This scheme naturally affected the supply for men last year. The whole reduction amounted to 2000 men, of whom 500 were officers, brought under the terms of the retirement scheme; the remaining number consisting of 500 seamen, 700 servants and artisans, and 300 boys. To shew how this slight reduction could be justified, it is enough to remark that the reserve in our ports available in addition to the 32,850 men actually serving afloat, averaged, during last year, 28,000 men. About a quarter of this number was in the home ports and the coast-guard, employed in the harbour and other ships; the number of Marines on shore was 6,200, and the rest consisted of supernumeraries and coastguard on shore, numbering over 12,000 men. Thus, it was clear that, for all the ships that would require to be commissioned in an ordinary way, there was a sufficient supply of men. Indeed, for the Navy in its normal state, it cannot be doubted that a force of 60,000 is sufficient for all practical purposes. But a difficulty has been foreseen and is now felt seriously, that the state of the reserves, for use in the event of an emergency, is not so satisfactory as is desirable. We have the Royal Naval Reserve, and the Royal Naval Coast Volunteers; but admirable as is the spirit which animates these bodies, it is felt that reserves to be effective, must be organized on a broader basis, and on a larger scale than ever. To shew that this difficulty has been appreciated, Mr. Childers proposed last year the establishment of a Seaman Pensioner Reserve, which met one part of the difficulty in offering inducements to men retired at an early age from the Service, to keep up their connection with it, and retain in some measure their professional knowledge as efficient gunners and sailors in the event of their being wanted in time of war. But this effort will only partially meet the difficulty, which, at the present time, presses with special force, and will no doubt receive special attention. What seems to be wanted is a more elastic system than the present, which shall provide for an easier flow of men in and out of the Service; enable them to retain for some time after leaving the Navy a knowledge of the duties they have acquired: and provide for a more complete union and harmony between the Merchant Service and the Royal Navy.

After all, men are not of much use without ships, and any slight alarm which may now be felt is, to some extent, pardonable. For, not only in 1869 but last year, ships, both large and small were sold off without scruple, when they were reported to be useless, and our fleet at present has been reduced to a very compact size.

The maintenance of a flying squadron was found so successful that not only were certain reductions carried out at some of the stations, but, had it not been for the war another squadron would have started last autumn. Including every class of vessel on active service, from a cruiser or gunboat, to a man-of-war, it

would appear that about two hundred and fifty vessels are now kept in commission, of which twenty-five are iron-clads. The most important squadrons, in the Mediterranean, the Channel, and the Coast-Guard, consist at present of the finest vessels in the Navy. It is interesting to ascertain how far attempts have been made to keep pace with the destruction of useless vessels by fresh constructions. And in reviewing the efforts of the past year in constructing new vessels for the Navy, two painful circumstances at once confront us, the loss of the 'Captain,' and the resignation of Mr. Reed. It would be useless in the space of a brief review, to attempt to enter into either of these controversies; we can only notice them as painful incidents, for which blame is or is not positively deserved, marring an otherwise fair and prosperous attempt to supply the Navy with efficient vessels. The only special point for notice here is one which requires attention, as it is of a very important character.

Shipbuilding, for many years, has been conducted in a fitful, irregular manner; each administration seemed to think itself justified in getting on as well as it could with the ships it found in existence, and trusting to accident or a panic to go in for shipbuilding with violent energy. This fitful policy has been, as may well be imagined, the very reverse of what is either economical or judicious. It has led to ships being built in a hurry, which were not wanted; to the extravagant admission of artisans at one time and their necessary wholesale dismissal at another; and to the Navy generally being in want of proper ships. As evidences of such defects, we have only to refer to Sir John Pakington finding himself compelled to build, all of a sudden, fifteen frigates which were almost obsolete before they were completed; and to the dockyard dismissals of the last three years. Immoderate work; immoderate stagnation of work; and immoderate employment or dismissal of artisans has been the fruit of this sort of shuttlecock policy. This defect Mr. Childers has already attempted to set right, by laying down what he considers the minimum annual rate at which shipbuilding should be maintained and by following it out.

