to the petition, attempted to join in the objections filed by the bankrupt to the allowance of these claims, by filing with the referee the following paper, indorsed "Objections": "In the Matter of W. J. Gentle, Bankrupt. In Bankruptcy. "The undersigned, creditors of the said W. J. Gentle, bankrupt, whose claims have been duly proved and allowed in said matter, do hereby unite in the objections to the claim of F. S. Cone and W. H. Dryden, copartners under the firm name of Cone & Dryden, filed herein on the 2d day of May, 1904, and hereby adopt the objections of the said bankrupt, hereto attached. "Anthony Kelly & Co., "By Bailey & Voorhees, The referee, after hearing argument upon the objections, held that the proceedings had in the District Court when Gentle was declared a bankrupt were not res judicata or conclusive upon him as to the validity of the claim of Cone & Dryden, and decided that he would hear further proof. As we understand the record, the referee did not reject the claim, neither did he allow it, but decided only that the proceedings in the District Court when Gentle was adjudicated a bankrupt were not conclusive upon him. This, we think, was the full extent of his ruling. From this finding, upon the petition of Cone & Dryden, the matter was certified to the District Judge by the referee, who, after argument, made the order here complained of. This case presents the single question whether a petitioning creditor in an involuntary bankruptcy proceeding, whose claim has been adjudged valid by the court, on the application for an adjudication, in which proceedings its validity was in issue, can be required to establish it again before the referee at the suggestion of the bankrupt and other creditors, not parties to the petition. The District Court held that he could not, and in this conclusion we concur. In the proceedings had before the District Court at the time the adjudication was made, the bankrupt appeared and answered, and in his answer not only put in issue the question of bankruptcy, but set out in detail the transactions out of which the alleged indebtedness of petitioners arose, and attempted to show that by reason of these and other transactions he owed no part of the claim for $5,361. Under the issues as framed by the parties, if his defense to this claim was good to the extent of one dollar, it was good as to the entire amount. The defense to the $500 claim of Cone & Dryden was based upon and in connection with the grocery business, which he alleged entered into the real estate transactions set out in the pleadings, and was by the answer made to depend upon the real estate transactions and the transfer of the stock of goods; hence, if the District Court had found that his defense to the $5,361 was good, it must necessarily have found that the defense to the $500 item was good, for, under the issues as made by the pleadings, the validity of both of these claims, necessarily united by reason of the incidents out of which they grew, was involved. In an adjudication in involuntary bankruptcy there is involved not only the question whether or not the petitioning creditors represent claims to the extent of $500 or upwards, but also the question whether or not the bankrupt owes debts to the extent of $1,000 or more. The answer in this case put in issue all of these questions. It is therein alleged: "That practically the whole of the remaining indebtedness referred to in the petition herein as being the indebtedness of the said W. J. Gentle owing to other creditors not uniting in said petition is in truth and in fact the indebtedness of the said Cone & Dryden, incurred by the said W. J. Gentle as their agent in the operation and management of the said grocery store.” Under these issues, the court, in determining the question whether or not Gentle should be declared a bankrupt, necessarily had to determine whether or not the allegations of the answer were true. If they were true, then the indebtedness claimed by the petitioning creditors did not aggregate $500, and the bankrupt did not owe $1,000 provable in bankruptcy, for the debts thus alleged to have been created were in fact the debts of the petitioning creditors. The court, therefore, in making the adjudication, had to find that the bankrupt owed the petitioning creditors the sum of $5,361, for, as we have already seen under the issues, he owed the whole of it or he owed none of it. It must be conceded, we think, that if there had been a judgment in the case reciting that, the issues herein coming on to be heard upon the pleadings and evidence, the court found that the defendant owed the petitioning creditors the sums of $5,361 and $500, the judgment thereon would have concluded the bankrupt as to the amount he owed the petitioning creditors. Gould v. Railway Co., 91 U. S. 526, 23 L. Ed. 416; Miller v. Covert, 1 Wend. 487; Roberts v. Heim, 27 Ala. 678; Robinson v. Howard, 5 Cal. 428; Aurora City v. West, 7 Wall. 99, 19 L. Ed. 42; Goodrich v. City of Chicago, 5 Wall. 573, 18 L. Ed. 511. We do not think that the bankruptcy act contemplates that in a case where, upon issues involving the validity of the petitioning creditors' claim in the proceedings for an adjudication, the question has been fully heard and determined in favor of the validity of the claim, the bankrupt shall thereafter be allowed, when these same creditors present their claims for mere formal proof before the referee, to file the same answer and demand that the same issue shall again be tried before the referee and finally before the same judge who heard the application of the petitioning creditors for an adjudication, and this is precisely what is sought to be done in this case. In In re Fallon, Fed. Cas. No. 4,628, Judge Blatchford said: "So long as the adjudication of bankruptcy stands unrevoked, all inquiry as to the existence or validity of the debt claimed to be due to the petitioning creditor in the involuntary proceedings is precluded. The debt due to such creditor was established for the purpose of the adjudication, and neither the debt nor the adjudication can be attacked on a motion of this kind by a creditor who claims an adverse interest to the assignee in bankruptcy." In In re Ulfelder Clothing Co. (D. C.) 98 Fed. 409, the identical question now before the court was passed upon by Judge De Haven. In that case the petitioning creditor alleged that the corporation was indebted to her in the sum of $2,000, evidenced by a promissory note. The answer, in addition to putting in issue the allegations of the petition in relation to insolvency, also contained a denial that the petitioner was a creditor of the corporation in any sum or amount whatever. The case there, as here, was heard upon the |