After a careful consideration of the matter, Mr. Childers came to the conclusion that to keep the Navy at all up to par in ships, that is, maintain a minimum standard of efficiency, it would be necessary to build about 20,000 tons of shipping. This annual increase to the strength of the Navy would serve to supply the defects caused by the annual waste or decay of ships,and would obviate the necessity, except in a time of emergency, of resorting to any violent means for increasing their number. This work he proposed should be divided between the armoured and unarmoured vessels, by building 12,000 tons of the former and 8,000 tons of the latter class; and, with the view of making use of the dockyards and dockyard labour as much as possible, he proposed that about a fifth of the work only should be done by contract. To be

convinced how important an addition this would be to our fleets, we have only to know that it represents in ships three new ironclads, a frigate, a corvette, and six small vessels annually. This would, indeed, be a very satisfactory plan if properly carried out, and its cost would be roughly about two millions and a half; or in other words, about a quarter of the sum annually voted for the Navy would be devoted to the solid increase of its power, and would be a positive increase to the property of the nation.

But to know and understand a little more clearly what this policy really means, it is necessary to know practically how our Navy stands in regard to ships, especially ironclads, at the present moment. This time last year there were forty-seven armoured vessels of all descriptions; of which thirty-seven were complete and ten were being built. An enumeration of their names will be all that is necessary, to show in what position we stand now; a full description of them has already appeared in these pages. The ten incomplete vessels were the 'Iron Duke,' 'Sultan,' and the 'Glatton,' which were being completed at the Royal dock-yards; the Swiftsure,' Vanguard,' Triumph,' and 'Hotspur,' which were being built by contract; and, lastly, the three new ships, laid down by Mr. Childers, the Devastation,' Rupert,' and 'Thunderer.' This was the condition of our iron-clad fleet a year ago. To shew how far the Government has endeavoured to give a practical effect to its shipbuilding policy, and what progress has been made during the past year, we can state that of these ten unfinished vessels five were launched, the Vanguard,' 'Iron Duke,' 'Hotspur,' 'Sultan,' and 'Swiftsure,' and, as will be seen by the following statement, five new ships were laid down, namely, the Fury,' Cyclops,' Gorgon,' 'Hecate,' and 'Hydra,' all turretships, of which two, the 'Fury,' and 'Hecate,' are to be built at the Royal dock-yards. Our whole iron-clad fleet is as follows:

6

Broadside iron-clads.

I. Hercules, Sultan.-II. Audacious, Invincible, Vanguard, Iron Duke, Swiftsure, Triumph.-III. Bellerophon, Lord Clyde, Lord Warden, Minotaur, Agincourt, Northumberland, Royal Alfred, Penelope, Repulse.-IV. Achilles, Royal Oak, Prince Consort, Caledonia, Ocean, Valiant, Hector, Zealous.-V. Warrior, Black Prince, Defence, Resistance. -VI. Pallas, Favorite.-VII. Enterprise, Research, Viper, Vixen, Waterwitch. Added in 1870. None.

Turret iron-clads.

I. Devastation, Thunderer.-II. Monarch.-III. Glatton.-IV. Hotspur, Rupert.-V. Royal Sovereign, Prince Albert.-VI. Wyvern, Scorpion. Added in 1870. At the dock-yards: Fury, Hecate. By contract: Cyclops, Gorgon, Hydra.

the

past few past few months, as many iron-clads

We start, therefore, in the present year with fifty-two ironclads, of which ten are incomplete. But here, again, we arc painfully reminded of an error, for the loss of the 'Captain reduces this number to fifty-one. The finest vessel whieh was added to the Navy last year was the 'Sultan,' which is not unlike the Hercules;' but is superior in power from being able to carry its armament in a more powerful manner. The outbreak of war has caused the Government to push forward shipbuilding with great energy during and it is by no means improbable that will be added to the Navy this year as were added last year. Great progress has been made with the 'Devastation.' 'Glatton,' and Triumph,' and we may expect to hear of their being launched possibly before many months are over. Before leaving the subject of ships, we must notice the launch of the Plucky,' 'Comet' and 'Blazer' gun-boats like the 'Staunch,' with one gun in their bows, mounted and used after the fashion of a Moncrieff battery. Unfortunately, while these gun-boats are additions to our naval strength, the loss of the gun-boat Slaney' last year was a misfortune to the service and a loss to the country. It is proposed, too, at Chatham, to build two armoured gun vessels, designed probably with the view of acting like the gun-boats on the Seine, near Paris, which did good service in the sortie on the 30th of November; these will be called the Scourge' and Snake,' -lastly, there are some wooden vessels of various sizes now under construction. The 'Blonde' is an iron-screw vessel, being built at Portsmouth; the Raleigh' has just been laid down at Chatham, and is an iron-screw frigate cased with wood; the Robust' is an 81 screw-frigate, which either is or is not being proceeded with at Devonport. The Bulwark' is what bootmakers would call a misfit,' and will probably go the way of misfits by being offered for sale at half price; she is an 81 gun screwfrigate which was laid down at Chatham a long time ago; and last year it was proposed to convert her into an iron-clad; but upon investigation it turned out that the experiment would be very costly and not by any means satisfactory, so that idea has been abandoned, and like the heroine in the "House that Jack built" she still remains, like that maiden, "all forlorn." Four small vessels, the Lively,' 'Osborne,' 'Vigilant' and 'Woodlark,' conclude the ship-building work which the Government have in hand.

Ships, however, are of little use without guns, and we will now notice what has been done to place naval armaments on a proper footing. It will not be forgotten that the accident in the 'Hercules,' added to other suspicious circumstances induced Mr. Childers to look closely into the present state of the heavy ordnance for the fleet. Last year, however, he expressed himself satisfied with all guns of a 12-ton 9-inch calibre and under; but

suggested that the heaviest ordnance for the Navy was not satisfactory. The 18-ton gun was not quite trustworthy; but, on the other hand the 25-ton gun had been proved thoroughly efficient. In other words, while the ordnance of the most powerful and least powerful iron-clads was good, the armaments of the 'Hercules and Sultan' at least were not quite satisfactory. Then again, good as the 25-ton gun was for the Monarch,' Hotspur' and 'Triumph,' it is not powerful enough for the new ships now being constructed, such as the 'Devastation,' Fury and others. For these vessels it has been determined to have at least 30-ton guns; but these have not yet been constructed, and it is not intended to open competitions for guns of this class. Then again, the chilled projectiles for the Navy are not satisfactory, several having burst; competition, therefore, is to be allowed for the best projectile. Captain Palliser, in discussing this question, thought that the failures were not serious enough or sufficient in number to warrant any re-opening of the controversy of guns and projectiles. We cannot, however, be too certain on such vital points in warfare as armament and ammunition; though it will not do now to enter into experiments heedlessly or unnecessarily, when it is considered that every round from a 600-pounder costs the country about nine pounds sterling. It is satisfactory to know too, on good authority, how very safe our service guns are. Cases of bursting are very few, and there are guns now in use which are by no means damaged after having fired 1,000 or 2,000 rounds. But with the knowledge which recent experience has given that the best gun is one of the safest steps to victory in warfare, we cannot afford to lose any opportunity of placing our naval ordnance in the highest state of efficiency. A step in this direction was taken last year by the issue of an order from the War Office for the construction of a 35-ton gun which is simply to be an enlargement of the service gun; that is, it will consist of a series of coils. We can obtain some idea of the gigantic nature of this gun in knowing that the outer coil will consist of a bar of iron nearly equal in length to the height of the Monument. One very important point was taken up last year in connection with naval ordnance, namely, the best way of protecting ship's decks. These are very vulnerable, and are exposed to special danger from plunging fire. Several experiments were conducted at Shoeburyness which proved on the whole satisfactory to the Navy, by showing that the penetration of such decks as those of the Monarch' and the larger ironclads was less easy than was imagined. Some interesting experiments took place at Liège in the course of the year, the principal object of which was to ascertain how to increase the durability of small guns, especially bronze. MM. Montefiori and Kunzel had invented some new process which was considered useful in improving guns; their idea being that by the mixture